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CONTACT
schauer@virginia.edu
(434) 924-6777
Room WB376

ASSISTANT
Donna Wills

SUBJECTS
Constitutional Law, Evidence, Legal Reasoning, Jurisprudence, Philosophy of Law

C.V.

Frederick Schauer

David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law
J.D., Harvard Law School, 1972
M.B.A., Dartmouth College, 1968
A.B., Dartmouth College, 1967

Frederick Schauer is David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. He is also Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, Emeritus, at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, where he taught from 1990 to 2008, served as academic dean and acting dean, and also taught courses on evidence and freedom of speech at the Harvard Law School. Previously, Schauer was professor of law at the University of Michigan, and has also been visiting professor of law at the Columbia Law School, Fischel-Neil Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, Morton Distinguished Visiting Professor of the Humanities at Dartmouth College, distinguished visiting professor at the University of Toronto, distinguished visitor at New York University, and James Goold Cutler Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary. In 2007-2008, he was the Eastman Professor at Oxford University and a fellow of Balliol College. A fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and former holder of a Guggenheim Fellowship, Schauer is the author of The Law of Obscenity (BNA, 1976), Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge, 1982), Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford, 1991), Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (Harvard, 2003), and Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Harvard, 2009). He is also the editor of Karl Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules (Chicago, 2011), and co-editor of The Philosophy of Law (Oxford, 1996) and The First Amendment (West, 1995). Schauer was founding co-editor of the journal Legal Theory, has served as chair of the Section on Constitutional Law of the Association of American Law Schools and of the Committee on Philosophy and Law of the American Philosophical Association. He has served on the board of governors of the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project, and on the board of visitors of the Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth College. In 2006, Schauer was author of the foreword to the Harvard Law Review’s Supreme Court issue, and has written numerous articles on freedom of speech and press, constitutional law and theory, evidence, legal reasoning and the philosophy of law. His books have been translated into Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese, and Turkish, and his scholarship was the subject of a book (Rules and Reasoning: Essays in Honour of Fred Schauer, Linda Meyer, ed., Hart Publishing, 1999) and special issues of the Notre Dame, Connecticut, and Quinnipiac law reviews; Politeia and the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. In 2005 he was a recipient of a university-wide Outstanding Teacher award at Harvard University.

Scholarship Profile: Unconventional Wisdom (Virginia Journal 2010)



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Books and Book Chapters:

"Must Virtue Be Particular?," in Law, Virtue and Justice 265 (Amalia Amaya & Ho Hack Lai eds., Hart, 2013).

"The Ubiquity of Prevention," in Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, eds.,
Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law: Principles and Policies (Oxford University Press, 2013).

“Necessity, Importance, and the Nature of Law,” in Jordi Ferrer, et al., eds., Neutrality and Theory of Law (Marcial Pons (Spanish); Springer (English), 2013).

“Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text,” in Matthias Klatt, ed.,
Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy 307 (Oxford University Press, 2012).

“Comparative Constitutional Compliance: Notes Towards a Research Agenda,” in Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff, eds.,
Practice and Theory in Comparative Law 212 (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

“Is Defeasibility an Essential Property of Law?,” in Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista Ratti, eds.,
The Logic of Legal Requirements: Essays on Defeasibility 77 (Oxford University Press, 2012).

“Legal Reasoning” (with Barbara A. Spellman), in Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison, eds.,
Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning 719 (Oxford University Press, 2012).

“Social Epistemology, Holocaust Denial, and the Post-Millian Calculus,” in Michael Herz & Peter Molnar, eds., The Content and Regulation of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses 129 (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

“Editor’s Introduction,” in Karl Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules 1 (University of Chicago Press, 2011).

“Perché il precedente nel diritto (e altrove) non è interamente (e nemmeno sostanzialmente) questione di analogia,” in Luca Pelliccioli & Vito Velluzzi, eds.,
L'analogia e il diritto: Antologia Breve 111-120 (Pisa, Italy: Edizioni ETS, 2011).

“Ponderación, subsunción, y el rol restringente del texto juridico,” in Gustavo A. Beade & Laura Clérico, eds., Desafíos a la ponderación 51-77 (Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2011).

“The Trouble with Cases” (with Richard Zeckhauser), in Daniel P. Kessler, ed., Regulation versus Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law 45 (University of Chicago Press, 2011).

Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Harvard University Press, 2009). (Spanish edition, Madrid, Marcel Pons Ediciones, translation in progress) (Portugese edition, Madrid, Marcial Pons Ediciones, translation in progress) (South Asia edition, Universal Law Publishing Company, forthcoming 2011)

Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (Harvard University Press/Belknap Press, 2003) (paperback edition, 2006)(Italian edition forthcoming Spring 2008, Il Mulino, Bologna; Spanish translation now in progress).

“Institutions and the Concept of Law: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin (with Some Help from Neil MacCormick),” in Maksymilian del Mar & Zenon Bankowski, eds., Law as Institutional Normative Order: Essays in Honour of Sir Neil MacCormick 35 (Ashgate Publishing, 2009).

“Paltering” (with Richard Zeckhauser), in Brooke Harrington, ed., Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating 38 (Stanford University Press, 2009).

“Rules of Recognition, Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law On Acceptance” (with Larry Alexander), in Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Kimma, eds., The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution 175 (Oxford University Press, 2009).

Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, 1991) (paperback edition, 1992) (Italian edition, La Regole del Gioco, Bologna, il Mulino, 2000) (Spanish edition, Las Reglas en Juego, Madrid, Marcel Pons Ediciones, 2004).

The Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary (with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) (Harcourt Brace/Oxford University Press, 1996).

Supplements to Gunther, Constititional Law (Foundation Press, 1983-96).

Law and Language (ed.) (Dartmouth/Gower/Ashgate Publishing Company, 1992).

The First Amendment: A Reader (with John H. Garvey) (West Publishing Company, 1992, 2nd ed., 1995).

Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press, 1982) (paperback edition, 1982) (Turkish edition, İfade Özgürlüğű: Felsefǐ Bir İnceleme, Ankara, Liberal Dűşűnce Topluluğu, 2002).

The Law of Obscenity (BNA Books, 1976).

Articles and Review Essays:

"Modeling Tolerance" (forthcoming).
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"Constitutionalism and Coercion," 54
B.C. L. Rev. 1881 (2013).
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“Is Expert Evidence Really Different?”
89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (2013) (with B. Spellman).
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“Official Obedience and the Politics of Defining ‘Law,’” 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1165 (2013).
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“The Decline of ‘The Record’: A Comment on Posner,” 51 Duquesne L. Rev., 51 (2013).
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“The Jurisprudence of Custom,” 48
Tex. Int'l L. J. 523 (2013).
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“Legal Realism Untamed,” 91
Tex. L. Rev. 749 (2013).
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“On the Open Texture of Law,” 87 Grazer Philosophische Studien, 195 (2013).

“The Miranda Warning,” 88 Wash. L. Rev., 155 (2013).
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"Law and Social Cognition," (with Barbara Spellman), Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2012-10.
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"Legal Reasoning," (with Barbara Spellman), Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2012-09.
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"Lie-Detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence," Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2012-49.
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“Anonymity and Authority,” 27 J.L. & Pol. 597 (2012).
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"Is the Rule of Recognition a Rule?,” 3 Transnat’l Legal Theory 173 (2012).

“On the Nature of the Nature of Law,” 98 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 457 (2012).

“The Permutations of Academic Freedom,” 65 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2012).
HeinOnline PDF

“Harm(s) and the First Amendment,” 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81 (2012).
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“The Political Risks (If Any) of Breaking the Law,” 4 J. Legal Analysis 83 (2012).
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"The Best Laid Plans," 120 Yale L.J. 586 (2010) (reviewing Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (2011)).

“Bentham on Presumed Offenses,” 23
Utilitas 363 (2011).

"Is Legality Political?," 53
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 481 (2011).
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“On the Relation Between Chapters One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty,” 39 Cap. U. L. Rev. 571 (2011).
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“Positivism Before Hart,” 24 Can. J.L. & Juris. 455 (2011).
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“Transparency in Three Dimensions,” 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1339.
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"Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence?: Neuroscience, Lie Detection, and Beyond," 95
Cornell L. Rev. 1191 (2010).
HeinOnline (PDF)

"Facts and the First Amendment," 57
UCLA L. Rev. 897 (2010).
HeinOnline (PDF)

"Is There a Psychology of Judging?," in David Klein & Gregory Mitchell, eds.,
The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making 103 (Oxford University Press, 2010).

"Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law," 14
Trends Cognitive Sci. 101 (2010).

"Was Austin Right After All? On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law," 23
Ratio Juris 1 (2010).

"When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Individual Action?," 44
Ga. L. Rev. 769 (2010).
HeinOnline (PDF)

“Institutions and the Concept of Law: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin (with Some Help from Neil MacCormick),” in Maksymilian del Mar & Zenon Bankowski, eds., Law as Institutional Normative Order: Essays in Honour of Sir Neil MacCormick 35 (Ashgate Publishing, 2009).

"Legal Fictions Revisited" (work in progress).
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"Necessity, Importance, and the Nature of Law" (work in progress).
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"On Open Texture of Law" (work in progress).
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“Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text,” in Matthias Klatt, ed., Institutional Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2010).

Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence?: Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Mistaken Conflation of Legal and Scientific Norms,” 95 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).
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“Is Defeasibility an Essential Property of Law?” in Jordi Ferrer, ed., Defeasibility in Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2010).

“The Trouble with Cases” (with R. Zeckhauser), in Daniel Kessler & Andrei Shleifer, eds.,
Litigation versus Regulation (National Bureau of Economic Research/University of Chicago Press, forthcoming 2010).

"
When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official Action? (The Sibley Lecture)," 44 Ga. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).
SSRN | HeinOnline (PDF)

Facts and the First Amendment (the Melville Nimmer Memorial Lecture),” 57 UCLA L. Rev. 897 (2010).
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“Is There a Psychology of Judging?” in David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell, eds., The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making 103 (Oxford University Press, 2010).

“Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law: A Contrarian View,” 14 (3)
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 101 (2010).

Was Austin Right After All?: On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law,” 23 Ratio Juris 1 (2010).
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Is it Important to be Important?: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Case Selection Process,” 119 Yale L.J. Online 77 (2009).
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"Artists’ Moral Rights and the Psychology of Ownership" (with Barbara A. Spellman) 83 Tul. L. Rev. 661 (2009).
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“Institutions and the Concept of Law: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin (with Some Help from Neil MacCormick),” in Maksymilian Del Mar, ed., Law as Institutional Normative Order: Essays in Honour of Sir Neil MacCormick 35 (Ashgate Publishing, 2009).
HeinOnline (PDF)

"Is it Better to Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech and the Precautionary Principle," 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 301 (2009).

"Paltering" (with Richard Zeckhauser), in Brooke Harrington, ed.,
Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating 38 (Stanford University Press, 2009).

“Rules, Rationality, and the Significance of Standpoint,” 35
Queen’s L.J. 305 (2009).

“Rules of Recognition, Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance” (with L. Alexander), in Matthew Adler & Kenneth Himma, eds.,
The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitutuion 175 (Oxford University Press, 2009).

"
Authority and Authorities," 94 Va. L. Rev. 1931 (2008).
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"A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park," 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1109 (2008).
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“In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law – and Epistemology Too,” 5 Episteme 295 (2008).

"Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) Is Not Totally (or Even Substantially) about Analogy," 3 Persp. on Psychol. Sci. 454 (2008).
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“Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick,” 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 316 (2008).

"Hohfeld’s First Amendment," 76
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 914 (2008).
HeinOnline (PDF)

“Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?” (The Henry J. Miller Lecture), 24 Ga. State L. Rev., 381 (2008).

Regulation by Generalization (with Richard J. Zeckhauser)," 1 Reg. & Governance 68 (2007).
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“Expression and Its Consequences,” U. Toronto L.J., 57 705 (2007).

"
Ambivalence about the Law," 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (2007).
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“Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories,” 54 UCLA L. Rev., 1747 (2007),
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“Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law,” in Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy, eds., 13 The Nature of Customary Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

“Should Presidents Obey the Law (And What Is 'The Law,' Anyway),” in Terry L. Price & J. Thomas Wren, eds., 183
The Values of Presidential Leadership (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

“Foreword: The Court’s Agenda – And the Nation’s,” 120
Harv. L. Rev., 4 (2006).
HeinOnline (PDF)

"Do Cases Make Bad Law?", 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883 (2006).
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“On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law,” 155 U. Penn. L. Rev., 165 (2006).
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“(Re)Taking Hart,” 119 Harv. L. Rev., 852 (2006).

“Legislatures as Rule-Followers,” in Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds.,
The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State 468 (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

“Is There a Right to Academic Freedom,” 77
U. Colo. L. Rev., 907 (2006).
HeinOnline (PDF)

“Legal Information as Social Capital” (with V. Wise), 99 Law Lib. J., 267 (2006).

"
The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson," 25 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 493 (2005).
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Towards an Institutional First Amendment," 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1256 (2005).
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“Imposing Rules,” 42 San Diego L. Rev., 85 (2005).
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The Exceptional First Amendment,” in Michael Ignatieff, ed., American Exceptionalism and Human Rights 29 (Princeton University Press, 2005).
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"Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and America: A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture," in Georg Nolte, ed., 47 European and U.S. Constitutionalism (2005).
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“On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas,” 37 Conn. L. Rev. 907 (2005).
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“The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards,” 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 803 (2005).
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“On the Relationship Between Press Law and Press Content,” in Timothy Cook, ed., Freeing the Presses: The First Amendment in Action 51 (Louisiana State University Press, 2005).

“Deferring,” 103
Mich. L. Rev. 1567 (2005).
HeinOnline (PDF)

“The Wily Agitator and the American Free Speech Tradition,” 58 Stan. L. Rev. 2157 (2005).

“La Categorizacion, en el Derecho y en el Mundo,” 28
Cuadernos de Filosofia del Derecho 307 (2005).

"The 'Speech-ing' of Sexual Harassment," in Catharine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel, eds.,
Directions in Sexual Harassment Law 347 (2004).

The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience," 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765 (2004).
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“The Limited Domain of the Law,” 90 Va. L. Rev. 1909 (2004).
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“Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution,” 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1045 (2004).
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“The ‘Speech-ing’ of Sexual Harassment,” in Catharine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel, eds., Directions in Sexual Harassment Law 347 (Yale University Press, 2004).

“Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning,”
Sup. Court Rev. 2003 197 (2004).
HeinOnline (PDF)

“The Failure of the Common Law” (The Willard Pedrick Lecture), 36 Az. St. L. Rev., 765 (2004).

Neutrality and Judicial Review,” 23 Law and Philosophy, 217 (2003).
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“The Convergence of Rules and Standards,” N. Z. L. Rev., 303 (2003).
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“The Heroes of the First Amendment,” Michigan Law Review, 101 (2003), 2118-33
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“The Dilemma of Access,” in Nancy Palmer, ed., Terrorism, War, and the Media (Hollis Publishing, 2003), 259-69

The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour v. Casey Martin,” Supreme Court Review, 2001 (2002), 267-97
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“First Amendment Opportunism,” in Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone, eds., Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era (University of Chicago Press, 2002), 174-97

“Bundling, Boundary Setting, and the Privatization of Legal Information” (with V. Wise), in John Donahue & Joseph Nye, eds., Market Based Governance (Brookings, 2002), 129-42


“Free Speech and the Social Construction of Privacy,”
Social Research, 68 (2001), 221-32

“Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply,”
Constitutional Commentary, 17 (2000), 455-82 (with L. Alexander)
HeinOnline (PDF)

Non-Legal Information and the Delegalization of Law,” Journal of Legal Studies, 29 (2000), 495-515 (with Virginia J. Wise)
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“Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 17 (2000), 293-309

The Generality of Rights,” Legal Theory, 6 (2000), 323-36
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“Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior” (The Robert Marx Lecture), University of Cincinnati Law Review, 68 (2000), 615-36
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“The Cost of Communicative Tolerance,” in Raphael Cohen-Almagor ed., Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance (University of Michigan Press, 2000), 28-42

“Speech, Behaviour, and the Interdependence of Fact and Value,” in David Kretzmer & Francine Hazan eds., Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against Democracy (Kluwer, 2000), 28-42


“Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment,”
Texas Law Review, 77 (1999), 1803-36 and in J. Rosencranz ed., If Buckley Fell (Century Foundation. 1999), 103-20 (with R. Pildes)

“Talking as a Decision Procedure,” in Stephen Macedo ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999), 17-27


“Fuller on the Ontological Status of Law,” in W.J. Witteveen ed., Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design (Amsterdam University Press, 1999), 124-42


“Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment,”
Harvard Law Review, 112 (1998), 84-120
HeinOnline (PDF)

“Positivism Through Thick and Thin,” in Brian Bix ed., Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 1998), 65-78

“Instrumental Commensurability,”
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146 (1998), 1215- 1234
HeinOnline (PDF)

“On the Supposed Defeasibility of Legal Rules,” Current Legal Problems 1998 (M.D.A. Freeman ed., Oxford University Press, 1998), 223-40

“La ética del gobierno ¿debe codificarse?” (The Ethics of Codification and the Codification of Ethics), Perspectivas en política, economía y gestión, 1(2) (1998), 167-84


“Internet Privacy and the Public-Private Distinction,”
Jurimetrics, 38 (1998), 555-64
HeinOnline (PDF)

“Prediction and Particularity,” Boston University Law Review, 78 (1998), 773-89
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“Legal Positivism as Legal Information,” Cornell Law Review, 82 (1997), 1080-1110 (with V. Wise)
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“Discourse and Its Discontents,” Notre Dame Law Review (Symposium in Honor of Frederick Schauer), 72 (1997), 1309-34
HeinOnline (PDF)

“On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,” Harvard Law Review, 110 (1997), 1359-87 (with L. Alexander)
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“The Ontology of Censorship,” in Robert Post ed., Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation (Getty Research Institute for the History of Art, 1997), 147-68

“Constitutional Invocations,”
Fordham Law Review, 65 (1997), 1295-1312
HeinOnline (PDF)

“Generality and Equality,” Law and Philosophy, 16 (1997), 279-97

“Prescriptions in Three Dimensions,”
Iowa Law Review, 82 (1997), 911-22
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“Justificacion etica de la libertad de expression: asignando los costos de la tolerancia,” Perspectivas en politica, economia y gestión, 1(1) (1997), 1-15

“The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech,”
Arkansas Law Review, 49 (1997), 687-702
HeinOnline (PDF)

“On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions,” Journal of Legal Studies, 25 (1996), 27-52 (with R. Zeckhauser)
HeinOnline (PDF)

“Positivism as Pariah,” in Robert George ed., The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (Oxford/Clarendon Press, 1996), 31-56

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