
Mark Tushnet is the leading constitutional scholar of the Critical Legal Studies movement, and Red, White, and Blue extends and integrates his work on constitutional theory. Much of his analysis is worth reading, including his chapter on church and state, but his larger claims are wildly implausible.

Tushnet's integrating theme is the liberal and republican traditions in American constitutionalism. Liberalism emphasizes individualism and self-interest; republicanism, which Tushnet believes has been forgotten, emphasizes community and the public interest. Both traditions were important to the framers, but they had few illusions about selfless individuals.

Tushnet argues that liberalism's emphasis on self-interest makes constitutional theory both necessary and impossible. It is necessary because those who govern cannot be trusted, but impossible because those who police the governors cannot be trusted either. Separation of powers, constitutional rights, and judicial review protect us from self-interested abuse by government officials and from majoritarian tyranny. But if judges have the last word, what will protect us from judicial tyranny?

Tushnet offers two answers. In the long run, the majority will appoint new judges and do whatever it wants. In the short run, life tenured judges can do whatever they want, and no theory of constitutional interpretation will restrain them. Tushnet finds every interpretive theory capable of justifying any result a judge wants to reach. He believes that the Constitution may be interpreted to require laissez faire, socialism, or anything in between.

He sees a return to republicanism as the only hope. But Tushnet's version of republicanism is far removed from American constitutional tradition. For Tushnet, republicanism requires universal employment with tenure and a substantially equal distribution of wealth. In that happy state, one would discuss issues face to face and work things out; no constitutional theory would be needed.

Whatever the merits of these positions, he should not expect us to believe they derive from the framers. Tushnet’s only link to the framers is that some framers believed that economic independence is prerequisite to political participation. Their solution was a limited franchise; Tushnet’s is massive redistribution of wealth. The two proposals do not have much in common.

Tushnet's claims of radical indeterminacy are surely related to his radical politics. He believes that private property is a bad thing; with-
out that, it is hard to see how he could convince himself that the Constitution might require socialism. Apart from the Constitution’s express protections of private property, the Constitution exists within a culture, with political and economic traditions that limit the range of plausible interpretations. If you reject major elements of those traditions, other interpretations may also seem plausible. If enough Americans come to share Tushnet’s politics, judges may read the Constitution his way. He is surely right that no constitutional theory will stop a large and determined majority.

But constitutional theory moderates less determined assaults on our liberties. To shift to religious persecution examples, the Constitution did little for Mormons in the nineteenth century, but much more for Jehovah’s Witnesses in the twentieth. The experience of contemporary “cults” is somewhere in between.

Constitutional theory itself influences American values and reduces the risk of a sharp turn away from the values we have constitutionalized. Surely the religion clauses have contributed to an unmatched degree of religious liberty and pluralism in the United States. American understanding of the religion clauses, however, is not the wholly passive product of an independently achieved preference for tolerance. Yet that is the implication of Tushnet’s claims that Americans can make the Constitution mean anything they want it to mean.

Tushnet’s chapter on church and state sees in the Supreme Court’s cases a tendency to reduce claims of religious liberty to claims of free speech, denying their distinctive religious element, and a tendency to protect religious liberty only to the point where it begins to have real social consequences. He attributes these tendencies to the liberal tradition, which he thinks is incapable of understanding either the nonrational or the communal aspects of religion. This is one way to read the cases, and he makes a serious case for it. But his only solution is a vague call to revitalize republicanism, so that Americans will all be more communal. Then conflicts can be resolved informally instead of legally.

Tushnet has devoted enormous energy and intellect to showing that constitutionalism is impossible in theory. Readers who find his vision of universal virtue and cooperation impossible will prefer to explore how constitutionalism might struggle along in practice.

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK
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Kenneth Wald has written a textbook in the field of religion and politics that rises above comparable texts in other areas of political science. Wald does what one expects from any text—he demonstrates an understanding of the relevant literature and summarizes it in a manner that communicates to students. However, he does so in a fashion that goes above and beyond the call of duty. Wald's analysis of the literature is consistently insightful. In addition, he brings some original research of his own to the text, particularly in sections concerning political behavior.

A flavor for the book is obtained by a short review of the chapter content. In light of theories of modernization and Marxism that predict the secularization of society, Wald begins with the question: Why has religion persisted so strongly in the United States? The whole book is preoccupied with this query. Next he turns to a brief discussion of the incentives for religious activism, the opportunities for religious involvement, and the resources that religious groups possess in this country. Chapter 3 examines the historical legacy of religion to American political culture. A lengthy chapter on religion and political behavior follows in which Wald makes extensive and original use of the national data from the General Social Surveys. Chapter 5 examines the church/state controversy. In Chapter 6, Wald evaluates the strategies pursued by religious interest groups. Next, the author turns to the political mobilization of evangelicals followed by a chapter on the political activity of four other religious groups in American society: Catholics, mainline Protestants, black Protestants, and Jews. A final chapter evaluates the role of religion in American politics, concluding that the advantages of religious involvement outweigh the disadvantages.

It is difficult to capture the sophistication of this work in a short review. Two examples must suffice. First, Wald confronts the very sticky problem of a definition of religion throughout the book. Naturally, a widely shared definition is not available at this time given the rather underdeveloped state of theory in the field of religion. Wald does take the reader beyond a doctrinal or creedal approach to religion by examining the social group and institutional aspects of religion. Second, Wald's analysis of the positive and negative contributions of religion to the American political process is both balanced and sophisticated. In this discussion, he confronts empirical research findings of a generation ago that linked strong religious commitments with intolerance and shows that the relationship is curvilinear and not linear. In other words, intolerance is least present among both the least and the most committed religionists.

This book is must reading for an introduction to the field of religion.
and politics in the United States. It serves as an excellent textbook in courses in the field and could be used as a supplementary text for other courses in American politics.

Lyman A. Kellstedt
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In this book, Robert L. Maddox, executive director of Americans United for Separation of Church and State, offers both a broad historical sketch of the development of the principle of separation of church and state within American politics and a brief review of a variety of issues which touch upon the separation of church and state within American society today. The text, written for the general reader, provides a thoughtful and reflective presentation of a particular perspective in this continuing debate.

Simply stated, Maddox argues that the push for religious freedom and the separation of church from state neither emanated from a secular mindset nor from modern jurisprudence, but is historically rooted in the drive toward separation of church and state advanced by the Founders and Framers of this country. Regardless, Maddox argues, the specific intent of the Founders and Framers remains largely a moot issue when it comes to applying the Constitution to today's world.

In relationship to contemporary issues, Maddox argues that constitutional democratic governments should have no role in promoting religion. In reviewing various contemporary issues related to the separation of church and state, Maddox outlines some of the present unresolved questions. Maddox is not totally opposed to religion in the public square; for example, he does address ways in which religion could fruitfully be taught within the curriculum of public schools. Neither does Maddox argue that churches should be totally exempt from engaging in political activity; they should, however, exercise caution when engaging in political activity as much out of concern for their own ministry as out of concern for the political process.

One's understanding of the proper relationship between church and state, however, is tied both to one's ecclesiology and to one's philosophy of the state. Maddox, unfortunately, does not directly address
either of these two presuppositions. As a result, he does not alert his reader to how his interpretation is tied to his starting presuppositions.

CORWIN SMIDT
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At the end of the year 1846 after their tragic exodus from Nauvoo, Illinois, the Mormons found themselves scattered in various temporary locations in Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska. The largest concentration was at Winter Quarters, Nebraska, and in nearby settlements on both sides of the Missouri River. In Mormons at the Missouri Richard Bennett provides a dramatic view of how precarious the future of the church really was as it "lay uprooted and strewn over a vast terrain stretching from Nauvoo to Winter Quarters, awaiting the wintry blast." He also presents a superbly interesting and historically significant study of one of the most critical few years in Mormon history. Chapters on sickness and death, Mormon society, social life, and religion in the Missouri River settlements are all well done, as is an important discussion of how plans were laid for the big push to the Great Basin.

The reader concerned with issues of church and state will be especially interested in at least two aspects of the story of Winter Quarters. First, its planning and government were fully under the direction of church authorities and any political or economic decisions were part of their long-range plans for the well-being of the church. Next, the Mormons were on Indian lands and had to obtain permission to settle from the Indians themselves as well as from William H. Medill, commissioner of the Office of Indian Affairs. The process was partly political, and Medill finally ordered them to abandon Winter Quarters in 1848 largely because he was antagonized by Colonel Thomas L. Kane who, in pleading their cause in Washington, seemed to be asking for "special privilege" for the Mormons. The townsite was vacated that summer, therefore, as some settlers took up the trek to the Great Basin while others found continuing temporary refuge on the Iowa side of the river.

Mormons at the Missouri fills an unfortunate gap in our understanding of how the Mormons survived, both individually and institutionally, during this all-important transition period. Richard Bennett and
the University of Oklahoma Press are to be congratulated on at last providing such a study.

JAMES B. ALLEN
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An increasingly complex church-state relationship has developed over United States government funding of religious refugee relief agencies. In The Uneasy Alliance, J. Bruce Nichols examines the historical development of this relationship, recent relief efforts, and the future of government funding under current church-state law.

Refugee relief agencies from the “three faiths” have come to view their work in terms of “complementarity,” accepting—and many times soliciting—government funds for use in “humanitarian zones of cooperation.” Motivated by the non-Jewish community’s lack of response to Hitler’s early persecutions and by the subsequent formation of Israel in 1948, Jews practice bitzu’ism, or “implementationism.” This policy of getting the job done with relative indifference to ideological or political roadblocks has been effective in moving Jewish refugees to Israel as part of the Aliyah, or sacred “Law of Return.” Catholics follow Pope Pius XI’s philosophy of “subsidiarity,” which declared that the larger institution (the state) should delegate to smaller, subsidiary institutions (the church and others) tasks that lesser institutions are best suited to perform. Through church-state contacts that focus on the life of the individual as the point of intersection, Catholic Relief Services has become the largest religious refugee relief agency in the world. American Protestants, influenced by the 1937 Conference on Church, State, and Community held in Oxford, England, initially were reluctant to accept government funds. The Conference reinforced Protestant First Amendment interpretations by concluding that the church should maintain its own standards of truth, justice, and freedom independent of those imposed by government. More recently, however, a number of evangelical relief agencies formed during the Reagan era have joined in government-funded activities without taking the traditional step of forming “nonreligious secular affiliates designed to address church-state questions.

Nichols argues that “the golden cord binding moral purposes of the government and the church in international humanitarian assistance were severed in Vietnam.” Agencies employed a new generation of volunteer workers who considered themselves to be in the vanguard
of a new, more humane movement to give voice to the cries of refugees. Many workers were outspoken in their condemnations of United States foreign policy.

Three chapters are devoted to recent relief efforts in Honduras, Thailand, and Sudan. Nichols focuses, however, on the inequities of United States refugee policy in Central America, where particular refugee populations have been armed to fight while the basic needs of others have been ignored. The Reagan administration sought to secure the aid of a religious relief agency that would not ally itself with the guerilla sympathies of many Salvadoran refugees in Honduras. Government officials commented that religious workers have a difficult time distinguishing “the Lord’s work” from illegitimate political involvement.

Because of the greatly expanded powers of the executive branch in foreign affairs, Nichols contends that religious agencies must seek extralegal solutions to church-state conflicts through administrative governmental channels. Relief workers must demonstrate that impartial humanitarian assistance is consistent with the best traditions of United States foreign policy. For this approach to work, Nichols argues, aid efforts must do three things: retain a primary focus on the needs and welfare of innocent victims, aspire to the status of neutrality, and distribute aid in a nondiscriminatory fashion.

Nichols briefly examines the benefits of an independent humanitarian operation free from the political constraints of the U.S. State Department; however, he feels that the United States government would never place its foreign aid under the administration of an independent authority. Current practices abroad owe more to a view that favors the accommodation of church and state than to Jefferson’s concept of a “wall of separation.” Through accommodation, Nichols asserts, religious agencies can remain in a position to influence government policy and work in countries that are more receptive to voluntary agencies than to agencies stamped solely with “official” United States policy.

Nichols, who is Director of Education and Studies at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in New York City, admirably attempts to balance all of the church-state dynamics at work in refugee affairs. The magnitude of his field research greatly advances the study of church-state relations abroad. He obviously places the safety and well-being of the refugees themselves above all the squabbling over church-state relations. In his attempt to do so, however, Nichols compromises the church’s prophetic role in society with a heavy burden of accommodation. One of his main contentions is with the sanctuary movement to aid Central American refugees fleeing conflict in their homelands: “The notion that the courts, by weighing adversarial arguments, will vindicate the religious freedom of church workers to perform the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and thereby demonstrate that the Kingdom of God has prevailed over the principalities and powers is political, legal, and the-
ological nonsense.” Nichols fails to take into consideration such important factors as the historic role of church sanctuary, the moral response of American church workers given the geographical proximity of Central America, and the international principle of barring the forcible return of refugees whose lives would be threatened in their homelands. Given the lessons of Le Chambon, France, where villagers gave sanctuary to Jews during World War II, and the Underground Railroad of the American Civil War, in which case American churches gave sanctuary to slaves, the prophetic role of the modern-day sanctuary movement should not be taken lightly.

Randy L. Brantley
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The popularity of Walter Rauchenbusch’s “Kingdom of God” theology, his “Social Gospel,” reached its peak during the Progressive Period. The middle class embraced his message that individuals had to assume responsibility for the evils of society. Social “salvation,” in turn, required that reformers take a more practical view of the State.

Walter Rauchenbusch was a product of his time; otherwise he would not have gained such wide acceptance. Like other members of the Progressive intelligentsia, he held racist and elitist ideas, despite his life-long dedication to improving the conditions of the poor. Furthermore, these ideas led to a contradiction between his goal of a “Christianized” social order and the methods he proposed to achieve it.

The intellectual climate of the Progressive Period allowed Rauchenbusch to advocate use of the state to “save the social order. This was possible because he did not threaten the existence of the state. Despite all the rhetoric, Rauchenbusch was comfortable with the capitalist state he frequently attacked as unjust. He was friendly with powerful people like the Rockefellers and frequently accepted money from them and others for personal use. Although labeling himself a socialist, he found capitalism acceptable.

Paul Minus’s biography handles the development of Rauchenbusch’s “Kingdom” theology with grace and clarity. And he deals with the issue of church and state in Rauchenbusch’s thought. Like many biographers, however, his treatment of his subject is biased. When Rauchenbusch becomes unpopular for his pro-German position in World War I, Minus portrays him as a rejected and martyred prophet. While too good a biographer to ignore some “moral blind
spots,” his attempts to rationalize them are the weakest part of the book.

The biography, however, is well worth reading. Minus reveals aspects of Rauchenbusch’s development that have not been presented before. It is an interesting and solid piece of research based on primary sources. Rauchenbusch’s “Kingdom” theology, which is grounded in economics, sociology, and history, still appeals to middle class religious reformers.

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When France conquered West Africa it already had certain supposi-tions about Islam; in the age of the Crusades, the French like their other fellow Christians had developed strong antipathy to “the infi-del.” A more recent experience antedating French imperialism in West Africa which had a more direct impact was the struggle for control over Algeria; the French found the conquest of Algeria frustrating. Resistance there, as later in West Africa, was seen as due to the fanati-cism of Islam.

France launched imperial conquest in West Africa in the 1880s at exactly the time that the new Republic (founded in 1870) unleashed an anticlerical campaign at home. Faced by a strongly organized religion, Islam, in West Africa it was only natural, argues Harrison, for the French soldiers and administrators to see in the cadis and marabouts of West Africa a Moslem version of the hated cleric.

Harrison shows with great skill the vacillation of French policy— torn as it was by natural suspicion of Islam and its representatives and a practical understanding that some modus vivendi would have to be achieved. In World War I the French feared that their Moslem sub-jects would identify with the Ottoman Empire and thus the Central Powers; when this did not happen the worst phobias were over and after that with rare exception an effort was made to coopt and maneu-ver Moslem leaders thus facilitating French rule. There were a few Moslem leaders who from time to time challenged the French, and when this happened the old fears and phobias re-emerged among the French.

The study might have looked at interwar policy in broader terms; in the 1930s for instance there was an interministerial committee on Moslem affairs. What impact it might have had on policy could have been an enlightening issue. Harrison mentions the establishment of
the Centre des hautes études d'administration musulmane. The ideolo-
gy of this school and its graduates could be ascertained, as he sug-
gests, by reading the "corpus of writing on Islam by [its] students and
teachers. . . ." He regrets not having done so, although from having
worked there this reviewer can attest that the task would by no means
have been insurmountable.

The book clearly does what it sets out to do: namely to delineate
French policy toward Islam from conquest to decolonization. An issue
that the book title evokes is a consideration of the impact of French
policy on Islam. How and why was it that when France took down the
tricolour in West Africa in 1960 a larger proportion of the population
was Moslem than had been the case a century earlier? Presumably,
that would be the fitting subject of another book.

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A History of Islamic Societies. By Ira M. Lapidus. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1988, 974 pp. $42.50.

This volume, by Ira M. Lapidus, seeks to identify the forces operative
in the formation of the distinctive type of society found in each of
the Muslim empires, states, communities, and tribal societies under
investigation.

The author demonstrates that it is not so much Islamic religious
influences that have shaped each successive rising society, but much
more, the pre-Islamic or non-Islamic social milieu out of which the
emerging political entity first evolved.

Lapidus first traces the breach between state institutions and reli-
gious organizations that resulted in the separation of state and religion
in the Muslim societies during and after the caliphate period. The sul-
tanate or a similar institution provided the norm for governing polit-
cal regimes. It was the Sufi brotherhoods, Shi'a sects, and other
religious groupings that provided for religious organization.

In section two, the author considers additional societies between
the tenth and nineteenth centuries and demonstrates the factors in
their development and the forces at work responsible for their varia-
tions. This reviewer will confine his observations chiefly to Iran, Tur-
key, and India.

The Safavids came to power in 1500 and converted Iran from
Sunni to Shi'a Islam. While all regions of the country were under the
control of the Shah, each was actually ruled by a tribal lord. Political
power was divided and was also very loosely organized.

In contrast, the Ottoman arrangement was highly organized with
the central government maintaining tight control over the various units. The center was able to do so because of its overall strength and the relative weakness of the tribal peoples. A further factor was the idea of Ottoman legitimacy. Unlike that of the Safavids, it was never questioned by the Ottoman subjects. They were at home with patrimonial leadership.

On the Indian sub-continent, a different situation prevailed. A unique feature of the Mughal court was its mixed composition, an amiable blend of the Hindu and Muslim cultures into a unique fabric. Further marked contrasts existing in conditions prevailing in the Safavid, Ottoman, and Mughal empires was the absence of any dominant religious expression of Islam emerging from India, as developed in the case of Iran (Shi'a) and Turkey (Sunni). Under the Mughals, there were numerous Sufi brotherhoods, all schools of law, diverse theologies, Sunnis and Shi'as, as well as those who followed charismatic leaders and owed allegiance to no single communal body.

An unmistakable pattern emerged. The characteristics noted in each of the three examples are out of the earlier socio-cultural milieu rather than from Muslim religious influences of later years. There is a clear reversion to a point behind the advent of each of the societies' Islamic period, reaching back to their non-Islamic periods.

Among other Southeastern Asia peoples—Indo Malaysians, Indonesians and others, while considering themselves Muslims, were not strongly bound by Islamic ritual, concepts, law, ethics, or institutions. It was an assimilated Islam and more of an identity than a social organization.

Thus, in the various societies, Islam was never the sum of the influence of earlier Islamic religious forces. Each “inherited and maintained a cultural identity, a social organization, political institutions and a system of economy defined in non-Islamic terms.” The most that can be claimed is that “Islam was but one aspect of a more complex society.”

It follows that Lapidus is able to lay to rest the common notion that in Muslim societies, state and religion are one and that Islam is a total way of life which defines all Muslim activity. Muslim societies do not conform to such an ideal but “were and are built around separate state and religious institutions.” Since the late Abbasid caliphate onward, separation between religion and state has been normative for Islam.

The pattern repeats itself endlessly. The Ottoman experiment was the first effort toward the secularization of religious institutions and associations. These innovations were imposed from the top, but with only slight penetration. This effort divided the country into a modernized urban elite versus an unreconstructed rural peasantry among whom little if anything was modified. This produced the spectacle of a secular state with a populace that never ceased identifying itself as Muslim in form and practice. Though religion in Turkey remains dis-
established, movements and parties committed to the Islamization of state and society continue to grow stronger.

Turkey secularized because it was centrally strong enough to do so. Religion was merely relegated to the role of private religion as a part of the national identity, but “is only faintly able to lay claim to the control of public life.”

Iran rejected the secularist policies of the Shah and began a process of re-Islamization because the central government was weak and could not prevent it or impose indefinitely its designs upon the grass roots populace of the vast rural areas. In both instances, the re-formulations and re-groupings followed not along an identifiable basic Islamic pattern, but along earlier, non-Islamic templates.

The book is fresh and its ideas are anything but a rehash of old theories. It commands attention and deserves wide circulation.

Dwight Baker
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Egyptian perceptions of collective identity, their relation to policy and action, and the relation of both to changing historical conditions are the concerns of this book. At the beginning of the twentieth century, most educated Egyptians combined local Egyptian patriotism with loyalty to the Ottoman state and attachment to the wider Islamic community, but a small minority espoused a narrower Egyptian territorial patriotism. The results of World War I, notably the Ottoman defeat, gave the lead to Egyptianism. Consequently, the Revolution of 1919 was waged for purely Egyptian nationalist goals and resulted in the establishment of an Egyptian national state. The newly established Egyptianism held the field in the conflict over the Caliphate, 1924-26. In response to this “drastic historical transformation,” Egyptian intellectuals developed a new collective image. First, Egyptian was categorically separated from Arab. Then it was demonstrated how the unique environment of the Nile Valley, history, and race had created a unique nation whose “only authentic national heritage” was Pharaonic. Accordingly, Egyptian literature and arts must draw exclusively from the Pharaonic heritage. Pharaonicism influenced not only the arts but politics. Egypt did not turn its back on the Arabs, Islam,
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and the East, but the public and the government reacted on the basis of Egyptian national interest. Nevertheless, continued Egyptian concern with Arab and Islamic questions, even in the heyday of Pharaonicism, was a portent of pressures which were soon to have significant effect.

The late notice of the continued vitality and future import of Arab and Islamic sentiment is a bit discordant, for the book’s organization and a number of general statements indicate the extinction of both sentiments by Pharaonicism. But the treatment of particulars conclusively demonstrates that Egypt-first was the unrivaled principle in intellectual and political life. Conceptualization and analysis are outstanding; the quantity and quality of sources virtually unparalleled. The second volume is eagerly anticipated.

C. ERNEST DAWN
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Huppert writes on the re-politicization of Judaism, in the form of the advent to political power of the so-called religious political parties. He writes not about the so-called ultra-Orthodox extremists (Agudat Yisrael, which is non-Zionist, or anti-Zionist ones), but about the religious-Zionist parties held to be moderate, which are Mizrahi, Poel Mizrahi, and now the National Religious Party (NRP). These parties have been on the scene from the beginning of Zionism, so Huppert takes up the political establishment of Judaism not on account of the 1988 elections, which turned a chronic problem into an acute one, but because Zionism as a movement has been developing for close to a century now.

Orthodox Judaism in its NRP form controls the religious courts, which govern matters of personal status, the public-religious educational system, inculcating Orthodox religious ideology, local religious councils, and the like. So, he maintains, “Long before the issue reached its present proportions Orthodox also became the dominant voice for dormant ethnicity. It was largely due to Orthodox pressure that some sovereign state structures and systems financed by the state budget became institutionalized on ethnic lines.” His main point is that the establishment as state religion of Orthodox Judaism is led by “the ‘good guys’ of the NRP.”

This affects the following areas of public life: “medicine (by restricting autopsy); industry, transportation, and entertainment; burials; the food industry; the military (by creating exceptional options for wo-
men who declare their religious Orthodox affiliation and men who enroll in Yeshiva, enter religious-Orthodox units, or join as cadets in the religious-Orthodox Military Academy; local government; and family life (by monopolizing marriages and divorces)." He judges: they "claim they have nothing to do with religious coercion: they are not committing acts of coercion because they are changing the very structure of the State of Israel step by step with patience and without physical brutality."

That is Huppert’s case, and it is spelled out factually, and, if not dispassionately, then at least with force and compelling reason. The chapters cover “from state sovereignty to rabbinical entity”; “quovadis Orthodoxy?”; “the place where they must take you in”; and “back, to the ghetto.” This is the best single account of the establishment of Orthodox Judaism in the State of Israel ever published in the English language. Huppert has provided the single most powerful argument for the separation of church and state that the experience of Judaism can provide for common discourse: a brilliant, frightening but true indictment of a situation that is catastrophic for the family of religions known as Judaism.

JACOB NEUSNER
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Among the many recent publications chronicling Jewish-Christian relations in Poland during World War II, this analytical, in-depth account by Nechama Tec stands out for its objective and comprehensive treatment. Herself the beneficiary of aid from a Polish Christian family, Tec earlier told her own story in the memoir Dry Tears: The Story of a Lost Childhood (1984), and now returns to the theme with a thoroughly researched study that will greatly assist in the sorting out of the complex story of wartime Polish-Jewish relations.

Tec divides her book into three parts. The first, consisting of four chapters, describes what was involved for Jews to pass for and hide among Christians, and for the latter to risk their lives to help Jews. It also attempts to answer the question of why some Poles did shelter Jews, while others aided the Germans in their gruesome roundups. The two chapters of Part Two focus on two unusual types of Polish rescuers, those who did so for payment, and the seemingly contradictory rescuer who was simultaneously a committed anti-Semite. The final four chapters examine in analytical detail those Poles who aided
Jews without financial reward and at great personal risk. The author analyzes this group in terms of the importance of social class, political affiliations, personal friendship, and religious motivations as determinants in the rescuers' behavior, and concludes that the main characteristic shared in common was an individualistic personality that set them apart from the general communities in which they lived. Hence, as “mavericks” to begin with, they were more likely to ignore conventional wisdom and custom in order to defy authority, even at substantial risk to their lives.

The resource base of this work is superb, and should remain the definitive study on the subject for the foreseeable future. It gives the best insights into why Poland had at once the best and worst possible conditions for rescuing Jews from the Nazis.

EDWARD D. WYNOT, JR.
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The scholarly world suffered an incalculable loss with the premature death of Klaus Scholder four years ago. The Tübingen historian's work on the German Kirchenkampf did much to advance an understanding of this critical epoch, and the long-awaited translation of the first volume of his magnum opus on the churches under National Socialism has finally appeared. Here he brings together the hitherto disparate strands of Protestant and Roman Catholic policies during the Weimar Republic and carefully traces the rapid-fire actions by the regime to bring the churches into line during Hitler's first year in office.

In a short review only a few passing references can be made to the many insights found in this solidly researched and carefully written book. Scholder makes clear that the collapse of 1918 was a spiritual and theological problem of the first order, and the unresolved question of the spiritual meaning of the German defeat undermined the Republic from the very beginning. Still, an amicable constitutional settlement was worked out which permitted the twenty-eight territorial churches to consolidate their position and resist efforts to establish a national Protestant church. The heavy emphasis on the moral vision and effect of Christianity in postwar Protestant theology led not only to dissociation from the Weimar order but also (through Barthianism) provided a basis on which the church could reject National Socialism. For Catholics the decisive issue was obtaining a concordat with Prussia (and the German Reich as well), but these were achieved at high cost.
His treatment of the völkisch movement and its impact on both Hitler's thinking and that in the church helps today's readers to see the danger of allowing any set of political beliefs, no matter how persuasive, to be linked with the Christian faith. The lesson of Nazi Germany is clear: beware of political ideologies and messiahs, especially when they appear in the guise of spiritual leadership.

Since he posed as a man of God who would restore national greatness and bring the country back again to the place of power and respect it once possessed, Hitler's accession to the chancellorship was welcomed by representatives of all segments of German Christianity. The nation was "standing tall" again, the Catholics got their concordat, and the Jews were squeezed out of public life, but in return the church was seduced and made into a tool of Hitler's will. By applying carrot-and-stick pressures and giving his surrogates a free hand, the Fuehrer soon had the churches in a state of confusion and disarray. Scholder meticulously details the political maneuverings within both the religious communities and the state organs, and he shows that the attempt to establish a "national" or "Reich" church was a failure and that it essentially served to galvanize the opposition. The leaders operated under the illusion that Hitler and the Nazi party really desired a strong and effective German church, and this had as much to do with its demise as the emergence of the Confessing church. At the same time, the pro-Nazi "German Christians" failed to gain the respect of Hitler and by the end of 1933 their position was rapidly eroding.

This is a book that deserves careful and thoughtful reading, and it certainly should be a must acquisition by every respectable college and theological seminary library. The only criticism here is a technical one: the publisher failed to mention the key role of Professor Franklin H. Littell in preparing the translation.

RICHARD V. PIERARD
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Terre Haute


Toward the end of his exposition on the journey from the Holocaust to solidarity, Marc Ellis writes: "Jewish theology has no choice but to balance the survival of the Jewish people with the preservation of its message of community. It is compelled to assert that survival and preservation of its essential message are ultimately one and the same thing: there is no survival in any meaningful sense without a deepening of the witness its values offer to the world." Would that it were so!

For many post-Holocaust Jews, survival is the primary responsibility of
However persuasive Ellis’s conclusions seem to be, they belie the very premise of this book. Throughout the first part of Toward a Jewish Theology of Liberation, Ellis describes the discontinuities in contemporary Jewish life: the shattering of the Holocaust, the emergence from powerlessness, the quest for statehood, and the search for values despite radical transformations in Jewish experience. Ellis depicts Elie Wiesel’s confrontation with despair and his tortured journey back from the abyss. Ellis portrays Richard Rubenstein’s radical rejection of tradition and sympathetically understands the integrity of the path that his teacher has chosen. So, too, he details Irving Greenberg’s argument that Jews have entered the third great era of Jewish history. Yet Ellis fails to harmonize his early emphasis on transformations in Jewish history with his insistence on continuity of values. Nor does he demonstrate that the values he upholds are in continuity with the mainstream of Jewish tradition.

Other parts of the book are problematical. The evidence that Ellis marshals for Jewish renewal is idiosyncratic. It does not reflect larger sociological trends in the Jewish community. His evocation of Martin Buber and Etty Hillesum are important—but the brevity of the work may mask a shallowness of thought.

Ellis has presented the contemporary Jewish dilemma to the non-Jew in a theological discourse familiar to Christians who study liberation theology. They may value his work; unfortunately, Ellis has said much less to his Jewish brethren who seek a harmony between the leftist politics and Jewish life in the post-Holocaust era.

MICHAEL BERENBAUM
Georgetown University
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The Deafening Silence: American Jewish Leaders and the Holocaust.

In recent years there has been an interest in the Anglo-American response to the Holocaust. Most recently attention has been focused on the failure of American Jewish leaders to help rescue their European brethren. Medoff’s Deafening Silence is one of those works. It seems to be a time for self-blame and guilt trips.

Medoff has gone through some of the existing papers, but there is very little new in his presentation. The story is that such Jewish organizational leaders as Stephen S. Wise, Morris Waldman, and Congressman Sol Bloom failed to do their part to help rescue the Jews of
Europe. They were overly concerned with anti-Semitism and their safety in America.

He does not examine the rivalry between such organizations as the Joint Distribution Committee and the World Jewish Congress. While there is some mention of such individuals as Waldman, who did almost nothing to help rescue European Jewry, there is hardly a passing reference to the Joint Distribution Committee, which was specifically established in the First World War period to help fellow Jews in distress.

If Medoff would examine OSS files recently opened and released by the CIA he would see that some of these Joint Distribution Committee officials not only failed to help rescue their brethren, but they were agents of the U.S. spy agency. Throughout the war period their line of reasoning was that they could do nothing that U.S. government regulations or Spanish government regulations or any other government regulations would not permit. They would only help those "legal" refugees with papers, visas, and passports. But as these OSS papers are examined, one sees some of these individuals like Joseph Schwartz, Alfred Jaretzki, and Saly Mayer as informers and agents of the U.S. government rather than independent figures working to help save their Jewish brethren.

Why did not Medoff examine the record of the Joint Distribution Committee as well as that of Wise and Waldman?

The killers were the Nazi Germans and their collaborators. The free world, the political leaders, and the pope refused to help the Jews. That Jewish political figures like Sol Bloom and Morris Waldman were self-centered, that they did not feel themselves emancipated enough to overcome the bigotry of such officials as Breckinridge Long of the U.S. State Department and to fight on behalf of their Jewish brethren is a side issue. The principal issue is that the Christian world failed to help six million Jews from being assassinated by the German Nazis, that Christian heads of state refused to raise a finger on behalf of the Jewish people, and that they looked the other way and participated in a conspiracy of silence.

A question which a contemporary observer might ask is: How many times need this story of the failure to rescue be repeated? What good does it do? Will it end the callousness and indifference to suffering? Might it persuade the bigots and racists of our time to cease their bigotry? Will it prevent Nazis from winning support in France, England, Canada, the United States, Austria, and Germany?

Medoff's book is worth reading for those who might not be aware of America's indifference to the Holocaust, but for those who have
studied, researched, and even written about this history it has little new to offer.

HERBERT DrukS
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With this work Robert Kolb adds to his already extensive contributions to Reformation scholarship by examining early Lutheran attitudes toward sainthood and Christian heroism. The study focuses on the first but least-known Protestant “martyr book”: the Accounts of God’s Chosen Witnesses, Confessors and Martyrs of Ludwig Rabus, the first volume of which appeared in 1552. Kolb seeks to “survey and analyze Rabus’s work along with other approaches and materials which shed light on how Lutherans digested and transformed this vital element of Christian life and thought, theology and piety.”

Martin Luther, Philipp Melanchthon, and their students condemned the medieval veneration of the saints as an idolatrous perversion that drew attention away from the one true saviour. They sought to replace this practice by pointing instead to confessors of the Word of God throughout history. This was the goal of the “martyr books.” But Rabus, who spent most of his career as Church superintendent at Ulm, was clearly no John Foxe. His multi-volumed work was unwieldy, poorly organized, and lacking in integration, a hodge-podge collection of biographical accounts culled from sources both ancient and modern.

Kolb offers several reasons to explain why Lutheran Germany never produced a work that played a role comparable to that of John Foxe’s book among English Puritans and Jean Crespin’s among French Huguenots. First, Germany saw fewer actual martyrs than did the Western lands, hence no comparable sense of militancy developed. Second, north Germans probably had fewer saints to venerate in the first place, and thus found less meaning in the search for heroes of the faith in the Reformation era. Third, Lutherans never rejected images of the saints as fully as other Protestants in their preaching, calendars, hymns, and art; hence they may have had less need for newer heroes. Fourth, Luther himself stood as such a towering prophetic figure that he all but fully met the Lutheran need for heroes of the faith.

While medieval beliefs and practices regarding the saints did not die out suddenly with Luther’s movement, Lutheran teaching strove consistently to overcome the traditional associations. The apocalyptic
belief in God's imminent deliverance of believers through the Last Judgment was common among sixteenth-century Lutherans, and this message helped eliminate the need to trust in the power of the saints. By the seventeenth century, as the historical consciousness of the Reformation era waned, Lutherans could again regard some ancient saints as models for the daily life and virtues of the Christian. Kolb argues, however, that in a broader sense Protestantism undermined the very need for heroic religious models: every believer could live a saintly life by doing the ordinary tasks to which God had called him.

Both the questions Kolb asks and the answers he gives tend to reflect his deep religious commitment; some readers may wish for more neutral language and a more consistent attempt to analyze the social significance of ideas. Yet unlike certain other scholars who seek to preserve a particular religious heritage, Kolb does make an effort to explore the social context of the changing attitudes he studies. He draws, for example, on the works of Peter Brown and Lionel Rothkrug, among others, to place his own study in a broader framework. For this reason and many others, his work is a useful and welcome contribution.

ROBIN B. BARNES
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Even though it is an old theme, the relationship between church and state in the German Reformation has received new life over the last decade through studies of specific territories. Saxony, Württemberg, Lippe, and Westphalia have all been the subject of such studies; and now that there is this detailed analysis of Hesse, it too can be added to the list.

Wright has attempted the slippery task of showing how Hessian socioeconomic policy in the early sixteenth century was influenced by three developments: the rise of the territorial state, commercial capitalism, and the Lutheran Reformation. The task is slippery because all three factors are both interrelated and independent of each other, and it is difficult to sort out the influence attributable to any one of them. Nevertheless, building on a large amount of raw data, Wright has painstakingly traced the features of Hessian policy that resulted from these political, economic, and religious movements.

In general, Wright concludes that the rise of the territorial state and commercial capitalism dictated specific policies of the Hessian
princes while the adoption of Lutheranism defined the overall goal of promoting the common good. This conclusion raises several important questions which are only partially addressed by the author. One can ask, for example, whether the needs of the state and capitalist policies were in basic agreement with a religiously-defined concept of the common good. At one point, Wright notes that “traditional Christian values of brotherly love, charity, humility, and poverty, and the communal values of mutual trust and common concern, came to be challenged by the capitalistic values of gross accumulation, individual competition, and, above all, self-interest.” The question is: Were specifically Lutheran values, if in fact they were different from traditional Christian values, more compatible with the capitalistic policies that guided the Hessian government? Wright has not convincingly demonstrated this superior compatibility of Lutheran values. On the one hand, he argues that the “new value system” introduced with the Reformation motivated Landgrave Philip’s intensive campaign to alter the institutions that dealt with poverty and charity. But, on the other hand, Wright acknowledges that the distribution of charity continued in limited form the pre-Reformation tendency to rationalize almsgiving.

This one example suggests how difficult it is to determine precisely if Reformation theology and ethics fundamentally altered political and economic policy in those territories that became Protestant. Much clearer is the influence of structural changes effected by Protestantism on the administration of economic policies, e.g., the transfer of economic and legal jurisdiction from defunct ecclesiastical institutions to the territorial government. Wright’s analysis of this transfer and its effects on the Hessian populace, illustrated in numerous charts and tables, nicely demonstrates this concrete impact of the Reformation on the state.

SCOTT H. HENDRIX
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Through his earlier works on Marx and Marxism, David McLellan has established a reputation for excellence in the world of Marxist scholarship. Marxism and Religion confirms his good standing. The book does not propose any startling new interpretation of the Marxist critique of religion. But it does offer a careful description and assessment of the Marxist critique, and it underscores some significant differences in the ways Marxist thinkers have approached religion.

Marx himself, says McLellan, treated religion with great disdain.
He dealt with it seriously only to the extent that it functioned as an obstacle to social change. In his mature writings, Marx treated religion as a phenomenon caused entirely by socio-economic conditions. Religion had no autonomy or history of its own and would simply disappear once socialism created more humane conditions.

Engels devoted far greater attention to religion. His writings served as the basis for a more complete Marxist “history” of religion, treating primitive religion, early Christianity, the Protestant Reformation, and the religion of his day. McLellan criticizes the “superficiality” of Engels's studies, however, noting that Engels generally relied on only one source for each of the different historical epochs of religion. Among the German Social-Democrats, McLellan credits Karl Kautsky with a more serious study of religion, and he notes the Austro-Marxists’ openness to positive features in religion. But Soviet Marxism became the dominant Marxism of the twentieth century and, following Lenin, it saw no social value in religion.

Antonio Gramsci merits special attention, in McLellan’s judgment, for making “the foremost Marxist contribution to the study of religion,” focusing especially on the relations between intellectuals and the masses throughout the history of Catholicism. McLellan also surveys the views of the Frankfurt school, dissenting Marxists in Eastern Europe, and neo-Marxists in Western Europe, and he includes a discussion of the use of Marxist ideas by liberation theologians in Latin America.

McLellan concludes with arguments against those who would classify Marxism itself as “a religion.” He also notes the many limitations of the Marxist critique of religion. He believes that religion, with its greater awareness of the limits of human endeavors, has a better future than Marxism with its dependency on achieving success.

Arthur F. McGovern, S.J.
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Professor James A. Brundage describes his book as “a monograph . . . wrapped in a survey.” The monograph comprises four chapters that examine law and sexuality in the classical period of canon law (1140-1348); it is based on manuscript and printed sources. The survey component begins with five chapters dealing with sex and law from antiquity to Gratian’s Decretum, and concludes with three chapters, two covering the period from the Black Death to the Reformation and
the Council of Trent (1563), and a final chapter recapitulating the argument of the work and reflecting on medieval survivals in modern law and morality. The survey parts are based both on printed primary sources and on an extensive reading in the secondary literature. Professor Brundage’s book is a monument of erudition and scholarly labor, and inadequate space here prevents description of the usefulness for students and specialists of this encyclopedic work.

Professor Brundage ably describes the history of the systematic compilation of, and commentary on, ecclesiastical law, and thus familiarizes the reader with the collections of law and the expert who interpreted it. The survey parts allow him to link his analysis of specific topics in the classical period to their ancient and early medieval background, and to their prospective development through the sixteenth century. Thus one of the features that make this work indispensable is the treatment, intensively in the classical period 1140-1348, and extensively, back to antiquity and forward to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, of a wide range of topics: concubinage, prostitution, adultery, rape, homosexuality, extra-marital sexual behavior, marital sexual behavior, the validity of marriage, separation and divorce, legitimacy, impotence, and many others. These, and similar topics, are easy to find by using either the satisfyingly comprehensive index, or the table of contents, which guides readers to clearly titled chapters and subheadings. In sum, students who want to know what canon law said and canonists thought about sexuality in the Middle Ages and want to understand how to find their way around this body of law, they should read, and own, this book.

Nevertheless, this is not a flawless performance—how could it be considering its scope?—and the reader should not read uncritically. A few examples of wrong or debatable details must serve as representative. One may not argue that “Hebrew Scriptures” describe sex as “brutish” on the basis of Jesus Ben Sirach and Tobit, because these books are deuterocanonical and because the argument blurs the distinction between the Hebrew Bible and the religion of Hellenistic Judaism. To reduce Luke 14:20-27 and 18-29 to a teaching on celibacy does singular violence to the context; and to say Luke 20:34-35 implies that “celibacy is necessary for salvation” is to distort the passage even more than a medieval exegete would.

Then there are inconsistencies, sometimes recognized but unresolved. Ancient Romans seem tolerant and intolerant of homosexuality. Paul has “loathing for sex” but “not a revulsion at [the] moral enormity” of “sexual conduct.” “Adultery in early Germanic society” cannot be “an exclusively female crime” if, as the author asserts in the very next clause of the same sentence, “a few codes also penalized men for adultery under some circumstances.” And, finally, this reviewer finds a confusing variety of opinions on whether sexual ethics had demographic effects, which raises the larger question of what ef-
fect any of this law or moralizing had on the “society” of the author’s title.

The basic problem with Professor Brundage’s argument is the unexamined question of how law—and especially canon law—influences behavior. In spite of a lack of the kind of evidence one might want, the argument requires a more comprehensive consideration of sanctions. Church law is peculiar in its lack of direct coercive powers and, at the same time, in its extensive moral component and its regulation of behavior that seems impossible to enforce. Canon lawyers and theologians certainly thought they had different disciplines and they explicitly distinguished between the external forum of the ecclesiastical court and the internal forum of conscience (as well as the institutional expression of the internal forum, the forum of penance). But in practice, there is much overlapping. Thus we need to think about how historians are to assess the role of canon law and the role of sermons, confession, and other institutions of socialization in affecting social action.

And that brings us back to the biggest question. Celibate clerics prescribed and harangued—in law, sermon, and theological text—against pleasure and for asceticism. But who listened? And how did “society” behave? Professor Brundage often admits that we cannot know whether laymen and women obeyed, in body or spirit. But more often he assumes that they must have done, and describes the terrible psychological costs of paying attention. In those assumptions he also may be too modern. For the fear of repression that he and the reader feel when confronted with this tangle of sexual regulation may have less to do with medieval Christians who were officially subject to it, and more to do with more perfectly socialized inhabitants of the twentieth century’s iron cage. And that is an interpretive dilemma for which there is no easy solution.

Thomas N. Tentler
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Ann Arbor


This collection of previously published lectures and articles is divided into three parts: The Church’s Evolving Social Teaching, Theology and Emancipation, and Critical Social Theory. Gregory Baum, professor of religious studies at McGill, and trained also as a sociologist and political theorist, is eminently qualified to write on religion and society.

One essay that is particularly impressive is entitled, “The Social
Context of American Catholic Thought.” Baum argues that, while originally American Catholic theology was in dialogue with American culture, during the second half of the nineteenth century the emphasis shifted to the new immigrants, and as a result this dialogue was abandoned, not to be found again until Vatican II. Indeed, Baum states that American Catholic social thought starts with Vatican II. While this is probably too broad a statement, Baum does have a point.

There is also a very good discussion of liberation theology and its relationship to Marxism. Baum holds that, while they have many themes in common, liberation theology is more in the tradition of Catholic theology than is that of Marxism. He also takes great pains to distinguish the “preferential option for the poor” from the Marxist class struggle. Because he is well-versed in both traditional Catholic theology and in political and social theory, Baum can say with some authority when John Paul II is making reference to Pius XI rather than to Karl Marx.

In describing the thought of John Paul II, Baum pays particular attention to *Laborem exercens*, to which he had previously devoted a whole volume. Generally, he shows a great deal of admiration for the last four popes, but is not afraid to criticize certain paths Catholic theology has taken. In the opening chapter, entitled “Faith and Liberation: Development since Vatican II,” Baum details this path with regards to social teaching, stressing the importance of the meeting of the Latin American Bishops at Medellin, Colombia in 1968, which, he argues, was influenced by the new social justice orientation.

Some of the essays were directed originally to a Canadian audience, and so the examples and references used are Canadian ones, but this does not really detract from the universal appeal of the book. The non-Canadian reader can easily exchange examples from his own country or culture.

AUGUSTINE J. CURLEY, OSB
Newark Abbey
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The encounter between traditional peoples and Western culture has often resulted in syncretic religious movements combining aspects of pre-conquest religions with Christianity. In this book Gonzalo Castillo-Cárdenas provides an analysis of one such movement from Colombia in the early part of the twentieth century, when whites and mestizos were moving into Indian land and dispossessing the inhabit-
Liberation Theology from Below is two books. The first is a sympathetic discussion of the Lamista movement. The second (an appendix pp. 97-151) is the translation from Spanish into English of Lame’s manuscript “Los Pensamientos del Indio que se Educó Dentro de las Selvas Colombianas,” “The thoughts of the Indian Educated in the Colombian Forests” (Castillo-Cárdenas’ use of the word “forests” for the Spanish “selvas” makes one wish the book contained a third section with a Spanish version of Los Pensamientos. At several points in the book this reviewer found himself wanting to check the original source.) The existence of this manuscript offers Castillo-Cárdenas the unique opportunity to analyze the theological underpinnings of a millenarian movement. He does this in the five chapters which constitute the first part of the book.

As he states in chapter one Castillo-Cárdenas has two objectives: to understand the nature of Lame’s religious thought as expressed in “Los Pensamientos,” and a critical interpretation of that thought as an expression of popular theology. The book is unique among treatments of indigenous responses to secular and religious imperialism. Castillo-Cárdenas sees the Lamista movement as a coherent, legitimate response by the Indians of Colombia to their history, not as an irrational mixture of ideologies pursuing a lost cause. His view is expressed in his preface where he states, “We find ourselves at a point in human history when the most significant event that is taking place in terms of hope for an alternative future for humanity may be the emergence of the power of Third World peoples.”

While this reviewer shares many of the author’s sentiments and applauds his placing of this document and movement within its historic context, one has trouble with his thesis that Lame’s movement and manuscript represent a form of “liberation theology from below.” His own analysis identifies this as a struggle arising out of an ethnic identity. Liberation theology as it has developed in Latin America is not an ethnic movement, but is directly linked to class identity and struggle by a people who are proletarianized.

ARTHUR D. MURPHY
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The topic of this book deserves the special attention of the readers of this journal. It is a case study of a conflict over the control of education in Austria, with special emphasis on the period of the First Republic, 1918-1934; the opening chapter provides essential background for the pre-1918 period when education became a major public policy issue in the declining decades of the Hapsburg monarchy.

The principal contenders in the conflict over the control of education were, on the one side, the Roman Catholic Church and certain political parties associated with the social strata loyal to the Church's teaching mission. On the other side was the working class movement, unions, and the Social Democratic party, as well as small groups of liberal bourgeois elements who favored secular education. The conflict over education was not so much a church-state conflict, as it was a contestation over who should provide the dominant thrust in education, especially on the primary and secondary level, i.e., a moral-religious vs. a secular-democratic thrust. In this contestation the Roman Catholic Church had the support of Austria's central (federal) government and of most of the state (provincial) governments for its championship of a religious-moral education. But it found itself in a bitter conflict with the government of the city-province of Vienna which contained one-third of the country's population of approximately six million inhabitants. The government of Vienna was under the control of the Social Democratic party for most of the life of the First Republic and it was deeply committed to instituting a secular-democratic educational system.

As important as this study is for an understanding of the formulation and execution of public policy in the field of education, it must be reported that this study failed in what should have been its central task: it failed to grasp, or did not want to grasp, the full dimensions of the achievement of the city of Vienna in trying to create an educational system which, for the first time in Austria—or perhaps anywhere in Europe—would not track students based essentially on social class membership; an educational system fully secular in which students would no longer be required to go to confession and attend mass and receive compulsory religious education. What is particularly disturbing is the author's unquestioning acceptance of the proposition that the papacy and the Austrian episcopacy could speak authoritatively for the 90 percent of the population counted as Roman Catholics, without ever raising the question whether this 90 percent still practiced the religion, accepted the Church's position on social issues, or wanted their children educated in schools that enforced religious teaching and practices.

For this reviewer who is a product of that educational system and...
who was, unavoidably, involved in this "school-conflict," but who also has credentials as a scholar in the United States, the present volume has dutifully counted all the trees but has failed to understand the nature of the "forest" which it purported to examine. One comes away with the uneasy feeling that the author's perspective on the conflict over education in Austria during the First Republic owes more to Bill Bennett and Allan Bloom than to any serious effort to grasp the basic elements of this conflict: the attempt to bring into the twentieth century an educational system still burdened with eighteenth century absolutism, nineteenth century liberalism, and twentieth century social conflict over the institutionalization of the welfare state and the modernization of a system weighed down with rules and institutions of an irrelevant past.

ALFRED DIAMANT
University of Indiana
Bloomington


The author of this monograph has made a happy discovery. In Tsarist Russia peasant women were not simply mute workhouses but had concepts, rituals, and symbols of their own. This women's culture was in some ways contrary to the prevailing patriarchal system. While women held a subordinate position in Russian society, in their mental world they were separate and equal.

Ms. Hubbs has made use of prehistoric artifacts, fragments from old Slavonic literature, nineteenth century folklore, folk art, and the cult of Mary and "Saint" Friday. She says that the image of the mother was associated with rivers, the spring, soil, and Russia itself. She also describes the cult of nymphs and the lore about Baba Yaga, the witch. These figures had a negative side, and so were ambivalent, a problem of interpretation which the author does not attempt to solve.

It would be valuable to have similar monographs, or better, comparative studies, covering women's folklore in other countries of Europe, especially Eastern Europe, where more archaic material is likely to have survived. Was the mental world of women contradictory to the prevailing male world view in other parts of Europe? In northwestern Europe, where feminism first emerged, did the folklore reflect a greater equality between the sexes?

The main obstacle to such studies is linguistic: the materials that must be used in the study of the smaller nations are almost always in the native tongue, not in the more widely known European lan-
guages—English, French, German, and Russian. In order to follow out
the line of investigation initiated by Ms. Hubbs, a team would be
required.

In deciding whether to do further research it is necessary to re-
member that folklore is the product of familistic society, a kind of soci-
ety that prevailed all over Europe through the fifteenth century and in
the more isolated parts of south and west Europe well into the twenti-
heth. Europe folk culture lacked both ethical and political depth: it
included no understanding of "the public interest," no universal moral
principles, no striving for spiritual growth, and women in this culture
rarely had real life, as opposed to imaginary adventures. Women who
study women's folklore learn about their past, which helps in self-defi-
nition, but not about their future.

MARY K. MATOSSIAN
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The Excellent Empire: The Fall of Rome and the Triumph of the
Church. By Jaroslav Pelikan. San Francisco: Harper and Row,

As 1976 witnessed the bicentennial of the first volume of Edward
Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, so
1988 was observed by various historians as the bicentennial of the
completion of that work, which over the two centuries has assumed a
life of its own.

In anticipation of the 1988 observance, Jaroslav Pelikan, Sterling
Professor of History at Yale University, produced his own reflections
and interpretations of Gibbon as an eighteenth-century rationalist who
refuted or gave faint praise to early Christian theologians who were
challenged to explain Rome's decline. Jerome (translator of the Scrip-
tures into the Latin Vulgate) saw the event as the apocalypse, Eusebius
in his Ecclesiastical History wrote of the emergence of a new world
order, and Augustine explained in his City of God how vanity and cor-
ruption, displeasing to God, brought forth the "Respublica Christiana."

From persecution to Constantiian toleration to Theodosian pro-
scription of pagan ritual, Caesaropapsim dominated the church of New
Rome at Constantinople, while the bishops of the church of Old Rome
on the Tiber replaced, with Petrine Supremacy, the collapse of impe-
rial rule.

Professor Pelikan performs a commendable task in bringing Gib-
bon more into focus vis-à-vis the early theologians. That eighteenth-
century historian, a product of the enlightenment, had little patience
with "superstition and fear" as the basis for the growth of an intolerant
and unyielding hierarchy—be it secular or clerical—over the faithful. These reflections on Gibbon and early Christian apologists are a fresh and stimulating approach to continuing, and necessary, discussions on the relations of the church and the state, whether in the fourth century, or Gibbon’s time, or today.

The nine chapters, from “The Fall of Rome as Historical Paradigm” to “The Inestimable Gifts of Roman Civilization,” are based on the Walter Rauschenbusch Lectures given by the author at the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School in 1984.

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