THE FORBIDDEN FRUIT AND THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN MARIJUANA PROHIBITION

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Mr. Snell. What is the bill?

Mr. Rayburn. It has something to do with something that is called marihuana. I believe it is a narcotic of some kind.

Colloquy on the House floor prior to passage of the Marihuana Tax Act.

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We wish to express our sincere appreciation to the students who assisted us in the preparation of the tables at Appendix A. Because the drug statutes of the several states are particularly confusing and difficult to find, and because so many jurisdictions have recently changed their drug laws, the preparation of the chart required long, tedious work which so many were kind enough to perform. To them, our most sincere thanks.

We should like to thank especially Michael A. Cohen, John F. Kuether, W. Tracey Shaw, Alan K. Smith, and Allan J. Tanenbaum, all students at the University of Virginia School of Law, whose research assistance and tireless effort were invaluable.

We are particularly indebted to Professor Jerry Mandel who supplied us with much of the raw data used in the historical case studies in this Article. In his excellent article on drug statistics in the Stanford Law Review, Problems with Official Drug Statistics, 21 STAN. L. REV. 991 (1969), Professor Mandel suggested in a footnote that someone should attempt a history of the passage of anti-marijuana legislation. We have followed his suggestion and earnestly hope that our product will fill this gap.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Law may be rooted in fiction as well as fact. Indeed, a public policy conceived in ignorance may be continuously reaffirmed, ever more vehemently, so long as its origins remain obscure or its fallacy unexposed. Yet once a spark of truth ignites the public opinion process, the authority of time will not stay the flames of controversy. In stable times the policy may soon be reversed or modified to comport with reality. In volatile times, however, a single controversy may lose its urgency. Fueled by flames generated by related public issues, the fire may spread; truth may again be consumed in the explosive collision of competing cultural ideologies.

So it has been with marijuana.1 Suppressed for forty years without significant public attention, the “killer weed” has suddenly surfaced as the preferred euphoriant of millions of Americans. Hardly a day passes without public exposure to propaganda from one side or the other. Hardly a day passes without arrests of newsworthy figures for violations of marijuana laws. Before legislatures and courts, the law is attacked and defended with equal fervor. Sociological, medical and

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1 Throughout its tumultuous history, the common name of the cannabis drug has been spelled in numerous ways—marihuana, meriguana, mariguana, marijuana. We will use the last spelling because it appears most often in modern publications and conforms more nearly to the Spanish.
police testimony regarding the drug's effects is delivered feverishly to an attentive public.

Yet, apart from some expedient peripheral actions, little has been done. Detailed studies have been commissioned, but there has been no significant reconsideration of basic assumptions. Because the marijuana issue has become ensnared in broader social polemics, it has been stalemated. Stability and change, defiance and repression, hippieism and middle-Americanism, "law and order" and protest politics define the cultural milieu of which the marijuana issue is viewed as but a symptom.

This Article is motivated by twin concerns: that the flagrant disregard of marijuana laws bespeaks a growing disenchantment with the capacity of our legal system rationally to order society, and that the assimilation of the marijuana issue into larger social conflicts has consigned the debate to the public viscera instead of the public mind. Through a historical analysis of the marijuana laws we hope to re-focus the debate. An understanding of the origins of the laws might modulate the challengers' hostile accusations and at the same time promote in legislators an awareness of their own responsibility.

For the purposes both of description and evaluation, law is inseparable from the process by which it is adopted and the values it manifests. Accordingly, our history focuses both on the public policy formation process and on evolving patterns of our culture. With respect to policy formation, marijuana's legal history is a significant illustration of the interaction of the public opinion, legislative and judicial processes, and, in a broader sense, the relation between folkways and stateways. With respect to its value-content, the evolution of marijuana policy reflects quite precisely emerging cultural attitudes toward pluralism, privacy and individual pursuit of pleasure in an increasingly mechanized and depersonalized technological society.

II. The Antecedents: Criminalization of Narcotics and Alcohol.

The restrictive public policy with respect to marijuana, initiated in the late twenties and thirties and perpetuated to the present day, has never been an isolated phenomenon. At each stage of its development marijuana policy has been heavily influenced by other social issues because the drug has generally been linked with broader cultural patterns. Particularly at its inception, nationwide anti-marijuana legis-
lation and its fate in the courts were inseparably linked with the earlier anti-narcotics and prohibition experiences. In fact, the facility with which marijuana policy was initiated is directly related to the astoundingly sudden and extreme alteration of public narcotics and alcohol policy between 1900 and 1920.

In 1906 there were only three dry states, and judicial precedent abounded for the proposition that the right to possess alcohol for private consumption was an inalienable right. Yet, by 1917, twenty states had enacted prohibitionary legislation and most others were contemplating it. Two years later the eighteenth amendment and the Volstead Act had been enacted, and it was a federal crime to possess alcohol even for the purpose of drinking it within the home. Similarly, in 1900 only a handful of states in any way regulated traffic in narcotic drugs—opium, cocaine, morphine and heroin—even though all but heroin had been available for a decade or more. Yet, by 1914, all states had enacted some type of prohibitionary legislation, and the national government had enacted the Harrison Narcotic Act.

There were many major differences between the temperance and anti-narcotics movements. The temperance movement was a matter of vigorous public debate; the anti-narcotics movement was not. Temperance legislation was the product of a highly organized nationwide lobby; narcotics legislation was largely ad hoc. Temperance legislation was designed to eradicate known evils resulting from alcohol abuse; narcotics legislation was largely anticipatory.

On the other hand, there were striking similarities between the two movements. Both were first directed against the evils of large scale use and only later against all use. Most of the rhetoric was the same: These euphoriant products produced crime, pauperism and insanity. Both began on the state level and later secured significant congressional action. Both ultimately found favor with the courts, provoking interchangeable dissenting opinions.

We do not propose to unearth new truths about the events of this period. However, we do believe that a familiarity with the political and judicial response to the alcohol and narcotics problems is essential to an understanding of the eventual suppression of marijuana. We believe further that an understanding of the relation between public opinion and any sumptuary law is germane to a discussion of the predicament of current marijuana legislation. Finally, since much of the current debate about marijuana is focused on its harmful effects as
compared with those of narcotics and alcohol, the evolution of public policy in those areas is particularly material.

A. A Review of the Temperance Movement

Although aggressive prohibition campaigns had been mounted in every state in 1851-69,¹ and again in 1880-90,² in 1903 only Maine (1884), Kansas (1880) and North Dakota (1889) were completely dry states.³ Ernest Cherrington, the chronicler par excellence of the Prohibition movement, blamed the failure of the first thrust in part on the intervention of the slavery question, which siphoned the moral fervor of the people from the temperance movement.⁴ The failure of the second campaign he attributed to the inability of the prohibition activists to compete politically with growing liquor interests that dominated state and local governments.⁵

By 1906, however, the progress of the anti-saloon arm of the temperance movement in local option contests⁶ and the adoption of alcohol prohibition by the people of Oklahoma in a provision of their constitution ratified upon admission to statehood⁷ signalled a new crusade for state prohibitionary legislation. The Oklahoma vote so "electrified the moral forces of other states"⁸ that by 1913 six additional states had enacted statewide prohibition, and half of the remaining states were contemplating action.⁹

Perhaps the most significant development during this period occurred on the national level. The Supreme Court had earlier declared the police powers of the states, under which state prohibition laws were enacted, impotent to prevent importation of liquor from a wet state, of which there were still many, into a dry state and to stay the sale and delivery of such liquor to the buyer while in the original package.¹⁰

¹ E. Cherrington, The Evolution of Prohibition in The United States of America 135-45 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Cherrington].
² Id. at 176-84.
³ Id. at 180-81; Safely, Growth of State Power Under Federal Constitution to Regulate Traffic in Intoxicating Liquors, 3 Iowa L. Bull. 221, 222 (1917).
⁴ Cherrington 139.
⁵ Id. at 181-82.
⁶ Id. at 280.
⁷ Id. at 280-81.
⁸ Id. at 281.
⁹ Id. at 284.
¹⁰ Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
After a congressional attempt to deal with this decision in 1890 aborted in the courts, the buyer of liquor shipped in interstate commerce still had the right to receive and therefore to use such liquor. But in 1913 Congress, by the Webb-Kenyon Act, filled the gap by prohibiting the *shipment* of liquor from one state to another to be used in violation of the laws of the latter; dry states could thus enforce their prohibition laws against imported liquor. The mere passage of this law, according to Cherrington, committed Congress to a policy that recognized the liquor traffic as an outlaw trade and indicated congressional desire to assist the dry states.

By November 1913, the tide had decidedly turned. More than half the population and 71 percent of the area of the United States were under prohibitionary laws. Accordingly, the Fifteenth National Convention of the Anti-Saloon League of America unanimously endorsed immediate passage of National Constitutional Prohibition, whereupon the National Temperance Council was formed to combine the forces of the various temperance organizations toward this end.

By April 4, 1917, when a joint resolution was introduced in the Senate proposing an amendment to the Constitution prohibiting the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within the United States for beverage purposes, eighty percent of the territory of the United States was dry. Adopted by the constitutional majorities of both houses on December 18, 1917, the eighteenth amendment was ratified by the thirty-sixth state on January 16, 1919, and became effective on January 16, 1920. The Volstead Act, passed on October 28, 1919, pursuant to section 2 of the eighteenth amendment, outlawed

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11 Four months after *Leisy* Congress enacted the “Wilson Law,” designed to make all intoxicating liquors subject “upon arrival” to the laws of the state into which they were sent. Act of Aug. 8, 1890, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313. In Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898), however, the Supreme Court held that “upon arrival” meant *after delivery* to the consignee. Thus the right to receive the liquor and the attendant enforcement problems remained.


13 The Act was upheld in *Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry.*, 242 U.S. 311 (1917).

14 *Cherrington* 285-86.

15 *Id.* at 320.

16 *Id.* at 321-22.


18 *Id.*

19 *Id.* at 8.

possession of intoxicating liquor and therefore went significantly beyond the amendment itself.

The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the Wickersham Commission) attributed the passage of the eighteenth amendment not to public opposition to use of intoxicating beverages,\(^1\) although this was indeed the view of many of the leaders of the movement, but rather to antipathy to three major related evils: excessive consumption, political corruption and licensed saloons.\(^2\) Excessive use increased with the commercialization of production and distribution, and the expansion of saloons. Public resentment against the corrupting influence of the large liquor dealers in local politics, especially in the larger cities, tended to focus public attention on removing a cancer from the body politic. Finally, the institution that most strongly aroused public sentiment against liquor traffic was the licensed saloon, itself the symbol of intemperance and corruption. Owned or controlled by the large brewers or wholesalers, centers of political activity, homes of commercialized vice, the saloons were the \textit{bêtes noires} of middle-American public opinion.

Because public opinion was largely opposed only to the socio-political consequences of massive liquor traffic, the enforcement of total abstinence under the eighteenth amendment became increasingly difficult. By 1931 it was an accepted fact that the upper and middle classes were "drinking in large numbers in quite frank disregard of the declared policy" of the Volstead Act.\(^3\)

\(^1\) In 1904 Ernst Freund had noted, quoting from an article on "personal liberty" in the \textit{Cyclopedia of Temperance and Prohibition}:

\begin{quote}
Even the advocates of prohibition concede that the state has no concern with the private use of liquor. "The opponents of prohibition misstate the case by saying that the state has no right to declare what a man shall eat or drink. The state does not venture to make any such declaration. . . . It is not the private appetite of the citizen that the state undertakes to manage, but the liquor traffic. . . . If by abolishing the saloon the state makes it difficult for men to gratify their private appetites, there is no just reason for complaint."
\end{quote}

\textit{E. Freund, Police Power 484} (1904).

\(^2\) \textit{Wickersham Commission} 6-7.

\(^3\) \textit{Id.} at 21. In 1929 President Hoover had devoted a major part of his inaugural address to the "disregard and disobedience" of the eighteenth amendment. He attributed to the ordinary citizen "a large responsibility" for a "dangerous expansion in the criminal elements." Attempting to generate moral support for the law, he chastised the citizenry:

\begin{quote}
No greater national service can be given by men and women of goodwill—who, I know, are not unmindful of the responsibilities of citizenship—than that they should, by their example, assist in stamping out crime and outlawry by refusing participation in and condemning all transactions with illegal liquor. Our whole
The difficulties of securing compliance in such circumstances were aggravated by an inadequately designed enforcement strategy,\textsuperscript{24} public resentment of the lawless tactics of prohibition agents,\textsuperscript{25} and the lack of any sustained attempt at public education.\textsuperscript{26} For twelve years, however, millions of dollars were spent by federal and state governments in a fruitless effort to secure compliance with the law. Contemporary legal observers were particularly incensed by the dilution of constitutional protections, especially those provided by the fourth amendment, which was sanctioned by the courts in response to the "felt needs" of securing compliance through enforcement alone.\textsuperscript{27}

Although many plans were advanced for changing the prohibition laws to mitigate the lawlessness rampant during this period, as late as

\begin{quote}

system of self-government will crumble either if officials elect what laws they will enforce or citizens elect what laws they will support. The worst evil of disregard for some law is that it destroys respect for all law. For our citizens to patronize the violation of a particular law on the ground that they are opposed to it is destructive of the very basis of all that protection of life, homes and property which they rightly claim under laws.

\textit{Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States} 227 (Gov't Printing Off. 1969). The President's sermon fell on deaf ears.

\textsuperscript{24} President Hoover also noted in his inaugural address:

Of the undoubted abuses which have grown up under the eighteenth amendment...part are due to the failure of some States to accept their share of the responsibility for concurrent enforcement and the failure of many State and local officials to accept the obligation under their oath of office zealously to enforce the laws.


\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Wickersham Commission} 44-46.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Id.} at 48.

\textsuperscript{27} The Wickersham Commission noted:

\begin{quote}

Some advocates of the law have constantly urged and are still urging disregard or abrogation of the guarantees of liberty and of sanctity of the home which had been deemed fundamental in our policy.... High-handed methods...even where justified, alienated thoughtful citizens, believers in law and order. Unfortunate public expressions by advocates of the law...deprecating the constitutional guarantees involved, aggravated this effect. Pressure for lawless enforcement, encouragement of bad methods and agencies of obtaining evidence, and crude methods of investigation and seizure on the part of incompetent or badly chosen agents started a current of adverse public opinion in many parts of the land.

\textit{Id.} at 46.

Many legal commentators thought that the courts, manned by "fanatically dry" judges, succumbed to these pressures, especially in the fourth amendment area. See, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{F. Black, Ill Starred Prohibition Cases} (1931), where the author criticizes, among other cases, \textit{Olmstead v. United States}, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (upholding wiretapping), and \textit{Carroll v. United States}, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (upholding warrantless search of automobile).
\end{quote}
1931 even its most vigorous opponents felt that repeal of the eighteenth amendment was politically unfeasible. By 1932, however, public opinion had become so inflamed that the Democratic National Convention included repeal in the party platform. Proposed by Congress on February 20, 1933, the twenty-first amendment was ratified by the thirty-sixth state on December 5, 1933.

B. Anti-Narcotics Legislation to 1914

For our purposes, the major feature of temperance history is the responsiveness of the political process to public opinion. Whether or not a majority of Americans ever favored prohibition and whether or not the thrust of public opinion was ever accurately assessed, the public opinion process was attuned to the question for half a century. The alleged evils of alcohol abuse were matters of public knowledge; the proper governmental response was a subject of endless public debate; enactment and repeal of Prohibition were attended by widespread public participation.

In contrast, the early narcotics legislation was promulgated largely in a vacuum. Public and even professional ignorance of the effects of narcotic drugs contributed both to the dimensions of the problem and the nature of the legislated cure. The initial legislation was attended by no operation of the public opinion process, and instead generated a new public image of narcotics use. Only after this creation of a public perception occurred did the legislative approach comport with what we shall call latent public opinion.

1. Narcotics Use at the Turn of the Century: A Growing Problem

Although estimates have varied widely regarding the number of persons regularly using cocaine, opium, morphine and heroin during the pre-criminalization period, a sufficiently accurate figure can be drawn from a composite of contemporary surveys conducted between 1878 and 1924. Estimates range from 182,215 (1884) to 782,118 (1913). We

28 F. Black, supra note 27, at 149-50.
30 The earliest surveys employ a methodology much less sophisticated than those conducted after 1914. The later studies, however, suffer from a time lag which inevitably detracts from accuracy. In any event, taken together, these surveys adequately describe the contours of the phenomenon under consideration.
31 The earliest attempt at a compilation of addiction figures was undertaken by O. Marshall in 1878. Marshall, The Opium Habit in Michigan, 1878 Mich. State Bd. of
can safely estimate that there were between one-quarter and one-half million Americans addicted to narcotics around the turn of the century, comprising at least one percent of the population.\textsuperscript{32}

This rather large addict population included more females than males.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{Health Ann. Rep. 61-73.} From questionnaires sent to doctors, Marshall found 1,313 users of opium or morphine and concluded therefrom that there were 7,763 addicts in the state. Dr. Charles Terry later concluded that, if Marshall's figures were representative, total incidence of addiction in the United States in 1878 was 251,936. C. Terry \& M. Pellens, The Opium Problem 15 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Terry \& Pellens]. Marshall was unable fully to take into account the fact that the incidence of drug abuse in the cities was much higher than that in the rural areas he studied; accordingly, his figures probably underestimate the extent of addiction in the state.

In a similar study of Iowa in 1884, J. M. Hull found 5,732 addicts which, if representative, would reflect a national addict population of 182,215. Hull, The Opium Habit, 1885 Iowa State Bd. of Health Biennial Rep. 335-45, quoted in Terry \& Pellens 16-18.

In 1900 the author of a Vermont study sent 130 questionnaires to various druggists in an attempt to determine the monthly sales of various drugs. His 116 replies indicate that 3,300,000 doses of opium were sold every month, or enough for every person in Vermont over the age of 21 to receive 1½ doses per day. Grinnel, A Review of Drug Consumption and Alcohol as Found in Proprietary Medicine, 23 Medico-Legal J. 426 (1905), quoted in Terry \& Pellens 21-23.

Perhaps the best pre-1914 estimate was made by Dr. Charles Perry who, as Health Officer of Jacksonville, Florida, compiled data for that city in 1913. He found that 541 persons, or .81% of the city's population, used opium or some preparation thereof in 1913. Nationwide, this incidence would be 782,118. 1913 Jacksonville, Fla., Bd. of Health Ann. Rep., quoted in Terry \& Pellens 25.


The first post-Harrison Act study, and perhaps the most reliable of all research during this period, was done by Lawrence Kolb and A. G. DuMez of the United States Public Health Service. Utilizing previously computed statistics together with information regarding the supply of narcotics imported into the United States, these authors concluded the addict population never exceeded 246,000. Kolb \& DuMez, The Prevalence and Trend of Drug Addiction in the United States and Factors Influencing It 1-20 (39 Public Health Reports No. 21) (May 23, 1924).

At the same time the Narcotic Division of the Prohibition Unit of the IRS estimated that there were more than 500,000 drug addicts in America. Narcotic Division of the Prohibition Unit, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Release (May 4, 1924), quoted in Terry \& Pellens 42 n.25.


\textsuperscript{32} But see M. Nyswander, The Drug Addict as a Patient 1-13 (1956) (the author suggests that perhaps 1 to 4% of American adult population was addicted in 1890).

\textsuperscript{33} Of the 1,313 addicts in Marshall's Michigan study, 803 were females and only
more whites than blacks, and was confined neither to particular geographical regions nor to areas of high population concentration. Its most significant characteristic was its predominantly middle-class composition. Such attributes contrast starkly with the overwhelmingly black, lower-class male addict population that today inhabits our major urban centers.

Nineteenth century narcotics addiction was generally accidental. It is widely believed that medical addicts far outnumbered "kicks" or "pleasure" addicts. Medical addiction stemmed from many sources. The first was overmedication. Civil War hospitals used opium and morphine freely and many veterans returned addicted to the drugs. Overmedication continued long after peace had been restored, due to the ready availability of these drugs with and sometimes without prescription. Since physicians were free to dispense these drugs as painkillers, persons given morphine first for legitimate therapeutic purposes often found themselves addicted. This problem was exacerbated by the absence of restrictions upon druggists in refilling prescriptions containing extensive amounts of morphine and other opiates and by the introduction of the hypodermic syringe. The danger of overmedication increased in 1884 when cocaine was first introduced into the prac-
tice of medicine, and again in 1898 when an advance in German chemistry produced heroin, a partially synthetic morphine derivative. For a time recommended as a treatment for morphine addiction, heroin was also widely used for medicinal purposes.

A second source of accidental addiction was the use and popularity of patent medicines. Exotically labeled elixirs were advertised as general cures for ills ranging from snake bite to melancholia. By containing up to thirty or forty percent morphine or opiates by volume, most patent medicines fulfilled their cure-all promises. However, a heavy price was exacted for such cures. In the absence of a requirement that contents be printed on the label, many an unsuspecting person became addicted without ever knowing the medicine that worked so well contained dangerous narcotics.

Thus, careless prescription, incessant dispensation and hidden distribution of harmful drugs, the addictive effects of which were unknown until too late, fostered a large addict population which continued to increase in the early twentieth century. The increase in narcotics consumption, and therefore addiction, is well illustrated by the fact that 628,177 pounds of opiates were brought into this country in 1900, three times the amount imported thirty years earlier. Governmental and medical default explains the innocent nature of nineteenth century narcotics addiction and therefore its predominantly middle-class, nationwide character.

Not all addiction was accidental and private. It has been suggested that both medical knowledge and governmental regulation occurred only when each narcotic drug achieved a significant degree of “street” use. Our research supports this thesis, especially when “street” use is identified with the poor and with racial minorities. For example, opium, the drug first determined addictive and first identified with “pleasure” use, was the earliest prohibited. Legislation was first passed in the west coast states with newly immigrated Chinese populations among whom its use was prevalent. Heroin early achieved a widespread nonmedical or “street” use, especially in large urban centers among lower-class males.
Marijuana Prohibition

Nevertheless, addiction, even to opium, was predominantly involuntary until 1900. Professional attention was not focused directly on “street” use until after two developments had significantly reduced the possibility of medical addiction. First, the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act in 1906 led to the demise of the patent medicine industry, one of the primary causes of medical addiction. The labelling requirements of the Act, coupled with the later regulation of the production and distribution of the opiates, protected the public from the dangers of ignorance and virtually put the patent medicine industry out of business. Second, the discovery of new nonaddictive painkillers and anesthetics reduced the likelihood of post-operative addiction since physicians no longer needed to rely so heavily on morphine and opium preparations to reduce and control pain.

2. State Legislative Response Before 1914

Although many states regulated narcotics indirectly through their general “poison laws” before 1870, the first anti-narcotics legislation did not appear until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Most of the early legislation focused primarily on crime prevention and public education regarding the dangers of drug use. The spread of opium-smoking, especially in the western states with high oriental populations, provoked legislation in eighteen states between 1877 and 1911 designed

47 See H. Kane, Opium-Smoking in America and China (1882), in which the author supports the contention that by approximately 1890 narcotic addiction had become widespread among the respectable and professional classes. He states:

The practice [opium smoking] spread rapidly and quietly among this class of gamblers and prostitutes until the latter part of 1875, at which time the authorities became cognizant of the fact, and finding, upon investigation, that many women and young girls, as also young men of respectable family, were being induced to visit the dens . . . .

Quoted in Terry & Pellen 73.

48 Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
49 “The peak of the patent medicine industry was reached just prior to the passage of the federal Pure Food and Drug Act in 1906.” Terry & Pellen 75.
50 U.S. Treasury Dept., State Laws Relating to the Control of Narcotic Drugs and the Treatment of Drug Addiction 1 (1931) [hereinafter cited as State Laws].
51 The first drug legislation enacted in eight states outlawed the administering of a narcotic drug to any person with the intent to facilitate the commission of a felony. These states were California (1872), Idaho (1887), New York (1897), North Dakota (1883), Pennsylvania (1901), South Dakota (1883), Utah (1876) and Wisconsin (1901). Id. at 1-2.
52 Twenty-two states made such legislation their first laws concerning the drug problem. Id. at 2.
53 Id. at 3-4.
to eradicate the practice either by preventing the operation of opium dens or by punishing the smoking of opium altogether. As the addictive qualities of opium, cocaine, morphine and later heroin became known, primarily through observation of "street" use, concerned physicians finally began to agitate for stricter regulation than that provided by the "poison laws," even though such laws included opium and cocaine. Nevada enacted the first law prohibiting the retail sale of opiates for nonmedical purposes in 1877. In 1887, Oregon prohibited sale of cocaine without a prescription, and seven states followed suit by the turn of the century, as did thirty-nine more by 1914. However, only twenty-nine states had included opiates in their prohibitionary legislation by 1914.

With the exception of the Oregon scheme, nineteenth century narcotic laws did not attempt to restrict or prohibit possession of narcotics, and were directed solely at distribution and sale. By 1913, only six states had prohibited the mere possession of restricted drugs by unauthorized persons. Three additional states prohibited possession with intent illegally to dispense such drugs.

3. Watershed: The Passage of the Harrison Act

The first national legislation designed to regulate narcotics distribution, the 1909 "Act to Prohibit Importation and Use of Opium," barred the importation of opium at other than specified ports and for other than medicinal use. The law further required the keeping of import

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64 States with such legislation were Arizona (1883), California (1881), Georgia (1895), Idaho (1887), Maryland (1886), Missouri (1911), Montana (1881), Nevada (1877), New Mexico (1887), North Dakota (1879), Ohio (1885), Pennsylvania (1883), South Dakota (1879), Utah (1880), Wisconsin (1891) and Wyoming (1882). See id., pt. III.
65 Id. at 5.
66 Id. at 5, 251.
67 Arizona (1899), Arkansas (1899), Colorado (1897), Illinois (1897), Mississippi (1900), Montana (1889) and New York (1893). Id., pt. III.
68 See id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 251.
71 California (1909), Maine (1887), South Carolina (1911), Tennessee (1913), West Virginia (1911) and Wyoming (1903). Id., pt. III.
72 Maryland (1912), Ohio (1913) and Virginia (1908). Id.
records. The main force behind the passage of this statute was a desire to bring the United States into line with other nations that had signed international conventions against the use of the drug. However, as state anti-narcotics legislation began to take on crusade proportions, pressure was generated for federal regulation of the importation of opium for medicinal purposes and of the interstate trade in cocaine, morphine and heroin. Consequently, the Harrison Act, until this year the foundation of federal law controlling narcotic drugs, was passed in 1914.

The Harrison Act, a taxing measure, required registration and payment of an occupational tax by all persons who imported, produced, dealt in, sold or gave away opium, cocaine or their derivatives. The Act required all legitimate handlers of these narcotics to file returns setting forth in detail their use of the drugs. Each legitimate handler was required to use a special order form in making any transfer of narcotics. Since the Act also provided that only legitimate users could register and no one but a registered user could obtain the specified form, any transfer by an illegitimate user was a violation of the Act. For those failing to comply with its registration requirements, the original Harrison Act provided penalties of not more than $2,000 in fines or more than five years imprisonment, or both.

The passage of the Harrison Act was the culmination of increasing concern in the medical profession about the freedom with which physicians prescribed and druggists dispensed addictive drugs, primarily morphine and heroin. During the period of little or no regulation, the innocent addicts were regarded as victims of an unfortunate sickness in need of treatment; usually they could find a friend physician or druggist willing to sustain their habits. The passage of the Harrison Act, however, by imposing a stamp of illegitimacy on most narcotics use, fostered an image previously associated primarily with opium—that of the degenerate dope fiend with immoral proclivities. As the regulation of physicians and druggists became more stringent, especially after the Supreme Court held that prevention of withdrawal was not a legitimate medical use that justified a prescription to an unregistered

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64 Hearings on the Importation and Use of Opium Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. at 9 (1910).
person,\textsuperscript{67} this image fulfilled itself. All addicts, whether accidental or pleasure-seeking, were shut off from their supply and had to turn underground to purchase the drugs. Inflated underground prices often provoked criminal activity and this activity in turn evoked in the public a moral response, cementing the link between iniquity and drug addiction.\textsuperscript{68}

The early clinical experiments dealing with narcotics addiction were inevitable victims of enforcement of the Act.\textsuperscript{69} The concept that underlay the clinical effort—that addiction was a medical problem to be dealt with by sustaining the addict cheaply while trying to induce gentle withdrawal—was antithetical to the attitude provoking the criminal classification of unlawful possessors of narcotic drugs.\textsuperscript{70} Clinics were run in such cities as New York, Shreveport and Jacksonville,\textsuperscript{71} but by 1923 all were closed, thus removing still another legitimate source of supply for the addict. Again, the crimes committed to enable these people to tap the illicit sources increased public hysteria and misunderstanding about the link between the opiates and crime.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{67}Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919).

Another result of the physicians' resignation to pressure was that addicts to the opiates began to commit petty crimes in order to secure the drugs which could prevent their suffering. These inevitable law-induced crimes greatly accentuated the general public belief that opiates had some inherent sinister property which could change normal people into moral perverts and criminals. See generally T. Duster, \textit{The Legislation of Morality} 3-28 (1970).


\textsuperscript{70}For a savage attack on the clinic system by a well-known supporter of the law enforcement model of the Harrison Act, see Stanley, \textit{Narcotic Drugs and Crime}, 12 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 110 (1921).

\textsuperscript{71}Lindesmith reports that for a brief period of time from 1919 to 1923 some forty clinics of this type existed in the United States. A. Lindesmith, \textit{supra} note 31, at 136.

\textsuperscript{72}The closing of the New York Clinic in 1919 was an especially potent factor in promoting hysteria about heroin. More than 7,400 addicts, about 90 percent of whom were users of heroin, were thrown on the streets of the city. Driven to commit crimes, including those of narcotic violations, many of these addicts were arrested. The increased number of arrests was widely interpreted as an indication of moral deterioration due to narcotics instead of evidence of maladministration of what could have been a useful law. There were, of course, physicians who disented both as to the wisdom of closing the clinics and as to the harmful effect of the drugs. Many of those who persisted in helping their patients were arrested. Kolb, \textit{supra} note 68, at 27.
In addition to redefining the public conception of narcotic addiction in a way that would not be seriously challenged for half a century, the Harrison Act also provided a strange model for the administration of narcotics laws which would significantly affect future developments. Drafted as a tax law rather than an outright criminal statute, the Act was intended to do indirectly what Congress believed it could not do directly—regulate possession and sale of the opiates. Indeed, congressional caution was justified. A five-to-four decision by the Supreme Court in the 1903 Lottery Case suggested what later became fact—the Court, as self-appointed arbiter of the federal system, would plant the tenth amendment in the path of congressional regulation of “local” affairs. That direct regulation of medical practice was indeed considered beyond congressional power under the commerce clause is clearly indicated in contemporary opinions. First, in its 1918 decision in *Hammer v. Dagenhart*, the Court held the Child Labor Act unconstitutional. Second, the Court ultimately upheld the Harrison Act as a valid exercise of the taxing power only by a five-to-four margin. Finally, there is some fairly explicit language about congressional regulation of medical practice in subsequent Harrison Act opinions.

This indirect regulation of narcotics traffic under the pretext of raising revenue had a number of significant consequences. First, since the Act could not penalize users or addiction directly, there was an immediate need for complementary residual state legislation in order to deal effectively with the drug problem. Second, the enforcement of the

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73 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
74 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
75 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919). The four dissenters asserted that “the statute was a mere attempt by Congress to exert a power not delegated, that is, the reserved police power of the States.” Id. at 95. It is interesting to note, however, that a subsequent congressional attempt to regulate child labor through the taxing power was also invalidated. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
76 Justice McReynolds stated for the Court in *Linder v. United States*, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925):

> Obviously, direct control of medical practice in the States is beyond the power of the Federal Government. Incidental regulation of such practice by Congress through a taxing act cannot extend to matters plainly inappropriate and unnecessary to reasonable enforcement of a revenue measure.

The Court also held that the Harrison Act did not apply to mere possession of opium. In reaching this conclusion the Court pointed out that any congressional attempt to punish as a crime possession of any article produced in a state would raise the gravest questions of power. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916).
Act was necessarily assigned to the Internal Revenue Service in the Treasury Department.

The first enforcement agency for the Harrison Act was the Narcotics Division of the Prohibition Unit of the Internal Revenue Service created in 1920.\(^7\) This division was incorporated in the Prohibition Bureau which was created in 1927.\(^8\) In 1930, the enforcement of the narcotics laws was severed from the Bureau of Prohibition and established as the separate Bureau of Narcotics in the Treasury Department.\(^9\) The existence of this separate agency anxious to fulfill its role as crusader against the evils of narcotics has done as much as any single factor to influence the course of drug regulation from 1930 to 1970.\(^10\) Although the impact of the Bureau on the passage of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and the Marihuana Tax Act will be explained in detail in subsequent sections, it is important here to note that the existence of a separate bureau having responsibility only for narcotics enforcement and for educating the public on drug problems inevitably led to a particularly prosecutorial view of the narcotics addict. Moreover, this creation of the Bureau separate from the newly created FBI in the Justice Department unnecessarily bifurcated federal law enforcement operations in this area.

C. The Judicial Role and the Constitutional Framework: The Police Power and Intoxicant Prohibition to 1920

It is not novel to suggest that the fate of contemporary constitutional challenges to marijuana prohibition depends in part on a judicial reading of public opinion as well as on the availability of a constitutional peg on which to hang an "activist" judicial inquiry. Since contextual pressure and analytical conflict were also central elements of the judicial response to alcohol and narcotics prohibition between 1850 and 1920, it is worthwhile to trace that response.

As in today's court battles over marijuana laws, the clash then was between two polar constitutional concepts—the police powers of the state and allegedly "fundamental" personal constitutional rights. The

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\(^7\) Schmeckebier, The Bureau of Prohibition, in Brookings Inst. for Gov't Research, Service Monograph No. 57, at 143 (1929).

\(^8\) An Act to Create a Bureau of Customs and a Bureau of Prohibition in the Department of the Treasury, ch. 348, 44 Stat. 1381 (1927).


conflict opened on state constitutional grounds and was continued in the realm of the fourteenth amendment. On the issues of alcohol and "hard" narcotics, the police power was triumphant. In the light of the comparisons drawn in current constitutional arguments among marijuana, alcohol and narcotics, an inquiry into the long struggle is informative.

1. Phase One: Prohibition of Sale and Manufacture of Alcohol

During the first wave of prohibitionist legislation in the 1850's, thirteen states outlawed manufacture and sale of intoxicating beverages. The constitutionality of such laws under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution had been presaged in the License Cases in 1847, where in six separate opinions the Supreme Court upheld Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island laws regulating wholesale and retail sales of liquor. Chief Justice Taney's famous dictum stated:

And if any State deems the retail and internal traffic in ardent spirits injurious to its citizens, and calculated to produce idleness, vice, or debauchery, I see nothing in the constitution of the United States to prevent it from regulating and restraining the traffic, or from prohibiting it altogether, if it thinks proper.

Armed with this pronouncement, the courts of eight states rebuffed challenges under their own constitutions. Some of these decisions gave scant attention to the constitutional argument but simply defined the police power in broad terms and perhaps cited the Taney dictum.

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81 The primary objective of prohibitionary legislation was to suppress all traffic in intoxicating beverages. Accordingly, most states prohibited both manufacture and sale. However, New Hampshire's law, in effect from 1855 through 1903, forbade only sale.

82 Sixteen states passed prohibitionary legislation for the whole territory of the state. However, twelve of them had repealed this legislation by 1903, and a thirteenth, Maine, had repealed its statute before 1884 when prohibition was embodied in a constitutional amendment. E. Freund, Police Power 202, 203 (1904).

83 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).

84 Id. at 577.

85 State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185 (1858); State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290 (1856); State v. Allmond, 7 Del. 612 (1856); People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244 (1856); Santo v. State, 2 Iowa 165 (1855); Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328 (1855); People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330 (1854); Commonwealth v. Kendall, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 414 (1853); Jones v. People, 14 Ill. 196 (1852).

86 State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185 (1858); Commonwealth v. Kendall, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 414 (1853); Jones v. People, 14 Ill. 196 (1852).

87 State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290 (1856); State v. Allmond, 7 Del. 612 (1856); Santo v. State, 2 Iowa 165 (1855); Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328 (1855).
However, the rationale and rhetoric of those decisions squarely rejecting the constitutional objections merit a detailed comparison with that of two decisions, in New York\(^8\) and Indiana,\(^9\) declaring the statutes void.

Even the opponents of the laws acknowledged the potential public evils of intemperance\(^10\)—crime, pauperism and vice—the eradication of which was the objective of prohibitionary legislation. Yet they argued that the means employed to accomplish this end—prevention of sale—was beyond the police power. Alcohol had admittedly beneficial uses\(^9\) and was harmful only when abused.\(^2\) In order to eliminate it from channels of commerce, thereby depriving its owners of a fundamental incident of ownership—the right to sell\(^3\)—a more pernicious character had to be shown.\(^4\) Accordingly, the public benefit did not justify the

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\(^8\) Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).

\(^9\) Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855).

\(^10\) Dissenting in People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244 (1856), Justice Pratt noted: “That intemperance is a great evil, no sane man can doubt.” Id. at 284. The Iowa court asserted:

There is no statistical or economical proposition better established, nor one to which a more general assent is given by reading and intelligent minds, than this, that the use of intoxicating liquors as a drink, is the cause of more want, pauperism, suffering, crime and public expense, than any other cause—and perhaps it should be said, than all other causes combined.

Santo v. State, 2 Iowa 165, 190 (1855).

\(^11\) Dissenting in People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244 (1856), Justice Pratt stated: “Spiritious liquors are necessary in the prosecution of many of the most valuable arts, as well as for mechanical, manufacturing and medicinal purposes.” Id. at 260.

\(^12\) The Indiana Court noted “as a matter of general knowledge . . . that the use of beer &c. as a beverage, is not necessarily hurtful, any more than the use of lemonade or ice cream. . . . It is the abuse, and not the use, of all these beverages that is hurtful.” Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 519-20 (1855).

\(^13\) Justice Pratt reasoned:

Liquors, then, whether produced by fermentation or distillation, do legally constitute property of use and value; and the owner of this species of personal property, when lawfully acquired, is, upon every principle, . . . entitled to the possession and use of it. This legally includes the right of keeping, selling or giving it away, as the owner may deem proper. This is a natural primary right incident to ownership . . . .


\(^14\) Said the Indiana Court:

[T]he legislature enacted the law in question upon the assumption that the manufacture and sale of beer . . . were necessarily destructive to the community, and in acting upon that assumption, in our judgment, has unwarrantably invaded the right to private property, and its use as a beverage and article of traffic, . . . We repeat, the manufacture and sale and use of liquors are not necessarily hurtful, and \textit{this the Court has a right to judicially inquire into} and act upon in deciding upon the validity of the law in question—in deciding . . . whether it is
restriction of private rights. The criminalization of sale of alcohol beverages constituted a deprivation of "property" without due process, or, failing that, it constituted an infringement of the inalienable right of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness rooted in the precepts of natural justice that the people reserved to themselves when they entered into the social compact. New York, in *Wynehamer v. People*, accepted the due process argument, at least with respect to alcohol lawfully acquired, and Indiana endorsed the inalienable rights argument in *Beebe v. State*.

The virtues of judicial restraint were vehemently defended in the decisions rejecting these arguments: The courts uniformly refused to interfere with the discretionary exercise of the police power in the absence of a specific constitutional prohibition. The Vermont Supreme Court view was typical:

> The legislature in passing the law in question doubtless supposed that the traffic and drinking of intoxicating liquors went hand in hand ... and that by cutting off the one, the other would also fall with it. Whether the drinking of intoxicating liquors tends to produce intemperance and whether the intemperance is a gangrene, tending to corrupt an indirect invasion of a right secured to the citizen by the Constitution.

*Beebe v. State*, 6 Ind. 501, 520-21 (1855) (emphasis added).

In an opinion often cited as the first to invoke the substantive construction of "due process of law," Judge Comstock in *Wynehamer v. People*, 13 N.Y. 378, 392-93, 398 (1856), stated:

> To say ... that "the law of the land" or "due process of law", may mean the very act of legislation which deprives the citizen of his rights, privileges or property, leads to a simple absurdity. The Constitution would then mean, that no person shall be deprived of his property or rights unless the legislature shall pass a law to effectuate the wrong, and this would be throwing the restraint entirely away. The true interpretation of these constitutional phrases is, that where rights are acquired by the citizen under existing law, there is no power in any branch of the government to take them away.

> When a law annihilates the value of property, and strips it of its attributes, by which alone it is distinguished as property, the owner is deprived of it according to the plainest interpretation, and certainly within the spirit of a constitutional provision intended expressly to shield private rights from the exercise of arbitrary power.

The Indiana court held the prohibitionary legislation in contravention of a provision in the state constitution declaring that "all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." *Beebe v. State*, 6 Ind. 501, 510 (1855). Dissenting in *People v. Gallagher*, 4 Mich. 244, 258 (1856), Justice Pratt conducted an identical natural rights inquiry without the benefit of Thomas Jefferson's penmanship.

*13 N.Y. 378 (1856).*

*6 Ind. 501 (1855).*
the moral health of the body politic, and to produce misery and lamentation; and whether the law in question is well calculated to cut off or mitigate the evils supposed to flow directly from intemperance and indirectly from the traffic in intoxicating liquors, were questions to be settled by the lawmaking power; and their decision in this respect is final and not to be reviewed by us.  

Under this view, societal self-protection, the essence of the police power, is broadly defined. So long as the legislature determines that the use of alcoholic beverages exerts an adverse effect on public health, safety or morals, the courts may question neither the factual determination nor the means employed to restrict that use. In answer to the argument that the courts have a special obligation to review the relation between means and ends where personal liberties are curtailed, these courts disavowed any power "to annul a legislative Act upon higher grounds than those of express constitutional restriction," or, after assuming for sake of argument the existence of such power, they declined to exercise it. In response to the argument accepted by Judge Comstock in Wynehamer v. New York—that prohibition of sale of legally acquired alcohol was a deprivation of property without due process of law—most courts distinguished Wynehamer on its facts, held that no essential "property" right had been violated, or construed "due process" to refer only to due procedure and not to the "power . . . to create and define an offense."

Two polar conceptions of the scope of judicial review clashed over a subject of intense public interest. The immediate question was settled in favor of the constitutionality of prohibiting manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages; in fact, the Indiana court itself disavowed its contrary decision in Beebe three years after rendering it. However, the jurisprudential dialogue had merely begun. Today, Wynehamer is

100 See State v. Guernsey, 37 Me. 156, 161 (1853).
104 State v. Allmond, 7 Del. 612, 692 (1856).
105 State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185, 197 (1858); Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328, 360 (1855).
106 Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482 (1858).
107 In People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244 (1856), the majority stated: The legislature has said that . . . no man shall sell liquors to be used as a
regarded as the initial step on the road to the vested rights conception of due process. Similarly, Beebe is the philosophical ancestor of all challenges to prohibition of intoxicants—alcohol, narcotics and marijuana.

With the passage of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether prohibitionary exercises of the state police powers were now limited by federal law. The battle fought in the 1850's on state constitutional grounds was refought in the 1870's and 80's on federal territory—with the same outcome. In a series of cases culminating in Mugler v. Kansas, it slowly became settled that the manufacturer or seller of intoxicating liquors had no constitutional rights under either the privileges and immunities or due process clauses that could prevent the operation of the police power of the state, regardless whether the liquor was bought or manufactured before passage of the law or even whether it was manufactured solely for personal use.

beverage, because by so doing, he inflicts injury on the public; but, says the defendant, irrespective of the evil, this right to sell liquors is a natural right, and you have no power to pass a law infringing that right. How does he prove it? Not by any adjudged cases; there are none, nor by anything in the constitution preserving to him this right; but it is to be determined by the nature and character of the right. . . . [The manner in which the determination is to be made is] a question very suitable and proper for the discussion and deliberation of a legislative body, but one which cannot be entertained by this court.

Id. at 257. Judge Pratt replied:

If the doctrine is true that the legislature can, by the exercise of an implied discretionary power, pass any law not expressly inhibited by the constitution, then it is certain that a hundred laws may be enacted by that body, invading directly legitimate business pursuits, impairing and rendering worthless trades and occupations, and destroying the substantial value of private property to the amount of millions of dollars. . . . But who, I ask, believes that the legislature possesses the power, or that the people, in their sovereignty, ever intended to confer on that body such unlimited omnipotence? As appears to me, no man of reason and reflection can believe it.

Id. at 277-79 (dissenting opinion).

108 Mere possession or consumption of alcohol was not prohibited during this phase of temperance legislation. Many of the courts were careful to allude to this feature and to note that forfeiture could result only from illegal possession—possession with intent to sell in violation of the law. See, e.g., Santo v. State, 2 Iowa 165 (1855); Commonwealth v. Kendall, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 414 (1853).

109 123 U.S. 623 (1887).

110 In Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1873), the Supreme Court held that the prohibition of traffic in intoxicating drinks violates no privilege and immunity of United States citizenship; the Court avoided the question whether a law prohibiting sale of liquor owned before the law was passed was a deprivation of property without due process. Four years later, in Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877), the Court sustained a prohibition law against a challenge under the obligation of contracts clauses but still deferred consideration of the Wyneman question. In upholding
Thus, as a matter of both state and federal constitutional law, the courts required no more, and probably less, than that legislation be designed to retard a public evil—here pauperism and crime—and be rationally related to that end. Absent a specific constitutional limitation, it did not concern the courts that such regulations affronted personal liberty and property rights. The theoretical justification of incidental curtailment of private liberties in the public interest was that the legislature must conduct the balancing; if the balance is unsound, the law will be repealed. Indeed, the courts were probably willing to indulge that presumption as a practical matter since the passage of the prohibition laws was preceded by vigorous public debate. In fact, the public opinion process did work in reaction to these curtailments of private liberty, and most such laws were subsequently repealed in the ensuing decade.

2. Phase Two: Prohibition of Sale of Opium

As noted above, the first prohibitionary narcotics legislation was enacted on the west coast in the 1880's in order to prohibit sale and distribution of opium for nonmedical purposes. The racial overtones

the seizure and forfeiture of liquors belonging to the petitioner, Justice Bradley stated:

If the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of any manufacture or traffic, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance, by any incidental inconvenience which individuals or corporations may suffer. All rights are held subject to the police power of the State.

97 U.S. at 32.

Finally, in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), Wynebamer was slain. The Court sustained a conviction for selling beer manufactured before the passage of the law. The Court even held that, in order to make effective its regulations against sale, the State might forbid manufacture for personal use. Id. at 662. The only constitutional inhibitions remaining after Mugler emanated from the commerce power. For a discussion of the gradual elimination of these restrictions by congressional action, see Safely, Growth of State Power Under Federal Constitution to Regulate Traffic in Intoxicating Liquors, 3 Iowa L. Bull. 221, 229-34 (1917).

111 In Mugler, Justice Harlan stated:

There is no justification for holding that the State, under the guise merely of police regulations, is here aiming to deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights. . . . If, therefore, a state deems the absolute prohibition of the manufacture and sale, within her limits, of intoxicating liquors for other than medical, scientific, and manufacturing purposes, to be necessary to the peace and security of society, the courts cannot, without usurping legislative functions, override the will of the people as thus expressed by their chosen representatives. They have nothing to do with the mere policy of legislation.

123 U.S. at 662.

112 See note 82 supra.
Marijuana Prohibition

of this legislation were self-consciously acknowledged by the initial Oregon and Nevada decisions. Sustaining the conviction of an alien for selling opium in *Ex parte Yung Jon*, the Oregon district court noted:

Smoking opium is not our vice, and therefore it may be that this legislation proceeds more from a desire to vex and annoy the "Heathen Chinee" in this respect, than to protect the people from the evil habit. But the motives of legislators cannot be the subject of judicial investigation for the purpose of affecting the validity of their acts.

The opium laws were attacked on precisely the same grounds as had been the alcohol prohibition legislation. The Nevada court had no trouble in *State v. Ab Chew*; it simply cited the *License Cases*, the Delaware decision sustaining prohibition of alcohol sale, and distinguished *Wynehamer* as holding only that the sale of lawfully acquired property could not be prohibited. Within this framework, the result was obvious:

It is not denied that the indiscriminate use of opium ... tends in a much greater degree to demoralize the persons using it, to dull the moral senses, to foster vice and produce crime, than the sale of intoxicating drinks. If such is its tendency, it should not have unrestrained license to produce such disastrous results. ... Under the police power ... in the interest of good morals, the good order and peace of society, for the prevention of crime, misery and want, the legislature has authority to place such restrictions upon sale or disposal of opium as will mitigate, if not suppress, its evils to society.

The Oregon court, in the *Yung Jon* decision five years later, did not take the easy way out. The court was apparently not disposed to imply that sale of previously owned alcohol and cigarettes could be prohibited, and thus reject outright the *Wynehamer* conception of due process; instead it chose to hold that sale of opium for nonmedical purposes was

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118 28 F. 308 (D. Ore. 1886). The prisoner had been convicted in an Oregon court and was being heard on petition for habeas corpus.
114 Id. at 312.
115 16 Nev. 50 (1881).
116 Id. at 55-56.
117 The Supreme Court rejected it one year later in *Mugler v. Kansas*, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
not an incident of ownership and, since the law did not prohibit sale for medical purposes, no property right was deprived. Not as cautious as his brethren, Judge Deady inquired more actively into the nature of opium before upholding the legislation. Whether a legislative act is “prohibitory” (and by implication whether it violates the due process clause) “must depend on circumstances, and particularly the character of the article, and the uses and purposes to which it has generally been applied in the community.”

He then noted that opium was primarily a medicinal drug; that although used in the East for centuries as an intoxicant, that use was new in the United States and confined primarily to the Chinese; that it was classed as a poison and was less easily detected than alcoholic intoxication, “which it is said to replace where law and custom have made the latter disreputable;” and that its “evil effects” were manifest upon the nervous and digestive systems, resembling delirium tremens. Thus, there was no longstanding regard of opium as a legitimate article of property except for medical use. Accordingly,

the act does not in effect prohibit the disposition of the drug, but allows it under such circumstances, and on such conditions, as will, according to the general practice and opinions of the country, prevent its improper and harmful use.

Thus, whatever the judicial propensity to limit the police power in the interest of property rights, prohibition of traffic in opium—worse than alcohol and confined to aliens—violated no implied or express constitutional limitations.

3. Phase Three: Prohibition of Possession of Alcohol to 1915

At this stage of constitutional jurisprudence, criminalization of pos-
session or consumption of alcohol or narcotics was arguably a deprivation of property without due process of law. The first wave of prohibition cases had held only that the right to sell even previously acquired liquor was not an essential element of ownership. They had not held that the state could forbid the essential attribute of ownership—the right to use. In fact, many courts had expressly noted that alcohol was still a legitimate article of property.  

Until 1915 the weight of authority was that it was beyond the police power to prohibit mere possession of alcoholic beverages unless the quantity justified an inference that they were held for sale. A few cases so held; many courts so stated in dictum, while holding the laws either in conflict with particular constitutional provisions regarding the “sale” of liquor or in excess of the power of municipal corporations; and many contemporary commentators so stated.

Although the due process rationale was sometimes employed, the preferred approach was “inherent” limitation. In his 1904 treatise, Police Power, Ernst Freund premised the “inherent” limitation of noninterference with purely private conduct not on any inalienable natural right but on the requirement that interference be justified on grounds of the public welfare. This and the “practical difficulties of enforce-

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120 State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290 (1856); Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328 (1855); Commonwealth v. Kendall, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 414 (1853); cf. State v. Clark, 28 N.H. 176, 181 (1854) (ordinance that prohibited using or keeping intoxicating liquors in any refreshment saloon or restaurant, “not unreasonable,” since it did not “profess to prohibit either the use or sale of liquor altogether”).


122 Commonwealth v. Campbell, 133 Ky. 50, 117 S.W. 383 (1909); Ex parte Brown, 38 Tex. Crim. 295, 42 S.W. 554 (1897); State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 10 S.E. 283 (1889).


125 E.g., State v. Williams, 146 N.C. 618, 61 S.E. 61 (1908).

126 E. Freund, Police Power 486 (1904):

Under these circumstances it seems impossible to speak of a constitutional right of private consumption. There seems to be no direct judicial authority for declaring private acts exempt from the police power, and the universal tolerance with regard to them should be ascribed to policy. Like any other exercise of the
ment, coupled with the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches," 127 would sufficiently deter legislative abuse.

Absent the addition of a natural rights notion, however, this decisional frame becomes ambivalent on the dispositive question in an adjudication questioning such legislative "abuse": Can the mere "policy" of nonintervention with private conduct justify a more rigorous judicial inquiry into the relation between the prohibited private acts and the alleged public evil? If it cannot, the constitutional attack on prohibition of possession is no stronger than that on prohibition of sale. If it can, is not the judicial role subject to the same charge of usurpation as it would be if the courts employed a pure natural rights approach?

In any event, when the courts first confronted possession prohibition, the rhetoric was varied—due process, 128 natural rights 129 and private liberty 130—but the approach was the same—a refusal to accept the legislative findings as to the relation between private act and public harm and a refusal to defer to the legislative balance of private liberty and public need. For example, in one of the leading cases, Commonwealth v. Campbell, 131 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky cited Cooley, Mill and Blackstone for the proposition that

[i]t is not within the competency of government to invade the privacy of the citizen's life and to regulate his conduct in matters in which he alone is concerned, or to prohibit him any liberty the exercise of which will not directly injure society. 132

Noting next that defendant was "not charged with having the liquor in his possession for the purpose of selling it, or even giving it to another" and that "ownership and possession cannot be denied when that ownership and possession is not in itself injurious to the public," 133 the court concluded that

[t]he right to use liquor for one's own comfort, if the use is without

127 Id.
128 E.g., State v. Williams, 146 N.C. 618, 61 S.E. 61 (1908).
129 E.g., State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 10 S.E. 283 (1889).
130 E.g., Eidge v. City of Bessemer, 164 Ala. 599, 51 So. 246 (1909); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 133 Ky. 50, 117 S.W. 383 (1909).
131 133 Ky. 50, 117 S.W. 383 (1909).
132 Id. at 58, 117 S.W. at 385 (emphasis added).
133 Id. at 63, 117 S.W. at 387.
direct injury to the public, is one of the citizen’s natural and inalienable rights. . . . We hold that the police power—vague and wide and undefined as it is—has limits . . . .

The key to this reasoning, of course, is the court’s insistence that the injury be direct as measured according to a judicial yardstick. Although the court devoted little attention to the question, it implicitly rejected arguments that the only way to exorcize the public evils attending excessive use and adequately to enforce prohibitions against sale was to prevent any private use at all. The court impliedly held that the posited connection, albeit rational, was “remote” or “indirect” or “unreasonable” and therefore entitled to no deference.135

4. Phase Four: Prohibition of Possession of Narcotics

This active judicial role in alcohol cases should be compared with the courts’ simultaneous refusals to second-guess legislative “findings”

134 Id. 63-64, 117 S.W. at 387.

135 Similarly, in State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 10 S.E. 283 (1889), the court stated: It can hardly be questioned that the right to possess property is [an inalienable] right, and that that right embraces the privilege of a citizen to keep in his possession property for another. It is not denied that the keeping of property which is injurious to the lives, health, or comfort of all persons may be prohibited under the police power. . . . [I]t must, of course, be within the range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure others. But it does not follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these ends is to be accepted as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State . . . .

The keeping of liquors in his possession by a person, whether for himself or for another, unless he does so for the illegal sale of it, or for some other improper purpose, can by no possibility injure or affect the health, morals, or safety of the public; and, therefore, the statute prohibiting such keeping in possession is not a legitimate exertion of the police power.

Id. at 148-49, 10 S.E. at 284 (emphasis added); accord, Ex parte Brown, 38 Tex. Crim. 295, 42 S.W. 554 (1897).

In Ex parte Wilson, 6 Okla. Crim. 451, 119 P. 596 (1911), the court, after quoting extensively from Commonwealth v. Campbell, noted, “The only conclusion that we can legitimately arrive at is that the act in question is not within a reasonable exercise of the police powers of the state—is unconstitutional and void.” 6 Okla. Crim. at 475, 119 P. at 606 (emphasis added). Finally, the Alabama Supreme Court stated, in striking down a local ordinance prohibiting possession by beverage dealers of alcoholic beverages: [The ordinance] can be justified only, if at all, on the ground that it sustains some reasonable relation to the prohibition law in the way of preventing evasions of that law by trick, artifice, or subterfuge under guise of which that law is violated. But it has no such relation. It undertakes to prohibit the keeping in any quantity and for any purpose, however innocent, of intoxicating liquors and beverages in places which are innocent in themselves.

with regard to the criminalization of possession of opium. In a series of
cases decided in Washington, Oregon and California in 1890, 1896
and 1911 respectively, courts held that the relation between narcotics
use and public harm was to be drawn by the legislature.

In answer to the argument, accepted in the alcohol cases, that despite
the absence of explicit constitutional limitations the police power of
prohibition was inherently limited to acts which "involve direct and
immediate injury to another," the courts replied in predictable fash-
on: The state may prevent a weak man from doing injury to himself
if it determines that such injury may cause the individual to become a
"burden on society;" the state could find that excessive use of opium,
an active poison, would debase the moral and economic welfare of the
society by causing ill health, pauperism and insanity; the state could
find that the potential for and evils attending excessive use demand a
prohibition also of nondeleterious moderate use. Accordingly, in the
words of the Supreme Court of Washington,

[i]t is for the legislature to place on foot the inquiry as to just in what
degree the use is injurious; to collate all the information and to make
all the needful and necessary calculations. These are questions of fact
with which the court cannot deal. The constitutionality of laws is
not thus to be determined.

136 Ex parte Yun Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 114 P. 835 (1911); Luck v. Sears, 29 Ore.
421, 44 P. 693 (1896); Ah Lim v. Territory, 1 Wash. 156, 24 P. 588 (1890).
137 Ah Lim v. Territory, 1 Wash. 156, 63, 24 P. 588, 589 (1890).
138 If the state concludes that a given habit is detrimental to either the moral,
mental or physical well being of one of its citizens to such an extent that it is
liable to become a burthen upon society, it has an undoubted right to restrain
the citizen from the commission of that act; and fair and equitable consideration
of the rights of other citizens make it not only its right, but its duty, to restrain
him.
Id. at 164, 24 P. at 590; accord, Ex parte Yun Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 515, 114 P. 833, 837
(1911); Luck v. Sears, 29 Ore. 421, 426, 44 P. 693, 694 (1896).
139 Ex parte Yun Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 515, 114 P. 835, 837 (1911); Luck v. Sears,
29 Ore. 421, 425, 44 P. 693, 694 (1896).
140 But it is urged . . . that a moderate use of opium . . . is not deleterious and
consequently cannot be prohibited. We answer that this is a question of fact
which can only be inquired into by the legislature.
Ah Lim v. Territory, 1 Wash. 156, 64, 24 P. 588, 590 (1890). The dissent argued
that moderate use by some could not be punished to prevent excessive use by others.
Id. at 172-74, 24 P. at 592-93.
141 Id. at 165, 24 P. at 590.

[Whether [opium's] nature and character is such that for the protection of
the public its possession by unauthorized persons should be prohibited is a ques-
The California court had more difficulty with the argument that punishment of possession of alcohol had been held beyond the police power. Despite its rhetoric regarding the wide bounds of legislative fact-finding, the court actually made its own determination that public injury from private abuse was more likely with narcotics than alcohol. The lower court had said so overtly:

But liquor is used daily in this and other countries as a beverage, moderately and without harm, by countless thousands...; whereas it appears there is no such thing as moderation in the use of opium. Once the habit is formed the desire for it is insatiable, and its use is invariably disastrous.\(^\text{142}\)

The California Supreme Court shied away:

We do not understand this to have been intended to declare an established or conceded fact. So interpreted, the expression would be, perhaps unduly sweeping. But the validity of legislation which would be necessary or proper under a given state of facts does not depend upon the actual existence of the supposed facts. It is enough if the law-making body may rationally believe such facts to be established. If the belief that the use of opium, once begun, almost inevitably leads to excess may be entertained by reasonable men—and we do not doubt that it may—such belief affords a sufficient justification for applying to opium restrictions which might be unduly burdensome in the case of other substances, as, for example, intoxicating liquors, the use of which may fairly be regarded as less dangerous to their users or to the public.\(^\text{143}\)

What the court said is unobjectionable. What it did not say, however, is significant. This reasoning implies that if the legislature should determine that the potential for excessive use of alcohol—and consequently for the public evils of pauperism, crime and insanity—is great enough to prohibit all use, that judgment would have to stand. Probably not intending so to suggest, the court really held that it thought that opium use was more likely adversely to affect the public welfare

\(^\text{142}\) Ex parte Yun Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 514, 114 P. 835, 838 (1911) (quoting lower court opinion) (citations omitted).

\(^\text{143}\) Id. at 515, 114 P. at 838 (emphasis added).
than alcohol use; accordingly, paternal criminal legislation was "reasonable" in the former case and not in the latter, even though they were identically "indirect." It helped, perhaps, that the legislature was not telling the judge and his white, middle-class colleagues that they shouldn't smoke opium, and that the objective was merely to prevent a few "Heathen Chinee" from hurting themselves through their stupidity and from spreading their nasty habit to the whites.\textsuperscript{144}

The only astounding thing about the opium possession cases is that there was at least one dissenting opinion. In the Washington case, Ah Lim \textit{v. Territory},\textsuperscript{145} Judge Scott, for himself and another judge, insisted on either a more conclusive demonstration that the private act of smoking opium "directly and clearly affected the public in some manner" or a more narrowly drawn statute. He catalogued the alleged public justifications:

That smoking or inhaling opium injures the health of the individual, and in this way weakens the state; that it tends to the increase of pauperism. That it destroys the moral sentiment and leads to the commission of crime. In other words, that it has an injurious effect upon the individual, and, consequently, results indirectly in an injury to the community.\textsuperscript{146}

After noting the insufficiency of all of the justifications including the argument that the moderate desires of some must be sacrificed to prevent abuse by others,\textsuperscript{147} the judge concluded:

[The Act] is altogether too sweeping in its terms. I make no question but that the habit of smoking opium may be repulsive and degrading. That its effect would be to shatter the nerves and destroy the intellect; and that it may tend to the increase of pauperism and crime. But there is a vast difference between the commission of a single act, and a confirmed habit. There is a distinction to be recognized between the use and abuse of any article or substance. . . . If this

\textsuperscript{144}"It must be conceded that its indiscriminate use would have a very deleterious and debasing effect upon our race . . . ." \textit{Id.} at 514, 114 P. at 838.

\textsuperscript{145}1 Wash. 156, 24 P. 388 (1890).

\textsuperscript{146}\textit{Id.} at 168, 24 P. at 591.

\textsuperscript{147}Individual desires are too sacred to be ruthlessly violated where only acts are involved . . . which do not clearly result in an injury to society, unless, possibly, thus rendered necessary in order to prevent others from like actions which to them are injurious. \textit{Id.} at 173, 24 P. at 592. He concluded, however, that the statute was too broad and that this question need not be reached.
act must be held valid it is hard to conceive of any legislative action affecting the personal conduct, or privileges of the individual citizen. that must not be upheld. . . . The prohibited act cannot affect the public in any way except through the primary personal injury to the individual, if it occasions him any injury. It looks like a new and extreme step under our government in the field of legislation, if it really was passed for any of the purposes upon which that character of legislation can be sustained, if at all.\footnote{148}{Id. at 174-75, 24 P. at 593.}

The sanctity of “the personal conduct or privileges of the individual citizen” had suffered its first blow. The knockout was only a few rounds away.

5. Phase Five: Prohibition of Possession of Alcohol After 1915

The year 1915 was the watershed year for prohibitionists in the courts. By 1913, the tide had finally turned in the state legislatures, many of which prohibited possession of more than a certain quantity of alcoholic beverages. The first of these statutes to reach the courts was that of Alabama in \textit{Southern Express Co. v. Whittle}.\footnote{149}{194 Ala. 406, 69 So. 652 (1915).}

Overruling its earlier decision in \textit{Eidge v. City of Bessemer},\footnote{150}{164 Ala. 599, 51 So. 246 (1909).} one of the leading cases during the earlier phase, the Alabama court swept away all restraints on the police power. So long as the legislation was directed at some legitimate purpose and was not arbitrary, the court should not interfere.\footnote{151}{It is the peculiar function of the lawmakers to ascertain and to determine when the welfare of the people requires the exercise of the state's police powers, and what are appropriate measures to that end, subject only to the power and authority of the courts to see, when assured to the requisite certainty, that the measures of police so adopted do not arbitrarily violate rights protected by the organic laws.}

Whether or not the Supreme Court had so intended, the Alabama court, like other state courts, relied heavily on Justice Harlan's opinion in \textit{Mugler v. Kansas},\footnote{152}{123 U.S. 623 (1887), quoted in 194 Ala. at 428-33, 69 So. at 659-60.}

and gave its legislature a blank check when exercising police powers:

If the right of common law to manufacture an intoxicating liquor for one's own personal use, out of one's own materials by the application of one's own personal effort, may be forbidden by appropriate legislation under the police power, as was expressly ruled in \textit{Mugler v. Kan-
it cannot be logically or soundly asserted that the receipt or possession of more than a specified quantity at one time may not be forbidden by a statute . . . .\textsuperscript{153}

The alleged sanctity of private conduct gave the court little pause; this was just one of a number of instances where ancillary prohibitions of acts and conduct, innocent in themselves, have been sustained and confirmed as an exercise of the police power of the state; and so upon the theory that some valid legislative purpose might be more certainly made effective, or that evasions of the laws might be prevented or hindered of accomplishment.\textsuperscript{154}

Though the Alabama court did not do so, it could have cited the opium possession cases as authority. Most courts did.

The Alabama decision was quickly followed in Idaho\textsuperscript{155} and in nine other states.\textsuperscript{156} When the Idaho case, \textit{Crane v. Campbell},\textsuperscript{157} came before the Supreme Court, Justice McReynolds dealt the knockout blow:

As the state has the power . . . to prohibit [sale and manufacture], it may adopt such measures as are reasonably appropriate or needful to render exercise of that power effective. And, considering the notorious difficulties always attendant upon efforts to suppress traffic in liquors, we are unable to say that the challenged inhibition of their possession was arbitrary and unreasonable or without proper relation to the legitimate legislative purpose.\textsuperscript{158}

The principle noted by Freund,\textsuperscript{159} that the police power did not easily extend to matters of private conduct, was ignored:

\textsuperscript{153} 194 Ala. at 433, 69 So. at 660.
\textsuperscript{154} Id. at 434, 69 So. at 660.
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Ex parte} Crane, 27 Idaho 671, 151 P. 1006 (1915), aff'd \textit{sub nom.} Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304 (1917).
\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Ex parte} Zwissig, 42 Nev. 360, 178 P. 20 (1919); Fitch v. State, 102 Neb. 361, 167 N.W. 417 (1918); State v. Brown, 40 S.D. 372, 167 N.W. 400 (1918); Liquor Transportation Cases, 140 Tenn. 582, 205 S.W. 423 (1918); State v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 51 Utah 569, 172 P. 1050 (1918); Delaney v. Plunkett, 146 Ga. 547, 91 S.E. 561 (1917); State v. Carpenter, 173 N.C. 767, 92 S.E. 373 (1917); City of Seattle v. Brookies, 98 Wash. 290, 167 P. 940 (1917); Brennan v. Southern Express Co., 106 S.C. 102, 90 S.E. 402 (1916) (dictum).
\textsuperscript{157} 245 U.S. 304 (1917).
\textsuperscript{158} Id. at 307-08 (citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{159} See text at note 126 \textit{supra}.
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[I]t clearly follows from our numerous decisions upholding prohibition legislation that the right to hold intoxicating liquors for personal use is not one of those fundamental privileges of a citizen of the United States which no State may abridge. A contrary view would be incompatible with the undoubted power to prevent manufacture, gift, sale, purchase or transportation of such articles—the only feasible ways of getting them. An assured right of possession would necessarily imply some adequate method to obtain not subject to destruction at the will of the State. 160

Given the restrictive interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause161 and the refusal to extend substantive due process outside the economic area,162 there was no existing federal constitutional pigeonhole for "private conduct" as a principle of constitutional limitation. And on the state level the courts ignored the "intrinsic limitation" argument and discarded the direct-indirect yardstick in the wake of the temperance movement.

The commentators were outraged. Again and again the courts were indicted for interpreting constitutional precepts to correspond with public opinion.163 The judicial retreat on the temperance question coincided perfectly with the final success of the Prohibition movement. And the commentators were quite justified in so noting.

It was merely icing on the cake when the Supreme Court upheld the provision of the Volstead Act164 outlawing possession of intoxicating liquor. The Court predictably rebuffed165 an argument that it was beyond congressional power under section 2 of the eighteenth amendment to prohibit possession for personal consumption of liquor owned before the passage of the Act.166

160 245 U.S. at 308.
161 E.g., Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
162 Substantive due process was slowly being watered down even in the economic area during this time. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
163 E.g., Bronaugh, Limiting or Prohibiting the Possession of Intoxicating Liquors for Personal Use, 23 Law Notes 67 (1919); Rogers, "Life, Liberty & Liquor": A Note on the Police Power, 6 Va. L. Rev. 156 (1919); Safely, Growth of State Power Under Federal Constitution to Regulate Traffic in Intoxicating Liquors, 3 Iowa L. Bull. 221 (1917); Vance, The Road to Confiscation, 25 Yale L.J. 285 (1916).
164 Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919).
166 This argument was accepted in United States v. Dowling, 278 F. 630 (S.D. Fla. 1922).
6. A Postscript on the Police Power: The Cigarette Cases

Interestingly, the legislative solicitude for the health of the citizenry during the period under discussion also extended to the prohibition of cigarette smoking in several jurisdictions. In 1897, the General Assembly of Tennessee made it a misdemeanor to sell, give away or otherwise dispose of cigarettes or cigarette paper. The Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the statute under the police power on the grounds that cigarettes were not legitimate articles of commerce, being "inherently bad and bad only." The United States Supreme Court affirmed in Austin v. Tennessee, primarily on the authority of the alcohol and opium cases, noting that there need be only a rational basis for the legislative determination that the commodity is harmful to justify its prohibition. The Court did not even mention any objection based on deprivation of property rights or personal liberty.

The issue was posed more directly in Kentucky and Illinois cases regarding the validity of local ordinances prohibiting smoking of cigarettes "within the corporate limits" in one case and "in any street, alley, avenue . . . park . . . or [other] public place" in the other. Both courts held the ordinances unreasonable interferences with personal liberty.

Cigarettes do not seem until recently to have attracted the attention of the public as more injurious than other forms of tobacco; nor are we now prepared to take judicial notice of any special injury resulting from their use or to indorse the opinion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee that "they are inherently bad and bad only." At the same time we should be shutting our eyes to what is constantly passing before them were we to affect an ignorance of the fact that a belief in their deleterious effects, particularly upon young people, has become very general and that communications are constantly finding their way into the public press denouncing their use as fraught with great danger to the youth of both sexes. Without undertaking to affirm or deny their evil effects, we think it within the province of the legislature to say how far they may be sold, or to prohibit their sale entirely . . . provided . . . there be no reason to doubt that the act in question is designed for the protection of the public health.

Id. at 348-49; cf. Gundling v. City of Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900) (affirming validity of licensing sale of cigarettes).

168 Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 563, 48 S.W. 305 (1898), aff'd, 179 U.S. 343 (1900).
169 179 U.S. 343 (1900).
170 The primary issue before the Court was whether the statute infringed the exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 344. However, before turning to the "original package" questions, the Court first had to conclude that the statute was a legitimate exercise of the police power, for only then could an indirect interference with interstate commerce be sustained. Id. at 349. The Court noted on this point:

City of Zion v. Behrens, 262 Ill. 510, 104 N.E. 836 (1914); Hershberg v. City of Barbourville, 142 Ky. 60, 133 S.W. 985 (1911).
The argument that the ordinances were calculated to insure the public safety by preventing fire hazards was held to be too remote and the argument accepted in *Austin* regarding potential injury to the smoker's health apparently was not made or at least went unacknowledged by both courts.

These decisions, rendered in 1911 and 1914, were probably consistent, under a direct-indirect injury to society theory, with *Austin* and with the alcohol and narcotics cases up to that time. The post-1915 alcohol possession cases, however, undermined any such distinction, insofar as it authorized a more active judicial inquiry into the relationship between the private conduct and the public need. At least at this stage of its development it may be fruitless to seek out a "neutral principle" beyond common sense regarding the undefined constitutional limitations on the police power. Professor Brooks Adams noted in 1913 that the scope of the police power could not be determined in advance by abstract reasoning. Hence, as each litigation arose, the judges could follow no rule but the rule of common sense, and the Police Power, translated into plain English, presently came to signify whatever, at the moment, the judges happened to think reasonable. Consequently, they began guessing at the drift of public opinion, as it percolated to them through the medium of their education and prejudices. Sometimes they guessed right and sometimes wrong, and when they guessed wrong they were cast aside, as appeared dramatically enough in the temperance agitation.  

And Justice Holmes noted:

> It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned

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172 In the broad language in which the ordinance is enacted it is apparently an attempt on the part of the municipality to regulate and control the habits and practices of the citizen without any reasonable basis for so doing. The ordinance is an unreasonable interference with the private rights of the citizen . . . .

262 Ill. at 513, 104 N.E. at 837-38.

The ordinance is so broad as to prohibit one from smoking a cigarette in his own home or on any private premises in the city. To prohibit the smoking of cigarettes in [such circumstances] is an invasion of his right to control his own personal indulgences.

142 Ky. at 61, 133 S.W. at 986 (1911). By holding that the ordinance applied in the home, the Kentucky court avoided the question raised in the Illinois case. The reasoning would appear to compel the same result, however.

by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare.174

Whether the development of the judicial response to exercises of the police power at the time was the result of the changing public opinion or a changing analytical framework, trends in that response were evident. It remains to be seen whether any trends are evident today to indicate how marijuana users will fare in the future.

III. THE GENESIS OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION

Until the inclusion of marijuana in the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act in 1932 and the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act in 1937, there was no "national" public policy regarding the drug. However, as early as 1914 the New York City Sanitary Laws included cannabis in a prohibited drug list and in 1915 Utah passed the first state statute prohibiting sale or possession of the drug. By 1931 twenty-two states had enacted such legislation. In the succeeding section, we shall delve into the circumstances surrounding the passage of several of these early laws and the ensuing judicial acquiescence in the legislative value judgments concerning marijuana. We conclude that the legislative action and judicial approval were essentially kneejerk responses uninformed by scientific study or public debate and colored instead by racial bias and sensationalistic myths.

A. Initial State Legislation: 1914-1931

As indicated above, the Harrison Act, a regulatory measure in the garb of a taxing statute, left many gaps unfilled in the effort to prohibit illegal or nonmedical use of opiates and cocaine. Although Commissioner Anslinger of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics stated in 1932 that few states had responded to the Harrison Act,1 most states had in fact enacted or reenacted narcotics laws in the period from 1914 to 1931.2 In so doing, twenty-one states had also restricted the sale of marijuana as part of their general narcotics articles, one state had prohibited its use for any purpose, and four states had outlawed its

2 STATE LAWS 35-327.
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cultivation. Our objective in this section is to determine why these states chose to include cannabis in their lists of prohibited drugs.

The first consideration was the increasing public awareness of the narcotics problem. As noted above, the Harrison Act engendered a shift in public perception of the narcotics addict. With ever-increasing frequency and venom, he was portrayed in the public media as the criminal "dope fiend." This hysteria, coupled with the actual increases in drug-related criminal conduct due to the closing of the clinics, was the basis for a good many of the post-Harrison Act narcotic statutes. Other forces such as lurid accounts in the media, publications of private narcotics associations, and the effective separation of the addict and his problems from the medical profession all pressed legislatures into action to deal more effectively with what was perceived as a growing narcotics problem.

Despite the increasing public interest in the narcotics problem during this period, we can find no evidence of public concern for, or understanding of, marijuana, even in those states that banned it along with the opiates and cocaine. Observers in the middle and late 1930's agreed that marijuana was at that time a very new phenomenon on the national scene. The perplexing question remains—why did some states include marijuana in their prohibitive legislation a decade before it achieved any notice whatsoever from the general public and the overwhelming majority of legislators?

From a survey of contemporary newspaper and periodical commentary we have concluded that there were three major influences. The most prominent was racial prejudice. During this period, marijuana legislation was generally a regional phenomenon present in the southern and western states. Use of the drug was primarily limited to Mexican-Americans who were immigrating in increased numbers to those states. These movements were well noted in the press accounts

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3 Id. at 14.
4 For a discussion of the change in the public image of addicts and the closing of clinical experiments, see p. 988 infra.
5 See TERRY & PELLENS 877-919.
6 See, e.g., text at notes 24-25 infra. For somewhat more clinical discussions, see TERRY & PELLENS 877-919.
9 Hearing on H.R. 6385 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Tax Act Hearings].
of passage of marijuana legislation. A second factor was the assumption that marijuana, which was presumed to be an addictive drug, would be utilized as a substitute for narcotics and alcohol then prohibited by national policy. This factor was particularly significant in the New York law, the forerunner of nationwide anti-marijuana legislation. Finally, there is some evidence that coverage of the drug by the Geneva Conventions in 1925 was publicized in this country and may have had some influence.

1. Rationale in the West: Class Legislation

Geometric increases in Mexican immigration after the turn of the century naturally resulted in the formation of sizeable Mexican-American minorities in each western state. It was thought then and is generally assumed now that use of marijuana west of the Mississippi was limited primarily to the Mexican segment of the population. We do not find it surprising, therefore, that sixteen of these states prohibited sale or possession of marijuana before 1930. Whether motivated by outright prejudice or simple discriminatory disinterest, the result was the same in each legislature—little if any public attention, no debate, pointed references to the drug's Mexican origins, and sometimes vociferous allusion to the criminal conduct inevitably generated when Mexicans ate "the killer weed."

In Utah, for example, the nation's first statewide prohibition of marijuana—in 1915—was attended by little publicity. The combina-

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10 The Bureau of Immigration recorded the entry of 590,765 Mexicans into the United States between 1915 and 1930. Of these, upwards of 90% in each year were to be resident in the 22 states west of the Mississippi, and more than two-thirds were to reside in Texas alone. Information compiled from Tables, Immigrant Aliens, By States of Intended Future Residence and Race or Peoples, published yearly for each fiscal year from 1915 to 1930 in Comm'r Gen. of Immigration Ann. Rep.

11 Tax Act Hearings 20, 33.


13 Id. at xv.

14 At its 1915 session, the Utah legislature passed an omnibus narcotics and pharmacy bill which included under it the cannabis drugs. Ch. 66, §§ 7, 8, [1915] Utah Laws 77. The law forbade sale and possession of the named drugs, and provided for medical use under a system of prescriptions and order blanks. Interestingly, clinical treatment of addicts was allowed. Id. at 77-80. The law also prohibited possession of opium and marijuana pipes. Id. at 80. Violations were misdemeanors punishable by fines and/or imprisonment for terms up to six months, but third offenders faced prison terms from one to five years. The statute made no distinction between sale and possession, nor among the various drugs. The law was revised in 1927. Ch. 65, [1927] Utah Laws 107.
tion of increasing Mexican immigration\textsuperscript{16} and the traditional aversion of the Mormons to euphoriants of any kind\textsuperscript{16} led inevitably to the inclusion of marijuana in the state's omnibus narcotics and pharmacy bill. Similarly, when the New Mexico and Texas legislatures passed marijuana legislation in 1923, the former by separate statute\textsuperscript{17} and the latter by inclusion,\textsuperscript{18} newspaper reference was minimal despite coverage in both states of legislative action.\textsuperscript{19} The longest of the \textit{Santa Fe New Mexican} references noted:

The \textit{Santa Fe} representative, however, had better luck with his bill to prevent sale of marihuana, cannabis indica, Indian hemp or hashish as it is variously known. This bill was passed without any opposition. Marihuana was brought into local prominence at the penitentiary board's investigation last summer when a convict testified he could get marihuana cigarettes anytime he had a dollar. The drug produces intoxication when chewed or smoked. Marihuana is the name commonly used in the Southwest and Mexico.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{16}See note 10 \textit{supra}.

\textsuperscript{17}See \textsc{The Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints}, containing the revelations given to Joseph Smith, the Prophet § 89, at 154 (1921) (§§ 5, 7, wine or strong drink) (§ 8, tobacco) (§ 9, hot drinks) (revelations given through Joseph Smith the Prophet, at Kirtland, Ohio, February 27, 1833, known as the Word of Wisdom).

\textsuperscript{18}The statute made importation of cannabis illegal and established a presumption of importation whenever a person was found to possess the drug. Ch. 42, §§ 1-2, [1923] N.M. Laws 58-59. Violations were punishable by fine and/or imprisonment from one to three years. Cultivation, sale or giving away cannabis except for use by physicians and pharmacists was also prohibited, and violations were punishable on first offense by one to three years in prison and on subsequent offenses by three to five years imprisonment. \textit{Id.} §§ 3, 4.

\textsuperscript{19}The \textit{Santa Fe New Mexican}, hometown paper of the bill's sponsor, made only one mention of marijuana at the time of passage, and that was to note that the drug was being smuggled into the state prisons. \textit{Santa Fe New Mexican}, Feb. 1, 1923.

The \textit{Austin Texas Statesman} gave heavy coverage to legislative news at this time because the legislature was in special session called by the Governor to deal with a budgetary problem.

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Santa Fe New Mexican}, Jan. 31, 1923. The statute was passed on February 27, 1923; during the period from January 20 to February 28, there were only three other
In its only direct reference to marijuana, the *Austin Texas Statesman* stated:

The McMillan Senate Bill amended the anti-narcotic law so as to make unlawful the possession for the purpose of sale of any marihuana or other drugs. Marihuana is a Mexican herb and is said to be sold on the Texas-Mexican border.21

The discriminatory aspects of this early marijuana legislation, suggested only obliquely by origin and apparent disinterest in Utah, New Mexico and Texas, are directly confirmed in Montana and Colorado. Montana newspapers gave relatively “full” coverage to a proposal to exclude marijuana from the general narcotics law and to create a separate marijuana statute.22 On seven different days from January 24 to February 10, 1929 (the date of the bill’s passage), the *Montana Standard* succinctly noted the progress of the bill through the legislature. The giveaway appeared on January 27 when the paper recorded the following:

There was fun in the House Health Committee during the week when the Marihuana bill came up for consideration. Marihuana is Mexican opium, a plant used by Mexicans and cultivated for sale by Indians. “When some beet field peon takes a few rares of this stuff,” explained Dr. Fred Fulsher of Mineral County, “He thinks he has just been elected president of Mexico so he starts out to execute all his political enemies. I understand that over in Butte where the Mexicans often go for the winter they stage imaginary bullfights in the ‘Bower of Roses’ or put on tournaments for the favor of ‘Spanish Rose’ after a couple of whiffs of Marijuana. The Silver Bow and

references to marijuana. The newspaper first noted the bill in a one sentence report that a ban on sale of marijuana was to be discussed. *Id.*, Jan. 20, 1923. Finally, in articles entitled “A Day In The Legislature,” the progress of the bill (H.B. 56) was noted on February 21 and 27 in simple lists of bills enacted. *Id.*, Feb. 21, 27, 1923. So inconsequential was the bill that it was not even mentioned in two stories describing the activities of the legislature for that session. *Id.*, Feb. 27, 1923, at 1, col. 1.

21 Austin Texas Statesman, June 19, 1923. Despite heavy coverage of legislative news and of narcotics generally, the *El Paso Times* made no reference to marijuana between June 10 and June 25. The *Texas Statesman* mentioned the “McMillan Bill” only two other times, each time without direct reference to marijuana.

22 Unlike most states that passed laws early in the 1920's against marijuana use, Montana in 1927 passed a statute which merely amended the first section of its general narcotic law, Rev. Code of Mont. ch. 227, § 3186 (1921), to include marijuana. Ch. 91, § 1, [1927] Mont. Laws 324. The new law, ch. 6, [1929] Mont. Laws 5, made use, sale or possession without a prescription a misdemeanor.
Yellowstone delegations both deplore these international complications." Everybody laughed and the bill was recommended for passage.23

The same year, a change in Colorado’s marijuana law was precipitated by less comic apprehensions of the drug’s evil effects. On April 7, 1929, a girl was murdered by her Mexican step-father. The story was lead news in the Denver Post every day until April 16, probably because the girl’s mother was white. On the 16th it was first mentioned that this man might have been a marijuana user. Headlined “Fiend Slayer Caught in Nebraska[;] Mexican Confesses Torture of American Baby,” and subheaded “Prisoner Admits to Officer He is Marihuana Addict,” the story relates in full the underlying events:

“You smoke marihuana?”
“Yes”
The Mexican said he had been without the weed for two days before the killing of his step-daughter.24

On April 17, the story on the Mexican included the following:

He repeated the story he had told the Sidney Chief of Police regarding his addiction to marihuana saying that his supply of the weed had become exhausted several days before the killing and his nerves were unstrung.25

With regard to the legislative news there is no mention at any time of a bill to regulate marijuana; however, on April 21, the Denver Post noted the Governor had signed a bill increasing penalties for sale, possession or production of marijuana.26

The reader should note that public perception of marijuana’s ethnic origins and crime-producing tendencies often went hand in hand, especially in the more volatile areas of the western states. Stories such as the one appearing in the Denver Post, where defendants charged with

23 The Montana Standard, Jan. 27, 1929, at 3, col. 2.
25 Id., April 17, 1929, at 2, col. 1.
26 Id., April 21, 1929. Ch. 95, [1927] Colo. Laws 309, penalized possession, sale, gift, or cultivation of any of the cannabis drugs as a misdemeanor. Offenses carried a fine and/or imprisonment in the county jail for not less than one or more than six months. The new law, ch. 93, [1929] Colo. Laws 331, increased the penalties for second offenders to one to five year terms in the penitentiary.
violent crimes attempted to blame their actions on the effects of marijuana, were primarily responsible for the drug's characterization as a "killer weed." In any event, from this brief survey of marijuana prohibition in the western states, we have concluded that its Mexican use pattern was ordinarily enough to warrant its prohibition, and that whatever attention such legislative action received was attended by sensationalist descriptions of crimes allegedly committed by Mexican marijuana users.

2. Rationale in the East: Substitution

The first significant\textsuperscript{27} instance of marijuana regulation appeared in the 1914 amendments to the New York City Sanitary Laws. The inclusion by the New York legislature of marijuana in its general narcotics statute in 1927 was the precursor of nationwide legislation.\textsuperscript{28} For these reasons, we have chosen New York as the most likely source of information regarding the rationale for marijuana prohibition in Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island and Vermont, all of which had acted before 1931.\textsuperscript{29}

In January 1914 the New York legislature passed its first comprehensive statute—The Boylan Bill—regulating the sale and use of habit-forming drugs\textsuperscript{30} and did not include marijuana among its list of pro-

\textsuperscript{27} Although Commissioner Anslinger stated in the 1937 Tax Act Hearings that the District of Columbia had no law regulating marijuana, Dr. Woodward of the AMA refuted the Commissioner's statement by citing a 1906 provision which limited the sale of cannabis to pharmacists and regulated sale of the drug by such pharmacists to the public. Tax Act Hearings 92-93. The D.C. provision, Act of May 7, 1906, ch. 2084, § 13, 34 Stat. 175, is typical of early attempts to deal with the drug under the general poison laws, but it is noteworthy in its treatment of marijuana separately from opiates.

\textsuperscript{28} See pp. 1030-33 infra.

\textsuperscript{29} In 1913, Maine prohibited the sale of \textit{cannabis indica} without a prescription. \textit{State Laws} 137. Massachusetts passed a similar law in 1917, id. at 150, and Michigan forbade possession in 1929, id. at 161. A 1923 Ohio law prohibited sale or possession with intent to sell, id. at 242; Rhode Island prohibited sale in 1918, id. at 263; and Vermont barred sale without a prescription in 1915, id. at 296.

\textsuperscript{30} Ch. 363, [1914] N.Y. Laws 1120. The first narcotics legislation in New York was enacted in 1893. Ch. 661, art. XII, § 208, [1893] N.Y. Laws 1561. The 1893 law provided that no prescription containing opium, morphine, cocaine or chloral could be filled more than once. Two years later, the legislature enacted a provision requiring that the effect of narcotics on the human system be taught in the public schools. Ch. 1041, § 1, [1895] N.Y. Laws 972. In 1897, a law was passed making it a felony to possess any narcotic "with intent to administer the same or cause the same to be administered to another" without his consent. Ch. 42, § 1, [1897] N.Y. Laws 21. The first provision aimed at the sale of narcotics was passed in 1907 and
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hibited narcotics. It appears that the Board of Health of New York City then amended its Sanitary Code adding "Cannabis indica, which is the Indian hemp from which the East Indian drug called hashish is manufactured," to the City’s list of prohibited drugs. Violation of this provision of the City Sanitary Code was a misdemeanor punishable by a small fine and/or a jail term of up to six months. On July 29, 1914, an article reporting the amendment appeared in the New York Times wherein the drug was described:

This narcotic has practically the same effect as morphine and cocaine, but it was not used in this country to any extent while it was easy to get the more refined narcotics.32

The next day the editors of the Times commented:

[T]he inclusion of cannabis indica among the drugs to be sold only on prescription is only common sense. Devotees of hashish are now hardly numerous enough here to count, but they are likely to increase as other narcotics become harder to obtain.33

From these observations, it would appear (1) that there were few marijuana users at the time; and (2) that use of the drug was expected to increase as a direct result of the restriction of opiates and cocaine.

Despite New York City’s early classification of cannabis with known narcotics, New York State did not prohibit sale and possession of the drug for other than medicinal purposes until 1927.34 And this was true despite a great deal of activity on the narcotics front from 1914 to 1927, when the legislature acted four different times.35 Throughout provided that the sale or distribution of cocaine without a prescription was unlawful. Ch. 424, § 1, [1907] N.Y. Laws 879. This provision was subsequently amended to provide for the keeping of records of sales and of transactions between dealers. Ch. 470, § 2, [1913] N.Y. Laws 984; ch. 131, § 1, [1910] N.Y. Laws 231; ch. 277, § 1, [1908] N.Y. Laws 764.

31 N.Y. Times, July 29, 1914, at 6, col. 2.
32 Id.
33 Id., July 30, 1914, at 8, col. 4.
34 Ch. 672, [1927] N.Y. Laws 1695-1703.
35 The 1914 act was amended by the Whitney Act in 1918 which also provided for the repeal of the 1914 act. Ch. 639, [1918] N.Y. Laws 2026. In 1921 an act was passed that in effect repealed all the legislation relating to the narcotics problem. Ch. 708, [1921] N.Y. Laws 2496. The measure made no provision for other laws on the subject. This surprising move was made in the interests of economy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1921, at 1, col. 8, and with the belief that the drug problem could be better handled by local authorities working in concert with federal agencies. See id., Jan. 9,
all this tumult and in the variety of narcotics proposals suggested or enacted, marijuana or cannabis was not classified among the restricted drugs until the drafting of the 1927 Act. This act defined cannabis as a "habit-forming drug," and accordingly punished as misdemeanors the control, sale, distribution, administration and dispensing of cannabis except for medical purposes. The penalty provision of the statute did not discriminate among types of offenses, first or subsequent violations, or the prohibited narcotic drugs.

There is no apparent indication in the contemporary commentary of the reasons for inclusion of marijuana in the New York laws. When the 1927 law was passed, public concern was focused on the general need to reduce narcotic addiction; none of the commentators were concerned about marijuana. While there were numerous articles in the media dealing with the problems of the opiates, morphine, cocaine and heroin, only four articles about marijuana appeared in the major New York newspaper during the entire period from 1914 until 1927. In 1923 the New York Times noted that the "latest habit forming drug . . . marijuana, which is smoked in a cigarette" was exhibited at a women's club meeting. In 1925 the same paper reported that the drug had been banned in Mexico. One year later, the paper reported the results

36 As late as 1918, a legislative committee that had exhaustively studied the narcotics problem in New York did not mention the use of marijuana and concluded: "The drugs which are the sources of the difficulty are cocaine and eucaine with their salts and derivatives and opium and its derivatives, codeine, morphine and heroin." Joint Legislative Comm. to Investigate the Laws in Relation to the Distribution and Sale of Narcotic Drugs, Final Report, New York Senate Doc. No. 35 (1918), quoted in Terry & Pellens 833.

37 The Act of April 5, 1927, repealed both the 1923 and 1926 laws and replaced them with a comprehensive narcotic control scheme. Ch. 672, [1927] N.Y. Laws 1695. This act contained provisions relating to the control and use of narcotic drugs and treatment of addicts; it also exempted certain preparations from its coverage. The act furnished the model for the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. See pp. 1030-31 infra.

Subsequently, in 1929, unlawful sale of narcotics was made a felony and all other violations of the 1927 act were made misdemeanors. Ch. 377, [1929] N.Y. Laws 881.

38 Id. § 421 (14), [1927] N.Y. Laws 1697.

39 Id. § 443, at 1702.

40 Id. § 423, at 1697.

41 See id. § 443, at 1702.


43 Id., Jan. 11, 1923, at 24, col. 1.

44 Id., Dec. 29, 1925, at 10, col. 7.
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of testing in Panama on the effects of marijuana. The article noted that as a result of these tests the study group concluded marijuana smoking was relatively safe; thus, it was “recommended that no steps be taken by the authorities of the Canal Zone to prevent the sale or use of marijuana and that no special legislation on that subject was needed.” Finally, in July 1927, the Times reported that a Mexican family was said to have gone insane from eating marijuana. Perhaps the clearest indication of the absence of notice given the marijuana section of the 1927 Act is that none of the articles discussing the Act after its passage refer to marijuana.

It is likely, then, that the inclusion of cannabis in the state law was motivated primarily by the same fear that had provoked the Sanitary Law Amendment in 1914. Use, though still slight, was expected to increase. Throughout the entire New York experience the main argument was preventive: Marijuana use must be prohibited to keep addicts from switching to it as a substitute for the drugs which had become much more difficult to obtain after the enactment of the Harrison Act, and for alcohol after Prohibition. Accordingly, the passage of the Harrison and Volstead Acts were direct causes of the preventive inclusion of marijuana among prohibited drugs. In fact, it has been observed that marijuana use did increase during this period.

Another factor that may have influenced the passage of the 1927 Act was the Second Opium Conference at Geneva in 1925, which included Indian hemp within the Convention against Opium and other Dangerous Drugs, even though the United States had withdrawn in

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46 Id., Nov. 21, 1926, § 2, at 3, col. 1.
47 Id., July 6, 1927, at 10, col. 6.
48 See id., Mar. 25, 1927, at 4, col. 6; id., April 6, 1927, at 13, col. 2.
49 See Simon, From Opium to Hash Eesh, Sci. Am., Nov. 1921, at 14-15. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1923, at 24, col. 1. A similar argument was made with respect to cocaine:

Cocaine in particular is greatly in demand. When prohibition is in force, persons, especially drinkers from compulsion of habit who have been robbed of their daily drink, will naturally resort to cocaine . . . .

Weber, supra note 7, at 372.
40 B. Renborg, International Drug Control 216 (1947):

As the campaign against the illicit traffic in opium, morphine, and cocaine drugs made progress and gradually resulted in diminution of the supplies on the illicit market, a marked increase in the illicit traffic and the use of Indian hemp drugs was noticed, more particularly on the North American Continent (the problem of marihuana) and in Egypt (the hashish problem).

1925 from the League of Nations deliberations on controlling and regulating the international traffic in dangerous drugs. \(^{51}\)

3. The International Scene

The first mention of marijuana on the international front came with the preliminary negotiations for the Hague Conference of 1912. In preparing for this Conference, which represented an attempt to deal with the international opium traffic, the government of Italy proposed that the production and traffic in Indian hemp drugs be included as part of the agenda of the Conference. \(^{52}\) During the Conference itself, there was no mention of the drug, and the Convention did not include cannabis in its provisions. In addition to the Convention, however, the delegates signed a closing protocol:

2. The Conference considers it desirable to study the question of Indian hemp from the statistical and scientific point of view, with the object of regulating its abuses, should the necessity thereof be felt, by internal legislation or by an international agreement. \(^{53}\)

It was not until just before the Geneva Conference of 1925 that the proposal was mentioned again. In 1923 the following resolution was passed by the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs of the League of Nations:

IV. With reference to the proposal of the Government of the Union of South Africa that Indian hemp should be treated as one of the habit-forming drugs, the Advisory Committee recommends the Council that, in the first instance, the Governments should be invited to furnish to the League information as to the production and use of, and traffic in, this substance in their territories, together with their observations on the proposal of the Government of the Union of South Africa. \(^{54}\)

At the 1925 meeting in Geneva, the Egyptians led the way in proposing that hashish be included within the Convention. \(^{55}\) An Egyptian dele-

\(^{51}\) Id. at 344-46.


\(^{54}\) *Advisory Comm. on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, Report to Council on the Work of the Sixth Session* (1924), *quoted in* W. Willoughby, *supra* note 50, at 374.

\(^{55}\) *See* W. Willoughby, *supra* note 50, at 251.
Mr. El Guindy's study is so typical of the so-called scientific or empirical evidence that has been presented to justify the drug's prohibition that the following excerpt must be included. In stating that the real danger of hashish is that it will produce insanity, the Egyptian delegate presented the following:

The illicit use of hashish is the principal cause of most of the cases of insanity occurring in Egypt. In support of this contention, it may be observed that there are three times as many cases of mental alienation among men as among women, and it is an established fact that men are much more addicted to hashish than women.56

The Egyptian proposal was referred to a subcommittee for study and later in the Conference this group reported that the use of Indian hemp drugs should be limited to medical and scientific purposes. The proceedings contain no record of what medical or scientific evidence might have been brought forward to support the inclusion of the Indian hemp drugs in the Convention.57 Nevertheless, they were the subject of Chapters IV and V of the Convention.58

4. Conclusion

The early laws against the cannabis drugs were passed with little public attention. Concern about marijuana was related primarily to the fear that marijuana use would spread, even among whites, as a substitute for the opiates and alcohol made more difficult to obtain by federal legislation. Especially in the western states, this concern was identifiable with the growth of the Mexican-American minority. It is clear that no state undertook any empirical or scientific study of the effects of the drug. Instead they relied on lurid and often unfounded

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56 Quoted in id. at 378. Mr. El Guindy concludes by saying: "Generally speaking, the proportion of cases of insanity caused by the use of hashish varies from 3 to 60 percent of the total number of cases occurring in Egypt." Id. at 379.

57 There are no records of these subcommittee hearings, so we can only surmise that the quality of the evidence might have been about as bad as that presented in the floor report of the Egyptian delegation.

58 Geneva Convention of 1925, quoted in W. Willoughby, supra note 50, at 539. Moreover, the Convention defines Indian hemp as follows:

"Indian hemp" means the dried flowering or fruiting tops of the pistillate plant Cannabis sativa L. from which the resin has not been extracted, under whatever name they may be designated in commerce.

Id. at 535
accounts of marijuana’s dangers as presented in what little newspaper coverage the drug received. It was simply assumed that cannabis was addictive and would have engendered the same evil effects as opium and cocaine. Apparently, legislators in these states found it easy and uncontroversial to prohibit use of a drug they had never seen or used and which was associated with ethnic minorities and the lower class.

B. Judicial Corroboration

Two significant conclusions appear from a study of the few cases involving convictions for marijuana offenses under the initial wave of state laws. First, the argument regarding a private conduct limitation on the police power had been so discredited it was not even made. Second, the courts, like the legislatures, relied on nonscientific materials to support the proposition that marijuana was an addictive, mind-destroying drug productive of crime and insanity.

In only one case was there a serious constitutional challenge to the validity of the legislation. Appealing a Louisiana conviction for possession of five hundred plants of marijuana, the defendant in State v. Bonoa argued not that the state could not punish mere possession but rather that the statute was overbroad, since aside from its use as an intoxicant the marijuana plant was employed in the manufacture of hemp line, in the preparation of useful drugs and for the production of bird seed for canaries. Defendant’s contention was that only possession, sale or use for deleterious purposes could be prohibited.

The court’s reply was that the drug’s deleterious properties outweighed its uses, especially since “[t]he Marijuana plant is not one of the crops of this state.” Defendant also offered the reductio ad absurdum argument that if possession of the marijuana plant may be prohibited simply because intoxicating resin may be extracted from the flowering tops, then the possession of corn or grapes may be prohibited.

In an extensive survey of cases appearing in the Fourth Decennial Digest for the years 1926 to 1936, we could find only eight cases dealing with marijuana under laws enacted prior to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. In chronological order: Gonzales v. State, 108 Tex. Crim. 253, 299 S.W. 901 (1927); State v. Franco, 76 Utah 202, 289 P. 100 (1930); State v. Bonoa, 172 La. 955, 136 So. 15 (1931); Santos v. State, 122 Tex. 209, 53 S.W.2d 609 (1932); Baker v. State, 123 Tex. Crim. 209, 58 S.W.2d 534 (1933); Horton v. State, 123 Tex. Crim. 237, 58 S.W.2d 833 (1933); State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 935 (1933); People v. Torres, 5 Cal. App. 2d 580, 43 P.2d 374 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935).

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61 Id. at 964, 136 So. at 18.
because whiskey and wine may be made from them, or possession of poppies because opium may be extracted from them. To this the court replied that alcohol was less injurious than marijuana and that both alcohol and opium were difficult to prepare from these sources while the marijuana plant was easily converted into tobacco and cigarettes.

The court's reasoning is admirable if we accept the basic premise that the marijuana drug is deleterious. To support this conclusion the court quoted from Solis Cohen Githens' Pharmacotherapeutics:

The first symptom is usually an exaltation of the mind . . . . The ideas are joyous . . . . Sleep follows . . . . When aroused from sleep . . . the mind . . . passes into the same somnolent condition, which lasts for several hours and is followed by a sense of weakness and extreme mental depression. In certain eastern people . . . perhaps because of continued use, the somnolent action is replaced by complete loss of judgment and restraint such as is seen more often from alcohol. An Arab leader, fighting against the crusaders, had a bodyguard who partook of haschisch, and used to rush madly on their enemies, slaying everyone they met. The name of "haschischin" applied to them has survived as "assassin."

The habitual use of cannabis does not lead to much tolerance, nor do abstinence symptoms follow its withdrawal. It causes, however, a loss of mentality, resembling dementia, which can be recognized even in dogs.62

The court also quotes Rusby, Bliss & Ballard, The Properties and Uses of Drugs:

The particular narcosis of cannabis consists in the liberation of the imagination from all restraint . . . . Not rarely, in [the depression] state, an irresistible impulse to the commission of criminal acts will be experienced. Occasionally an entire group of men under the influence of this drug will rush out to engage in violent or bloody deeds.63

On these two sources, the entire opinion stands. The allegedly deleterious consequences—criminal activity and insanity—are supported only by the mythical etymology of the word "assassin." The marijuana user's purported propensity toward crime, based on similar and often

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62 Id. at 961-62, 136 So. at 17-18.
63 Id. at 962-63, 136 So. at 18.
weaker authority, was the primary rationale underlying passage of the Marihuana Tax Act.\textsuperscript{64} So preposterous is this assertion that even the proponents of criminalization—including the Commissioner of the Bureau of Narcotics—later implicitly rejected it.\textsuperscript{65}

In any event, the courts were as willing to accept such evidence as the legislatures. In a Utah case, \textit{State v. Navaro},\textsuperscript{66} where the court cited the acknowledged evils of marijuana to repel a vagueness attack,\textsuperscript{67} it relied on another set of dubious authorities. First, the court referred to the case of \textit{State v. Diaz}\textsuperscript{68} wherein a defendant in a first degree murder prosecution tried to disprove the requisite mens rea by showing that he was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the offense. Diaz had claimed that "his mind was an entire blank as to all that happened to him and stated that after smoking the marijuana he became 'very crazy.'"\textsuperscript{69} To corroborate his assertion, defendant summoned a physician whose testimony was summarized in \textit{Diaz} in a passage quoted in full in \textit{Navaro}:

\begin{quote}
He stated that [marijuana] is a narcotic and acts upon the central nervous system affecting the brain, producing exhilarating effects and causing one to do things which he otherwise would not do and especially induces acts of violence; that violence is one of the symptoms of an excessive use of marijuana. . . . That the marijuana produces an "I don't care" effect. A man having used liquor and marijuana might deliberately plan a robbery and killing and carry it out and escape, and then later fail to remember anything that had occurred . . . .\textsuperscript{70}
\end{quote}

Thus an attempt in an adversary setting by an accused to escape criminal responsibility by blaming his offense on marijuana intoxication

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} See pp. 1055-57 infra.
\item \textsuperscript{65} See pp. 1072-73 infra.
\item \textsuperscript{66} 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 (1933).
\item \textsuperscript{67} Appellant, convicted on an information charging "possession of marijuana," contended that the statute prohibited only possession of the flowering tops and leaves of the marijuana plant. The court held that marijuana was the popular name for the drug, not just the plant, and that the information accordingly charged an offense. For this proposition, it cited dictionaries, other state statutes, articles, cases and texts. It is the court's familiarity with the articles describing the allegedly evil effects of the drug with which we are concerned.
\item \textsuperscript{68} 76 Utah 463, 290 P. 727 (1930).
\item \textsuperscript{69} \textit{Id.} at 469, 290 P. at 729.
\item \textsuperscript{70} 83 Utah at 12, 26 P.2d at 957, \textit{quoting} 76 Utah at 469-70, 290 P. at 729.
\end{itemize}
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became medical authority for the scientific hypothesis that marijuana use causes crime.

The second source of support in Navaro for the allegedly deleterious effects of marijuana was a 1932 article by Hayes and Bowery (the latter a member of the Wichita, Kansas, Police Department) entitled *Marihuana*.\(^\text{71}\) Calling for stricter penalties for marijuana use, the authors stated that during the exhilaration phase, the user is likely to have increased sexual desires\(^\text{72}\) and to commit "actions of uncontrollable violence, or even murder."\(^\text{73}\) For these propositions, they cited newspaper accounts of crimes the causes of which the reporter attributed to marijuana\(^\text{74}\) and police testimony to the same effect.\(^\text{75}\) For example, the Chief Detective of the Los Angeles Police Department was quoted as saying:

> In the past we have had officers of this department shot and killed by Marihuana addicts and have traced the act of murder directly to the influence of Marihuana, with no other motive. Numerous assaults have been made upon officers and citizens with intent to kill by Marihuana addicts which were directly traceable to the influence of Marihuana.\(^\text{76}\)

It should be noted that Hayes and Bowery attributed the violent impulse to the absence of restraint engendered during the so-called exhilaration phase, while each of the authorities cited by the Louisiana court in *Bonoa* attributed the same impulse to the sufferings experienced during the "depression" phase.\(^\text{77}\)

The authors also asserted that habitual use leads to a "loss of mental activity, accompanied by a general dullness and indolence, like that of chronic alcoholics or opium eaters," to "destruction of brain tissues" and inevitably to insanity. For this proposition, the authors merely said that "seventeen to twenty per cent of all males admitted to mental hospitals and asylums in India have become insane through the use of this drug."\(^\text{78}\)

\(^{72}\) *Id.* at 1087, 1089.
\(^{73}\) *Id.* at 1088.
\(^{74}\) *Id.* at 1093.
\(^{75}\) *Id.* at 1088, 1090-91.
\(^{76}\) *Id.* at 1088 (emphasis added).
\(^{77}\) Compare text at note 72 *supra* with text at notes 62-63 *supra*.
\(^{78}\) Hayes & Bowery, *supra* note 71, at 1090.
Finally the court cited an article by Eugene Stanley, the District Attorney of New Orleans, entitled *Marihuana as a Developer of Criminals.*\(^7\) The title conveys the message. We will return to Mr. Stanley in the succeeding section.\(^8\)

The nonchalance with which Utah and Louisiana courts cited sensationalistic, nonscientific sources to support the proposition that marijuana produced crime and insanity suggests how widely accepted this hypothesis was among decision-makers, both judicial and legislative, prior to 1931. Given the prevalence of this attitude, the noninvolvement of the middle class, and the precedent established in the earlier alcohol and narcotics cases, it is not surprising that constitutional challenges were either not made or easily rebuffed. Nor is it surprising that challenges regarding the ambiguity of the word "marijuana" were unsuccessful.\(^8\) The courts, like the legislatures, assumed marijuana caused crime and insanity, and assumed that had public opinion crystallized on the question, it would have favored the suppression of a drug with such evil effects.

IV. PASSAGE OF THE UNIFORM NARCOTIC DRUG ACT: 1927-1937

Our conclusions to this point bear summarization. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, state as well as national policy was steadfastly opposed to manufacture, sale and consumption of narcotics and alcohol except for medical purposes. Constitutional objections were uniformly ignored, in the narcotics cases primarily because the nexus between the private conduct and public harm was *in fact* a close one, and in the alcohol cases primarily because the legislation was in response to full operation of the public opinion process, to which the courts were willing to defer.

We have also found that public opinion had not crystallized against

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\(^8\) See p. 1044 infra.
intoxicants generally, although public policy was moving rapidly in that direction. Ultimately, the mere existence of that public policy—even in the form of criminal law—was not sufficient to convert a public antipathy toward the evils of commercial alcohol traffic into opposition to moderate use of alcohol. On the question of private use, the public policy was unenforceable and eventually abandoned. However, with respect to narcotics, the public policy, also expressed through the criminal law, effectively converted narcotics use, in the public view, from a medical problem to a legal-moral problem. Sympathy for unfortunate victims turned into moral indictment. Because other laws and medical advances had reduced the number of accidental addicts, the number of addicts decreased; in this sense the public policy was successful. However, to the extent that this policy effectively ostracized a group of users from the rest of society, drove them to criminal activity to sustain their habit, and engendered a moralistic public image, the stage was set for many ensuing problems the consequences of which have only recently become matters of public debate.

Ancillary to these developments during this period was the classification of marijuana in some half the states as an addictive drug that produced the same evils as the opiates and cocaine—crime, pauperism and insanity. The users, few in number, were primarily Mexicans. But as Mexican immigration increased and the legitimate supply of narcotics and alcohol disappeared, a fear developed, particularly in the western states, that marijuana use would increase, particularly among the white youth. As a result, some twenty-two states restricted marijuana use to medical channels. The private conduct objection having evaporated, the courts uncritically affirmed the legislative classification, accepting on faith nonscientific opinion that marijuana was a “killer weed.”

Even though the public opinion process did not operate on the issue during this period, the decision-makers in all probability thought that their actions comported with latent public attitudes. If indeed marijuana caused crime and insanity, of course the public would oppose its use, as it presumably did use of opium and cocaine. Because the users were few in number and confined primarily to a suppressed social and economic minority, there was no voice which could be heard to challenge these assumptions. To put it another way, the middle class had successfully frustrated alcohol prohibition because the public opinion process came to reflect its view that the law should not condemn intoxication. Yet because marijuana use was primarily a lower class phenomenon, the middle class was generally unaware of the proposed leg-
islation. The public opinion process did not operate, and decision-makers remained uninformed about the drug. Quickly and with neither consideration nor dissent, the laws were enacted, thus establishing a deliberative format followed often in the succeeding decades.

Although the groundwork had been laid, denigration of the "loco-weed" was primarily a regional phenomenon until 1932. Nationalization ensued in two fell swoops in the 1930's. First, cannabis was included in an optional provision of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act proposed in 1932. Second, Congress enacted the Marihuana Tax Act in 1937. In the following sections we shall scrutinize these two watershed developments.

A. Origins of the Uniform Law

As we have suggested, the Harrison Act's masquerade as a revenue measure required residual state legislation in order to effectuate full prohibition of the narcotics trade in America. After its passage most states obediently marched to the tune played in Washington. By 1931 every state had restricted the sale of cocaine and, with the exception of two, the opiates. Thirty-six states had enacted legislation prohibiting unauthorized possession of cocaine and thirty-five prohibited unauthorized possession of the opiates and other restricted drugs. Eight states also prohibited possession of hypodermic syringes. Perhaps the most significant feature of the state response to the Harrison Act was the sharp increase in penalties between 1914 and 1931. Even these penalties, however, seem light in comparison with current penalties.

On the other hand, some influential legislators thought that the Federal Act was sufficient to deal with the problem. And there was a con-

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1 See p. 989 supra.
3 Id. at 8.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 21.
7 See Appendix A, Tables II, III.
8 For example, in 1921 New York had repealed its general narcotics provision, ch. 708, [1921] N.Y. Laws 2496. See note 35 at pp. 1017-18 supra. Governor Miller of New York at that time stated:

*Being unable to resolve that conflict of opinion, I have deemed it the safest course to leave the subject to be governed by the Federal statute until such time at least as it shall more clearly appear in what way that statute may be wisely supplemented by the State.*

48 Report of the New York State Bar Ass'n 133 (1925) (emphasis original). Com-
siderable lack of uniformity regarding the offenses prohibited and the penalties imposed by the several states. Finally, there was little attention devoted to development of enforcement patterns within and among the states.\(^9\)

With such a variety of state legislation, it is not surprising that little data is available on the enforcement of these laws. Since the *Uniform Crime Statistics*, currently the most reliable source for enforcement data, were first compiled in 1932, there are no figures on the number of drug arrests by state authorities in the 1920's. One commentator asserts:

As of June 30, 1928, of the 7738 prisoners in federal penitentiaries, 2529 were sentenced for narcotics offenses, 1156 for prohibition law violations, and 1148 for stolen-vehicle transactions. Data are not available for approximately the same number in state institutions at this time.\(^10\)

Despite the significant degree of federal enforcement activity evidenced by the above data, state law enforcement agencies seldom involved themselves with narcotics.\(^11\) Perhaps the best evidence of the lax enforcement of state narcotic laws from 1914 to 1927 is the 1921 call for more effective enforcement of the 1917 Massachusetts anti-narcotic law by the Medical Director of the Boston Municipal Court:

missioner Anslinger felt that the states had failed to do their part during this period: Notwithstanding the limited power of the Federal Government, state officers immediately became imbued with the erroneous impression that the problem of preventing abuse of narcotic drugs was one now [after the Harrison Act] exclusively cognizable by the National Government, and that the Federal Law alone, enforced, of course, by Federal agencies only, should represent all the control necessary over the illicit narcotic drug traffic.


\(^9\)TERRY & PELLENS 969-91. See also 1928 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 77-78 [handbooks hereinafter cited as "HANDBOOK"].


\(^11\)See JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE LAWS IN RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION AND SALE OF NARCOtic DRUGS, FINAL REPORT, NEW YORK SENATE DOC. No. 35 (1918):

No fixed policy exists for the enforcement of the State statutes except in the larger cities of the State but their enforcement has been left to the desultory or spasmodic efforts of local police officials . . . .

*Quoted in TERRY & PELLENS 834. See also H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS 137-38 (1963).*
Our laws aiming at the suppression of morphinism could perhaps be better, but, no matter whether they be improved or not, they will not have their maximal efficiency without *adequate appropriations* for their enforcement. Even with the insufficient funds now available, more could be reached. I understand, for instance, that there is *no special police force* (white squads) entrusted with the detection and arrest of cases of V.D.L. [Violation of the Drug Law] and that officers are very much hampered by not being allowed to follow suspected persons outside their particular districts.12

The general lack of uniformity in anti-narcotic legislation,13 the weakness of state enforcement procedures,14 and the growing hysteria about dope fiends and criminality15 converged in several requests beginning as early as 1927 for a uniform state narcotic law.16

The drafting process of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act must also be viewed against the backdrop of two larger movements: (1) the trend toward the creation and dissemination of uniform state laws by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, a group to which each state sent two representatives appointed by the governor; and (2) the general concern in the late 20's and early 30's about controlling interstate crime, manifested, for example, in the creation of the nearly autonomous Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1930.

Because the concepts of states rights and narrowly construed federal power held such sway in this period, appeal to the National Commissioners was the inevitable recourse for those pressing for uniform anti-narcotic regulations.

### B. Drafting the Law

A committee of Commissioners in conjunction with Dr. William C. Woodward, Executive Secretary of the Bureau of Legal Medicine and Legislation of the American Medical Association, prepared and submitted at the 1925 meeting of the Commissioners the First Tentative Draft.17 The Committee report stated: "It occurs to your committee

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13 See *State Laws* 31-34.
14 *Id.* at 28.
15 See *Special Committee to Investigate the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs*, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Report (1919).
that the New York Act should be taken as a basis for framing a Uniform Act, and the draft submitted herewith is largely a copy of the New York Act." 18 It appears that the First Draft was drawn up by the Chairman of the Committee alone. 19 It was never presented on the floor of the full meeting but was recommitted for further study. 20 The First Draft included the following definitions:

(12) "Cannabis indica" or "cannabis sativa" shall include any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative or preparation thereof and any synthetic substitute for any of them identical in chemical composition.

(13) "Habit forming drugs" shall mean coca leaves, opium, cannabis indica or cannabis sativa. 21

Nowhere in the Committee report or in the Proceedings does there appear an explanation of the inclusion of cannabis under the prohibited or regulated drugs.

The Second Tentative Draft was presented in 1928, 22 and again the draft was not discussed at the Conference but recommitted for further study. 23 The Second Draft was an exact copy of the 1927 New York statute. 24 It retained cannabis in the class of "habit forming drugs." 25 The lack of concern on the part of the Commissioners themselves for the whole narcotics matter is reflected in the remarks of the President of the Conference in introducing a brief statement to the Conference by Dr. Woodward:

President Miller: In view of the importance of the act I think it would not be amiss to listen to the Doctor for a few minutes, that he may point out to us why it is important. In some of the states we do not recognize the importance because it has not been called to our attention. 26

Moreover, the statements of Dr. Woodward point out that one of the major forces supporting the drafting of the Uniform Act was the
AMA. The doctors not only wanted to protect the public from drug addiction but also sought uniformity among state laws “in order that the profession may have a better understanding of its obligations and duties and of its rights in the use of narcotic drugs.”

Two Third Drafts were submitted. The initial one closely resembled the first two Tentative Drafts and was presented in 1929. Again, it was recommitted for further study. The second Third Tentative Draft was the first to remove cannabis from the definition of “habit forming drugs” and to include only a supplemental provision for dealing with the drug. The explanation for this change from the first two drafts is contained in this note following the supplemental section:

Note: Because of the many objections raised to the inclusion of cannabis indica, cannabis americana and cannabis sativa in the general list of habit-forming drugs, no mention is made of them in other sections of this act. The foregoing section is presented in order to meet an apparent demand for some method of preventing the use of such drugs for the production and maintenance of undesirable drug addiction. It may be adopted or rejected, as each state sees fit, without affecting the rest of the act.

Judge Deering, the Chairman of the Committee on the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, recommended recommission for further study because the committee had not yet had a chance to consult with the newly created Bureau of Narcotics. At the time of this conference (August 14, 1930) no one had yet been appointed to fill the office of Commissioner of the Bureau.

After receiving suggestions from the newly appointed Commissioner

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27 Id. at 77.
28 1929 HANDBOOK 332-40.
29 Id. at 83.
30 1930 HANDBOOK 485-97.
31 The provision, which made an exemption for medicinal or scientific use, read in part as follows:

Section 12. (Cannabis Indica, Cannabis Americana and Cannabis Sativa.) No person shall plant, cultivate, produce, manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense or compound cannabis indica, cannabis americana, or cannabis sativa, or any preparation or derivative thereof, or offer the same for sale, administering dispensing or compounding ....

Id. at 493.
32 Id. There is no evidence of what objections had been raised. The authors feel certain that the dissenters were birdseed and hemp growers who also objected to the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act. See pp. 1054, 1059 infra.
33 1930 HANDBOOK 126-27.
Marijuana Prohibition

Anslinger, the Committee presented a Fourth Tentative Draft to the national conference in September 1931. The section dealing with marijuana was identical to that included in the 1930 revised version of the Third Tentative Draft. The national conference directed the Committee to return the next year with a Fifth Tentative or Final Draft.

The Fifth—and final—Tentative Draft was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on October 8, 1932. There were some major changes in the Uniform Act between the Fourth and the Fifth Tentative Drafts with regard to the regulation of marijuana. Although the marijuana provisions remained supplemental to the main body of the Act, any state wishing to regulate sale and possession of marijuana was instructed to simply add cannabis to the definition of “narcotic drugs,” in which case all the other provisions of the Act would apply to marijuana as well as the opiates and cocaine. It appears that the change from a supplemental section to a series of amendments to the relevant sections of the Act was preferred by the Narcotics Bureau.

The only opposition to adoption of the Final Draft came from some Commissioners who objected to tying the uniform state law to the terms of the Federal Harrison Act. This last obstacle to adoption of the Act was overcome by the argument that a number of states had already passed such legislation so that the federalism problem should not stand in the way; the Act was adopted 26-3. These floor arguments at the national conference are a most important indication that no one challenged or even brought up the issue of the designations of the drugs to be prohibited. Moreover, this brief debate confirms the notion that the Act received very little attention of any of the Commissioners other than those sitting on the committee that drafted it.

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84 1931 HANDBOOK 390-402.
85 Id. at 398-99.
86 Id. at 127-28.
87 1932 HANDBOOK 95-107.
88 Id. at 326.
89 See Tennyson, Uniform State Narcotic Law, 1 Fed. B. Ass’n J., Oct. 1932, at 55; Illicit Drug Traffic, 2 Fed. B. Ass’n J. 208-09 (1933) (indicating that the simple amendments for marijuana were designed by the Bureau so that other drugs could be added in the same way).
90 1932 HANDBOOK 95-107.
91 Id. at 107.
92 From our own computations, the total time spent by all the Commissioners discussing this Act from 1927 to 1932 could not have exceeded one hour. Moreover, the small number of states present at the time of the roll call, as compared with the
Examination of the annual proceedings of the Commissioners immediately suggests several conclusions about the drafting and proposal of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. (1) It was drafted in conjunction with the American Medical Association and, after 1930, Commissioner Anslinger of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. (2) It was not one of the more controversial uniform laws and it was given little consideration during the full meetings of the Commissioners. (3) Impetus for the legislation, especially the optional marijuana provisions, came from the Bureau of Narcotics itself. (4) No scientific study of any kind was undertaken before the optional marijuana section was proposed. (5) The first three tentative drafts included marijuana within the general part of the Act while the last two (including the one finally adopted by the Commissioners) made marijuana the subject of a separate, optional provision. (6) The model for all the drafts of the Uniform Act was the 1927 New York State statute.

C. Passage of the State Laws

By 1937 every state had enacted some form of legislation relating to marijuana, and thirty-five had enacted the Uniform Act. The process by which a previously regional phenomenon became nationwide closely parallels that which characterized the earlier state-by-state developments. The major difference is that the Bureau of Narcotics sought to insure passage of the Act in each state through lobbying and testifying before the legislatures and by propagandizing in channels of public opinion. The Bureau’s role has been overstated, however. The same factors that combined to produce the earlier legislation were exacerbated during the nationalization period, 1932-1937, and the legislation probably would have passed just as easily without the efforts of the Bureau.

Use of the drug was still slight and confined to underprivileged or fringe groups who had no access either to public opinion or to the legislators. The middle class had little knowledge and even less interest in the drug and the legislation. Passage of the Act in each state was attended by little publicity, no scientific study and even more blatant ethnic aspersions than the earlier laws. In short, the laws went unnoticed by legal commentators, the press and the public at large, despite the propagandizing efforts of the Bureau of Narcotics.

48 that voted on the Uniform Machine Gun Act the day before, indicates that concern for this Act was less than overwhelming.

As we noted earlier, marijuana use began in this country in states near the Mexican border, \(^{44}\) "marijuana" in fact being a Mexican label for the cannabis drug. Throughout the 1920's marijuana use was confined primarily to the Mexican-American community; however, by the late 20's use of this drug had spread to many of the larger cities and had become quite popular among some elements in the Black ghettos.\(^{45}\) Jazz musicians, dancers and others found the drug a cheap and readily available euphoriant.\(^{46}\)

Nevertheless, use still remained slight even in 1934. Commissioner Anslinger himself asserted in 1937: "Ten years ago we only heard about it [marijuana] throughout the Southwest . . . . [I]t has only become a national menace in the last 3 years." \(^{47}\) Still another commentator has written:

Only in the 1920's was there any significant usage even by the Mexican-American communities in border cities, and only in the mid and late 1920's did Negro, jazz musicians and "degenerate" bohemian sub-cultures start smoking marijuana. Even the most lurid journalists did not claim marijuana "seeped" into society at large until the 1930's and usually the mid-30's.\(^{48}\)

As late as 1928, the arrest of one Harlem youth for possession of a small amount of marijuana was news.\(^{49}\) Thus, we conclude that the number of users was still small, although it may have begun to grow around 1935, and that these users were still concentrated regionally in the West and Southwest and socio-economically within the lower-class Mexican-American and Black communities.

\(^{44}\) See H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS 135 (1963).
\(^{45}\) NEW YORK CITY MAYOR'S COMMITTEE ON MARIHUANA, REPORT, reprinted in THE MARIHUANA PAPERS 277-307 (D. Soloman ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as LAGUARDIA REPORT].
\(^{46}\) Id. at 292-94. The following exchange from the Hearings on the Marihuana Tax Act indicates the low cost of the drug in 1937:

Mr. Thompson: What is the price of marijuana?

Mr. Anslinger: The addict pays anywhere from 10 to 25 cents per cigarette. In illicit traffic the bulk price would be around $20 per pound. Legitimately, the bulk is around $2 per pound.

Tax Act Hearings 27.
\(^{47}\) Tax Act Hearings 20.
At the same time, the overwhelming majority of middle-class Americans in the 1930's knew nothing of marijuana use—they had never seen marijuana and knew no one who used the drug. Prior to 1935 there was little, if any, attention given marijuana in major national magazines and the leading national newspapers. That few middle-class Americans in this period knew anything of marijuana or its effects is best illustrated by the fact that the Bureau of Narcotics conducted a campaign to alert people to the dangers of marijuana. The Bureau as early as 1932 began arousing public opinion against marijuana by "an educational campaign describing the drug, its identification and its evil effects." In July 1936, the New York City police were shown marijuana so that they would recognize it growing or in dried, smokeable form. Thus, even policemen had to be shown the plant as late as 1936 to permit effective enforcement of the New York state law. We may accordingly infer that the level of public familiarity with the drug was quite low indeed.

What little information filtered to the middle class was generated by sporadic campaigns by local newspapers detailing the potential evils of marijuana; the accounts, as before, were sensationalistic and tended to exacerbate latent ethnic prejudices. For example, a 1934 newspaper account linked crime in the Southwest with marijuana smoking Mexican-Americans in the region. In a 1935 letter to the editor of the New York Times, a Sacramento, California, reader asserted:

Marijuana, perhaps now the most insidious of our narcotics, is a direct by-product of unrestricted Mexican immigration. Mexican peddlers have been caught distributing sample marijuana cigarettes to school children.

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50 There is only one article even vaguely related to marijuana listed prior to 1935—Our Home Hasheesh Crop, Literary Digest, Apr. 3, 1926, at 64. See H. Becker, Outsiders 141 (1963).

51 From 1923 to 1935 there were only thirteen short articles related in any way to marijuana in the New York Times, even though New York City had banned marijuana as early as 1914 and the state legislature had acted in 1927.


53 N.Y. Times, July 24, 1936, at 6, col. 3.

54 In 1923 the New York Times, in a short article, reported: "The latest habit forming drug... marijuana, which is smoked in a cigarette—was exhibited" at a women's club meeting. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1923, at 24, col. 1.

55 N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1934, § 4, at 6, col. 3.

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The writer went on to demand a quota on Mexicans permitted to enter the country. In testifying in favor of the Marihuana Tax Act, Commissioner Anslinger submitted a letter he had received from the editor of a Colorado newspaper asking the Bureau to help stamp out the marijuana menace. After describing an attack by a Mexican-American, allegedly under the influence of marijuana, on a girl of his region the writer stated:

I wish I could show you what a small marijuana cigaret can do to one of our degenerate Spanish-speaking residents. That's why our problem is so great; the greatest percentage of our population is composed of Spanish-speaking persons, most of whom are low mentally, because of social and racial conditions.  

Again, in the testimony at the hearings on the Marihuana Tax Act the following is excerpted from an article included in the record:

We find then that Colorado reports that the Mexican population there cultivates on an average of 2 to 3 tons of the weed annually. This the Mexicans make into cigarettes, which they sell at two for 25 cents, mostly to white school students.

Thus, not only did few middle-class Americans know about marijuana and its use, but also what little "information" was available provoked an automatic adverse association of the drug with Mexican immigration, crime and the deviant life style in the Black ghettos. Naturally, the impending drug legislation, as had the earlier state legislation, became entangled with society's views of these minority groups.

2. Role of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics

It has become quite fashionable among critics of existing marijuana legislation to assert that the sole cause of the illegal status of marijuana has been the crusading zeal of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and especially of its long-time head, Harry J. Anslinger. Some observers have suggested that the Bureau's activity was produced by bureaucratic exigencies and the need to expand; others have said the Bureau was

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67 Tax Act Hearings 32.
69 Dickson, Bureaucracy and Morality: An Organizational Perspective on a Moral Crusade, 16 Social Prob. 143 (1968).
on a moral crusade;\textsuperscript{60} still others have asserted that the Bureau believed its own propaganda about the link between criminality and dope fiends.\textsuperscript{61} While much of this may be true, it is clear that the Bureau did not single-handedly conjure up the idea of banning marijuana use. Since many states had already undertaken the regulation of marijuana before the creation of the Bureau in 1930, we cannot credit the Bureau alone with the pressure to outlaw the drug.

At the same time, it is certain that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' actions quickened the pace of the passage by state legislators of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. The Bureau saw the passage of state narcotics laws as one of its primary objectives. To this end we have detailed how directly the Bureau was involved in the creation of the Final Draft of the Uniform Act. After approval of the Final Draft, the Bureau began a significant campaign in the newspapers and legal journals to boost public support for the Uniform Act.\textsuperscript{62} By detailing the inability of federal enforcement agencies to deal with the burgeoning narcotics traffic, the Bureau continued to press for passage of the Uniform Act by creating a felt need in the public for such legislation.\textsuperscript{63} Despite the efforts of the Bureau, the Uniform Act went virtually unnoticed by legal commentators and periodicals, and by the public media.

3. Legislative Scrutiny and Media Coverage

The Uniform Act was passed by the legislatures of most states without scientific study or debate and without attracting public attention. In examining in detail the passage of the Uniform Act in Virginia and some other selected states, it will be clear that public concern over marijuana succeeded the outlawing of the drug and did not precede it. Our methodology to determine the extent of public attention in a given state at the time of the passage of the act was to review the newspapers of larger cities for the two weeks before and after passage.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{60} H. Becker, Outsiders 137-45 (1963); see T. Duster, The Legislation of Morality 17-19 (1970).
\textsuperscript{62} E.g., Anslinger, The Reason for Uniform State Narcotic Legislation, 21 Geo. L.J. 52 (1932); Tennyson, Uniform State Narcotic Law, 1 Fed. B. Ass'n J., Oct. 1932, at 55 (Mr. Tennyson was Legal Advisor, Bureau of Narcotics).
\textsuperscript{63} See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1931, at 37, col. 2.
\textsuperscript{64} It seems that if there were any public concern at all about the Uniform Act and its adoption, it should appear at those times in mention of the bill, marijuana or narcotic drugs in general. We used the papers of the larger cities under the assumption
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In Virginia the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act passed the House 88-0 on February 16, 1934,\(^6\) and was approved 34-0 by the Senate on February 22.\(^6\) Although the Act as passed in Virginia contained no marijuana provisions, the same legislature the next month passed a bill (H.B. 236), prohibiting "use of opium, marijuana [and] loco weed... in the manufacture of cigarettes, cigars" and other tobacco products.\(^6\) This law, which amended a 1910 Virginia statute prohibiting the use of opium in the manufacture of cigarettes,\(^6\) was the first mention of marijuana or any of its derivatives in the Virginia Code.

An examination of the Richmond Times-Dispatch, the newspaper of the state capital and perhaps the most influential newspaper in the state at that time, for the period surrounding the enactment of these two provisions (February 1 to March 15, 1934) shows clearly that little, if any, public attention attended their passage. There is no mention at any time of H.B. 236.\(^6\) As for H.B. 94 (the Uniform Act), the Times-Dispatch reported on February 7 that the bill had been introduced. This announcement was buried among the list of all bills introduced and referred on February 6.\(^7\) In a February 12 article dealing with "controversial" bills before the House and Senate that week no mention was made of H.B. 94. On March 6, the newspaper recorded: "Among the important bills passed were: ... [far down the list] the Scott bill, mak-

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\(^6\) Va. House Jour. 324 (1934).
\(^6\) Va. Senate Jour. 300-01 (1934).
\(^6\) Any manufacturer or manufacturers of cigarettes who shall employ opium, marihuana, loco weed, or any other sedative, narcotic or hypnotic drug, like chemical or substance, either in the tobacco used or paper wrappers of cigarettes, cigars, tobacco or any otherwise undiluted foodstuff or beverage, other than that advertised, sold and used as a drug or medicine, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or confined in jail not less than six months nor more than twelve months, or both, for each offense.


\(^6\) On March 11, 1934, the day after the prohibition of use of opium in cigarettes was amended to include marijuana, the Richmond Times-Dispatch did not mention the action, and an article entitled "Bills Passed by Assembly" did not mention any marijuana or narcotic laws. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mar. 11, 1934, at 4, col. 2. A March 12, six-column article, entitled "Vital Measures Passed in Busy 1934 Assembly" also did not mention either the narcotics legislation or the marijuana amendment. Id., Mar. 12, 1934, at 1, col. 2.

\(^7\) Id., Feb. 7, 1934, at 4, col. 1.
ing the State narcotic law conform to the Federal statute." That is the sum of the publicity received by the Uniform Act and the statute that first regulated marijuana in any way in Virginia.

In 1936, the legislature passed a separate statute prohibiting the sale and use of marijuana. This bill—S.B. 289—passed the House and Senate unanimously. The Act prohibited, except for a narrow medical exception, sale, possession, use and cultivation of marijuana. The penalties for violation, interestingly, were more severe than those for violation of the 1934 Uniform Act. Looking again at the Times-Dispatch for the period from February 15 to March 19, 1936, we find only one brief article on the new marijuana legislation. After the Senate passed the measure on February 29, the following appeared:

Among the bills passed by the Senate was the Apperson measure prohibiting the cultivation, sale or distribution of derivatives of the plant cannabis sativa, introduced as an outgrowth of alleged traffic in marihuana cigarettes in Roanoke. It fixes punishment for violation of its provisions at from one to 10 years in the penitentiary, or by confinement in jail for 12 months and a fine of not more than $1,000 or both.

Charges that school children were being induced to become addicts of marihuana cigarettes and that the weed was being cultivated in and near the city on a wide scale were laid before the Roanoke City Council last year. A youth who said he was a former addict of the drug testified before the Council that inhalation of one of the cigarettes would produce a 'cheap drunk' of several days' duration.

No further mention of this statute was made after the House passed it or after the Governor signed it into law.

In order to determine whether the lack of public attention in Virginia was common to other states when the first prohibition of marijuana took place, we have surveyed the leading newspapers of several other states at the times encompassing passage of the law. We tried to select states that had not previously regulated use of the drug under the assumption that more publicity would attend initial legislation than an amendment of existing law.

In New Jersey, Rhode Island, Oregon and West Virginia, for ex-

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71 Id., Mar. 6, 1934, at 2, col. 5.
74 Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mar. 1, 1936, at 12, col. 3.
ample, the major newspapers of Newark, Providence, Salem and Charleston, respectively, referred to the Uniform Act only once and to marijuana not at all. In Kentucky, the *Louisville Herald Post* printed only two short references to the Uniform Act, one of which referred to marijuana:

[Congressman] Kramer added that boys and girls of school age are being led into the use of habit forming drugs by underworld leaders. . . . [M]uggles or cigarettes made from marijuana, commonly called loco weed or hemp, are also tabooed under the new state law, it was learned.

Typical of both legislative and newspaper concern about the new law is the following *Charleston Daily Mail* comment:

**A Narcotic Bill**

Inconspicuously upon the special calendar of the house of delegates—rather far down upon it—is Engrossed S.B. No. 230, lodging specific powers in the hands of state authorities for the control of the traffic in narcotics. It has passed the Senate unanimously. It should pass the

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76 The *Newark Star Ledger* was surveyed from May 20 to June 10, 1933, a period surrounding the passage of the statute, ch. 186, [1933] N.J. Acts 397, on June 5, 1933. On the day of the signing of the bill, there appeared a short article noting that the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act had become law. *Newark Star Ledger*, June 5, 1933, at 2.

77 The statute, ch. 2096, [1934] R.I. Acts 101, was approved April 26, 1934. The *Providence Journal* was surveyed from April 10 to April 28, 1934, and on April 12 there appeared five sentences on the Uniform Act. *Providence Journal*, Apr. 12, 1934, at 8. On April 21, the law was described in a short article summarizing the business of the legislative session. *Id.*, Apr. 21, 1934, at 7. Neither article mentioned marijuana.

78 The *Salem Oregon Statesman* in the period from February 8 to February 28, 1935, had only one article dealing with drugs. *Salem Oregon Statesman*, Feb. 21, 1935, at 2, col. 2.

79 The Uniform Act was passed in West Virginia on March 8, 1935. Ch. 46, [1935] W. Va. Acts 179. The *Charleston Daily Mail*, which carried detailed legislative news, was surveyed from March 1 to March 20, 1935. On March 1, the legislature reconvened under a special calendar including the Uniform Act. During this period, the Act attracted little attention except for an editorial on March 7. *Charleston Daily Mail*, Mar. 7, 1935, at 10, col. 1. The bill was mentioned in passing in two other stories on upcoming legislation, and in a report that a federal judge criticized West Virginia's failure to enact the Act. *Id.*, Mar. 6, 1935, at 6, col. 4.

80 The *Louisville Herald Post* was surveyed from April 15 to June 15, 1934. The marijuana section of the Uniform Act became effective on June 14, 1934. Ch. 142, [1934] Ky. Acts 562. The only reference to the Act was *Louisville Herald Post*, June 6, 1934, at 10.

80 *Id.*
House, and its only danger of defeat there is the very real one that it will become lost in the shuffle of adjournment now but a few hours away.

The bill goes under the name of the uniform narcotic drug act and it is just that. Identical measures for the control by the states of illicit traffic on drugs have been passed by other states, notably the Southern group. Its passage here would result in a broad territory in which there are corresponding laws...

The editorial nowhere mentions marijuana. The bill itself passed in the waning hours of the special session with no subsequent attention given it.

From our survey of these and other states, we have concluded that with but one exception the Virginia experience was the norm. (1) The laws prohibiting use, sale, possession, and distribution of marijuana passed unnoticed by the media. There was no public outcry for such legislation. (2) Quite often the bill was buried beneath more controversial bills in a busy legislative session. (3) In many states the Act was passed late in the session along with myriad other “uncontroversial” laws. (4) Finally, no state undertook independent study to determine the medical facts about marijuana—they relied on information supplied by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics or a few lurid newspaper stories.

4. Available Medical Opinion

In conjunction with the fourth conclusion from our state case histories of the passage of this Act, we should examine the extent of medical knowledge that might have been available to legislators had they wanted to conduct an independent evaluation of the dangers of the hemp drugs.

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82 Id., Mar. 11, 1935, at 1, col. 1, reports: “In the confusion of the closing hours Saturday night the legislature passed many bills, many of them unread and unprinted and not understood.”
83 In Missouri, the passage of the Uniform Act was attended by pressure on the legislature stemming from a hysteria campaign in the St. Louis Star Times which contained 5 major articles urging the outlawing of marijuana and presenting lurid case studies of the evils of the drug. These articles were quoted in the Tax Act Hearings. See St. Louis Star Times, Jan. 17-Feb. 19, 1935.
84 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1931, at 37, col. 2 (recording Commissioner Anslinger's statements on the need for uniform state laws to regulate marijuana).
85 In the Missouri case, the legislature, in response to the scare stories in the St. Louis Star Times, took only 10 days to present the law, hold quick hearings, and unanimously pass the anti-marijuana legislation.
Marijuana Prohibition

There were five influential sources for information about the effects of marijuana and hemp on humans. None of these were conducted with the scientific precision characterizing modern studies of drug effects. However, they each deserve mention here either because they deserved attention then or because they heavily influenced later commentators.

The first exhaustive study of the effects of cannabis and the other hemp drugs was done by the British in India. Their Indian Hemp Drugs Commission studied cannabis use among the native population in India in 1893 and 1894, and submitted its conclusions in a 500-page report. The Commission received evidence from 1,193 witnesses, including 335 doctors, and studied the relevant drug-related judicial proceedings and the intake records of every mental hospital in British India. As a result they concluded:

In regard to the moral effects of the drugs, the Commission are of opinion that their moderate use produces no moral injury whatever. There is no adequate ground for believing that it injuriously affects the character of the consumer. Excessive consumption, on the other hand, both indicates and intensifies moral weakness or depravity. Manifest excess leads directly to loss of self-respect, and thus to moral degradation. In respect to his relations with society, however, even the excessive consumer of hemp drugs is ordinarily inoffensive. His excesses may indeed bring him to degraded poverty which may lead him to dishonest practices; and occasionally, but apparently very rarely indeed, excessive indulgence in hemp drugs may lead to violent crime. But for all practical purposes it may be laid down that there is little or no connection between the use of hemp drugs and crime.

It is quite clear, however, that the Indian Hemp Drug Commission Report was not disseminated in the United States until 1969.

On the other hand, periodic reports of the Panama Canal Zone Governor's Committee to study the physical and moral effects of the use of marijuana were available to legislators before the passage of the Uniform Act. After an investigation extending from April to December 1925, the Committee reached the following conclusions:

There is no evidence that marijuana as grown here is a "habit-forming" drug in the sense in which the term is applied to alcohol,
opium, cocaine etc. or that it has any appreciable deleterious influence on the individual using it.\textsuperscript{89}

In 1933, a similar Panama Canal Zone committee reported:

Delinquencies due to marijuana smoking which result in trial by military court are negligible in number when compared with delinquencies resulting from the use of alcoholic drinks which also may be classed as stimulants and intoxicants.\textsuperscript{90}

About the time that the final Governor's Committee Report from the Canal Zone was completed, a New Orleans physician, Dr. Fossier, completed a study from which he concluded that marijuana was a highly dangerous drug with habit-forming properties.\textsuperscript{91} This piece would have remained relatively unnoticed due to the obscurity of the journal in which it was published had it not been picked up by the New Orleans District Attorney, Eugene Stanley, and made the basis for his own article—Marihuana as a Developer of Criminals\textsuperscript{92}—which appeared in a law enforcement journal. Mr. Stanley stated:

It is an ideal drug to cut off inhibitions quickly. . . .

At the present time the underworld has been quick to realize the value of this drug in subjugating the will of human derelicts to that of a master mind. Its use sweeps away all restraint, and to its influence may be attributed many of our present day crimes. It has been the experience of the Police and Prosecuting Officials in the South that immediately before the commission of many crimes the use of marihuana cigarettes has been indulged in by criminals so as to relieve themselves from the natural restraint which might deter them from the commission of criminal acts, and to give them the false courage necessary to commit the contemplated crime.\textsuperscript{93}

Mr. Stanley's article, based on no empirical data whatsoever, was widely used by courts to corroborate early legislation and by lobbyists to justify the later prohibitive legislation against the hemp drugs.\textsuperscript{94}

In 1933 the following colloquy appeared in the Journal of the American Medical Association:

\textsuperscript{89} Quoted in Marijuana Smoking in Panama, 73 The Military Surgeon 274 (1933).
\textsuperscript{90} Id. at 279.
\textsuperscript{91} Fossier, The Marijuana Menace, 84 New Orleans Medical & Surgical J. 247 (1931).
\textsuperscript{92} Stanley, Marihuana as a Developer of Criminals, 2 Am. J. Police Sci. 252 (1931).
\textsuperscript{93} Id. at 256.
\textsuperscript{94} See Tax Act Hearings 23-24, 37.
To the Editor:—I have been hearing about the smoking of cigarettes dipped into or medicated with fluid extract of Cannabis americana. I can find nothing about the use of the drug by addicts. What is its immediate effect? What are its late effects? What is the minimum lethal dose? In what way does it differ from or resemble “muggles” in its action? While in Louisiana I was told that the use of marijuana causes dementia. Is this true? Please omit name.

M.D., Illinois.

Answer.—The effect of Cannabis americana is the same as that of Cannabis indica; and, of the effect of the latter, the books are so full that it is hardly necessary to detail them here. It must suffice here to say that cannabis, at the height of its action, usually produces hallucinations, with or without euphoria, and that these are followed by a deep sleep. Its most marked after-effect is the liability to the establishment of a craving for the drug, the habitual use of which undermines the intellectual qualities and the social value of the victim and leads to general physical deterioration. It is stated that smokers nearly always become imbecile in time. The minimum lethal dose is unknown, no fatalities having been reported in man. In view of the fact that one dose may kill one dog that has no marked effect on another, one must admit the possibility of a lethal effect on man. In view of what has been said, it must be admitted that “marihuana,” which is merely another name for Cannabis indica, may cause dementia.95

The reply contains no indication how or where the persons who answered the question got their data. It seems clear from the nature of the response that the medical community was quite uncertain as to the effects of the drug in 1933.

In 1934, Dr. Walter Bromberg, senior psychiatrist at Bellevue Hospital, reported that marijuana was not a habit-forming drug and was far less responsible for crime than other drugs such as alcohol. In this study, Bromberg drew his data from examination of 2,216 inmates convicted of felonies.96 Dr. Bromberg pointed out that marijuana users tend to be passive in comparison to users of alcohol and that the hemp drugs

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95 100 J.A.M.A. 601 (1933).
96 Bromberg, Marijuana Intoxication: A Clinical Study of Cannabis Sativa Intoxication, 91 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 303 (1934).
should lead to crime only in cases of use by already psychopathic
types.\textsuperscript{97}

This then was the extent of medical evidence available to laymen and
legislators alike at the time the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and the first
prohibitions of marijuana were enacted in most states. We can conclude
the following from our brief review of the medical literature: (1)

\textsuperscript{97} Id. at 309; see Facts and Fancies About Marijuana, LITERARY DIGEST, Oct. 24, 1936,
at 7-8. This presentation begins by digesting Dr. Bromberg's article for laymen:

It is clear from this study [of 2,216 criminals convicted of felonies] that in this
region the drug is a breeder of crime only when used by psychopathic types
in whom the drug allows the emergence of aggressive, sexual or antisocial
tendencies. . . . It is quite probable that alcohol is more responsible as an agent
for crime than is marijuana.

The article continues:

The following facts stand out in social and medical reports:
1. Marihuana is not a habit-forming drug, as is heroin or opium.
2. It prolongs sensations; it is in high favor as an aphrodisiac.
3. It is the most inexpensive of drugs; marihuana cigarettes usually selling at
from three to twenty-five cents each.

The article then describes the effects of marijuana:

After smoking from one to three "reefers," if one has not been told what
to expect, the first effects of the drug pass almost unnoticed—nothing, perhaps,
but a slight twitching of muscles of the neck, back or legs. The mind remains calm
and clear. Suddenly, without apparent cause, a chance remark . . . sends the
subject into a spasm of violent laughter.

Becoming calm again, while the drug continues to exert its weird effects, the
smoker finds ideas crowding through his brain with bewildering rapidity; those
around him become slow—dull. Nor is the language of his own tongue swift
enough to keep pace with his lightning thoughts.

Soon the self-esteem of the smoker begins to grow in like proportion. . . .
Paradoxically, trifling discomforts become unbearable evils; the glare of a
match near-by brings a resentment that is immediately transformed into an
overwhelming desire for revenge. But before the "reefer man" could possibly
climb to his feet, or even reach a hand for a gun or knife, new thoughts have
come crowding in. . . .

Above all other distinguishing effects of marihuana intoxication is the fact that
all normal conceptions of time and space are lost.
As in the split-second dream that seems to last the night through, time seems
of interminable length; the clock stands still for days.
Vision, too, takes on new concepts. Inconsiderable distances become tre-
mendous. . . .

Yet, throughout the intoxication, there is constant awareness that the strange
fancies rushing through the mind are not natural, but purely the effects of the
drug; unlike the opium-eater, he is acutely conscious of those about him. He
has many of the sensations of the gay "drunk" at the ball.

Describing a pot-party:

There is little noise; windows are shut, keeping the smell of smoking weeds
away from what might be curious nostrils.
Nor is there any of the yelling, dashing about, playing of crude jokes or
physical violence that often accompany alcoholic parties; under the effects of
marihuana, one has a dread of all these things.
Little was really known about the effects of marijuana use—there were few studies and what studies there were had serious methodological flaws. (2) Even if the studies we record had been adequate methodologically, they appeared generally in obscure medical journals not widely read by laymen. (3) Of these studies, most found marijuana relatively harmless especially in contrast to use of alcohol. (4) None of these studies were considered in either the formulation or the passage of the Uniform Act in the states examined. And what is more astounding is that instead of consulting medical opinion, legislators relied on lurid newspaper accounts of marijuana, often provided by defendants in criminal prosecutions whose motivation was to use marijuana to escape criminal responsibility.

5. Provisions of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and Supplemental Virginia Marijuana Statute

Having studied the circumstances surrounding passage of the Uniform Act and similar legislation in several states between 1932 and 1937, we shall briefly summarize the provisions of those laws.

(a) Classification and Offenses.—The Virginia legislature made no changes in the Uniform Act as drafted by the Commissioners and did not include the supplementary marijuana provisions in passing that Act. In 1936, Virginia passed special marijuana legislation which defined cannabis exactly as did the definitional provision of the Uniform Act. Both the special marijuana statute in Virginia and the Uniform Act prohibited possession, transfer and cultivation of the drug but did not refer to the more specific acts that later came to be separated and punished more heavily, such as sale to a minor and possession of more than a certain amount.

(b) Penalties.—The Uniform Act contained no specific penalties for its violations; the matter of supplying the appropriate penalties was left to each state. Virginia punished first violations of its Uniform Act by a fine not exceeding $100 and/or imprisonment in jail not exceeding one year, and second and subsequent offenses by a fine not exceeding $1,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than five years in the penitentiary. The penalties for violation of Virginia's 1936 marijuana

100 Id.
statute were stiffer than for violation of its Uniform Act. Each offense was punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for from one to ten years or by confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and/or by a fine up to $1,000, in the discretion of the court or jury.\textsuperscript{102} An analysis of penalties for violation of the marijuana statutes enacted in other states at about the same time indicates Virginia's penalties were atypically harsh. In New Jersey, for instance, the penalty for unlawful possession and sale of marijuana was that attaching to a high misdemeanor.\textsuperscript{103} In Rhode Island the penalty for unlawful possession was a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than three years or both.\textsuperscript{104} For unlawful selling, Rhode Island provided a fine of not more than $2,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years or both.\textsuperscript{105} In Kentucky the penalty for a first offense violation was a fine of not less than $100 and not more than $500 or jail for not less than thirty days nor more than one year or both. For second and subsequent offenses the statute required imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.\textsuperscript{106} Finally, West Virginia penalized a first offender by a fine not exceeding $100 or jail for not exceeding one year or both, and subsequent offenders by fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five years or both.\textsuperscript{107} This comparison indicates that Virginia penalties could be more severe than the average. Moreover, Virginia did not distinguish in penalty between possession and sale of the drug, and violation of Virginia's separate marijuana law could be more heavily penalized than violation of the Uniform Act.

V. PASSAGE OF THE MARIHUA NA TAX ACT OF 1937

The first assertion of federal authority over marijuana use was the Marihuana Tax Act, passed in 1937. The obvious question, from a historical point of view, is why such legislation was thought to be nec-

\textsuperscript{102} Ch. 212, § 1(c), [1936] Va. Acts of Assembly 362. The penalty for violation of ch. 268, [1934] Va. Acts of Assembly 411, which prohibited the use of marijuana in the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes, was confinement in jail for from 6 to 12 months and/or a fine of from $100 to $1000.

\textsuperscript{103} Ch. 186, § 12, [1933] N.J. Laws 411.

\textsuperscript{104} Ch. 2096, § 14, [1934] R.I. Acts 111.

\textsuperscript{105} Id., § 15.


necessary, especially after the brushfire passage of the Uniform Act and related legislation in every state in the previous few years. Enforcement difficulty and public hysteria are two reasons which have been propounded for the federal action. We subscribe to a third, one which we rejected with respect to the uniform acts—Congress was hoodwinked by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

A. State Enforcement of the Uniform Law

One of the primary arguments in support of the Marihuana Tax Act was that the legislation was required to permit and facilitate adequate enforcement of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. Initial examination of enforcement statistics after passage of the Uniform Act suggests that marijuana seizures and arrests in most states rose dramatically.

The best example of this argument is contained in Commissioner Anslinger's statement to the congressional committee hearings on the Marihuana Tax Act:

STATE LAWS

All of the States now have some type of legislation directed against the traffic in marijuana for improper purposes. There is no legislation in effect with respect to the District of Columbia dealing with marijuana traffic. There is unfortunately a loophole in much of this State legislation because of a too narrow definition of this term. Few of the States have a special narcotic law enforcement agency and, speaking generally, considerable training of the regular peace officers will be required together with increased enforcement facilities before a reasonable measure of effectiveness under the State laws can be achieved.

NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Even in States which have legislation controlling in some degree the marijuana traffic, public officials, private citizens, and the press have urged or suggested the need for national legislation dealing with this important problem. A partial list of States wherein officials or the press have urged the need for Federal legislation on the subject are Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Louisiana, and Oklahoma.

The uniform State narcotic law has now been adopted by some 35 States, many of these including cannabis or marijuana within the scope of control by that law. However, it has recently been learned that the legislative definition of cannabis in most of these laws is too narrow, and it will be necessary to have the definition amplified in amendatory legislation in most of the States, to accord with the definition in the pending Federal bill. As is the case at present with respect to opium, coca leaves, and their respective alkaloids, the uniform State law does not completely solve the enforcement problem with respect to marijuana but it will provide the necessary supplement to the Federal act and permit cooperation of State and Federal forces, each acting within its respective sphere, toward suppression of traffic for abusive use, no matter in what form the traffic is conducted. The Bureau of Narcotics, under the Marijuana Taxing Act, would continue to act as an informal coordinating agency in the enforcement of the Uniform State law, exchanging information as between the respective State authorities in the methods of procedure and attempting to secure true uniformity in the enforcement of the act in the various States which have adopted it.

Tax Act Hearings 31.
However, we should be careful to note at the outset the inadequacies of most drug statistics, which, especially during this period, do not permit conclusive analysis regarding the extent of enforcement.

Reporting officials frequently do not differentiate among the drugs. Different jurisdictions employ different measures of enforcement—number of arrests, convictions, kilograms of the drug seized, or number of seizures; even where the same measures are used, statistics are often compiled for different time frames. In addition, changes in the definitions in the laws—such as a change from considering cannabis as only the flowering top of the plant to considering it the whole plant—can wildly distort the statistics from year to year. To add to the confusion, enforcement agencies can manipulate the data for their own uses; if they must appear to be attacking the drug problem or to need more resources, they can change radically the statistical appearance of the enforcement problem by using, for example, arrests as their enforcement measure. Finally, the mere passage of prohibitive legislation will in itself be reflected in the enforcement data. This is especially important for our study of enforcement patterns in the states before passage of the Marihuana Tax Act. As one commentator has explained:

A point that should be obvious but that is sometimes overlooked is that there are no official statistics relating to violations of a drug law until the drug law is enacted. To compare official preenactment and postenactment data is to compare nothing to something, and naturally drug use will appear to rise.2

For all these reasons, the drug statistics from the period of the 1930's must be used somewhat hesitantly to support any contention about the extent of state enforcement before the enactment of Marihuana Tax Act. With this caveat in mind, we shall proceed, nevertheless, to do so.

Although Commissioner Anslinger testified at the hearings on the Tax Act that state officials frequently asked for federal assistance,3 it appears from the Federal Bureau's own statistics that state and municipal agencies were proceeding with vigor to stamp out marijuana use.4 We

2 Mandel, Problems with Official Drug Statistics, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 991, 1002 (1969). This article is the most complete discussion of the present inadequacies of all official drug statistics.

3 Tax Act Hearings 26-27.

4 The FBN statistics for 1935 through 1937 on quantities (in pounds) of harvested marijuana seized by state and municipal authorities in the major states are as follows:
Marijuana Prohibition

do not have fully accurate data, but there are indications that both New York and Louisiana were moving against marijuana use. In 1934, the New York police discovered a large field of marijuana growing near the Brooklyn Bridge. In making a related raid, the police also seized 1,000 marijuana cigarettes. In 1935, the police burned a marijuana crop found growing on the grounds of the Welfare Island penitentiary. Throughout 1936, the narcotics division of the New York police found and destroyed several marijuana crops growing in and around the city. Fragmentary figures are available on law enforcement in Louisiana which indicate there were 219 arrests on marijuana charges in New Orleans alone from 1930 until April of 1936. In Louisiana as a whole for 1936 over 1,195 pounds of bulk marijuana were seized.

This evidence suggests that state authorities in areas where marijuana use had become common at all were dealing fairly effectively with the trade in the drug. Although some states may have hoped that passage of a federal law dealing with marijuana would reduce the enforcement burden on state and local police and bring additional federal services and money, the law cannot really be justified as filling an enforcement void. Nevertheless, this was one of the most effective arguments advanced by Commissioner Anslinger in the halls of Congress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1935</th>
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<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
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<td>1,196</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>372,000</td>
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<td>Ohio</td>
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<td>431</td>
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<td>Texas</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>463</td>
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<td>All other states</td>
<td>2,232</td>
<td>1,972</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>391,787</td>
<td>5,372</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bureau of Narcotics, U.S. Treasury Dept., Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs 63 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Traffic in Opium]; id. at 90 (1936); id. at 81 (1937); Part of the erratic quality of these figures may stem from failure to weigh only the dried flowering tops of the plants seized. For example, 256 pounds seized in 1937 may represent a larger quantity of total plants than 391,787 pounds seized in 1935. See Mandel, supra note 2, at 999.

6 N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1934, at 4, col. 4. The article goes on to refer to "marijuana [sic], or loco weed, which produces a pleasant, relaxed sensation when smoked, and eventually drives the habitual user insane . . . ."


9 See Tax Act Hearings 25.
Some observers have attributed passage of the Tax Act to public hysteria. In support of this contention, they show that there was a marked increase in the number of titles dealing with marijuana in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature from 1936 until 1939, compared with the total absence of articles on this subject in preceding years.

It should be noted, however, that only seven articles treating marijuana or hashish appeared from 1920 to August 1937, when the Tax Act was passed. With respect to medical opinion, the AMA Journal presented an article opposing the enactment of the Tax Act and arguing, as did their representative at the Tax Act hearings, that existing state laws were sufficient if properly enforced.

It seems the national media and medical opinion were far from hysterical at the time the Tax Act passed. There were a few local newspaper campaigns against the drug, but they tended to peak about two years before the passage of the Act and were isolated instances of public support for the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. Moreover, these atypical state scares did not draw national attention.

In fact, whatever publicity the “marijuana problem” received during this period was attributable to Commissioner Anslinger and his office, who conducted an active educational campaign for federal legislation. They prepared press stories on the dangers of the drug and travelled around the country disseminating propaganda. Despite these efforts,

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4. See text at notes 47-50 infra.


7. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1937, § 6, at 6, col. 4. The article reported a meeting between Anslinger and the chairwoman of the New York Federation of Women's Clubs. After the meeting, the chairwoman started an all out campaign against marijuana, focusing on lobbying for the nationwide passage of state legislation, and on an
however, public knowledge of the marijuana proposals was minimal at best. The *New York Times* contained nine references to marijuana from January 1936 until it reported on August 3, 1937, 18 "President Roosevelt signed today a bill to curb traffic in the narcotic, marihuana, through heavy taxes on transactions." 19

As in prior years, marijuana was still not a matter of public attention, and the so-called "problem" and the federal proposal to cure it went virtually unnoticed by most of the American public. At the same time, however, the "educational" campaign conducted by the Bureau to inform the Congress of the dimensions of the "problem" was highly successful. In this sense, the Bureau itself created the "felt need" for federal legislation; the Bureau—and not public hysteria which it was unable to arouse—was the major force behind the Tax Act. We assign to the Bureau the instrumental role with respect to passage of the Tax Act even though we did not do so with respect to the Uniform Act. So successful were the Commissioner's efforts in the Congress that the hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee and the floor debate on the bill are near comic examples of dereliction of legislative responsibility.

C. The Tax Act Hearings

Although the Marihuana Tax Act was modelled after the Harrison Act, marijuana was not simply included in the earlier act primarily for three reasons. First, the importation focus of the Harrison Act was inappropriate for marijuana because there were domestic producers.20

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18 *Id.*, July 24, 1936, at 6, col. 3; *id.*, July 28, 1936, at 11, col. 6; *id.*, Aug. 14, 1936, at 12, col. 3; *id.*, Aug. 19, 1936, at 16, col. 3; *id.*, Oct. 4, 1936, § 1, at 3, col. 3; *id.*, Oct. 28, 1936, at 27, col. 6; *id.*, Jan. 3, 1937, § 6, at 6, col. 4; *id.*, Mar. 22, 1937, at 24, col. 1; *id.*, May 4, 1937, at 26, col. 1.

19 *Id.*, Aug. 3, 1937, at 4, col. 5.

20 Compare Tax Act Hearings 13-14 (testimony of Clinton Hester, Office of the General Counsel of the Treasury Department) with State v. Bonoa, 172 La. 955, 136 So. 15 (1931). It should be asked whether the information at congressional disposal changed so drastically between 1937 and 1956 as to justify the statutory presumption enacted at that time, 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964), providing that possession of marijuana was presumptive evidence of knowing concealment of illegally imported marijuana.
Second, since cannabis had been removed from the *United States Pharmacopoeia* and had no recognized medicinal uses, the variety of medical exceptions in the Harrison Act were inapplicable. Second, since cannabis had been removed from the *United States Pharmacopoeia* and had no recognized medicinal uses, the variety of medical exceptions in the Harrison Act were inapplicable.\(^2\) Third, even though the Supreme Court had upheld the Harrison Act's prohibition against *purchase* by unregistered persons of the designated drugs, there was some uncertainty whether the earlier 5-4 decision\(^2\) would be followed. Accordingly, the Marihuana Tax Act imposed a prohibitive tax of $100 an ounce on the designated transactions, rather than prohibit the purchases directly.\(^2\)

The brief three days of hearings on the Act\(^2\) present a case study in legislative carelessness. At no time was any primary empirical evidence presented about the effects of the drug, and the participating congressmen seem never to have questioned the assumed evils. Furthermore, the only real concerns seem to have been that farmers would be inconvenienced by having to kill a plant which grew wild in many parts of the country, and that the birdseed, paint and varnish, and domestic hemp industries would be damaged by passage of the law.\(^2\) Finally, the one witness appearing in opposition to the bill, Dr. William C. Woodward, legislative counsel of the American Medical Association and an early and respected participant in the drafting of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act,\(^2\) was roundly insulted for his audacity in daring to question the wisdom of the Act.

We reproduce in the following few pages some of the dialogue from the hearings, to give the reader the flavor of these ramshackle proceedings, and to allow him to understand more fully the pyramiding of absurdity represented by the amendments of the 1950's. From the hearings we extract contemporary perception of use patterns and harmful effects of marijuana, the quality of medical and other evidence presented, and a short glimpse at how the witnesses were treated by the committee.

1. *Who Were Users?*

The record of the hearings indicates quite clearly that the Federal

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\(^{21}\) *Tax Act Hearings* 13-14. Earlier state statutes, particularly Virginia's, had taken great pains to outline medical exemptions from the marijuana prohibition. See p. 1040 *supra*.


\(^{23}\) *Tax Act Hearings* 13-14.

\(^{24}\) The hearings, including all material not actively discussed but merely read into the record, cover only 124 pages.

\(^{25}\) *Tax Act Hearings* 77-86; see *State v. Bonoa*, 172 La. 955, 136 So. 15 (1931).

\(^{26}\) See pp. 1030-32 *supra*. 
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Narcotics Bureau was anxious for the committeemen to believe marijuana use was a relatively new phenomenon that was on the increase in America.\(^7\) Once again, marijuana use and the Mexican minority were closely linked: "The Mexican laborers have brought seeds of this plant into Montana and it is fast becoming a terrible menace, particularly in the counties where sugarbeets are grown."\(^8\) Again, also, marijuana was presented as the agent by which the underworld class hoped to enslave American youth.\(^9\) The youth of the marijuana users was contrasted with the increasing age of the usual opiate addict. Perhaps most interestingly for later developments, Commissioner Anslinger succinctly noted that heroin addicts and marijuana users came from totally different classes and that the use of one drug was unrelated to use of the other:

Mr. Anslinger. This drug is not being used by those who have been using heroin and morphine. It is being used by a different class, by a much younger group of people. The age of the morphine and heroin addict is increasing all the time, whereas the marihuana smoker is quite young.

Mr. Dingell. I am just wondering whether the marihuana addict graduates into a heroin, an opium or cocaine user.

Mr. Anslinger. No sir; I have not heard of a case of that kind. I think it is an entirely different class. The marihuana addict does not go in that direction.\(^30\)

The hearings shed no more light on who was using the drug and in what numbers.

2. What's Wrong with Marijuana?

If the proceedings did not shed light on the patterns of usage, this in no way was an obstacle to unanimity on the evils of the drug—insanity, criminality and death. Three major sources were relied on to support

\(^{27}\) See Tax Act Hearings 30-31.
\(^{28}\) Id. at 45.
\(^{29}\) Quoting Dr. Walter Bromberg, Mr. Anslinger stated:

Young men between the ages of 16 and 25 are frequent smokers of marihuana; even boys of 10 to 14 are initiated (frequently in school groups); to them as to others, marihuana holds out the thrill. Since the economic depression the number of marihuana smokers was increased by vagrant youths coming into intimate contact with older psychopaths.

\(^{30}\) Id. at 24.
this consensus: (1) a variety of horror stories from newspapers cited by Mr. Anslinger and others about atrocious criminal acts committed by individuals under the influence of the drug;\(^31\) (2) studies by Eugene Stanley, the District Attorney of New Orleans, linking the drug and the population of the Louisiana jails;\(^32\) and (3) some inconclusive experimentation on dogs.\(^33\) As we noted earlier, the newspaper stories about crimes committed under the influence of marijuana have two things in common: The reports are unsubstantiated, and many of the accused invoked their use of marijuana as a defense to the charge.\(^34\)

The New Orleans report concluded: "After an exhaustive research on marijuana from its earliest history to the present time, this drug is in our judgment the one that must be eliminated entirely."\(^35\) What was this exhaustive research? It appears to have been nothing but quotations from the most hysterical series of newspaper articles to appear at that time\(^36\) and reports of the number of marijuana addicts to be found in the prison population.\(^37\) The relation of these figures to the conclusion that the drug must be regulated was never established.

The Stanley study\(^38\) was even less well documented and even more outrageous in its description of the effects of marijuana use. "It is an ideal drug to quickly cut off inhibitions."\(^39\) For this proposition Stanley relied on the story of the Persian "Assassins" who allegedly committed

\(^{31}\) Id. at 22-23.
\(^{32}\) Id. at 32-37.
\(^{33}\) Id. at 50-52.
\(^{34}\) See id. at 22-23. It is entirely likely that some of these particularly lurid stores were the product of desperate defendants, who, upon being caught red-handed in the commission of crime, sought mitigation of their penalties by claiming to be under the influence of the drug. See Bromberg, Marijuana: A Psychiatric Study, 113 J.A.M.A. 4 (1939). Bromberg cautions, "The extravagant claims of defense attorneys and the press that crime is caused by addiction to marihuana demands [sic] careful scrutiny, at least in this jurisdiction [New York County]." Id. at 10.

\(^{35}\) Tax Act Hearings 35.

\(^{36}\) A good example is the series run by the St. Louis Star-Times in early 1935 which featured such articles as the one entitled "Young Slaves to Dope Cigaret Pay Tragic Price for Their Folly" on Jan. 18, 1935.

\(^{37}\) See Gomila & Gomila, Marihuana—A More Alarming Menace to Society Than All Other Habit-Forming Drugs, quoted in Tax Act Hearings 32, 34. Mr. F. R. Gomila was public safety director of New Orleans.

\(^{38}\) Stanley, Marihuana as a Developer of Criminals, 2 Am. J. Police Sci. 252 (1931), quoted in Tax Act Hearings 37-42, is based on, and indeed is nearly a word-for-word paraphrase of, Fossier's article in the New Orleans Medical Journal, supra note 91 at p. 1044. As we have seen, Fossier, in reaching his conclusions, overlooked the Panama Canal Zone study.

\(^{39}\) Tax Act Hearings 39.
acts of terror while under the influence of hashish. Although Stanley included in his list of references the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report, it is clear he made little effort to catalogue the then available data but contented himself with a number of bold and undocumented assertions. In reading the hearings, one continues to expect some report of a medical or scientific survey, and instead one finds these two reports by New Orleans law enforcers. The contrary conclusions of the Canal Zone studies were not even mentioned.

Finally, a scientific study of the effects of marijuana was presented, but, in keeping with the overall tone of the hearings, this was the most preposterous evidence of all. The Treasury Department presented a pharmacologist who had tested the effects of the cannabis drugs on dogs. He concluded that "[c]ontinuous use will tend to cause the degeneration of one part of the brain." One paragraph later, however, this scientist stated: "Only about 1 dog in 300 is very sensitive to the test." Later in the doctor's testimony, after he had stated over and over the potential evils found from the testing on dogs, he was unable to make the crucial link between a dog's response to the drug and the human response. More incredibly, as the following exchange points out, the doctor really had no knowledge of what effect the drug had on the dogs, since he was not familiar with the psychology of dogs:

Mr. McCormack. Have you experimented upon any animals whose reaction to this drug would be similar to that of human beings.

Dr. Munch. The reason we use dogs is because the reaction of dogs to this drug closely resembles the reaction of human beings.

Mr. McCormack. And the continued use of it, as you have observed the reaction on dogs, has resulted in the disintegration of the personality?

Dr. Munch. Yes. So far as I can tell, not being a dog psychologist . . . .

Dr. Woodward, the sole witness representing the American Medical Association, noted the inadequacy of these medical statistics. We include his statement on that point in full:

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40 One assumes the drug was thought to be too dangerous to risk experimentation on people.
41 Tax Act Hearings 48.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 51.
That there is a certain amount of narcotic addiction of an objectionable character no one will deny. The newspapers have called attention to it so prominently that there must be some grounds for their statements. It has surprised me, however, that the facts on which these statements have been based have not been brought before this committee by competent primary evidence. We are referred to newspaper publications concerning the prevalence of marihuana addiction. We are told that the use of marihuana causes crime.

But yet no one has been produced from the Bureau of Prisons to show the number of prisoners who have been found addicted to the marihuana habit. An informal inquiry shows that the Bureau of Prisons has no evidence on that point.

You have been told that school children are great users of marihuana cigarettes. No one has been summoned from the Children's Bureau to show the nature and extent of the habit, among children.

Inquiry of the Children's Bureau shows that they have had no occasion to investigate it and know nothing particularly of it.

Inquiry of the Office of Education—and they certainly should know something of the prevalence of the habit among the school children of the country, if there is a prevalent habit—indicates that they have had no occasion to investigate and know nothing of it.

Moreover, there is in the Treasury Department itself, the Public Health Service, with its Division of Mental Hygiene. The Division of Mental Hygiene was, in the first place, the Division of Narcotics. It was converted into the Division of Mental Hygiene, I think, about 1930. That particular Bureau has control at the present time of the narcotics farms that were created about 1929 or 1930 and came into operation a few years later. No one has been summoned from that Bureau to give evidence on that point.

Informal inquiry by me indicates that they have had no record of any marihuana or Cannabis addicts who have even been committed to those farms.

The Bureau of the Public Health Service has also a division of pharmacology. If you desire evidence as to the pharmacology of Cannabis, that obviously is the place where you can get direct and primary evidence, rather than the indirect hearsay evidence.44

Dr. Woodward's testimony clearly manifests the deficiencies of the hearings, for at no time did the congressional committee hear primary sources of competent medical evidence before labeling cannabis the producer of crime and insanity.

44 Id. at 92.
3. How Dare You Dissent!

Following the testimony of the Treasury Department and its witnesses, the only witnesses who came forward were representatives of legitimate industries that feared the Tax Act would damage their businesses, because manufacture of their products required some part or parts of the cannabis plant. These witnesses were assured that the Tax Act would have little if any impact on their operations.

The one witness who opposed the adoption of the Act was roundly accused of obstructionism and bad faith. Dr. Woodward, one of the chief drafters of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, appeared on behalf of the AMA to suggest that, if there was to be any regulation of the cannabis drugs at all, it should be added to the Harrison Act and not be the subject of this separate, and he felt inadequately considered, legislative proposal. We have already examined Dr. Woodward's skepticism on the dangers of the drug. He added to this a thinly veiled attack on the lack of cooperation the AMA had received from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Finally, he advocated either assisting state enforcement of their existing laws dealing with the drug or at most including marijuana as a regulated and taxed drug under the Harrison Act.

Either because of antipathy to the AMA or because of the audacity of these suggestions, the Committee members savagely attacked both Dr. Woodward and the AMA. Witness the following exchange, starting with the doctor's answer to questions why he had not proposed marijuana legislation:

Dr. Woodward. In the first place, it is not a medical addiction that is involved and the data do not come before the medical society. You may absolutely forbid the use of Cannabis by any physician, or the disposition of Cannabis by any pharmacist in the country, and you would not have touched your Cannabis addiction as it stands today.

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45 Thus, the following witnesses appeared: Hon. Ralph E. Lozier, General Counsel of the National Institute of Oilseed Products; Raymond G. Scarlett of the birdseed industry; and Joseph B. Hertzfeld, Manager, Feed Department, The Philadelphia Seed Co.

46 See id. at 74.

47 Id. at 87-121.

48 Id. at 87-88 ("During the past 2 years I have visited the Bureau of Narcotics probably 10 or more times. Unfortunately, I had no knowledge that such a bill as this was proposed until after it had been introduced").
because there is no relation between it and the practice of medicine or pharmacy. It is entirely outside of the those two branches.

The Chairman. If the statement that you have just made has any relation to the question that I asked, I just do not have the mind to understand it; I am sorry.

Dr. Woodward. I say that we do not ordinarily come directly to Congress if a department can take care of the matter. I have talked with the Commissioner, with Commissioner Anslinger.

The Chairman. If you want to advise us on legislation, you ought to come here with some constructive proposals, rather than criticism, rather than trying to throw obstacles in the way of something that the Federal Government is trying to do. It has not only an unselfish motive in this, but they have a serious responsibility.

Dr. Woodward. We cannot understand yet, Mr. Chairman, why this bill should have been prepared in secret for 2 years without any intimation. even, to the profession, that it was being prepared.49

After accusing Dr. Woodward of obstruction, evasion and bad faith, the Committee did not even thank him for his testimony.50

D. Congressional “Deliberation” and Action

We noted earlier that the marijuana “problem” and the proposed federal cure were virtually unnoticed by the general public. Unable to arouse public opinion through its educational campaign, the Bureau of Narcotics nevertheless pushed the proposed legislation through congressional committees. The Committee members were convinced by meaningless evidence that federal action was urgently needed to suppress a problem that was no greater and probably less severe than it had been in the preceding six years when every state had passed legislation to suppress it. The Committee was also convinced, incorrectly, that the public was aware of the evil and demanded federal action.

The debate on the floor of Congress shows both the low public visibility of the legislation and the nonchalance of the legislators. The bill passed the House of Representatives in the very late afternoon of a long

49 Id. at 116.
50 See id. at 121. There is some indication in Fred Vinson’s questioning of Dr. Woodward that one cause of the hostility directed at the witness was the growing disfavor with which the New Deal Congress viewed the fairly conservative AMA. Vinson was particularly pointed when he said that the AMA was trying to obstruct here as it had with the Health Care provisions of the Social Security Act. Id. at 102-04.
session; many of the members were acquainted neither with marijuana nor with the purpose of the Act. When the bill first came to the House floor late on June 10, 1937, one congressman objected to considering the bill at such a late hour, whereupon the following colloquy occurred:

Mr. DOUGHTON. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the bill (H.R. 6906) to impose an occupational excise tax upon certain dealers in marihuana, to impose a transfer tax upon certain dealings in marihuana, and to safeguard the revenue therefrom by registry and recording.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

Mr. SNELL. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, and notwithstanding the fact that my friend, Reed, is in favor of it, is this a matter we should bring up at this late hour of the afternoon? I do not know anything about the bill. It may be all right and it may be that everyone is for it, but as a general principle, I am against bringing up any important legislation, and I suppose this is important, since it comes from the Ways and Means Committee, at this late hour of the day.

Mr. RAYBURN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I may say that the gentleman from North Carolina has stated to me that this bill has a unanimous report from the committee and that there is no controversy about it.

Mr. SNELL. What is the bill?

Mr. RAYBURN. It has something to do with something that is called marihuana. I believe it is a narcotic of some kind.

Mr. FRED M. VINSON. Marihuana is the same as hashish.

Mr. SNELL. Mr. Speaker, I am not going to object but I think it is wrong to consider legislation of this character at this time of night.\(^1\)

On June 14 when the bill finally emerged on the House floor, four representatives in one way or another asked that the proponents explain the provisions of the Act. Instead of a detailed analysis, they received a statement of one of the members of the Ways and Means Committee repeating uncritically the lurid criminal acts Anslinger had attributed to marijuana users at the hearings. After less than two pages of debate, the Act passed without a roll call.\(^2\) When the bill returned as amended from the Senate, the House considered it once again, and adopted as

\(^1\) 81 Cong. Rec. 5575 (1937).

\(^2\) Id. at 5689-92.
quickly as possible the Senate suggestions, which were all minor. The only question was whether the AMA agreed with the bill. Mr. Fred Vinson not only said they did not object when in fact their committee witness had dissented strenuously, but he also claimed that the bill had AMA support. After turning Dr. Woodward’s testimony on its head, he also called him by another name, Wharton.

In summary, the Act passed the Congress with little debate and even less public attention. Provoked almost entirely by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and by a few hysterical state law enforcement agents hoping to get federal support for their activities, the law was tied neither to scientific study nor to enforcement need. The Marihuana Tax Act was hastily drawn, heard, debated and passed; it was the paradigm of the uncontroversial law.

E. Provisions of the Act

Except for the three differences noted above, the Marihuana Tax Act is modelled directly after the earlier federal tax act regulating the opiates—the Harrison Act. As with that Act, the enforcement of the new marijuana tax was left to the Bureau of Narcotics in the Treasury Department. Thus, as a result of the 1937 statute, the jurisdiction of the Bureau was increased substantially.

The Marihuana Tax Act deals specifically with the seeds, resin and most other parts and derivatives of the plant Cannabis Sativa L. The Act requires persons importing, producing, selling or in any other way dealing with the drug to pay an occupational tax and to register with the Internal Revenue Service. In addition, all transferees of marijuana are required to file a written order form and to pay a transfer tax, $1 per ounce if registered and a prohibitive $100 per ounce if not registered. Possession of the drug without a written order form constitutes presumptive evidence of noncompliance with the Act. It is also unlawful for a transferor to transfer the drug to a person who has not secured the

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53 Id. at 7624-25.
54 Id. at 7625.
55 See Dickson, Bureaucracy and Morality: An Organizational Perspective on a Moral Crusade, 16 Social Probs. 143 (1968) (relating this expansion of the Bureau's area of enforcement to their solid support for the need of such federal legislation).
56 Section 4(b) of the Act (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4755(a)(2)) gives rise to a presumption that one is a producer of marijuana within the terms of the Act if marijuana is found growing on his property.
57 The Act does not prohibit possession or purchase of marijuana per se.
VI. THE 1950'S: HARSH PENALTIES AND A NEW RATIONALE—THE "STEPPING STONE" THEORY

The 1950's witnessed the advent of an extremist legislative policy with respect to drugs generally and marijuana in particular. For the first time in our national history, there was public interest in narcotic drugs. Apparently there had been an increase in narcotic drug abuse in the late 40's, and the public mind was ripe for the FBN propaganda. In the paranoid atmosphere of the times, the call for harsher penalties was soothing. Unfortunately, marijuana was caught in the turbulence of this era. Although the pharmacological facts about the drug were beginning to emerge, congressional furor was aroused by the novel assertion, rejected by Commissioner Anslinger in 1937, that use of marijuana led to use of harder drugs. This new plateau of misinformation was to provide the base for continual escalation of penalties and proliferation of offenses throughout the decade.

A. The Boggs Act and Its Progeny: The First Escalation

In 1951 Congress passed the next major piece of federal narcotics legislation—the Boggs Act. The importance of this legislation is that it provided much harsher penalties for all drug violators. Also, for the first time on the federal level, marijuana and other narcotics were lumped together as a result of the Act's provision for uniform penalties for violators of either the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act or the Marihuana Tax Act. This indiscriminate treatment of marijuana as just another narcotic drug flew in the face of contemporary testimony challenging the assumption that the hemp drugs were addictive, crime-producing, and likely to lead to insanity and death. New testimony that marijuana was unlikely to be addictive was buried under the new rationale for harsh penalties against offenders of the marijuana laws—that the drug

1 Between 1937 and 1951, the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act was amended to change the definition of cannabis from the flowering or fruiting tops of just the female plant to include the corresponding parts of the male plant. See 1942 HANDBOOK 172-73.
inevitably is the stepping stone to heroin addiction. Eventually, the states followed the federal lead in striking out against drug violators with the same mindless fervor that characterized their anti-communist campaigns.

1. The Problem: Increased Narcotics Use

The hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee and the floor debate show that the primary reason for passage of the Boggs Act was the increase in narcotic use in the period 1948-1951. Testimony and evidence from a wide variety of sources indicated an abrupt and substantial increase in addiction, especially among teenagers, between 1947 and 1951. Young people under 21 who had rarely been addicts suddenly became a predominant group involved in addiction and narcotics crimes. Representative Boggs, speaking during the congressional debates on his bill, enunciated a concern which was reflected in many other quarters. After noting that there had been a 24 percent increase in arrests for narcotics violations between 1949 and 1950 and a 77 percent increase between 1948 and 1950, Representative Boggs stated:

The most shocking part about these figures is the fact that there has been an alarming increase in drug addiction among younger persons. In the first 6 months of 1946, the average age of addicted persons committed . . . at Lexington, Ky. was 37½ years. Only 3 patients were under the age of 21. During the first 6 months of 1950, only 4 years later, the average had dropped to 26.7 years, and 766 patients were under the age of 21. . . .

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5 Hearings Before the Special Senate Comm. to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, exhibit 1, at 131, 240-41, 266 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Kefauver Committee Hearings]. Senator Kefauver stated at the June 26, 1951, session of the hearings:

Illegal drug use has reached epidemic proportions, according to information secured by this committee from different parts of the country. One of the most alarming aspects is the reported increase in addiction among the younger generation, some of school age.

Id., pt. 14, at 235. See also N.Y. Times, June 19, 1951, at 25, col. 1 ("the present wave of juvenile addiction struck us with hurricane force in 1948 and 1949, and in a short time had the two Federal hospitals bursting at the seams") (statement of Commissioner Auslinger).

6 A 57 year-old addict witness, who had started smoking opium around 1912, stated that he had never seen significant use of drugs by young people until recently and theorized that marijuana was the cause. Kefauver Committee Hearings, pt. 14, at 382.
... [I]n New York City alone it has been estimated that 1 out of every 200 teen-agers is now addicted to some type of narcotics.\textsuperscript{7}

Later he said, "We need only to recall what we have read in the papers in the past week to realize that more and more younger people are falling into the clutches of unscrupulous dope peddlers . . . ."\textsuperscript{8}

Representative Boggs then proceeded to insert in the record eleven newspaper and magazine articles dated between May 2 and July 16, 1951.\textsuperscript{9} The \textit{Washington Evening Star} of July 16 (the day of the debate) carried a story on the results of a mayor's committee report on drug addiction in New York City. According to the newspaper, "between 45,000 and 90,000 persons in New York City are using illicit dope. . . . Based on the city's population of 7,835,099, that would be 1 out of every 87 or 1 out of 174 persons." The paper indicated that the report showed an increase in addiction among teenagers, and it called for "more severe penalties for dope sellers, and for wholesale revisions of Federal and State penal statutes relating to sale."

An article in \textit{Time} magazine of June 25, 1951, inserted by Mr. Boggs, related New York City School Superintendent William Jansen's statement that one out of every 200 high school students in the city was a user of habit forming drugs. The article went on to describe the "alarming increases in dope consumption" in other major cities and the ease with which school children obtained narcotics. Another article, in the \textit{Washington Evening Star} of June 12, 1951, contained statements by a member of the staff of the Attorney General of New York to the effect that between 5,000 and 15,000 of New York City's 300,000 high school students were drug addicts. To supplement the stock figures, these articles included the testimony of witnesses who described their own acts of prostitution and thievery, the loss of educational opportunities, the death of addicts from "hot shots," the horrors of withdrawal, and a wide variety of other aspects of drug abuse.

This evidence of increasing use of narcotics, especially among the young, and the fear that narcotics use would continue to spread, presented a problem that Congress felt needed a quick and effective solution.

\textsuperscript{7} 97 CONG. REC. 8197 (1951).
\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Id.} at 8198.
\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Id.} at 8198-8204.
2. The Solution: Harsher Penalties

In the same way that the congressional hearings, investigations and debates reflect the impetus for enactment of the Boggs Act, they also reveal the official and public consensus as to the solution—harsher penalties. Perhaps Commissioner Anslinger best described the prevailing climate when he stated:

Short sentences do not deter. In districts where we get good sentences the traffic does not flourish.

There should be a minimum sentence for the second offense. The commercialized transaction, the peddler, the smuggler, those who traffic in narcotics, on the second offense if there were a minimum sentence of 5 years without probation or parole, I think it would just about dry up the traffic.10

This statement before the Committee was quoted by Representative Boggs during the congressional debate on his bill, along with the Kefauver Committee's recommendation that "mandatory penalties of imprisonment of at least 5 years should be provided for second offenders." Representative Boggs indicated that his bill was intended to incorporate the Kefauver Committee recommendations of mandatory minimum sentences for drug peddlers and had as its principal purpose... to remove the power of suspension of sentence and probation in the cases of second and subsequent offenders against the narcotics and marijuana laws, and to provide minimum sentences...12

Moreover, Representative Boggs and others supported the mandatory minimum sentences because they felt some federal judges had been lax in enforcing the narcotic laws13 and because they believed harsher penalties had reduced crimes, particularly kidnapping and the white slave trade, in other areas.14 Representative Edwin Arthur Hall of New

10 Id. at 8198 (as quoted by Representative Boggs). See also Kefauver Committee Hearings, pt. 14, at 430-31 (testimony of Commissioner Anslinger).
12 Id. at 8196.
13 See id. at 8197, 8207. One of the most critical statements on this point came from Representative Harrison of Virginia who, after noting that narcotics laws violations had been increasing "only" in those jurisdictions where federal judges had failed to impose adequate sentences on recidivists, stated: "Where the judiciary is abusing its discretion, it is the duty of the law-making body to limit the discretion in order that the public may be protected." Id. at 8211.
14 Id. at 8207.
York urged substitution of his bill, which provided for minimum sentences of 100 years for dope peddlers.\textsuperscript{15} Although there was some opposition to the Boggs Act, notably by Representative Celler, who thought that the mandatory minimum sentence provision would be unjust for addicts,\textsuperscript{16} the majority opinion was clearly that mandatory minimum sentences were necessary to insure punishment of peddlers.\textsuperscript{17} In response to Mr. Celler's contention that young addicts could be subjected to long prison terms because of the loss of judicial discretion in sentencing, Representative Jenkins stated:

The enforcing officers will always have sympathy for the unfortunate consumer, especially if he is harmless. These enforcing officers are going to protect the little boys and little girls. They are not going to drag the high school boys and girls before the criminal courts until they know that they are collaborating with the peddlers.\textsuperscript{18}

Mr. Boggs presented a more reasonable justification for mandatory minimums:

[I]t is not the intention of this legislation to affect a teen-ager or any such person who has possession of narcotics. But the gentleman also knows that if we try to make a distinction between possession and peddling that we immediately open the law to all types of abuses.\textsuperscript{19}

The Act as passed provided uniform penalties for violations of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act and the Marihuana Tax Act. The penalties prescribed were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First offense</td>
<td>2 - 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second offense</td>
<td>5 - 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third and subsequent offenses</td>
<td>10 - 20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine for all offenses</td>
<td>$2,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relatively low fines reflected a congressional belief that monetary penalties were an insignificant deterrent.\textsuperscript{20} An essential provision of the

\textsuperscript{15} Id. at 8209.
\textsuperscript{16} Id. at 8210.
\textsuperscript{17} Representative Celler suggested that harsh mandatory sentences would have "two results: grand juries will refuse to indict and petit juries will refuse to convict." Id. at 8206.
\textsuperscript{18} Id. at 8207.
\textsuperscript{19} Id. at 8206.
\textsuperscript{20} Id. at 8197.
Act removed judicial discretion in sentencing by providing that upon conviction for a second or subsequent offense the imposition or execution of the sentence could not be suspended nor probation granted. As in the nontax predecessors of the Boggs Act since 1909 and the Marihuana Tax Act, possession of a narcotic drug was sufficient for conviction unless the defendant could explain the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.\(^{21}\)

3. Marijuana and the Boggs Act

Congressional and public attention was clearly focused on hard narcotics use, primarily the opiates. Judging from the recorded proceedings, especially the floor debate in the House, marijuana seems to have been along for the ride, much as it had been during enactment of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. However, here there was a conscious decision to include marijuana violations in the new penalty provisions. Underlying this decision were determinations that marijuana use had also increased during the later 1940's, that it too was spreading to white teenagers, and that the drug's dangers warranted the harsh treatment contemplated by the Act.

\(a\) Increased Use.—To test the allegation of an increase in marijuana use during this period, we have used the seizure and enforcement figures used by the proponents of the legislation. These figures tend to sustain the hypothesis that marijuana traffic increased from 1948 to 1951, following a decline throughout the early 40's. However, the figures are also consistent with other hypotheses, for example that improved enforcement techniques and increased state-federal cooperation had increased arrests.

Federal agents of the Narcotics Bureau began vigorously enforcing the Marihuana Tax Act almost as soon as President Roosevelt signed it into law. From October 1 to December 31, 1937, alone, the FBN made 369 seizures totaling 229 kilograms of the drug.\(^{22}\) Moreover, state

\(^{21}\) Representative Keating questioned the constitutionality of the provision. Id. at 8206. Apparently Keating accepted Representative Harrison's statement that the language had been in the statutory predecessors for years and had been passed on by the Supreme Court. Id. at 8211.

\(^{22}\) Traffic in Opium 80 (1937). For a full and effective discussion of the flaws in these drug statistics from 1937 until the mid 1940's due to a confusion over what parts of the marijuana plant were to be weighed in determining how much of the drug had been seized, see Mandel, Problems with Official Drug Statistics, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 991, 998-99 (1969).
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officials made extensive seizures either in conjunction with FBN agents or in pursuance of their newly-passed state controls over marijuana.\textsuperscript{23}

Marijuana seizures by federal authorities hit their low point in 1945 when only 257 kilograms were taken, 128 of which were seized by the FBN and the rest by United States Customs agents.\textsuperscript{24} At this time the FBN had approximately 180 agents.\textsuperscript{25} This low seizure figure suggests a decrease in marijuana use throughout the early 1940's.\textsuperscript{26}

Beginning in about 1948, however, the arrest and seizure\textsuperscript{27} figures rose

\textsuperscript{23} The following figures are available from 1936 to 1941. After 1941 the FBN ceased publication of the number of seizures by state and municipal authorities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of seizures</th>
<th>Amount seized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>unreported</td>
<td>195 + tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>386 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>116 Kg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>22,807 Kg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>71,129 Kg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>19 Kg.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Traffic in Opium} 63 (1935); \textit{id.} at 57 (1936); \textit{id.} at 81 (1937); \textit{id.} at 80 (1939); \textit{id.} at 73 (1940); \textit{id.} at 38 (1941). The great discrepancy in these numbers may be one reason the FBN ceased their publication in 1941.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Id.} at 80 (1945).

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Hearings on Dep'ts of Treasury and Post Office Appropriations for 1951 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 128 (1950).}

\textsuperscript{26} The figures on the amount seized by federal agents from 1939-1945 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FBN</th>
<th>Customs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Traffic in Opium} 78 (1939); \textit{id.} at 72 (1940); \textit{id.} at 37 (1941); \textit{id.} at 49 (1942); \textit{id.} at 42 (1943); \textit{id.} at 34 (1944); \textit{id.} at 23 (1945).

\textsuperscript{27} The figures for the period 1946-1951 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Kgs. Seized</th>
<th>No. of Arrests for Violations of Marijuana Laws</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>1278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>1643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>1177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Traffic in Opium} 23, 27 (1946); \textit{id.} at 23, 29 (1947); \textit{id.} at 23, 28 (1948); \textit{id.} at 22, 26 (1949); \textit{id.} at 29, 33 (1950); \textit{id.} at 25, 29 (1951).
dramatically, the arrest figures rising 33 percent from 1947 to 1948. These figures tend to corroborate the Commissioner’s assertion that there was a drastic increase in narcotics use between 1948 and 1951 and to justify the simultaneous calls for amendment of the narcotics and marijuana laws. On the other hand, these figures could reflect increased or improved enforcement. For example, in 1949 the FBN had begun to encourage the largest cities to form special narcotics squads to deal especially with the drug problem. By 1951, however, only New York and Los Angeles had formed the separate police detail the FBN had requested. Thus even if one were tempted to try to correct for improvements in the law enforcement machinery, the seizure figures for the late 40’s and 50’s do sustain the notion that the traffic in marijuana increased from 1948 to 1951.

(b) Youthful Users.—As with the hard narcotics, Congress was especially alarmed by the alleged spread of marijuana to white teenagers and school children. Militating against this proposition is evidence that marijuana use was not widespread among the young as late as 1944. In that year, the famous La Guardia Report reached the following conclusions among others: Marijuana use was widespread in the Borough of Manhattan but tended to be limited to certain areas, notably Harlem; the majority of marijuana smokers were Negroes and Latin-Americans; and marijuana smoking was not widespread among school children.

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29 See text at note 10 supra.
32 The conclusions of the La Guardia Report are discussed in The Marihuana Papers 277-410 (D. Solomon ed. 1966). The thirteen conclusions on the sociology of marijuana use are so significant we include them in full:

From the foregoing study the following conclusions are drawn:
1. Marihuana is used extensively in the Borough of Manhattan but the problem is not as acute as it is reported to be in other sections of the United States.
2. The introduction of marihuana into this area is recent as compared to other localities.
3. The cost of marihuana is low and therefore within the purchasing power of most persons.
4. The distribution and use of marihuana is centered in Harlem.
5. The majority of marihuana smokers are Negroes and Latin-Americans.
6. The consensus among marihuana smokers is that the use of the drug creates a definite feeling of adequacy.
7. The practice of smoking marihuana does not lead to addiction in the medical sense of the word.
8. The sale and distribution of marihuana is not under the control of any single
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The La Guardia study portrays marijuana use in this period as a rather casual adjunct to ghetto life. Since it was not costly, this euphoriant was well within the reach of ghetto residents. It appears that throughout the early 40's marijuana use in the West as well as in the East continued to be associated with the ethnic minorities, especially in the inner city.3

The fear that marijuana use would spread to white teenagers is one that has recurred since the earliest legislative cognizance. In fact, it was probably a factor in the early opium laws.4 We have been unable to confirm whether the fear was justified at this time, but in light of the documentation of increased narcotics use among the young, we shall presume the same use patterns to be true of marijuana.

(c) The Danger: A New Rationale.—The FBN had begun its educational campaign for harsher marijuana penalties immediately after passage of the Tax Act.5 In the early years, the campaign was particularly effective with judges. For example, in one of the first cases under the Tax Act, a Colorado judge stated:

I consider marihuana the worst of all narcotics—far worse than the use of morphine or cocaine. Under its influence men become beasts, just as was the case with [the defendant]. Marihuana destroys life itself. I have no sympathy with those who sell this weed.

In the future I will impose the heaviest penalties. The Government is going to enforce this new law to the letter.6

organized group.
9. The use of marihuana does not lead to morphine or heroin or cocaine addiction and no effort is made to create a market for these narcotics by stimulating the practice of marihuana smoking.
10. Marihuana is not the determining factor in the commission of major crimes.
11. Marihuana smoking is not widespread among school children.
12. Juvenile delinquency is not associated with the practice of smoking marihuana.
13. The publicity concerning the catastrophic effects of marihuana smoking in New York City is unfounded.

Id. at 307.

33 The New York trend was also typical of Los Angeles. California Division of Narcotic Enforcement, Marijuana—Our Newest Narcotic Menace, April 1, 1940, at 12. See also Note, Youth and Narcotics, 1 U.C.L.A. Rev. 445, 453 (1954) (reporting a breakdown by race of narcotics arrests by the Oakland police department).
34 For example, in 1895 New York had passed a statute, ch. 1041, § 1, [1895] N.Y. Laws 972, requiring instruction in public schools on the effect of narcotics.
35 For full accounts of the FBN "educational campaigns" up through the present day, see TRAFFIC IN OPIUM from 1937 to the present. For the full exposition of the FBN's position on the drug user as a criminal before he becomes an addict, see Recidivism on Narcotic Law Violators, in TRAFFIC IN OPIUM for each year.
36 Judge J. Foster Symes of Denver, Colorado, quoted in TRAFFIC IN OPIUM 57 (1937).
The crime, pauperism and insanity rationale was accepted unquestioningly as late as 1951.\textsuperscript{37} Under this rationale, harsher penalties were certainly as imperative for marijuana offenders as they were for opiate offenders. However, in a paper filed as an exhibit to the hearings\textsuperscript{38} on the Boggs Act, Dr. Harris Isbell, Director of Research at the Public Health Service hospital in Lexington, Kentucky, exploded the traditional rationale. He stated that marijuana was not physically addictive.\textsuperscript{39} Although he postulated a definition of addiction which amounts to nothing more than chronic intoxication\textsuperscript{40} and noted the possibility of "temporary psychoses" in "predisposed individuals," Isbell's description of marijuana was extraordinarily favorable. Before the Kefauver Committee he testified:

\begin{quote}
[M]arijuana smokers generally are mildly intoxicated, giggle, laugh, bother no one, and have a good time. They do not stagger or fall, and ordinarily will not attempt to harm anyone.

It has not been proved that smoking marijuana leads to crimes of violence or to crimes of a sexual nature. Smoking marijuana has no unpleasant after-effects, no dependence is developed on the drug, and the practice can easily be stopped at any time. In fact, it is probably easier to stop smoking marijuana cigarettes than tobacco cigarettes.

In predisposed individuals, marijuana may precipitate temporary psychoses and is, therefore, not an innocuous practice with them.\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

Dr. Isbell's statements that marijuana does not cause a physical dependence were supported by other doctors,\textsuperscript{42} prison officials,\textsuperscript{43} and per-

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[37]{See, e.g., G. Creighton, Narcotics: Their Legitimate and Illicit Use (1951).}
\footnotetext[38]{Hearings on H.R. 5490 before the Subcomm. on Narcotics of the House Comm. on Ways and Means. 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Boggs Act Hearings].}
\footnotetext[39]{Dr. Isbell's paper stated:}
\begin{quote}
Any definition [of addiction] which makes dependence an essential feature will also not include intoxications with such substances as cocaine, marijuana, and amphetamine, because dependence on these substances is no more marked than is dependence on tobacco and coffee and yet, in some ways, intoxication with cocaine or marijuana is more harmful than is addiction to morphine. Furthermore, definitions which exclude cocaine and marijuana from the list of addicting drugs would cause endless confusion because, in common parlance and legally, both drugs are regarded as addicting.
\end{quote}
\footnotetext[40]{Id. at 147-48.}
\footnotetext[41]{Kefauver Committee Hearings, pt. 14, at 119.}
\footnotetext[42]{Id. at 156. See also Boggs Act Hearings 101.}
\footnotetext[43]{Boggs Act Hearings 96.}
\end{footnotes}
haps most significantly by the statement of a number of narcotics addicts. Despite this testimony the legislators approved greatly increased penalties for marijuana users. The crucial reason for this severe treatment can be seen in the following colloquy during the House subcommittee hearings:

Mr. Boggs. From just what little I saw in that demonstration, I have forgotten the figure Dr. Isbell gave, but my recollection is that only a small percentage of those marijuana cases was anything more than a temporary degree of exhilaration . . . .

Mr. Anslinger. The danger is this: Over 50 percent of those young addicts started on marijuana smoking. They started there and graduated to heroin; they took the needle when the thrill of marijuana was gone.

Many others—doctors, crime prevention experts, police and narcotics bureau officials—testified to the link between marijuana use and ultimate heroin addiction. Representative Boggs himself summed up this novel danger of marijuana in one of the few statements even to mention marijuana in House floor debate:

Our younger people usually start on the road which leads to drug addiction by smoking marijuana. They then graduate into narcotic drugs—cocaine, morphine, and heroin. When these younger persons become addicted to the drugs, heroin, for example, which costs from $8 to $15 per day, they very often must embark on careers of crime . . . and prostitution . . . in order to buy the supply which they need.

44 Kefauver Committee Hearings, pt. 14, at 73, 101, 109 (statements of three addicts). See also id. at 190, 204 for statements by addicts to the effect that upon moving from marijuana to hard drugs they did not know that the latter were addictive. The implication is clear that marijuana is not addictive. See id. at 91.

45 Boggs Act Hearings 206.

46 Kefauver Committee Hearings, pt. 14, at 133.

47 Boggs Act Hearings 105.

48 Kefauver Committee Hearings, pt. 14, at 449; Boggs Act Hearings 42.

49 97 CONG. REC. 8197-98 (1951). The linkage of marijuana use to heroin was also supplied by some of the testimony by addicts themselves. Of 27 addicts interviewed in part 14 of the Kefauver Committee Hearings, 15 testified that they had started their drug use with marijuana. This figure is misleading because a substantial majority of the 12 who had not used marijuana were addicts because of illness or were older addicts who had begun using drugs before marijuana was readily available. See Kefauver
The passage of this new Federal Act marked a significant shift in rationale for the illegal status of marijuana; that status became more entrenched by the indiscriminate lumping of marijuana with the other narcotic drugs.

4. The State Response: Mindless Escalation

While the Boggs Act was still pending in Congress, the Bureau of Narcotics encouraged the states to modify their existing narcotic and marijuana legislation to enact “penalties similar to those provided for in the Boggs bill [which] would be of material assistance in the fight against the narcotic traffic.” Seventeen states (including Virginia) and the Territory of Alaska responded by passing “little Boggs Acts” by 1953, and eleven other states increased their penalties by 1956.

In 1951, seven states and the Territory of Alaska passed penalty provisions similar to those contained in the Boggs Act. In addition, nine other states amended their drug laws to provide for more severe penalties, but the provisions were neither uniform nor identical to those provided for under the federal measure. In 1952, four more states, including Virginia, amended the penalty provisions of their drug laws.

Committee Hearings, pt. 14, at 11, 29, 54, 62, 71, 84, 93, 99, 104, 108, 153, 157, 160, 162, 167, 171, 182, 189, 194, 203, 211, 216, 220, 367, 380, 432, 436. Approximately 5 of the addict witnesses indicated that marijuana did in fact lead to the use of the harder drugs but only one gave definite reasons why he thought this transition inevitably took place. One male addict, after stating that the average age of marijuana smokers was 13 or 14, stated:

You would very seldom find a person smoking marijuana who does just that, he keeps on, and he gets to the point where he does not have the same drive or feeling that he first had, and it is like a stepping stone, he graduates to heroin. Kefauver Committee Hearings, pt. 14, at 199-200.

Note that among many of these addicts curiosity and peer group pressure was the primary factor in starting them into the use of hard drugs. Id. at 12, 32, 94, 109, 254. Moreover, Representative Boggs introduced some mystery into his statements during the House debates by stating:

A study in February of 1950 of 602 case reports indicates that 53 percent ... started their addiction to drugs by reason of association with other addicts, and 7 percent of them started on marijuana. 97 Cong. Rec. 8197 (1951). This study is cited on the same page with Representative Boggs’ statement that our young people usually start on the road to drug addiction by smoking marijuana.

Traffic in Opium 6 (1950).

Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Tennessee and West Virginia. Id. at 8 (1951).

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to bring them in line with the Boggs Act. Six more states followed suit in 1953. Finally, in 1955 and 1956 two states, Ohio and Louisiana respectively, enacted penalty provisions which were substantially more severe than those passed previously in any jurisdiction.

The Virginia "little Boggs Act" was signed into law on April 1, 1952, after having passed both houses unanimously. The measure was regarded as routine, and as one of the "less controversial" proposals to come before the legislature during the 1952 session. It cleared the House on a day when bills were being passed "at the rate of about one a minute during some periods" and won Senate approval during the final rush to complete business in the waning hours of the 1952 General Assembly.

The Act produced three basic changes in Virginia's scheme of narcotics control. It added marijuana to those drugs whose sale was forbidden under the state's version of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act; it created the new substantive crime of sale to a minor; and it provided for harsher penalties for violations of the drug laws.

Prior to 1952, the Virginia anti-marijuana provision was separate from those provisions governing the sale of "hard" drugs. But the 1952 Act repealed this provision and included marijuana under the state's general narcotic control law. As a result, a person illegally selling marijuana became subject to the same penalties imposed upon a person illegally vending such drugs as heroin, morphine and cocaine.

The heart of the 1952 Act was the provision for stiffer penalties for the violation of Virginia's general narcotic laws prohibiting the sale of drugs without a prescription. For the first offense, the penalty was im-

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53 Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky and Virginia. Id. at 6 (1952).
54 Delaware, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Wyoming. Id. at 9 (1953).
55 The Ohio law, approved June 16, 1955, provided for imprisonment of any one found guilty of illegally selling narcotic drugs for a period of not less than twenty nor more than forty years. Id. at 7 (1955). The Louisiana measure, adopted the following year, provided severe prison sentences without parole, probation or suspension for the illegal sale, possession or administration of a narcotic drug. Sentences ranged from a five year minimum to a ninety-nine year maximum. Id. at 28 (1956).
57 The bill, H.B. 132, passed the House 65-0 on February 23, 1952, and the Senate 34-0 on March 7, 1952.
prisonment in the penitentiary for not less than three nor more than five years plus a fine of not more than $1,000. For the second offense, the penalty was imprisonment for not less than five nor more than ten years and a fine of not more than $2,000. For the third and succeeding offenses, the penalties were fines of not more than $3,000 and imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than twenty years.

The 1952 Act also made it a felony to sell, barter, peddle, exchange or otherwise dispense marijuana or any other narcotic drug to a minor. Any person found guilty of such offense was subject to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years nor more than thirty years, no part of which could be suspended, and a fine of not more than $1,000 for the first offense, $2,000 for the second offense and $3,000 for the third and subsequent offenses. Such a provision exemplifies the increased sophistication of anti-narcotic legislation during the 1950's. Thus, the continued escalation of penalties for drug law violators was followed in Virginia. Moreover, despite the public concern and attention in the national media, in Virginia it is plain that the 1952 amendments to the narcotic laws passed virtually unnoticed in the press.62

B. The Late 1950’s: Another Escalation of the Penalties

Whether because use had decreased or because the propagandists had accomplished their main mission, the narcotics problem dropped almost entirely from public view after the Boggs Act was passed. Nevertheless, state and federal police authorities, armed with data suggesting that the strengthening of the drug laws had at least halted the increase in drug use, pressed for further increases in penalties in order entirely to root out the drug menace.63 Without significant debate or public

62 See also Proffit, An Analysis of the Missouri Narcotic Drug Laws, 17 Mo. L. Rev. 252 (1952), in which the author shows that narcotic hysteria was closely linked to the general hysteria and “Red Scare” of the early fifties: “The opinion has been advanced that the recent upsurge in consumption [of drugs] is fostered by Communists in an effort to undermine the morals of our youth.” Id. at 252-53. He cites a Missouri official who so testified before a state legislative committee. For more of the same, see W. Oursler & L. Smith, Narcotics: America’s Peril 266 (1952). The Missouri case parallels the Virginia data in that great public concern is expressed about the possible spread of narcotics addiction but little if any separate notice was given marijuana. Everywhere the narcotics evil was linked by veiled references to international communism, especially that of China, the traditional home of the opium habit.

interest, Congress responded by passing the Narcotic Control Act of 1956.64

Although the legislators paid even less attention to marijuana than they had in 1951, the precedent there established of classifying marijuana with hard narcotics resulted in a proliferation of marijuana offenses and a further increase in penalties. In some ways, this legislation represents the high-water mark of uninformed public policy regarding marijuana. In almost every respect, the provisions of the Act and the legislative motivation bear absolutely no rational relation to marijuana's pharmacology and to the drug's actual use and traffic patterns.

1. Provisions of the Narcotic Control Act of 1956

Public Law 728, an act intended to make more effective control of the narcotic drugs and marijuana, was approved on July 18, 1956. It amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act65 primarily in the direction of increasing still further the penalties for violation of those acts and proliferating the scope of federal control over the use, possession and sale of narcotic drugs and marijuana.

The new law raised the potential fine for all narcotics and marijuana offenses to $20,00066 and increased the mandatory minimum sentences for offenses in the prescription, registration and possession categories to two, five and ten years for successive offenses.67 No distinction was made between addicts and traffickers with regard to these types of violations. Violations of the sale, transfer and smuggling provisions of the Act carry a minimum sentence of five years for first offenses and ten years for all subsequent offenses.68 In this connection the Act created a new offense by prohibiting illegal importation of marijuana and forbidding knowing receipt, concealment, purchase, sale, and facilitation of transportation or concealment of such illegally imported marijuana.69 Simple possession was by statute sufficient evidence of guilt to convict.70 This provision, now 21 U.S.C. § 176a, paralleled a similar importation provision for narcotics originally passed in 1909.

64 Ch. 629, 70 Stat. 567.
65 Ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596 (1922).
67 Id. § 103, 70 Stat. 568 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7237 (1964)).
68 Id.
69 Id. § 106, 70 Stat. 570 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964)).
70 Id. (declared unconstitutional in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969)).
In addition, any sale or transfer of any drug by an adult to a juvenile was made punishable by a minimum ten-year sentence. Finally, the Act made suspension, probation and parole unavailable to all offenders except those convicted of a first offense for possession, prescription or registration.

In addition to the increases in offenses and penalties, the law contained a wide variety of provisions relating to enforcement. Customs and Narcotics Bureau agents were authorized to carry weapons and to make arrests without a warrant on belief that a drug violation had been committed. The Government was allowed to appeal unfavorable decisions suppressing evidence and to compel testimony from witnesses by a grant of immunity. In a concession to those legislators who favored a wiretapping provision, the new law created a category of offense based on the use of communications instrumentalities in violation of the drug laws. This provision carried penalties of a minimum two-year sentence and up to a $5,000 fine. The Act required that citizens who are drug users and drug law violators must register with the immigration authorities upon entering or leaving the United States. The Act also amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for deportation of alien drug users and drug law violators.

2. Marijuana—Along for the Ride

The Narcotic Control Act of 1956 was premised on the same beliefs as was the Boggs Act. Few if any of the legislators recognized that marijuana was in any way different from the physically addictive narcotics. The stepping stone concept was now so widely accepted that only once

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71 Id. § 103, 70 Stat. 568 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7237(b) (1) (1964)). The statute also provided that a seller peddling heroin to a minor may be subject to a sentence of life imprisonment imposed by a court, or to a death sentence imposed by a jury. Id. § 107, 70 Stat. 571 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 176b (1964)).
72 Id. § 103, 70 Stat. 569 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7237(d) (Supp. III, 1966)).
73 Id. § 104, 70 Stat. 570 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (1964)).
74 Id. § 201, 70 Stat. 573 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1404 (1964)).
75 Id., 70 Stat. 574 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1406 (1964)).
76 Id., 70 Stat. 573 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964)).
77 Id., 70 Stat. 574 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1407 (1964)).
78 Id. § 301, 70 Stat. 575 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (5), (23) (1964)).
79 The House Subcommittee on Narcotics, which produced what became the essentials of the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, revealed its knowledge of the distinction between marijuana and narcotics solely by a footnote to the major heading “Narcotics” which stated in fine print that the term narcotics included marijuana. See U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3294 (1956).
during the extensive congressional debates on the House and Senate versions of the bill was the subject of marijuana as a separate substance even raised. In a statement reflecting both ignorance of the basic characteristics of marijuana and naive acceptance of the stepping stone concept, Senator Daniel, Chairman of the Senate subcommittee that investigated the drug problem, described marijuana:

That is a drug which starts most addicts in the use of drugs. Marijuana, in itself a dangerous drug, can lead to some of the worst crimes committed by those who are addicted to the habit. Evidently, its use leads to the heroin habit and then to the final destruction of the persons addicted. 80

Because Congress bought the FBN's propaganda lock, stock and barrel, it is not surprising that there was no dissent from the proposition that harsher penalties were the means to eliminate illicit use and sale of all drugs. 81

3. Trafficking Patterns

The 1956 Act reflected an unsupported conception of the nature of the marijuana traffic. Under the assumption that "peddlers" of all drugs, marijuana included, are controlled by organized crime, the Act assessed

80 102 Cong. Rec. 9015 (1956).
81 Representative Boggs, father of the Boggs Act and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Narcotics of the House Ways and Means Committee, stated that "effective steps to eliminate the unlawful drug traffic requires ... the imposition of severe punishment by the courts," Id. at 10689. The subcommittee, which had set out to determine the effect of the Boggs Act on narcotics traffic, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3291 (1956), began its recommendations with calls for further increases in the penalties for narcotics law violations. Id. at 3309. In fact, the subcommittee felt that this was the only way to eliminate the drug menace, and recommended that educational programs on the evils of narcotics not be instituted in the schools for fear of exciting the curiosity of young people. Id. at 3305. Both the House Ways and Means Committee report and the subcommittee report are filled with statements to the effect that harsher penalties are the most effective weapons in the war against illicit narcotics. Id. at 3281-3303 passim. The Ways and Means Committee conclusion was succinct: "Experience with the Boggs law ... has clearly demonstrated the efficacy of severe punishment in reducing the illicit commerce in drugs." Id. at 3286.

Finally, Senator Daniel, speaking for the Senate subcommittee investigating the drug situation in the United States, found "it absolutely necessary for the Congress of the United States to strengthen the hands of our law enforcement officers and provide higher penalties if we are to stop the narcotics traffic in this country." 102 Cong. Rec. 9014 (1956). His subcommittee also recommended the kind of across-the-board increases in penalties that the Act eventually contained.
extremely heavy penalties for sale, especially to minors. For example, the House Ways and Means Committee report noted that “narcotic traffickers ... are in most cases well organized professional racketeers.” 82 Similarly, in recommending prohibition of probation or suspension of sentence for first-offender peddlers, the House subcommittee had asserted that if the first offender peddler problem was not solved, there would eventually be “large scale recruiting of our youth by the upper echelon of traffickers.” 83

While the reference to organized crime was undoubtedly valid with respect to hard drugs, the assumption that marijuana traffic was controlled by large-scale racketeers was completely unsupported. The marijuana distribution pattern today is far different than the distribution pattern for “hard” drugs. On college campuses today, the marijuana seller is likely to be a smoker who has a small amount he wants to sell. Unless one is to believe that organized crime has abdicated a distribution role to “amateurs,” it is difficult to imagine that it controlled the distribution of marijuana in 1956. Accordingly, the 1956 Act’s widely divergent treatment of sale and use of marijuana may not have been justified at the time of enactment, and it certainly makes little sense today.

4. Origin and Use

A related misconception about the marijuana trade concerns the new importation offenses. Underlying the presumption of knowing concealment of smuggled marijuana arising from possession are two findings—that the mainstay of marijuana traffic is imported from Mexico and that possessors are likely to be aware of that fact. Even in 1956, such findings were dubious. 84 As to the presumption of importation, Commissioner Anslinger’s estimate that 90 percent of all marijuana seized by federal authorities had been smuggled from Mexico 85 was grossly misleading. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics had practically abandoned the responsibility for marijuana control to increasingly effective state

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82 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3283 (1956); see id. at 3302.
83 Id. at 3304.
84 In holding unconstitutional the presumption of knowledge that marijuana was smuggled, the Supreme Court in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), relied on the change in use patterns from 1959 to 1967. We think the presumption was unconstitutional when passed in 1956, both as to importation and knowledge.
85 Daniel Committee Hearings 18.
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narcotics squads and to the Customs agents. Of course, federal figures taken alone would suggest a high percentage of importation. Furthermore, the Commissioner's conclusion was inconsistent with an essential premise of the Tax Act and with other materials before the Congress, all of which emphasized the large degree of domestic cultivation.

As to the possessor's knowledge, the underlying assumption again was that there was an organized trade pattern so that each user knew where his drug came from. As we know, marijuana was then a casual adjunct to ghetto life. It was a social, rather than an economic, phenomenon limited almost exclusively to unemployed or menially employed members of racial minorities in the center cities. As applied to such a class of people, the presumption is farcical.

5. Enforcement Patterns

Although the proliferation of federal offenses suggests on its face that state enforcement was inadequate to cope with marijuana trade or that increased use of the drug presaged increased narcotics addiction, nothing could be farther from the truth. Considering marijuana alone, the 1956 legislation was passed in response to no need at all. The enforcement statistics confirm our hypothesis that marijuana was simply "along for the ride."

86 The decline in the number of FBN arrests and seizures is directly related to the increase in local and state enforcement personnel. This thesis is supported by data from California where statewide arrests soared while federal arrests remained stable. Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California Dep't of Justice, Crime in California (1956). See also A. Lindesmith, The Addict and the Law 238 (1963). One commentator has suggested that except for the years immediately after the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act, when the Bureau wanted to concentrate on its newly acquired enforcement field, the FBN arrest data show clearly its emphasis on the hard narcotics. Mandel, Problems with Official Drug Statistics, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 991, 1019-20 (1969).

87 See note 20 at p. 1053 supra.

88 Written materials inserted into the record of the Senate hearings included the testimony of an experienced federal Customs official that high quality marijuana was being grown near the Texas cities of Laredo and Brownsville. Daniel Committee Hearings 3488-89. In addition, the Attorney General of Ohio noted that marijuana "may grow unnoticed along roadsides and vacant lots in many parts of the country." Id. at 4814. Also, a bulletin issued by the Philadelphia Police Academy recited that "plenty of marijuana is found growing in this city." Id. at 599.


90 This is especially true with respect to the young and black minorities. The
First, as we noted above, federal arrests declined continually after 1952. Although attributable in part to increased state enforcement and to a conscious FBN decision to concentrate on narcotics, the figures do suggest a decline in or at least a stabilization of marijuana use by the middle fifties, even in areas in which narcotics use continued unabated. Second, the class of users does not seem to have changed at all during this period. Arrest statistics still indicate that use was centered in the ghetto areas of major cities in California, Texas, Louisiana, Michigan, New York and Illinois. However, because statistics were not refined according to race, age, sex and often even the drug used, we cannot state categorically that there was no change in use patterns.

6. The Epitome of Irrationality: Virginia's 1958 Amendment

In 1958, Virginia's Uniform Drug Act was further amended to make the “possession of illegally acquired narcotic drugs [which included marijuana] in any quantity greater than twenty-five grains, if in solid form, or eight ounces, if in liquid form,” a crime punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000 and imprisonment for not less than twenty nor more than forty years. The effect of this enactment was to provide a penalty for illegal possession that was more than twice as severe as the penalty for unlawful sale and one and one-half times more stringent than that for sale to a minor. It is incredible that despite the extreme presumption has validity only as applied to recently immigrated Mexicans. Cf. Chein, The Status of Sociological and Social Psychological Knowledge Concerning Narcotics, in NARCOTIC DRUG ADDICTION PROBLEMS 146, 155 (R. Livingston ed. 1963). Mr. Chein reports a shift in drug use from 1930-1960 from old to young and a continued increase in the percentage of drug users who are Black or Spanish-speaking.

91 The number of federal arrests for marijuana violations fell from 1288 in 1952 to 169 in 1960. TRAFFIC IN OPIUM 26 (1952); id. at 69 (1960).

92 By 1954, many major states and cities had special narcotics squads. See Daniel Committee Hearings 13-14, 110.

93 Cf. TRAFFIC IN OPIUM 66 (1956); id. at 41 (1959). The FBN charts show clearly the extraordinary incidence of drug abuse among Blacks, Mexican-Americans and other minority communities.

94 Daniel Committee Hearings, exhibit 7, at 267-71. Local arrests in those six states accounted for 2,822 of the 3,205 marijuana arrests made by local law enforcers in 1954.

95 For example, the statistics in TRAFFIC IN OPIUM seldom even distinguish among the drugs involved, and the FBI Uniform Crime Statistics frequently report all drug related arrests together, with no delineation of the type of drug used or the nature of the offender.

96 Chein, supra note 90, at 152, suggests that whatever patterns of drug use existed in the fifties were merely continuations of patterns observed in the thirties.

harshness of this penalty, the measure passed both houses of the General Assembly with but one dissenting vote, and no mention was made of it in the Richmond Times-Dispatch during the period of February 14 to April 7, 1958.

In conclusion, the Federal Narcotic Control Act of 1956 and subsequent state legislation reflect the same basic congressional and public misconceptions about the nature and dangers of marijuana that characterized the early fifties. Even more unchanged, and in fact strengthened by results under the Boggs Act, was the assumption that the key to the solution of the narcotic drug problem was the imposition of harsher penalties on both users and traffickers in illicit drugs. Classification of marijuana with narcotic drugs was now a foregone conclusion. In fact, legislators seemed less aware that marijuana was a distinct substance than they had been in 1951.

VII. MARIJUANA USERS IN THE COURTS: 1930-1965

Having studied the evolution of legislative hostility to marijuana from a regional phenomenon with racial overtones to a nationwide paranoia, it is worthwhile to consider the fate of marijuana users in the courts during this evolutionary period. After the courts had summarily rejected the substantive constitutional arguments, appeals in marijuana cases tended to focus on three contentions particularly germane to drug violations: procedural objections arising from interrelated statutory schemes on the state and federal levels punishing essentially the same conduct; objections to police conduct intrinsic to victimless crimes; and objections to sufficiency of evidence at trial. Like their legislative colleagues, state and federal judges translated what they knew of the drug's mythical effects into overt hostility. Coupled with the traditionally conservative treatment afforded the rights of criminal defendants, especially in state prosecutions, this judicial hostility produced ever-lengthening sentences and few reversals.

A. Statutory Fantasies: The Complications of Federal Legislation

1. Quadruple "Jeopardy" and the "Killer Weed"

When Congress passed theMarihuana Tax Actin 1937, marijuana had already been included in the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and every state had enacted some form of marijuana prohibition. In addition to

1See p. 1034 supra.
its ostensible revenue-raising function, the Act was obviously designed both to deter further use of the drug and to facilitate enforcement of the state laws. The statute assured the availability to state prosecutors of the order forms filed with the IRS at the time of payment of the tax. Congress had thought that the order forms and registration requirements would develop an "adequate means of publicizing dealings in marijuana in order to tax and control the traffic effectively." 

Thus, after 1937, possession of marijuana without filing the transfer form and paying the federal tax constituted a violation of both state and federal law; yet filing the form and paying the tax would probably not have eliminated the buyer's exposure to prosecution under state law. Indeed, compliance would probably have readily identified the buyer to state officials. To this unfairness the courts paid no heed, noting that exposure to state and federal prosecution for the same act did not constitute double jeopardy and that the fifth amendment did not protect defendants from prosecution for violation of state law.

6 With minor exceptions, the Marihuana Tax Act requires all transactions in marijuana to be carried out by written order form. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4741-44 (1964). It is unlawful for a transferor to transfer except by such form obtained by the transferee, 26 U.S.C. § 4742 (1964), and for the transferee to acquire, transport or conceal marijuana without filing the transfer form, registering with the IRS and paying the applicable transfer tax. 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a) (1964). For heretofore unregistered persons, that tax is $100 an ounce. 26 U.S.C. § 4741 (1964). Since marijuana was excised from the United States Pharmacopoeia, there have been few legitimate transactions by registered persons. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Report: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 214 (1967). Since the tax is otherwise prohibitive, the Act is in effect almost entirely a criminal law; the crime is having anything to do with marijuana—possession, sale, acquisition or importation—since proof of possession coupled with failure, after reasonable notice and demand by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, to produce the transfer form is "presumptive evidence" of guilt. 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a) (1964).
After passage of the 1956 federal narcotic drug legislation, possession of marijuana constituted at least one, and often two, additional crimes. First, the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act was amended in 1956 to punish directly illegal importation of marijuana or other dealings in the drug with knowledge that it had been illegally imported. Since mere possession was sufficient evidence to convict under the Act, possession without registration and order form now constituted three crimes, and compliance with the filing and tax provisions would have exposed the defendant to liability under state law and under the importation provision if the original importation was illegal. Again the courts saw no fifth amendment violation. Second, another provision of the 1956 package required every person addicted to or using narcotics or convicted of a violation of the narcotics or marijuana laws punishable by over one year's imprisonment to register upon leaving the country. Designed to aid the Government in identifying potential smugglers, the statute was upheld, as a strict liability offense, against a multitude of constitutional challenges. Since penalties for marijuana possession almost uniformly exceeded one year's imprisonment during this period, a first offense possession conviction by either sovereign triggered the registration provision.

2. Statutory Presumptions

Because the federal statutes punished sale and possession of marijuana only indirectly, each had to bridge the gap between those acts and the

9 See pp. 1077-78 supra.
12 See note 19 infra and accompanying text.
15 Application of the statute was particularly harsh. Even though defendant, found guilty of a drug offense and sent to the California Youth Authority for several months, had been told upon release that his record was clean, the court held that he had violated the statute by failing to register. Adams v. United States, 299 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1962).
16 See Palma v. United States, 261 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1958); Reyes v. United States, 258 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. Ernadjian, 155 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Cal. 1957). The courts struggled mightily with arbitrariness, vagueness, right to travel, self-incrimination, and equal protection arguments, but upheld the statute. But cf. Russell v. United States, 305 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1962) (gun registration requirement unconstitutional since it required admission of presumptively unlawful possession).
technical crimes—tax violations and importation-related acts. As a bootstrap from the federal taxing power to a federal police power, Congress chose presumptions. Thus, under the Marihuana Tax Act, possession plus failure to produce the required forms was presumptive evidence of the criminal act—failure to pay the tax—and the courts had no trouble upholding this provision. In addition, under the Import and Export Act possession of marijuana constituted presumptive evidence of illegal importation and of defendant's knowledge of such importation.

Against a rash of attacks on the rationality of this presumption, the lower federal courts noted that the Supreme Court had upheld the same statutory language in the original Federal Import and Export Act with respect to opium, and that there was sufficient general knowledge that most marijuana was imported from Mexico to make the presumption rational. Although the Ninth Circuit at one time indicated that a defendant could rebut the presumption by showing that the marijuana in his possession was manicured and therefore more likely to have been domestically grown, that court later held that such proof was insufficient and that the defendant must also show actual domestic production.

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18 E.g., Manning v. United States, 274 F.2d 926 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 280 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1960).
19 This provision was early interpreted not to require government agents to request the transfer form at the time of arrest, the courts holding that possession of the form was an affirmative defense. E.g., Hill v. United States, 261 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1958); Hensley v. United States, 160 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 817 (1947).
20 Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 869 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Borne v. United States, 332 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Gibson, 310 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1962); Claypole v. United States, 280 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1960); Butler v. United States, 273 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1959); Caudillo v. United States, 253 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 931 (1958).
22 Caudillo v. United States, 253 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 931 (1958). Impliedly that the presumption of importation was a rule of evidence, not of substantive law, the court noted that imported marijuana was ordinarily composed of mixed twigs and stems since the growers waited until maturity before harvesting. In the United States, on the other hand, growers avoided police detection by picking individual leaves before the plant matured. Since appellant possessed mixed twigs and stems, the court upheld application of the presumption; the clear suggestion, however, was that the presumption would not be applied to manicured marijuana.
23 Costello v. United States, 324 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 930 (1964).
B. Attacks on State Legislation

Most attacks on the state statutes focused on the vagueness of statutory terms—marijuana, however spelled, or cannabis or Indian Hemp—both as a scientific matter and in terms of common experience. Predictably, however, few state courts were of a mind to inhibit legislative proscription of the "killer weed." Due in part to greatly exaggerated conceptions about the effects of the drug and in part to the ease with which the mature plant is processed for the outlawed purposes, the courts construed these statutory definitions as broadly as possible, despite the traditional rule of strict construction of criminal statutes.

With the progressive increase in the severity of penalties which accompanied adoption of the Uniform Act in the 1930's and 1940's and the surge of amendments in the 1950's in the wake of the Boggs Act,
some problems of application arose. Interestingly enough, some courts applied the lesser penalty where one of two penalties could be imposed.\textsuperscript{30} Similarly many courts tended to impose minimum sentences until the late 1950's when they, too, lost all sense of proportion.\textsuperscript{31}

\begin{center}
\textbf{C. Procedural Defenses and Entrapment}
\end{center}

Statutory attacks during this period tended to reflect the complicated interrelation of state and federal law and the scientific imprecision of legislative drafting. These attacks were usually rebuffed, and defendants, caught in a squeeze of judicial and legislative hostility, had few, if any, viable defenses based on whether or not they had violated the regulatory scheme. Both state and federal statutes merely required the prosecution to prove that the particular defendant was found in possession of a substance which when chemically tested was found to be marijuana. There were few tricky problems of proof, and the prose-

\textsuperscript{30} E.g., State v. Economy, 61 Nev. 394, 130 P.2d 264 (1942).

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cution usually had a clear case. If these offenders were caught dead to
rights on the merits, the energetic attorney had to look elsewhere for
his defense.

Fortunately, the exigencies of police practice in the field of narcotics
law enforcement provided a defendant's attorney with a new area of
attack—procedural irregularities in the arrest and apprehension of his
client. The possession and sale of marijuana epitomize the crime with-
out a victim; neither seller nor buyer is apt to complain of the transac-
tion. In order to promote vigorous law enforcement in this area, the
police have had to use a series of undercover agents, surprise raids and
often questionable search and arrest techniques. Because of the nature
of the conduct they are trying to stifle, the police must intrude into a
private social relationship where none of the parties wants it; thus, the
police have found it essential to employ highly secretive and often
patently deceitful practices. It is no coincidence that the vast develop-
ments in the law of criminal procedure—especially in the fourth amend-
ment area—have been outgrowths primarily of narcotics and marijuana
cases.

1. Search and Seizure

Today the major remedy for an illegal search is exclusion of the
seized items as evidence. Some states and the federal courts have used
this exclusionary rule since early in the twentieth century. However,
before the 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio32 required all states to adopt
this remedy, many state courts did not exclude illegally seized evidence.
In jurisdictions without the rule, it scarcely helped the victim of an
illegal search to raise the point. So, for example, in a 1945 Louisiana
case, the court permitted introduction of marijuana seized without a
warrant from defendant's room while he was out of town.33

Because of the scope permitted the searching officer, things were not
much better in jurisdictions adhering to the exclusionary rule. In
states using the rule before Mapp, the crucial issue when the lawfulness
of a search was questioned was whether or not the search was reason-
able under the circumstances.34 One might expect, in view of the

34 See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). The Court here upheld
the search of a one-room office on the grounds that the search was incident to a lawful
arrest, and said that the scope of such searches must turn on the reasonableness of the
search considering all the underlying circumstances.
judicial hostility toward marijuana defendants, that the reasonableness standard provided sufficient leeway for circumvention of the exclusionary rule in more than a few cases.\(^35\) Other end runs around the rule were developed in the federal system and in the states purporting to apply the rule to evidence seized in an illegal search. First, courts upheld searches if there was arguably an untainted source for seizure of the evidence. For example, a court might admit marijuana seized in a concededly illegal search where a police officer saw the marijuana before beginning the illegal search.\(^36\) Second, in order to have standing to assert the inadmissibility of seized items, one had to admit the narcotics in question belonged to him.\(^37\) Third, courts often permitted searches pursuant to a warrant to extend far beyond the items named in the warrant under what came to be known as the contraband theory. This theory reasoned that certain items could never lawfully be pos-

\(^{35}\) Cf. Anderson v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 461, 131 S.W.2d 961 (1939). See also Leal v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 222, 332 S.W.2d 729 (1959), holding it reasonable for a policeman to search defendant's shorts where he suspected from an informer's tip that the "out of the ordinary bulge" in defendant's pants concealed marijuana.

\(^{36}\) Ramirez v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 442, 125 S.W.2d 597 (1938). Eventually, courts began to allow the admission of illegally seized evidence if there was any untainted source whatsoever. Thus, where defendant testified that the police had found marijuana in a dresser drawer in his house, the court permitted the state to introduce the marijuana based on the untainted source of defendant's own statements in court. Rao v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 416, 271 S.W.2d 426 (1954).

\(^{37}\) See Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932). In that case Judge Learned Hand wrote:

\begin{quote}
Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in possession, of contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they come as victims, they must take on that role, with enough detail to cast them without question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but they were obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma.
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.} at 630.

\(^{38}\) See King v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 34, 335 S.W.2d 378 (1959). Here the Texas court held, with one dissent, that a search warrant for the premises of the husband authorized a search of the wife's bag in the house; her conviction for the materials found in the bag was affirmed.

In the field of search incident to an arrest, courts went even farther. Thus, a Texas court affirmed a conviction based upon the arrest and search of a defendant, even though the police officer admitted he had arrested the defendant solely for the purpose of searching him. The officer ostensibly arrested the defendant for a knife fight, but later admitted that he had arrested him because he suspected him of possession of marijuana. The court noted that the defendant was unable to give any authority for his contention that the state should be bound by the officer's statement as to the purpose of the arrest. Gonzales v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 548, 272 S.W.2d 524 (1954).
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2. Entrapment

In order for federal and state agents to detect narcotics traffic and use, it is essential that they infiltrate the drug culture. Obtaining this inside information may often involve police use of special employees—informers—or may require that the police become directly involved in the commission of the criminal act. Many defendants in narcotics cases have claimed that they were forced into sales or purchases of narcotics by the police or their agents. These charges led to the affirmative defense of entrapment, first recognized in federal courts by the Supreme Court in Sorrels v. United States. Since that time, the principles of the defense, as stated in that decision, were reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Sherman v. United States. In Sherman, a government informer induced the defendant, who was trying to quit his use of narcotics and was undergoing treatment at a narcotics rehabilitation center, to resume his use and supply the informer. The Court held that the conduct of the police informer constituted entrapment.

The entrapment defense would seem the ideal defense tactic in marijuana cases, because so often the defendant has been apprehended due to some police informer or police trick. However, the theoretical and practical outlines of the defense narrowly restrict its scope and make it rarely successful. Moreover, because it may entail an admission that defendant committed the act charged, it is usually the last resort.

From the beginning there have been two conflicting views of the entrapment defense. The majority view has considered entrapment an exception to the given criminal statute on the ground that the legislature could not have intended entrapment to fall within the statutory defi-

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39 It had been held that contraband may be seized in a search incident to arrest although the items taken had no relationship to the crime for which the arrest was made. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).


41 287 U.S. 435 (1932).


43 See A. Little, Drug Abuse and Law Enforcement (1967).

inition of the crime. With this as the theoretical justification of the defense, the inquiry focuses on the innocence of the defendant but for the police conduct. The practical question is whether the police merely supplied an opportunity for a person with a pre-existing predilection to the criminal act. In the majority view this question of fact is to be resolved by the jury.45

Throughout the years a substantial minority position has contended that the entrapment defense should be considered a police control mechanism. Under this view, the focus is on the police and their conduct rather than on the character of the defendant. This rationale is premised on the court's supervisory powers over the administration of justice, and the question of entrapment is one of law to be decided by the judge, not by the jury.46

The focus of the defense on the character of the defendant and the use of usually unsympathetic juries to decide the issue have greatly hindered the successfulness of the entrapment defense. Since the defense must be raised affirmatively, the defendant bears a heavy burden in proving that he would not have committed the crime but for the police inducement. Thus, in Gilmore v. United States47 the defendant was unable to carry the burden of proving that he would not have otherwise committed the marijuana offense. A government agent approached the defendant and requested marijuana, but the jury found no entrapment and the court could not declare that there was entrapment as a matter of law.

With the entrapment defense, as with illegal searches, the court has a known lawbreaker before it and for this reason is reluctant to free him unless there is an overwhelming reason to dismiss the charges. As a California court stated, "It is not the entrapment of a criminal upon which the law frowns ... ."48 The focus upon the defendant and his

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46 Id. at 378 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-59 (1932) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
47 228 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1955). See also United States v. Davis, 272 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1959). Davis was not strictly an entrapment case; the government agents had arranged for the transportation of a bag of marijuana from Texas to Chicago. The defendant argued that the agents' activities were illegal, and for that reason, the government was estopped from prosecuting him and that the evidence was inadmissible. The trial court found that the defendant had arranged for the deal and instructed the jury to acquit if the agents had illegally caused the importation. As in Gilmore, the jury was not willing to condemn the police.
48 People v. Branch, 119 Cal. App. 2d 490, 494, 260 P.2d 27, 30 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953), where the police had their witness call the defendant and ask to buy some
mental state, rather than a focus on the government enforcement practices and their possible effect of creating a particular crime, places an incredible burden on the defendant to try to convince the jury that he is otherwise blameless. The use of informers and special agents who become friendly with those suspected of dealing in marijuana, and the use of this friendship to try to purchase marijuana, often by supplying the cash, are bound to have a detrimental effect on the lay enforcement officers as well as to assure a slight increase in the supply of marijuana which would otherwise not have entered the trade. Nevertheless, the defense as presently structured remains virtually impossible for the defendant to raise with any real hope of success.

D. The Pro Forma Trial

When the marijuana defendant had exhausted his motions for dismissal or suppression of the evidence and was brought to trial, he was usually in deep trouble, faced with judicial hostility, lax methods of identification, and loose standards of proof. Convictions were rarely reversed for any reason and especially not for insufficient evidence. And penalties, no matter how harsh, were never set aside.

The first line of defense in the marijuana trial often involved the defendant's claim that the substance seized from him was not really marijuana. In general, the state had no difficulty proving the substance to be marijuana. In the important case, expert evidence of chemical tests may have been introduced, but more commonly courts permitted the testimony of police officers, undercover agents and other lay witnesses to be sufficient to create a question of fact for the jury to decide. Thus, when chemical evidence was not introduced, juries

marijuana and then accompanied the witness to the defendant's home.


were strongly inclined to believe the policeman or a disinterested prosecution witness as against the defendant.\(^{64}\)

This ease of identification combined with the uncritical acceptance of uncorroborated testimony\(^{65}\) produced what amounted in fact to a very low standard of proof. Thus, in a California case, *People v. Janisse*,\(^{56}\) the conviction was upheld on the testimony of teenage boys, though the defendant's co-workers testified for an alibi. The evidence of rookie police officers who later failed their civil service exams\(^{67}\) has been accepted over the word of the defendant. Finally, even the testimony of witnesses who stand to benefit only from the conviction of the defendant has been accepted without corroboration, whether the benefit was indirect\(^{58}\) or direct.\(^{59}\) The wisdom of allowing such testimony by itself to be legally sufficient for a conviction is doubtful.

Although in theory the state must prove the defendant's possession was knowing,\(^{60}\) through the use of circumstantial evidence the state usually encountered few problems in meeting its burden of proof. The state was permitted to use circumstantial evidence to link the defendant to a quantity of marijuana, but where only circumstantial evidence existed there must have been an instruction to the jury that all other...

\(^{54}\) See, e.g., cases cited at note 52 supra.


\(^{56}\) 162 Cal. App. 2d 117, 328 P.2d 11 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (it was not too improbable that defendant would have given marijuana away to a near stranger). But see *People v. MacCagnan*, 129 Cal. App. 2d 100, 276 P.2d 679 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (evidence of sale price admitted to show the unlikelihood that defendant was given the marijuana).


\(^{59}\) *People v. Winston*, 46 Cal. 2d 151, 293 P.2d 40 (1956) (witnesses against defendant for sale to minor were due to go on trial themselves); *People v. Ballejos*, 216 Cal. App. 2d 286, 30 Cal. Rptr. 725 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (agent alleged to be paid by government if successful was only witness against defendant).

reasonable inferences of innocence had been overcome. For example, behavior such as running away from police, if marijuana was found along the path run, was sufficient to link the defendant to possession, though mere proximity without other guilty behavior was not enough to prove possession.

Finally, judicial hostility to the "morally depraved" marijuana user was so strong that often judges condoned inflammatory statements by the prosecution to the jury about the nature of the drug and its users. Indeed, some judges themselves often participated in these highly emotional statements. For example, one judge in instructing a jury announced:

Marijuana is a vicious, demoralizing substance that robs a person of morality, honor, integrity, decency, and all the virtues that are the foundation of good character and good citizenship. The Government is constantly engaged in an effort to stamp out traffic in this and in narcotic drugs. Officers of the Government are employed in this effort usually and are entitled to credit for their loyalty and integrity.

In the same way, direct aspersions toward a defendant's character were tolerated. For instance, courts overlooked prosecution comments

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63 People v. Miller, 162 Cal. App. 2d 96, 328 P.2d 506 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (reversible error to introduce marijuana found down the street from the defendant's apartment without further proof of defendant's ownership). In Sherrad v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 119, 318 S.W.2d 900 (1959), defendant's conviction was reversed for the failure of the prosecutor to connect the payment to the defendant with the later payment to another defendant who made delivery of the marijuana to the agent. The court noted that defendant had been charged as the principal, and that no proof of any conspiracy had been made. See also People v. Vasquez, 135 Cal. App. 2d 446, 287 P.2d 385 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (defendant chargeable with transporting, not possession, where he told co-defendant to throw marijuana away and co-defendant did not do so).

64 Lake v. United States, 302 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1962).

65 See, e.g., People v. Sykes, 44 Cal. 2d 166, 280 P.2d 769, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 934 (1955) (evidence of defendant's activities as a pimp admissible in a trial on charge of marijuana sale to minor in order to prove that there was a plot to subjugate both the body and mind of the minor) (Traynor, C.J., dissented, stating that the evidence was prejudicial and of no probative value); Escamilla v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 346, 285 S.W.2d 216 (1955) (permissible for prosecutor to call defendant a peddler and then to withdraw statement); People v. Salo, 73 Cal. App. 2d 685, 167 P.2d 269 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946);
that the defendant sold his drugs near a junior high school or that drug use among teenagers must be stopped.

In sum, then, defendants in marijuana cases had great difficulties at trial during this period. Easy identification methods, jury acceptance of uncorroborated testimony, use of circumstantial evidence to prove defendant's possession was knowing, and the judicial participation in inflammatory statements to the jury made defense success at trial a virtual impossibility.

VIII. THE PUBLIC DISCOVERS THE TRUTH ABOUT MARIJUANA

We need not belabor the point, but sometime after 1965 the wisdom of the marijuana laws suddenly became dinner-table conversation in most American middle-class homes along with the Indochina war and campus dissent. Many sons and daughters, and even mothers and fathers, of the middle class had tried the drug, and those who had not were certainly familiar with “pot” and the law. The medical profession finally commenced a research effort to determine who was right—the user who said the drug was a harmless pleasant euphoriant or the lawmakers, who by their actions had condemned it as a noxious cause of crime, addiction and insanity.

A. Marijuana and the Masses

Although marijuana arrests and seizures hit their all-time low point in 1960, the middle and late sixties witnessed a revolution in marijuana use. Vast numbers of people have recently adopted the drug as their principal euphoriant; however, by all estimates, the new users are the sons and daughters of the middle class, not the ethnic minorities and ghetto residents formerly associated with marijuana. Student marijuana use is common among middle-class teenagers; it is estimated that 20% of high school seniors have tried marijuana at least once. Furthermore, many middle-class parents have discovered that their children are using marijuana, a trend that has been referred to as “the pot epidemic.”

Medina v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 249, 193 S.W.2d 196 (1946) (no error to call defendant a dealer in marijuana in possession trial).


1 Traffic in Opium 69 (1960).

2 In reporting the marijuana arrests of Robert Kennedy, Jr., and R. Sargent Shriver, Jr., Walter Cronkite noted that “[t]his case is not unusual; more and more parents across the nation find themselves going to court with their children on drug charges. It's becoming an incident of modern living.” CBS Evening News, Aug. 6, 1970. See also J. Rosevear, Pot: A Handbook of Marijuana 117-31 (1967); Traffic in Opium 2, 40 (1966).
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use is now so common that it has been associated in the public eye with
the overall campus life style. Accompanying the growth of widespread
marijuana use on campus has been an increasing experimentation with
the drug by intellectuals, professors, young professionals and members
of several other social groups who would never have considered using
the drug ten years ago.

Dr. Stanley F. Yolles, former Director of the National Institute of
Mental Health, testifying before a Senate subcommittee, said, “A con-
servative estimate of persons in the United States, both juvenile and
adult, who have used marihuana, at least once, is about 8 million and
may be as high as 12 million people.” Other estimates have run as
high as twenty to twenty-five million users. This vast increase in the
number of people using marijuana seems to have begun in the early and
middle sixties. It is likely that this new use pattern was initially pre-
cipitated by the publicity surrounding the LSD experimentation of Doc-
tors Alpert and Leary at Harvard in 1963. As a growing segment of
the academic fringe began to preach consciousness-expansion, students
began to find marijuana available on campus. From that point the phe-
nomenon snowballed. As more novice marijuana users reported no ill
effects from its use, more students tried it, and in turn those who used
and enjoyed the drug began to “turn on” those who had not. By
1970, some campuses reported that over seventy percent of the student
body were users. More recently, marijuana use spread beyond the
student subculture; reportedly its use has become common even among
young professionals on Wall Street. Moreover, since it is readily avail-
able and widely used in Vietnam, marijuana has become popular with
many soldiers.

3 See, e.g., R. DeBold & R. Leaf, LSD, Man and Society (1967); R. Goldstein, One
in Seven: Drugs on Campus (1966); K. Kenniston, The Uncommitted: Alienated
Youth in American Society (1967); D. Louria, The Drug Scene (1968); L. Simmons
4 See Malabre, Drugs on the Job, Wall St. J., May 4, 1970, at 1, col. 6. This article
deals not only with drug use by professionals but also details the increasing trend of
drug use on the job.
5 Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 267 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Narcotics
Legislation Hearings].
6 Id. at 268.
9 Malabre, supra note 4.
10 D. Louria, The Drug Scene 10 (1968).
The general public is clearly aware that there has been both a vast increase in the number of users and a shift from lower- to middle-class use of the drug. These great changes in the nature of marijuana use have had important social consequences. First, with the sharp rise in the number of users and the tendency of marijuana users to share common life styles and often political opinions, the drug has become associated in the past few years with a major counter-culture. Many proponents of that counter-culture have contended that the illegal status of marijuana—which puts large numbers of people on the wrong side of the criminal law—is the most significant unifying and recruiting agent for the New Left and the other political and social causes of the late sixties. Some New Left leaders have gone so far as to oppose reduction in the penalties for marijuana possession because they feel severe penalties aid their recruiting ends by making marijuana users outraged against a society that overacts so strongly to a nonexistent danger. We feel the general disrespect for marijuana laws may be causing a dangerous disrespect for all laws in a sizeable segment of the population. The credibility of government suffers on all issues when its handling of the use of this drug seems to so many so far removed from reality. This opinion is supported by the increasing medical evidence that the dangers of the drug are de minimus.

Secondly, the new middle-class use of marijuana has induced the first significant medical inquiry into the nature of the drug, has spawned increasing numbers of challenges to the constitutionality of marijuana laws and penalties, and has spurred the passage of more lenient legislation. One commentator has stated:

Nobody cared when it was a ghetto problem. Marijuana—well, it was used by jazz musicians or the lower class, so you didn’t care if they got 2-to-20 years. But when a nice, middle-class girl or boy in college gets busted for the same thing, then the whole community sits up and takes notice. And that’s the name of the game today. The problem has begun to come home to roost—in all strata of society, in suburbia, in middle-class homes, in the colleges. Suddenly, the punitive, vindictive approach was touching all classes of society. And now the

11 Perhaps the best statement the authors have yet encountered to this effect was made by Jerry Rubin, one of the Chicago Seven, in Charlottesville, Virginia, on May 6, 1970, when he said: “Smoking pot makes you a criminal and a revolutionary—as soon as you take your first puff, you are an enemy of society.” See also J. Rubin, Do It! (1970).

most exciting thing that's really happening is the change in attitude by the people. Now we have a willingness to examine the problem, as to whether it's an experimentation, or an illness rather than "an evil." With this change I think we can come to a more rational approach to methods of drug control.\footnote{N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 14 (statement of Dr. Stanley Yolles).}

Without doubt, the new class of users has successfully demanded more favorable attention from the legislatures and the courts than the lower class could have attracted. In fact, even the slightest circumscription of the reach of a state marijuana law is now national news.\footnote{See, e.g., Wash. Post, May 16, 1970, at A3, col. 8 (reporting a Minnesota Supreme Court decision holding that possession of small amount of marijuana does not necessarily justify conviction). This case is discussed at p. 1122 infra.}

A third result of the widespread use of marijuana has been a substantial challenge to the traditional picture of the national marijuana trade. Over the past three decades, law enforcement officials continued to convince legislators that the traffic in marijuana was controlled by professional criminals.\footnote{N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1969, § 4, at 8, col. 2.} Confronted with this portrait of the marijuana trade, legislators naturally stereotyped the "seller" as the vicious criminal pushing his wares for high profit and felt that extraordinarily harsh penalties were justified for sellers.\footnote{Narcotics Legislation Hearings 4 (statement of Senator Dodd).} From several recent studies it appears that the structure of marijuana traffic bears little or no relation to the traditional stereotype. In a recent survey of 204 users it was found that 44 percent had sold to friends at least once. Many casual users sell to leave themselves enough profit to cover the amount of their own use.\footnote{Goode, The Marijuana Market, 12 COLUM. F., Winter 1969, at 7.} The study further finds that even at the very top, profits are too small and the product too bulky to interest the criminal class that probably underwrites sales of heroin and other "hard drugs."\footnote{Id. at 8.} Thus even at the top, amateurs—composed generally of the students, young professionals and soldiers who constitute the users—are the main source of the drug.\footnote{Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4510 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Juvenile Delinquency Hearings]. At these hearings, former Commissioner of the Bureau of Narcotics, Henry Giordano, stated: "We have not seen any evidence of criminal syndicates such as the Mafia being involved [in the marijuana trade]." Id.}
cally sold by the ounce\textsuperscript{20} rather than by the cigarette as was traditionally assumed. Thus, even the relatively casual experimenter is likely to have at least an ounce of the drug in his possession.

\textbf{B. Enforcement of the Marijuana Laws: 1960-1970}

As a result of the rapid spread of marijuana use, full enforcement of the marijuana laws has become impossible.\textsuperscript{21} By 1967 the Federal Bureau of Narcotics had 299 agents, roughly 50 more than in 1956,\textsuperscript{22} in the same period the use of marijuana probably increased 1,000 fold. It seems obvious from both FBN statistics and the best available state and local statistics that two enforcement patterns emerged in the sixties: concentration on "sellers" and selective enforcement.

Since 1960 the FBN and major state and municipal narcotic squads have concentrated on the larger sellers. In the early sixties this trend was less pronounced,\textsuperscript{23} but by 1968 the Commissioner of the FBN said that 75 percent of federal marijuana arrests were of dealers and that even the remaining 25 percent were sellers but were charged with possession as a result of plea bargains.\textsuperscript{24} Statistics from California show the same concentration on sellers;\textsuperscript{25} nevertheless the California bureau found that most of these sellers were young and first offenders.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, at least by 1968 it became clear that sellers were quite often neophytes.

At the same time that the police have abandoned full enforcement for concentration on dealers, enforcement of the laws has remained necessarily haphazard and somewhat selective. Since marijuana use has become so common, there are certain student and hippie communities

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{20} Goode, \textit{supra} note 17, at 4, 5. See also Leary, \textit{The Politics, Ethics and Meaning of Marijuana}, in \textit{The Marijuana Papers} 121 (D. Solomon ed. 1966).
\textsuperscript{21} See Los Angeles Times, Dec. 4, 1967, \S 2, at 6, col. 1 (statement by Los Angeles police chief).
\textsuperscript{23} See \textit{Traffic in Opium} 72 (1960); \textit{id.} at 65 (1961); \textit{id.} at 78 (1963).
\textsuperscript{25} The state of California has kept excellent statistics since 1959. In 1968, as a typical year of the late sixties, the police seized over 30,000,000 grams of marijuana of all kinds in only 10,000 arrests. The high amount seized relative to the number of arrests seems to indicate the concentration on dealers. \textit{BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, DEPT OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DRUG ARRESTS AND DISPOSITIONS IN CALIFORNIA} 41, 43 (1968).
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{id.} at 37-39.}
Marijuana Prohibition

in which the police could arrest nearly everyone. Here the problem of selective enforcement necessarily arises—the police arrest those they dislike for other reasons, either political disagreement or suspicion of use of other drugs. This inevitable practice, although perhaps not consciously planned, has brought outcry from some victimized communities. This policy—if not a policy by the police at least a perception by the hippies—of selective enforcement has provided them increased impetus toward the anti-establishment life style they have adopted. Their attitude is aggravated when the police engage in particularly aggressive tactics, such as use of informers, to trap the offenders.

By 1970, the unenforceability of the marijuana laws was most clearly evidenced by the failure of President Nixon’s Operation Intercept which was designed to seal off the Mexican border and the supply of marijuana coming into the United States from Mexico. Both national and international tensions led to the failure of the “Noble Experiment.” By now, the marijuana trade is so scattered and at the same time so fragmented (with no real hierarchy in the trade) that the unenforceability of these laws has reached Prohibition proportions.

C. Emergence of Medical Opinion

One of the most significant causes of widespread middle-class use of marijuana was the lack of any medical proof of the allegedly evil effects of its use. In fact, what authoritative studies had been conducted up to this time were inconsistent with the assumptions underlying anti-marijuana legislation. In this situation, users viewed themselves as experimenters with a mild euphoriant, not criminals endangering themselves or society at large. The inevitable consequence was increased medical inquiry into the effects of the drug, beginning in about 1967.


29 Time, Sept. 26, 1969, at 70.

30 One commentator has charged that those most knowledgeable about marijuana have “dodged” the topic. Kaplan, The Special Case of Marihuana (Or, It’s the Doctor’s Fault). 9 J. Clinical Pharmacology 349, 351 (1969).

31 At the end of 1968 there existed only four known studies on human subjects conducted by Americans. See Weil, Zinberg & Nelson, Clinical and Psychological Effects of Marihuana in Man, 162 Science 1234, 1235 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Weil
Concurrently, the National Institute of Mental Health significantly increased its funding for grants and contracts for marijuana research.\textsuperscript{32} Despite this intensified inquiry, uncertainty about the effects of the drug persists. There are several major research obstacles responsible for continued absence of reliable research. After outlining the impediments to conclusive findings, we shall extract from the existing studies the present state of medical knowledge.

1. Research Obstacles

The major obstacle is the nature of the marijuana plant itself. Marijuana is a derivative of the plant \textit{Cannabis Sativa}, commonly denoted the hemp plant. It is classified as a dioecious plant, that is, the male reproductive parts are on one individual plant and the female parts are on another. The differentiation of the male and female plants is exceedingly significant because the chemical compounds responsible for the euphoric effect of marijuana are found primarily in the sticky resin that covers the unfertilized female flowers and adjacent leaves. The male plant may contain a small amount of this active resin, but it is grown mainly for hemp fiber.\textsuperscript{33}

The hemp plant yields three rough grades of intoxicating substances, the least potent of which is "marijuana."\textsuperscript{34} Yet, because the classification...
tions are imprecise, confusion is engendered by attributing to "marijuana" the effects produced by the excessive use of the more potent forms of cannabis.\textsuperscript{35} In addition, the psychic potency of the plant differs depending upon where the marijuana is grown,\textsuperscript{36} and upon cultivation variables such as occurrence of fertilization and time of harvesting:

If the male plants are not removed and fertilization occurs, the female plants which carry the main intoxicating properties are considerably weakened in that respect. In addition, unless harvesting is carried out immediately before the blossoming of the flowers there is further weakening and variation in the potency of the produce.\textsuperscript{37}

It is interesting to note in this connection that the marijuana used in the United States is among the weakest in the world.\textsuperscript{38} These factors frus-

\textsuperscript{35} As long as the term \textit{marihuana} is used indiscriminately to refer to cannabis of all kinds and potencies, confusion will continue. . . . In this country some of the vigorous opponents of marihuana seem to foster this confusion by attributing to any use of marihuana the effects produced primarily by the excessive use of the more potent forms of cannabis in an attempt to preserve a strongly negative public image of marihuana.


\textsuperscript{36} "The major botanical feature of the plant is the extreme variability in its appearance, characteristics and properties when grown in different geographical and climatic condition." Schwarz, \textit{Toward a Medical Understanding of Marihuana}, 14 CAN. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N J. 591, 592 (1969). In the United States and Mexico, for example, the production of the more potent forms is relatively uncommon, and there appears to be no demand for them. J. ROSEVEAR, \textit{Pot: A HANDBOOK OF MARIHUANA} 31-33 (1967).

\textsuperscript{37} Schwarz, \textit{supra} note 34, at 592.

\textsuperscript{38} Zunin, \textit{Marijuana: The Drug and the Problem}, 134 MILITARY MED. 104, 106-07 (1969). According to the author, several factors contribute to this phenomenon:

(1) The amount of resin found in the flowering tops markedly decreases as the plants are grown in more temperate areas. It is estimated that the resin content of Indian cannabis is 20%; Mexican 15% or less; that grown in Kentucky 8%; and that found in Wisconsin 6% or less.

(2) The activity of the resin in the female is greatly reduced if fertilized by the male. In this country, because of an inability to distinguish between the two plants, inattention to cultivation and lack of knowledge, the female plants are fertilized.

(3) The resinous content is highest prior to "going to seed" of the female plant. The marijuana in this country has gone to seed prior to harvesting.

(4) The male plant contains little or no resin content. In this country, the male plant is indiscriminately mixed with the female plant in the final preparation.

(5) The most active portion of the plant is the flowering top. In this country,
brate the creation of a standardized dosage in any given experiment and preclude the comparison of the results of independent studies.\(^3\)

In addition to the problems engendered by the great variance in potency and dosage, meaningful marijuana research is also inhibited by differences in means of consumption. Since standardized doses are generally considered impossible if the drug is smoked,\(^4\) most studies, including the La Guardia Report, are based upon oral administration of marijuana to the subjects. Yet smoking is the method of consumption among nearly all American users. Furthermore, standardized dosage is not even assured by the oral method since "little is known about the gastrointestinal absorption of the highly water-soluble cannabinoids in man."\(^5\) Finally, "[t]here is considerable indirect evidence from users that the quality of the intoxication is different when marijuana or its preparations are ingested rather than smoked. In particular, ingestion seems to cause more powerful effects . . . ."\(^6\)

2. Current Medical Knowledge

It is perhaps best to begin with the medical data concerning the traditional allegations about marijuana.

(a) The Myths.—First, it is universally accepted among medical preparations of marijuana are composed primarily of leaves, twigs and seeds which are crushed.

(b) The potency of marijuana decreases with time. It is reduced at the end of one year, markedly reduced at the end of two years, and nonexistent at the end of three years. In addition, it keeps better in cold, dry climates. Most of the marijuana in the United States is several months to several years old by the time it has been harvested and has passed through the smuggling operation.

Given the above variations in the plant and in its products and extracts, together with the continuing ignorance of its chemistry, it is not surprising that it is virtually impossible to make direct comparisons between the various studies on the effects of cannabis on human beings who are even more individually variable.

Schwarz, supra note 34, at 593.

Recently, what is believed to be the active ingredient in marijuana has been isolated and synthesized. However, this substance, denominated tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), is only available for research in very limited quantities. Weil Study 1235. Furthermore, it has not been proven that THC is the sole ingredient contributing to the effects caused by marijuana.

\(^{40}\) "[M]any pharmacologists dismiss the possibility of giving marihuana by smoking because, they say, the dose cannot be standardized." Weil Study 1235.

\(^{41}\) Id.

\(^{42}\) Id.
authorities that marijuana is not physically habit-forming. Although some researchers have asserted that a psychological dependence may result from continued use of the drug, this hypothesis has not been established and its relevance has been questioned. One authority has noted that "habituation to marihuana is not as strong as to tobacco or to alcohol." Another has commented that "[a] psychological dependence and desire for the drug may occur, but this is inconsistent and is not uncontrollable. . . . Perhaps the dependence is even less than the dependence on cigarettes."

Second, there is no evidence whatsoever that the use of marijuana has a direct relationship to the commission of crime. One commentator has noted that "[d]uring the high the marihuana user may say things he would not ordinarily say, but he generally will not do things that are foreign to his nature. If he is not normally a criminal, he will not commit a crime under the influence of the drug." In fact, it is entirely likely that the characteristic passive reaction to the use of marijuana tends to inhibit criminality. A recent study has shown that juvenile "potheads" tend to be nonaggressive and to stay away from trouble. Similarly, there is no scientific evidence for the proposition that marijuana is an aphrodisiac. It has been suggested to the contrary that the most potent form of cannabis, pure ganja, has the reverse effect, being taken by Indian priests to quell the libido.

Finally, the evidence is at best inconclusive regarding the contention that use of marijuana leads to the use of "hard" narcotics. Some of the early studies claiming to have established a valid connection were scientifically unreliable. One authority has observed in this regard:

"There is now an abundance of evidence that marihuana is not an addictive drug. Cessation of its use produces no withdrawal symptoms, nor does a user feel any need to increase the dosage as he becomes accustomed to the drug." Grinspoon, *Marihuana*, 221 Sci. Am. 17, 21 (1969).

Id.

Zunin, *supra* note 38, at 108.


McGlothlin & West, *The Marihuana Problem: An Overview*, 125 Am. J. Psych. 370, 372-73 (1968). This supports the finding of the La Guardia Report that marijuana is not a direct causal factor in criminal misconduct, but that the "high" leads to sociable attitudes.

*The Marihuana Papers* 44 (D. Solomon ed. 1966). Since marijuana has a tendency to produce drowsiness, it is difficult to see how it could lead to an act of violent sex. J. Rosevear, *supra* note 36, at 61. See also La Guardia Report, in *The Marihuana Papers* 296-97 (D. Solomon ed. 1966).
Supposedly scientific studies of this problem have been conducted in the past, such as the one done in a deprived area of a large city where the use of heroin was widespread, and indicating that many users of marijuana went on to the use of more hazardous drugs. I am sure that without previous marijuana, the use of such drugs in that environment would be just as high, and that if such a study were done on a college population, it would be found that the subsequent use of "hard" drugs would be negligible.\textsuperscript{49}

Referring to a presidential task force investigation, another authority has commented:

It is true that the Federal study showed that among heroin users about 50\% had had experience with marijuana; the study also found, however, that most of the heroin addicts had been users of alcohol and tobacco. There is no evidence that marijuana is more likely than alcohol or tobacco to lead to the use of narcotics.\textsuperscript{50}

On the basis of the available information, most authorities have concluded that there is no scientific basis for the theory that the use of marijuana is a causal factor in the use of "hard" narcotics.\textsuperscript{51} In any event, as a matter of common sense, it would appear that the phenomenon in dispute is very complex, including both individual personality features and environmental factors. As one commentator put it, "Several of the studies indicate that the previous statistics have been misleading and exaggerated." Whether or not the proposition can be scientifically established, "there is probably a slightly greater chance that an individual who has used marijuana could go on to opiates, but statistically this is not ... an important social consideration."\textsuperscript{52}

Thus it appears that none of the traditional allegations about marijuana has been scientifically established, that its allegedly addictive qualities have been disproved, and that the overwhelming weight of authority disputes its allegedly crime-producing and stepping stone tendencies. We will now briefly survey the medically recognized effects of the drug, physical, psychomotor and psychological.

\textsuperscript{50} Grinspoon, \textit{supra} note 43, at 21-23.
\textsuperscript{51} \textsc{The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Narcotics and Drug Abuse} 13-14 (1967); \textsc{Council on Mental Health and Committee on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, Dependence on Cannabis (Marijuana)}, 201 \textit{J.A.M.A.} 368-71 (1967).
\textsuperscript{52} Zunin, \textit{supra} note 38, at 108.
(b) Physical Effects.—The acute physical effects of marijuana are the subject of much debate. Various studies have reached different conclusions. Nearly all authorities, however, are in agreement that the bodily symptoms accompanying the “high” are very slight. The most commonly noted effects are a slight rise in blood pressure, conjunctival vascular congestion, slight elevation in blood sugar, urinary frequency and an increase in pulse rate. In general, these acute symptoms are relatively short-lived, and there are no known lasting physical effects. On the other hand, there is evidence that prolonged smoking could lead to “marijuana bronchitis,” and that communal smoking has the tendency to encourage the spread of communicable diseases.

(c) Psychomotor Effects.—Varying results have also been reported in studies of the acute effects of marijuana upon psychomotor functions. Although the researchers have sometimes found some slight impairment in performance tests, there is apparently no general depressing or stimulating effect on the nervous system and no influence on speech and coordination. In the most recent study, Doctors Weil, Zinburg and Nelson of the Boston University School of Medicine found that marijuana users are able to compensate nearly 100 percent for whatever adverse effects may result on ordinary psychomotor performance.

53 L. Goodman & A. Gilman, The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics ch. 16 (3d ed. 1965). Nausea, vomiting and diarrhea have also been reported, but it is felt that these symptoms are mainly the result of oral administration. Grinspoon, supra note 43, at 20. Increased appetite and dryness of the mouth are also said to be common.

54 Usually the reports of chronic ill effects are to be found in Eastern studies of individuals using the stronger hashish or pure resinous substances over prolonged periods of time and are complicated by the immeasurable effects of many other social, economic, personality and cultural factors. Schwarz, supra note 34, at 595.

55 Tests by Robert S. Morrow in the 1930’s revealed that even large doses of marijuana did not affect performances on tests of the speed of tapping or the quickness of response to simple stimuli. Grinspoon, supra note 43, at 20. “The drug did affect steadiness of the hand and body and the reaction time for complex stimuli.” Id. The most recent study in this area was done by Andrew Weil, Norman Zinburg and Judith Nelson of the Boston University School of Medicine. Their conclusions were that regular users of marijuana may show some slight degree of impairment in performance tests, but that the aptitude of the subjects may even improve slightly after smoking marijuana. Weil Study 1242. Marijuana-naive subjects tended to show some impairment in performance. Id.


57 We were struck by the difficulty of recognizing when a subject is high unless he tells you that he is ... . It seems possible to ignore the effects of marijuana on consciousness, to adapt to them, and to control them to a significant degree. Id.
Such findings suggest that marijuana is not likely to be a causal factor in driving accidents, a hypothesis that is supported by a recent simulated driving test comparing the performance of subjects under the influence of marijuana and alcohol. There seems to be no contention in the medical field that there are any lasting effects from marijuana in the psychomotor area. The Weil study reported that noticeable effects "were diminished between 30 minutes and 1 hour, and they were largely dissipated 3 hours after the end of smoking. No delayed or persistent effects beyond 3 hours were observed or reported."

(d) Psychological Effects.—The acute psychological effects of the use of marijuana are more complex. At the outset, it can be stated with certainty that "marijuana is definitely distinguishable from other hallucinogenic drugs such as LSD, DMT, mescaline, peyote, and psilocybin. Although it produces some of the same effects, it is far less potent than these other drugs. It does not alter consciousness to nearly so great an extent as they do nor does it lead to increasing tolerance to the drug dosage." Furthermore, the subjective effects of cannabis are dependent upon the personality of the user, his expectations, and the circumstances under which the drug is taken, as well as learning to smoke marijuana properly.

There is general agreement about the pleasurable psychological effects. Users uniformly experience greatly enhanced perception—whether real or delusory—of visual, auditory, taste and touch effects, increased sense of humor or hilarity, feelings of well-being or wonderment, and distorted time and space perceptions. In this connection, it is interesting to note that even the pleasurable phenomena are dependent on individual circumstances, particularly when the drug is taken for the first time. Many, if not most, people do not become "high" on their first exposure to marijuana even if it is smoked correctly. The probable explanation for

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58 Comparison of the Effects of Marijuana and Alcohol on Simulated Driving Performance, 164 Science 851 (1969) (concluding that subjects under a "social marijuana high" showed no significant differences from control subjects in accelerator, brake, signal, steering, and total errors). In addition, "unlike alcohol drinkers, most pot smokers studiously avoid driving while high." J. Rosevear, supra note 36, at 135.

60 Weil Study 1238.

61 Grinspoon, supra note 43, at 19.


this curious phenomenon is that repeated exposure to marijuana reduces psychological inhibition, as part of, or as a result of, a learning process.\textsuperscript{64}

Medical knowledge is most tentative with reference to adverse psychological effects. Recent studies, however, have vehemently disputed an earlier tendency to attribute psychoses and severe panic reactions to marijuana use.\textsuperscript{65} As Dr. Weil has noted:

Because reliable information about the acute effects of marijuana has been as scarce within the medical profession as without, many of these reactions have been misinterpreted and incorrectly treated. For example, simple panic states, which doubtless would be properly diagnosed in other circumstances, are often called “toxic psychoses” when doctors elicit immediate histories of marijuana use.\textsuperscript{66}

Medical experts now generally agree that the possibility of depression, panic and psychoses depends entirely on the circumstances of use and the personality of the user.\textsuperscript{67} In his most recent study, Dr. Weil concluded that “serious adverse reactions are uncommon in the ‘normal’ population,”\textsuperscript{68} but noted three exceptions. First, simple depressive reactions which rarely occur in regular users may occur in novices who approach their initial use ambivalently.\textsuperscript{69} Second, the most frequent adverse reaction is apprehension, more often described as anxiety, and sometimes reaching a degree of panic. Again, such reactions are closely related to the attitude of the user and to the social setting.\textsuperscript{70} The social setting also influences the frequency of panic reactions, suggesting again that this phenomenon correlates with the degree of reluctance with which people approach initial use of the drug:

\textsuperscript{64} “The subjective responses of our subjects indicate that they had imagined a marihuana effect to be much more profoundly disorganizing than what they experienced.” Weil Study 1241. This subjective control over the effects extended as far as the reporting of no effects when in actuality the subject had received a large dose. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{65} Grinspoon, \textit{supra} note 43, at 23-24.


\textsuperscript{67} See, e.g., Schwarz, \textit{supra} note 34, at 595; Weil, \textit{supra} note 66.

\textsuperscript{68} Weil, \textit{supra} note 66, at 997.

\textsuperscript{69} Marihuana depressions I have seen have occurred mainly in obsessive-compulsive persons who are ambivalent about trying the drug or who invested the decision to experience marihuana with great emotional meaning. In interviewing these patients, I have thought that they used marihuana as an excuse for letting themselves be depressed, not that their depressions were psycho-pharmacological. \textit{Id.} at 998.

\textsuperscript{70} Dr. Weil has stated that “panic reactions occurred most often among novice users of marijuana—frequently older persons who are ambivalent about trying the drug in the first place.” N.Y. Times, May 1, 1970, at 18C, col. 2.
In a community where marijuana has been accepted as a recreational intoxicant, they may be extremely rare (for example, one per cent of all responses to the drug). On the other hand, at a rural Southern college, where experimentation with the drug may represent a much greater degree of social deviance, 25 per cent of persons trying it for the first time may become panicked.\footnote{Id. These panic reactions may emulate acute psychoses in hospital emergency wards “where the patient may feel overwhelmed, helpless and unable to communicate his distress.” Weil, \textit{supra} note 66, at 998.}

The panicked person normally believes that he is either dying or losing his mind, and simple reassurance will end most such reactions.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} The reaction normally is short-lived, but it may be prolonged by an attitude encouraging the underlying fears.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} In short, “panic reactions . . . seem more nonpharmacologic than pharmacologic.”\footnote{\textit{Id.}}

Third, psychotic reactions occur rarely, if at all, in normal users,\footnote{\textit{Id.}} and occur mainly in persons with a low psychosis threshold or a history of psychosis\footnote{\textit{Id.}} or hallucinogenic drug experimentation.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} Even in such cases, marijuana is a precipitant rather than a primary cause of this type of reaction\footnote{\textit{Id.}} which lasts at most a day or two.\footnote{\textit{Id.}}

\section*{IX. Marijuana Legislation Clashes with Judicial Skepticism and Emerging Values—Piecemeal Judicial Response: 1965-1970}

The dramatic increase in marijuana use during the latter 1960's and the consequent increase in prosecution\footnote{See pp. 1096-1101 \textit{supra}. See also People v. Patton, 264 Cal. App. 2d 637, 70 Cal. Rpt. 484 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968), where the arresting officer testified that he had made about 1,000 marijuana arrests.} were matters of high public visibility. Judicial response at both the trial and appellate levels was in-

\footnote{Well, \textit{supra} note 66, at 998.}
fluenced by a combination of powerful forces, none of which had been present in the preceding years. The 1960's saw a revolution in the law of criminal procedure, and in few areas were police practices more suspect than in the enforcement of the drug laws. The latter part of the decade witnessed widespread dissent against the political and legal systems; this protest milieu gave an added dimension to marijuana use as more and more people smoked, oftentimes overtly, in order to defy a seemingly ignorant law. Faced with this unusual conjunction of widespread political and social eccentricity, the courts—institutional protectors of political deviants—were inevitably pressed into institutional sympathy for social deviants. A third force was the revitalized judicial interest in the value of privacy in a highly automated, technological society; more and more people went to the courts to question long-standing governmental prohibitions against essentially private decisions and acts—homosexuality, abortion, contraception and drugs. Together with the well-publicized medical skepticism about the soundness of the nation's drug laws, particularly those regulating marijuana, these forces moved the courts to scrutinize enforcement practices and consider a new wave of constitutional objections to state and federal marijuana legislation.

A. Multiple Offenses: Untying the Statutory Knots

1. Federal Developments

In the major decision during this period, the United States Supreme Court voided the federal provisions most often employed to prosecute the possessor (buyer) of marijuana. In the first arm of Leary v. United States, the Court held that the fifth amendment relieves unregistered buyers of any duty to pay the transfer tax and to file the written order form as required by the Marihuana Tax Act. The Court reasoned that, since filing such a form would expose a buyer to liability under state law, under the occupational tax provisions of the Tax Act, and perhaps under the marijuana provision of the Import and Export Act, the filing


3 Although Leary involved only the concealment and transportation provision, 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a) (2) (1964), the Eighth Circuit has held, correctly, that Leary also covers the acquiring provision, § 4744(a) (1), “since a person obviously would have to acquire the marijuana to knowingly transport or conceal it.” United States v. Young, 422 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970).

4 Because the “danger of incrimination under state law” was “so plain,” the Court did not pursue the additional question of a buyer’s exposure to liability under the Import and Export Act. 395 U.S. at 16 n.14.
provisions violated the fifth amendment guarantees against self-incrimination. On the other hand, the Court held in a later case that the fifth amendment does not relieve the marijuana seller of the duty to confine his sales to transferees who are willing to comply with the order form requirements. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit recently held that Leary does not compel invalidation of Tax Act section 4755(b), which prohibits the interstate transportation of marijuana, because a conviction under that section is not really a conviction for failing to register and pay the occupational tax and, even if it were, registration under section 4753 is not necessarily incriminating as was the written order form requirement struck down in Leary.

The second arm of Leary reversed the long line of decisions upholding the presumption of knowing concealment of illegal importation arising from possession under section 176a of the Import and Export Act. The Court held that, in light of the ease with which marijuana was domestically cultivated and the number of users, the presumption of knowledge could not rationally be drawn from possession; it could not be said "with substantial assurance that the presumed fact [knowing concealment of illegally imported marijuana] is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact [possession] on which it is made to depend." Although there is authority to the contrary, the Ninth Circuit has held this part of Leary retroactive, thereby invalidating all prior section 176a convictions in which the defendant did not admit

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7 "Although we need not reach the question, we feel that the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the insubstantial hazards of incrimination posed by § 4753." Id. at 306.
8 See p. 1086 supra.
9 Anticipating the Leary decision on the § 176a presumption was United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
10 395 U.S. at 52-53. Having found the "knowledge" presumption unconstitutional, the Court avoided consideration of the "illegal importation" presumption. Id. at 38. The knowledge presumption has also been held invalid as applied to hashish, United States v. Maestri, 424 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1970); cf. United States v. Cepelis, 426 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1970) (remanded for factual determination on whether Leary applies to hashish).

11 395 U.S. at 36.
knowledge and the jury was instructed as to the applicability of the statutory presumption.\textsuperscript{13}

A serious dispute remains as to what the Government will have to prove in subsequent prosecutions under section 176a. Assuming that the entire provision does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination,\textsuperscript{14} it is likely that the prosecution will have to prove actual knowledge of illegal importation in the future.\textsuperscript{15} Since it is highly improbable that such proof will be forthcoming, section 176a has probably been rendered useless as applied to possessors. It should be clear that the entire series of decisions under the Tax Act and section 176a has an air of unreality about them because Congress probably has Article I power directly to prohibit possession and sale of marijuana and has now exercised that power in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.\textsuperscript{16} This new legislation, although stopping short in some respects, discards many of the fictions perpetuated by earlier legislation. The \textit{Leary} decision was at least partially responsible for forcing Congress to rationalize the federal role in the drug field, particularly with respect to marijuana.

Another manifestation of judicial dissatisfaction with the extreme nature of existing drug legislation is the apparent reversal of the trend of decisions upholding the strict liability of one-time drug offenders, users

\textsuperscript{13} United States v. Scott, 425 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1970). We think the Ninth Circuit is right, at least with respect to convictions secured after marijuana achieved high public visibility in the 1960's. Since the number of people still incarcerated for earlier convictions is minimal, complete retroactive effect is in order. Essential to the \textit{Leary} decision was a determination that the presumption was factually unsupportable; it therefore constituted a material flaw in the fact-finding process and seriously impaired the right to jury trial.

\textsuperscript{14} Absent the written order form requirement of the Marihuana Tax Act, we do not see how prosecution under § 176a involves the fifth amendment at all. Neither did the Ninth Circuit. \textit{Id.} at 61.

\textsuperscript{15} See United States v. Martínez, 425 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1970); McClain v. United States, 417 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1969). A mere inference of importation is clearly not enough to sustain a conviction since it would nullify \textit{Leary}. Cf. United States v. Raniro, 282 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (where Government failed to prove possession beyond reasonable doubt, court could not infer knowledge of importation). It is difficult to see how the Government could raise an inference of knowledge without proving actual knowledge. If, however, such can be done, it is clear that the defendant has a right to prove that the marijuana was not imported. United States v. Espinoza, 406 F.2d 733 (2d Cir.), \textit{cert. denied}, 395 U.S. 908 (1969) (retrial ordered for failure of trial judge to allow defendant to prove that marijuana came from California).

\textsuperscript{16} Pub. L. No. 91-513 (Oct. 27, 1970). \textit{See also} \textit{Leary} v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 54 (1969) ("We are constrained to add that nothing in what we hold today implies any constitutional disability in Congress to deal with the marijuana traffic by other means").
and addicts for failure to register when leaving the country. The Ninth Circuit held the phrase "uses narcotic drugs" unconstitutionally vague. Taking a more direct approach, the Second Circuit found knowledge of the registration requirement to be an element of the crime. Thus construed, the statute precludes any due process challenge to the sufficiency of the notice. Although a self-incrimination issue remains, the Second Circuit's decision removed the most serious defect in the statute, one that had become intolerable as the number of marijuana convictions escalated in the late 1960's.

2. State Developments

The erosion of the archaic federal criminal statutes for marijuana-related offenses has been accompanied by a similar, albeit limited, development on the state level. The major issue in state litigation concerns so-called "drug-proximity" offenses which are generally employed as plea-bargaining tools or to prevent the release of a suspect when evidence was illegally seized or when the evidence is insufficient to secure a conviction under the substantive drug offense. Typical ancillary offenses are loitering in the common areas of a building for the purpose of unlawfully using or possessing any narcotic drug; loitering in public by a user, addict or convicted drug offender without lawful employment; presence in an establishment where narcotic drugs are dispensed; and presence of a user or drug offender in a private place where drugs are kept.

The decisional trend seems to point to the unconstitutional vagueness of simple loitering and vagrancy statutes. Because of the nexus between

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17 See p. 1085 supra.
18 Weissman v. United States, 373 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1967). Struggling to confine its holding, the court distinguished an apparently contradictory case, United States v. Eramdjian, 135 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Cal. 1957), on the ground that it involved "addiction" rather than use of narcotic drugs.
20 See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (application of city ordinance requiring convicted felons to register within five days after arrival in city where there is no actual notice or knowledge of ordinance is unconstitutional).
21 The Mancuso court did not discuss the issue.
24 Id. § 22-1515(a).
25 Id. § 33-416(a).
narcotics and crime, however, the courts are struggling to redefine narcotics-proximity statutes to avoid the vagueness objection. It might appear that where "good account" provisions give the arresting police officer too much discretion the statute will fail. On the other hand, courts generally avoid vagueness objections based on lack of notice by reading in knowledge elements wherever necessary. Because of the tenuous relation between marijuana and crime, the courts should construe "narcotics" in such statutes not to include marijuana.

Similar restriction of marijuana-related offenses has been accomplished by holding that charges of possession and sale will not both lie where the only possession is incident to sale, and by tightening the requirements of specificity in the indictment regarding the proscribed parts of the plant.


27 In People v. Pagnotta, 25 N.Y.2d 333, 253 N.E.2d 202, 305 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1969), the New York Court of Appeals upheld a statute making it illegal to loiter about any "stairway, staircase, hall, roof, elevator, cellar, courtyard, or any passageway of a building for the purpose of unlawfully using or possessing any narcotic drug." The court distinguished the ordinary vagrancy and loitering cases on the ground that the conduct punished in the narcotics vagrancy statute is directly related to the commission of crime against others:

[ Protection of innocent citizens from drug users is a very crucial problem. As has recently been pointed out by several newspaper articles, in some of our poorer urban areas where drug use is high, innocent citizens are often beaten, robbed and even murdered by drug addicts . . . . It is completely reasonable and proper for the Legislature to protect these citizens from accidentally stumbling into the midst of such miscreants in the common areas of buildings. ]

Id. at 338, 253 N.E.2d at 206, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 489.


29 E.g., United States v. McClough, 263 A.2d 48 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970) (reading sciontist provision into statute prohibiting prior drug users or offenders from being "found in any place . . . building, structure . . . in which any illicit narcotic drugs are kept"); cf. People v. Brim, 257 Cal. App. 2d 839, 65 Cal. Rptr. 265 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (interpreting statute outlawing knowingly being in a place where narcotics are being used as charging defendant with intentional involvement with the unlawful use of marijuana).


B. Procedural Objections to Enforcement Practices

The law of criminal procedure underwent a major revolution in the 1960's. The Bill of Rights was applied piece by piece to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court focused its concern on protecting the rights of the criminal defendant. The earlier philosophy had been that, so long as the defendant's rights at trial were guaranteed, the Court should not, and did not need to, intrude into the pretrial stages of the criminal process. For a variety of reasons it became clear in the 1960's that in a system where between 75 and 90 percent of all defendants bargain and enter guilty pleas, rights must be assured well before trial if they are to have any real meaning to the average person caught in the net of the criminal process. Thus, step by step the Court began to regulate police practices—search, arrest and interrogation techniques—and the conduct of the early stages of the criminal process. This substantial change in attitude meant that more marijuana defendants could successfully raise procedural objections.

1. Search and Seizure

The most important development for the marijuana offender has been the close judicial scrutiny of police searches as a result of Supreme Court rulings under the fourth amendment. More stringent standards have been established for the police to obtain search warrants, and the proper scope of searches incident to a lawful arrest has been narrowed substantially.

Although courts have refused to exclude any evidence that was in plain sight when seized, such as a bag of marijuana in a school satchel voluntarily opened by a student, or marijuana thrown out of a window by a defendant trying to dispose of it, they have narrowed the per-


missible time and area in which a car may be searched. Moreover, the
difficult standing problem posed by the requirement that one had to
admit possession or ownership of the seized property in order successfully
to challenge the search was alleviated in cases involving group arrests
by permitting all those on the premises to challenge a given search.

The new requirements for procuring search warrants led to a number
of technical defense victories. For example, searches of defendants' resi-
dences were successfully challenged in two Montana marijuana cases
because the warrants were issued by a justice of the peace, rather than
by a district judge, as required by the state law. These holdings were
premised on the sanctity of private residences, and they suggest a
growing reluctance to countenance "reasonable" warrantless searches,
especially of the home. Similarly, Maryland struck down the fruits of
a search of defendant's guests and their automobiles on the ground that
the permissible search was limited to the areas described in the warrant.
An Illinois court has held that property not included in the warrant
must be returned to the defendant. This return to a more stringent
view of particularity requirements of warrants stands in stark contrast
to the willingness of courts to overlook these requirements in the late
fifties.

Likewise, courts now scrutinize more closely police claims of probable
cause for expanding the area of the search. A California court held
that even though defendant was lawfully arrested, search of his luggage
in a friend's apartment was justified neither by the friend's consent nor
by the officer's having seen the defendant swallow something. The
search was especially unjustifiable since the defendant had been arrested
in his automobile. In another California case, the presence of peculiar
odors did not constitute probable cause for the search of a footlocker.

36 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). See also Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58 (1967). The holdings in both these cases are probably limited by Chimel.
41 See pp. 1089-91 supra.
42 People v. Cruz, 61 Cal. 2d 861, 395 P.2d 889, 40 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964); accord,
Cruz the court stated that it was reasonable for the officers to try to dislodge the
suspected marijuana from the defendant's mouth.
43 People v. McGrew, 103 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969), relying on
An airline had detained the footlocker since it corresponded to a police description. The officers had smelled the marijuana and then searched the footlocker before sending it on its way and tracing it. The California Supreme Court held that the smell alone was not sufficient cause to search without a warrant.

Despite judicial narrowing of the scope of searches with or without a warrant, the easing of the standing requirements, and the closer scrutiny on the probable cause issue, courts continue to permit police to enter dwellings without knocking or by force where circumstances indicate such action is reasonable and necessary. For example, a California court upheld a marijuana search, even though the police entered without knocking, because the police heard people running around inside yelling, “It’s the police,” and thought they heard a shot fired.\(^4\) The court held that the statutory knocking requirement was subject to exception when there was danger of destruction of evidence and danger to the police. Closely related to no-knock entry is forcible entry, upheld in an Illinois case\(^4\) where the police broke into the defendant’s residence when he did not immediately respond to their knocks. The necessity for forced entry is essentially the same as for unannounced entry, but forced entry adds the danger of causing fright and damage.

Another search area that has not been substantially liberalized is that of the border search. Customs officials have a much more extensive right to search than their police colleagues. Mere suspicion is sufficient to justify a border search.\(^4\) Even though the jurisdiction of customs agents ends once entry into the country is completed, the courts have allowed border guards great discretion in determining what constitutes completed entry. In \(Thomas v. United States\),\(^4\) the Fifth Circuit held admissible evidence seized an hour and a half after the appellant had reentered the United States because he was only six blocks from the border. Although there is an inevitable problem of how far the jurisdiction of the customs agent extends, \(Thomas\) suggests clearly that it is not limited to border crossings.

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\(^4\) People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 442 P.2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1968) (“‘In plain smell,’ therefore, is plainly not the equivalent of ‘in plain view’”).


\(^4\) United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967).

\(^4\) 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967). The customs agents had searched the defendants belongings at the time he had entered the country and had not discovered the marijuana and heroin he possessed. They came into town and searched the defendant when they were notified by an informer that he was carrying the contraband.
2. Entrapment

Although the majority opinions in *Sorrells v. United States*[^48] and *Sherman v. United States*[^49] remain the leading statements on entrapment, some courts have recently permitted expansion of the defense. In California a defendant may plead not guilty and still raise the entrapment defense in some cases. The court in *People v. Perez* stated:

To compel a defendant to admit his guilt as a condition of invoking the defense of entrapment would compel him to relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at the risk of not being able to meet his burden of proving entrapment.[^60]

The defendant must, however, still raise the defense at trial to be determined as a matter of fact by the jury.[^61] There is no right to raise the defense in a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence.[^62] Most courts continue to focus on the moral culpability of the accused[^63] in determining whether or not entrapment has been successfully shown. Recent Arkansas[^54] and Nevada[^65] cases, however, suggest that the courts are in-

[^50]: 62 Cal. 2d 769, 776, 401 P.2d 934, 938, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326, 330 (1965). The decision overturned a long series of precedents. That all justices concurred is indicative of the sentiment for change. The court required the prosecution to disclose the identity of the informant because he was essential to the defenses of entrapment and lack of knowledge. The decision was immediately implemented in People v. Marsden, 234 Cal. App. 2d 796, 44 Cal. Rptr. 728 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). There, defendant was repeatedly requested to furnish marijuana to a government agent and finally purchased and gave the agent one marijuana cigarette. The court noted that the case was close to entrapment as a matter of law.
[^54]: Peters v. State, 450 S.W.2d 276 (Ark. 1970). Here the defendant gave some marijuana free of charge to the agent after repeated requests. The marijuana had been left in the defendant's shop by others. In remanding the case for consideration by the jury whether entrapment existed the court stated:

Perhaps, neither the persistent solicitation, the use of an alias, the misrepresentation of the purposes for which [the agent] wanted to acquire the marijuana nor the use of friends of appellant for an entree, standing alone, would have been sufficient to raise a fact question as to entrapment, but when taken together along with the total lack of evidence that [the defendant] had possessed or sold marijuana before, there was such an issue.

_Id._ at 278.
[^55]: Froggatt v. State, 467 P.2d 1011 (Nev. 1970) (reversed for failure to give entrapment...
creasingly concerned about the conduct of law enforcement agents, especially in marijuana cases.

3. Other Prosecution Practices

Several major abuses, although judicially recognized, remain largely uncorrected. Long delay between offense and arrest is common in narcotics offenses because the police desire to expose the full extent of distribution and to maintain a cover for the undercover agent as long as possible. Yet any substantial delay will prejudice the defendant since the prosecution continues to gather evidence while the defendant may forget exact circumstances and possibly exculpating facts. Judicial response has been inconsistent, focusing primarily on the purposefulness of the delay. In light of the recent rejuvenation of the speedy trial requirement by the Supreme Court, there is some hope that this abuse may be corrected.

A more serious abuse with which state and federal prosecutors have been charged is politically-motivated discretionary enforcement. Although the courts can do little to remedy this state of affairs, it forms the basis for one of our basic contentions: The political-social overtones of the marijuana problem may inhibit a rational political and prosecutorial response and at the same time may provoke a protective judicial response. One judge, particularly expert with regard to contemporary drug problems, has acknowledged the partial truth of the charges of political prosecution against hippies, long-hairs and draft-card burning college students. To the extent that other trial and appellate judges recognize instruction where policeman placed marijuana in defendant's car and then defendant sold it to another officer).

60 Compare Jordan v. United States, 416 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) (since three-month delay was not purposeful, defendant must show actual prejudice), with Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (charges dismissed since seven-month delay found purposeful).


63 Oliver, Assessment of Current Legal Practices from the Viewpoint of the Courts, in Drugs and Youth 229 (J. Wittenborn ed. 1969). Judge Oliver tried to minimize the seriousness of the problem, however:

I think that as judge I must be interested in what might appear to be a pattern of discriminatory law enforcement, but I . . . consider much of this talk must be viewed with the same critical eye which most other talk about drug abuse must be viewed.

Id. at 233.
these prosecutorial tendencies, we can expect some judicial compensation either in fact-finding, in sentencing, or in response to substantive challenges to the law. It is our contention, of course, that such judicial reaction has already begun.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The ease of identifying marijuana in conjunction with the use of uncorroborated testimony and circumstantial evidence continues to require of the prosecution only a very low burden of proof. Nevertheless, appellate decisions are gradually beginning to tighten these requirements, and active judicial hostility at trial has all but disappeared.

Although the use of uncorroborated testimony to convict continues to be upheld by the courts, an Illinois appellate court has reversed a conviction because of the behavior of the testifying officer. Noting that the officer had repeatedly pressured the defendant to become an informer, the court held that the uncorroborated testimony of this officer was not sufficient to support a conviction. The court did not make clear whether it exercised a weight of the evidence review of the trial judge's fact-finding, or whether it applied an exclusionary evidence rule pursuant to its inherent powers over the administration of criminal justice. Whatever the case, judicial perspective in the clash between marijuana defendant and police officer has clearly shifted.

The amount of marijuana required to uphold a conviction is undergoing substantial change. The California Supreme Court held in People v. Leal that to be sufficient for conviction, the amount of narcotics must be enough for sale or consumption, the rule generally applied where the statute does not specify a minimum quantity. In Eckroth...

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60 See, e.g., Winfield v. State, 248 Ind. 95, 223 N.E.2d 576 (1967).
61 People v. Quintana, 91 Ill. App. 2d 95, 234 N.E.2d 406 (1968). The court was greatly displeased with the continuing misbehavior of the officer: "[The 5-8 previous arrests and shakedowns] were a high-handed display of police power which completely disregarded the defendant's constitutional rights." Id. at 98, 234 N.E.2d at 408.
63 People v. Villalobos, 245 Cal. App. 2d 561, 54 Cal. Rptr. 60 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (50 milligrams insufficient); see Tuttle v. State, 410 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (63 milligrams sufficient, enough to make a very small cigarette); People v. Hokuf, 245 Cal. App. 2d 394, 53 Cal. Rptr. 828 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (reversible error for the court not to instruct the jury that fragments of marijuana cannot support conviction). But see Franklin v. State, 8 Md. App. 134, 258 A.2d 767 (1969) (heroin), in which the court upheld a conviction for possession where the defendant went to the hospital with an overdose. Although recognizing that once the drug is inside the body there is no possession because there is no control, the court felt that prior possession and
v. *State*\(^{64}\) a Florida court ruled that the taking of a drug from a passing pipe is not sufficient to constitute possession where the defendant did not own the pipe, the drug or the premises. Similarly, in a case that received national publicity,\(^{65}\) the Minnesota Supreme Court held that if the state defines marijuana as a narcotic, it cannot punish possession of what could be native cannabis in amounts too scanty to produce a "narcotic" effect. Accordingly, exiguous traces of the drug found in the crevices of defendant's brief case left in his mistress' car did not constitute an amount sufficient for conviction.\(^{66}\)

Other problems remain unsolved. Circumstantial evidence continues to link defendants to seized marijuana. Constructive possession was found where the defendant's daughter was the actual possessor,\(^{67}\) and the fact that marijuana was found where an informer said she had seen defendant smoking it the previous day was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction.\(^{68}\) There is a split as to whether a conviction can be upheld where the defendant gratuitously brings the buyer and seller together. Massachusetts upheld the conviction for possession where the defendant's only contact with the marijuana was passing it to the state's agent,\(^{69}\) ruling that the facilitation of the sale added enough to the act of passing to allow the court to find possession. In a similar case, however, a New York court held that there was not present the required involvement or concert of action to uphold a conviction for sale.\(^{70}\)

Nevertheless, courts have refused conviction on numerous occasions in which the defendant was not linked exclusively with the marijuana that was found,\(^{71}\) and have generally required an outside linking factor before upholding the possession.\(^{72}\) However, the element that can tip the self-administration could be inferred. The decision should do much to discourage addicts from receiving any medical treatment that might expose them to criminal penalties.

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\(^{64}\) 227 So. 2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).

\(^{65}\) See p. 1099 & note 14 *supra*.

\(^{66}\) 65 State v. Resnick, 177 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1970).

\(^{67}\) People v. Thomas, 76 Ill. App. 2d 42, 221 N.E.2d 800 (1966).

\(^{68}\) State v. Mantell, 71 Wash. 2d 768, 430 P.2d 960 (1967).


\(^{71}\) See, e.g., State v. Oare, 249 Ore. 597, 439 P.2d 885 (1968) (one marijuana cigarette found in bathroom with two people, home owner convicted); People v. Van Syoc, 269 Cal. App. 2d 370, 75 Cal. Rptr. 490 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (marijuana found on right-hand side of the dashboard in defendant's car while parked in public lot); People v. Evans, 72 Ill. App. 2d 146, 218 N.E.2d 781 (1966) (marijuana found under bar where defendant had been sitting).

\(^{72}\) State v. Faircloth, 181 Neb. 333, 148 N.W.2d 187 (1967) (defendant had dufflebag

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scales in favor of conviction is often unrelated to the possible possession of the marijuana. For example, a California court upheld the finding of possession of marijuana discovered along with a purse the defendants had stolen. The defendants contended that the marijuana was not theirs and must have been in the purse when stolen. That the defendants were thieves probably played more heavily in the conviction than any evidence of their connection with marijuana.

Where marijuana is found on the premises of the individual, possession is presumed, although the courts have read in a defense of ignorance of the presence of the marijuana. Nevertheless, in a New Hampshire case the court upheld a possession conviction premised on the defendant’s knowledge of presence of the drug on the premises even though the court apparently believed the defendant’s story that it belonged to a third party. Ordinarily there is direct corroborating evidence to indicate the defendant’s knowledge.

Along with the gradual thaw on these points in state courts, the late sixties witnessed a total absence of the outrageous judicial participation in inflammatory statements about the dangers of the drug and its users which we saw was typical of the late fifties. To the contrary, the appellate opinions, at least, are replete with skeptical references to the inclusion of marijuana in the narcotics classification.

D. Sanction

Nowhere has judicial disenchantment with the drug laws, especially marijuana, been greater than in the area of punishment. Preference for civil treatment of drug abuse, disgust with severe mandatory sentencing that deprives the judiciary of its traditional function of weigh-

full of marijuana between bis legs in automobile); People v. Blunt, 241 Cal. App. 2d 200, 50 Cal. Rptr. 440 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (defendant only one who had sat in back of police car where marijuana found).


77 See 1131-32 infra.

78 E.g., Oliver, supra note 59.
ing the culpability of the individual offender, and skepticism about a statutory scheme which catches the user or small scale distributor and misses the major trafficker have all found their way into judicial opinions.

This dissatisfaction with legislative inaction in the area of de-escalating punishment has already begun to provoke remedial judicial action. In a landmark decision receiving national attention, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently held that any prison sentence imposed for first-offense possession of marijuana for personal use "should be suspended." While the court based its holding on the judiciary's statutory authority to suspend sentences in "the best interests of the public as well as of the defendant," and on the appellate court's power to review for abuse of discretion trial court sentencing decisions, it appears that the true locus of the opinion is the eighth amendment. That is, the court really determined that any prison sentence for first-offense possession of marijuana for personal use is unreasonably excessive. Accordingly, the decision will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

\[\text{References}\]

\[\text{Footnotes}\]

\[\text{Notes}\]
X. The Heart of the Matter—Substantive Constitutional Challenges to the Marijuana Laws: 1965-1970

Perhaps the most significant legal development engendered by the new class of marijuana users and shift in medical opinion is the vigorous wave of substantive constitutional attacks on the marijuana laws launched in 1965. Although the challengers have employed many labels, the essence of their attacks is an insistence on rationality in the legislative process. Contending that marijuana is a harmless euphoriant, the challengers have questioned governmental authority to prohibit its use at all. Arguing that it is no more, and perhaps less, harmful than alcohol and tobacco, the challengers have indicted as irrational the total prohibition of one coupled with permissive regulation of the others. Conversely, the challengers have vigorously attacked the arbitrary inclusion of marijuana in the legislative classification “narcotics” with admittedly harmful opiates and cocaine. Finally, the severity of the punishments imposed for marijuana violations has been attacked as violative of the eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause. A potent weapon in advancing these attacks has been the fact that the state and federal legislatures never conducted meaningful investigation into the effects of the drug, but relied instead on hearsay and emotional pleas.

Although the judiciary has become increasingly sympathetic to these challenges, to date it has left the legislation intact. As we inquire into the reasons for this recalcitrance, the reader should recall the nature of the judicial debate about intoxicants a half century ago. As the scope of the due process and equal protection clauses was substantially broadened over the years, the free-form “pursuit of happiness” and “inherent limitations” approaches were laid on the ash heap of constitutional history. As a result of the incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees into the fourteenth amendment, there now exist a plethora of more or less “explicit” constitutional limitations upon which the challengers have relied. Analytically, however, the marijuana challengers have asked the courts to fit square pegs into round constitutional holes. The dynamism of recent constitutional interpretation has not yet eroded the obstacles in the challengers’ path. But this is not to say that this erosion should not, and will not, eventually occur. In the succeeding pages, we shall evaluate the merits of the various arguments and the adequacy of the judicial responses.
A. The Burden of Justification: The Importance of Having a Presumption on Your Side

The mortar in the wall separating judicial from legislative power is the presumption of constitutionality of legislative action. Although this presumption evaporates where "legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,"¹ or where it affects adversely other fundamental rights,² the courts ordinarily will defer to the rationality of legislative proscriptions, classifications and sanctions. When legislation is attacked as irrational, arbitrary or factually groundless, the pertinent questions are whether the judiciary should conduct its own factual inquiry, and how groundless the legislation must be to earn the "arbitrary" or "irrational" designation (or its contextual equivalent).

Because of the placement of the burden of (dis)proof, legislation is not "arbitrary" simply because the legislature did not conduct a fact-finding investigation.³ When the legislation is attacked, the courts will assume that it was based on the collective knowledge and experience of the legislators. In short, the legislature, as a matter of constitutional law, has no affirmative duty to utilize the trappings of rationality.

Furthermore, legislation is not irrational simply because a factual hypothesis upon which it is premised cannot be proven. The legislature is entitled to guess and act upon the contemporary state of knowledge or ignorance. The generally accepted "facts" about marijuana in the 1920's and 30's, when the drug's possession and use were criminalized, were that it was physically addictive, caused insanity, and gen-

³ Although a requirement of fact-finding investigations for all legislation is desirable, judicial enforcement would reward persuasive legislative history and shake the separation of powers doctrine to its very roots. The spectre of judicial surveillance of everyday legislating, albeit by method and not substance, is one not likely to enthuse either legislators or judges.

Counsel for defendants in Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969), contended that the notable lack of legislative investigation into medical and scientific evidence concerning marijuana "violates certain minimum standards of rationality which must be part of the legislative process." Oteri & Silverglate, The Pursuit of Pleasure: Constitutional Dimensions of the Marihuana Problem, 3 Suff. L. Rev. 55, 60 (1968). However, the trial court and the Supreme Judicial Court both responded correctly that the nature of the legislative records was not the issue before the court. The question was whether the facts today are inconsistent with assumptions necessary to the rationality of the legislation. Commonwealth v. Leis, Nos. 28841-2, 28844-5, 28864-5 (Suffolk Super. Ct. 1968), excerpted in 3 Suff. L. Rev. 23, 25 (1968) (Tauro, C.J.), aff'd, 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969).
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erated crimes of violence. Later, in the 1950's, legislation was premised on the hypothesis that marijuana was the stepping stone to heroin and the other opiates. Since the assumptions could not be conclusively disproved, the legislation was rationally related to the legitimate objectives of preventing crime, pauperism and disease. As the California court in *Ex parte Yun Quong* had noted in 1911 in response to an attack on the early anti-opium laws:

>[B]ut the validity of legislation which would be necessary or proper under a given state of facts does not depend upon the actual existence of the supposed facts. It is enough if the law-making body may rationally believe such facts to be established.\(^4\)

Between 1950 and 1965 attacks on the marijuana laws were repelled in this manner since medical inquiry had not yet produced affirmative evidence of irrationality. Challenges to the classification of marijuana as a narcotic were rebuffed either by citing *Navaro* and the other cases first upholding the marijuana laws,\(^5\) or by quoting *Ex parte Yun Quong*.\(^6\)

By 1965, however, the revolution in marijuana use was underway, and independent medical researchers had begun to challenge the venerable assumptions. Armed with an increasing volume of scientific literature in their favor,\(^7\) challengers have assaulted the legislation in court in an effort to prove that "facts judicially known or proved preclude" the legislation’s rationality.\(^8\) Several trial judges have taken evidence on the physiological, psychological and sociological effects of marijuana,\(^9\) and some appellate courts have suggested that such steps be taken in their respective inferior courts.\(^10\) In Colorado, trial judges have twice declared

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\(^4\) 159 Cal. 508, 515, 114 P. 835, 838 (1911) (emphasis added).


\(^7\) See pp. 1104-10 *supra*.


that state's marijuana laws unconstitutional on the basis of such evidence, only to be reversed both times.\textsuperscript{11} Again and again, the verdict has been the same: Despite the substantial weight of authority regarding the mildness of the drug, enough doubt remains and enough rational men still consider the drug harmful that the courts cannot say the legislation is irrational.\textsuperscript{12} Some judges have expressed their own doubts about the accuracy of the factual premises and the wisdom of the legislative judgments pertaining to marijuana,\textsuperscript{13} but even they have been constrained to uphold the legislation. At the other extreme, some courts continue to rely on the old myths, considering the question well settled\textsuperscript{14} and rebuffing the challengers' attacks with a swish of the robed forearm:

Clearly, the use of marijuana and other drugs . . . presents a danger to the public safety and welfare of the community since they are clearly related to each other and to the commission of crime.\textsuperscript{15}

Many legislators hesitate to revise the marijuana laws drastically, because they feel the data is not yet complete. For the same reason, the courts have been even more reluctant to find that present legislation has no rational basis in fact, a finding made only in the rarest circumstances. Assuming for present purposes that the legislation is entitled to the traditional presumption, we believe that attacks grounded in the due process and equal protection clauses should fail. On the other hand, we are not convinced that challenges grounded in a rationality arm of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment are without merit. This argument has the advantage of acknowledging the rationality of criminalization while indicting the severity of the sanction.

1. Due Process and Equal Protection: Rationality of the Classification

The concurrent classification of marijuana as a "narcotic" with the

\begin{footnotesize}
\[\text{\textsuperscript{11} People v. McKenzie, 458 P.2d 232 (Colo. 1969); People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400 P.2d 923 (1965).}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{12} See cases cited notes 28-31 infra.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{14} Robinson v. United States, 327 F.2d 618, 624 (8th Cir. 1964) (Blackmun, J.) ("the boundary line, if any, between narcotics and marijuana is indistinct and . . . statutes and interpreting courts do not give much emphasis to it"); Spence v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 419, 420, 183 N.E.2d 363, 364 (1962) ("There is no question that the state had, under its police power, the right to classify cannabis as a narcotic drug."); People v. Glaser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 880 (1966).}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{15} People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 66, 400 P.2d 923, 927 (1965).}\]
\end{footnotesize}
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"hard drugs" and the permissive treatment of alcohol form the basis of the "irrationality" argument. Whether grounded in the minimum substantive content of the due process clause, in the overinclusive and underinclusive aspects of the equal protection clause, or in an independent limitation on the police power, the contention is the same: The legislative classification is not reasonably related to a valid legislative purpose.

The initial inquiry ought to focus on the nature of the state’s objective. The first possible objective we will call the "rationality" rationale. The state’s aim may be to promote productivity, rationality and participation in social processes, and conversely to prevent the citizen from "turning off" or frustrating his ability to function in socially desirable ways. Under this rationale, prohibition of all drug use would be rationally related to the state’s objective. Similar treatment of "hard" narcotics and marijuana would be justified, since no distinctions need be drawn between moderate and chronic use or between divergent ancillary social and physical effects. The real issues are whether this is a legitimate objective and whether the permissive treatment of alcohol invalidates the scheme.

As to the first issue, we do not believe that American governmental institutions are empowered to impose the Protestant Ethic upon a free people. Although we will explore this question in some detail below from another perspective, we note for now that opposition to mere use of euphoriants has never been the focus of legislative inquiry or the public opinion process in the entire history of drug regulation in this country. As we noted earlier, although total abstention was a peripheral concern of some proponents of Prohibition, that movement was directed primarily at the evils associated with excessive use and commercial distribution. Some judges recently have upheld marijuana legislation simply because marijuana is a "mind-altering drug," but it is unlikely that they perceived the implications of their statements.

As to the second issue, if we assume that rationalism is a legitimate objective of drug legislation, it is a long-standing constitutional principle that the legislature need not "cover the waterfront." If the law-makers determine, as a result of the failure of Prohibition for example, that "regulation" is the only feasible approach to alcohol, that judgment does

16 See text at notes 132-35 infra.
17 See p. 979 supra.
18 E.g., Raines v. State, 225 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1969).
not vitiate a prohibitionary approach to other intoxicants. That the legislature acts piecemeal does not make its actions any less "rational." 19

The state's objective in drug legislation may be to prevent excessive or chronic use on the ground that such use totally destroys the user's social utility and is likely to render him dependent on the state for subsistence. Although this "dependency" rationale is designed immediately to protect each citizen from himself, its mediate aim is the public good. In this respect marijuana prohibition resembles legislation requiring motorcycle users to wear crash helmets. 20 Again, there is some dispute regarding the legitimacy of this objective, a question to which we will return below.

Assuming the validity of the "dependency" rationale, however, the relevant factual inquiry focuses on the respective use patterns and effects of "hard" narcotics, marijuana and alcohol. The challengers contend that it is scientifically established that marijuana is not physically addictive, causes no permanent harm, and that its users do not develop a tolerance to the drug. The irrationality of classifying marijuana with the opiates and cocaine is aggravated, they contend, by the fact that there are six million chronic alcoholics in this country. In response to these arguments, some courts have noted that there is some evidence for the proposition that marijuana produces a "serious degree of psychological dependence, that it encourages experimentation with other drugs and that it may lead to addiction of narcotics." 21 Accordingly, since "reasonable men may entertain the belief that the use of [marijuana], once begun, almost inevitably leads to excess, such belief affords a sufficient justification for applying restrictions to these drugs." 22 In addition some courts have noted that there is some evidence that the smoking of marijuana may induce acute (albeit temporary) "psychotic breaks" in predisposed individuals. 23

Although the logic of the stepping stone and psychotic break arguments is suspect in determining valid state interest, we believe that contrary medical findings are still too tentative with respect to the psychological effects of marijuana use to sustain an irrationality challenge under the "dependency" rationale. In addition, the piecemeal principle once

20 See Borras v. State, 229 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1969).
22 Id. at 600, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
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again counters the challengers' underinclusive equal protection argument with respect to alcohol or LSD,\(^{24}\) allegedly more harmful drugs not classified as "narcotics." To the extent that some courts have searched for differences between alcohol and marijuana to defend directly the legislative scheme, they have usually been on shaky ground. For example, Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Tauro stated in *Commonwealth v. Leis*, after a full factual inquiry on the effects of marijuana:

> The ordinary user of marijuana is quite likely to be a marginally adjusted person who turns to the drug to avoid confrontation with and the resolution of his problems. The majority of alcohol users are well adjusted, productively employed individuals who use alcohol for relaxation and as an incident of other social activities.\(^{25}\)

Such statements misconstrue prevalent use patterns of both alcohol and marijuana. Moreover, such differentiation is grounded not in the "dependency" rationale but in the dubious "rationality" rationale. Judge Tauro would have been better advised to stick to the piecemeal principle, as have the California intermediate appellate courts.\(^{26}\)

The third possible objective of marijuana legislation is to prevent harm to others. For four decades, prohibition of marijuana has been based primarily on the "other-regarding" rationale. The relevant factual hypotheses are that marijuana use causes violent crime directly, that it leads to use of hard drugs and thereby causes violent crime indirectly, and that it causes "psychomotor discoordination" and thereby causes accidents by those under its influence.

Contemporary challengers have charged that these assumptions are completely without merit in light of contemporary medical knowledge. Although some courts continue to intone the old myths, relying on police testimony correlating marijuana use and violent crime,\(^{27}\) others

\(^{24}\) Defendant in People v. McKenzie, 458 P.2d 232 (Colo. 1969), varied the traditional underinclusiveness argument. He contended that the continued classification of marijuana as a "narcotic" drug after a legislative revision in 1968 could not be defended, since LSD, clearly a more harmful drug, was classified as a "dangerous" drug. Possession of LSD was a misdemeanor while possession of marijuana was a felony. Citing its decision in People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400 P.2d 923 (1965), the Colorado Supreme Court deferred to the unusual classification.


\(^{26}\) People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 67, 400 P.2d 923, 927-28 (1965); *cf.* People v.
have openly recognized the unsubstantiated character of each of these hypotheses.\(^2\)

Nevertheless, these courts have sustained the legislation because of the continuing uncertainty about the drug’s effects.\(^2\) Rather than supporting the hypothesis that marijuana intoxication independently causes violence, the courts have focused on the unpredictable effects of the drug depending on the psychological predisposition of the user. Since there is some evidence that marijuana can be especially volatile when used by despondent, hostile or unstable persons, a prophylactic approach is rational.\(^3\)

Similarly, while recognizing that there is no support for a direct causal link between marijuana use and hard narcotics use, the courts have held that some marijuana users’ graduation to more dangerous drugs due to environmental conditions is enough to uphold the legislation.\(^3\) Finally, recognizing that the possibility of reckless use of dangerous instruments while under the influence of marijuana might not ordinarily justify its total prohibition, the courts have relied instead on evidence that there is no scientific means of detecting whether or not a person is under the drug’s influence, as there is with alcohol.\(^3\)

Taken individually, each of these justifications leaves something to be desired. First, individuals psychologically predisposed to violent conduct will, in all likelihood, snap under the influence of some other catalyst even if deprived of marijuana. Second, the stepping stone theory is a self-fulfilling prophecy even to the extent that there is a correlation between marijuana use and hard narcotics use. Were it not for prohibitory marijuana legislation, users of that drug would not come into contact with illegal activity and perhaps consequently with narcotics pushers. Finally, there is persuasive evidence for the proposition that marijuana users are ordinarily rendered immobile and are unlikely to endanger others by driving automobiles.\(^3\)


\(^{32}\) Id.

\(^{33}\) See p. 1105 supra.
Taken collectively, however, these hypotheses provide a rational basis for prohibitionary legislation, the objective of which is to prevent harm to others. We conclude that there is not yet sufficient uniformity of medical opinion to overcome any presumption of rationality attaching to marijuana legislation. Those courts directly confronting the issue have responded correctly, regardless of the precise constitutional framework within which they have worked.

2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Rationality of the Sanction

Since marijuana penalties were drastically increased in the 1950's, the marijuana laws have been attacked repeatedly on the ground that high mandatory minimum sentences without parole or probation are cruel and unusual punishment. The starting point for resolution of this question is the Supreme Court's highly ambiguous decision in 1910 in *Weems v. United States*. The Court struck down a fifteen-year sentence at "hard and painful labor" imposed under Philippine law for falsifying a public document because the sentence was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment" as well as "unusual in its character." The punishment was condemned "both on account of... [its] degree and kind." Because the incidents of the challenged imprisonment were particularly abhorrent—"a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of property"—some courts and commentators believe that *Weems* does not depart from the traditional view that the eighth amendment speaks only to mode of punishment, not to length. Yet some members of the Court have stated that the amendment was directed "against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged." And the Court in *Weems* stated that the punishments there in question came "under the condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of their degree and kind." Accordingly, although the jurisprudence of

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34 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
35 Id. at 377.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 366.
40 217 U.S. at 377.
the eighth amendment is virtually nonexistent, courts and commentators have assumed that the amendment has a proportionality dimension.41

The difficult question is the proper standard for testing the constitutionality of allegedly excessive sentences. Although detailed inquiry into the subtleties of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, the battle is between those who would apply a fringe "decency" test42 and those who would apply a "rationality" test that essentially extends the minimum substantive content of the due process clause to the relation between crime and punishment.43 As applied to marijuana legislation, a "decency" inquiry would have been fruitless in the 1950's and 1960's but may yet succeed in the 1970's. Under that test, a punishment is unconstitutional only if "so aberrational as to violate 'standards of decency more or less universally accepted.'" 44 Since the history of marijuana legislation has again and again been characterized by varying degrees of hysteria in differing jurisdictions, there is no available measure of human decency against which to test the action. Moreover, if the legislatures are uniformly harsh, the judicial conscience is not likely to be shocked. However, as increasing numbers of state legislatures and the Congress finally begin to de-escalate the penalties for marijuana offenses, those states that maintain the 1950 punishment levels are likely to find themselves lagging behind "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 45

One contention that can, and has, been raised in the drug context has been that the penalty must bear a reasonable relation to the seriousness of the offense when compared with the punishments for more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction and for the same crime in other jurisdictions. The evolution of judicial response to this argument in marijuana cases has followed a path consistent with the change in use patterns and in public response.

In the first case raising this cruel and unusual punishment issue, State v. Thomas,46 the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld in 1953 that state's


42 See Packer, supra note 38.


44 Packer, supra note 38, at 1076.


46 224 La. 431, 69 So. 2d 738 (1953).
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years without parole for unlawful possession. The court said that the eighth amendment did not apply to the states and that similar state provisions spoke only to “form or nature of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration and amount.” 47 Finally, the court noted that, even if Weems applied, “[i]n view of the moral degeneration inherent in all aspects of the crime denounced by the Narcotics Act, it cannot be said that the length or severity of the punishment here prescribed is disproportioned to the offense.” 48 Five years later, the Texas Supreme Court upheld a life sentence for first offense possession, and stated that the legislature was solely responsible for assessing the permissible limits of punishment and that the jury was solely responsible for affixing sentence in a particular case. 49

In 1960, the Ninth Circuit in Gallego v. United States 50 upheld the provision of the 1956 Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act imposing a five-year mandatory minimum sentence without suspension, probation or parole for unlawful importation of marijuana. Assuming an excessiveness holding to be implicit in Weems, the court noted nevertheless that the penalty was not “so out of proportion to the crime committed that it shocks a balanced sense of justice. At worst,” the court continued, “it merely forbids in this kind of case and for good reason the discretionary granting of special benefits which Congress did not have to permit in the first place.” 51 The summary treatment of the issue is easily explained by the court’s apparent lack of sympathy with marijuana users; it quoted approvingly the moral denouncement delivered in Thomas. 52

Slowly the tide began to turn. A California court recently blanched at upholding the five-year minimum sentence imposed for giving away

47 Id. at 435, 69 So. 2d at 740.
48 Id. In State v. Bellam, 225 La. 445, 73 So. 2d 311 (1954), the court rebuffed a similar challenge to a seven-year sentence without parole for a second offense of possession of marijuana by simply citing Thomas.
49 Garcia v. State, 166 Tex. Crim. 482, 316 S.W.2d 734 (1958). The statute provided that a first offense was punishable by not less than two years nor more than life. The court applied the hands-off principle common to state courts, according to which any sentence within the statutory limits is valid. See, e.g., Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964); Saunders v. State, 208 Tenn. 347, 345 S.W.2d 899 (1961); State v. Jiles, 230 S.C. 148, 94 S.E.2d 891 (1956).
50 276 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1960).
51 Id. at 918.
52 Id. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Gallego in Halprin v. United States, 295 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1961), and Bettis v. United States, 408 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1969).
one marijuana cigarette, especially when the case had entrapment overtones. But in 1967 the defendant in *United States v. Ward* asked the Seventh Circuit to declare unconstitutional, as applied to marijuana, the sentencing provisions of the 1956 Act previously upheld by *Gallego* and subsequent cases. The no parole provision was indicted as inconsistent with current medical knowledge. After quoting at length from the then recently released Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice and from the Task Force Report on Drug Abuse, the court concluded:

> [T]he progress of scientific research in the whole area of narcotics and drug abuse, during the eleven years since [passage of the 1956 Act] has not resulted in the establishment of scientific knowledge to the extent that would enable us to nullify [section 7237] on constitutional grounds, even if we deemed it appropriate to do so.

Thus appeared the perpetual fate of rationality arguments, whether applied to sanction or to classification. Two years later the Fifth Circuit still found the medical data inconclusive and Massachusetts and California courts both summarily dismissed eighth amendment arguments.

Then, in 1968 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia took a significant step. In its decision in *Watson v. United States* (Watson I), a three-judge panel in an opinion by Judge Bazelon held that a mandatory ten-year sentence for appellant's third conviction for possession of heroin constituted excessive punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. The significance of *Watson I* was shortlived, however, because

54 387 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1967).
55 Id. at 848.
56 United States v. Drorar, 416 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1969).
60 Since the court identified numerous factors germane to its decision, delineation of a precise holding is difficult and the court probably so intended. We would suggest, however, that the court held that the imposition of rigid severe sentences, identified by
upon a rehearing en banc, the court avoided the eighth amendment issue and set aside the sentence on other grounds. In the en banc opinion (Watson II), the court does make a strong eighth amendment argument based on Robinson v. California. Since this important constitutional point was not fully litigated below, the court did not believe it could adequately rule on the question. Although most of Judge McGowan's opinion in Watson II is thus dicta, it does lay the foundation for future overturnings on eighth amendment grounds of possession sentences when applied to addicts.

An additional indication of both the sympathetic attitude of the federal courts and the expanding dimensions of the eighth amendment "excessiveness" argument appears in a recent opinion by Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York. In United States v. Kleinzahler, the issue was the applicability of the ameliorative provisions of the Youth Corrections Act to violations of the federal narcotic drug and marijuana laws. Defendant, a college graduate and highly salaried white collar worker, pleaded guilty to acquisition of marijuana without payment of the transfer tax (by any other name, possession for personal use). He was sentenced to a mandatory term of two years' imprisonment, which was suspended, two years' probation and a fine of $1,000. If the Youth

comparison with other offenses and by the absence of sentencing discretion to tailor the penalty to the culpability of the offender, is unreasonable either in the context of offenses closely related to if not compelled by disease or in the context of victimless crimes.

The court upheld Watson's conviction but remanded for resentencing in light of the Narcotic Rehabilitation Act of 1966. In so doing, the court declared unconstitutional a provision of that Act which exempts addicts with two prior narcotics convictions, holding such a provision to be a denial of equal protection. No. 21,186, at 29 (D.C. Cir., July 15, 1970) (en banc).

Judge McGowan noted that

if Robinson's deployment of the Eighth Amendment as a barrier to California's making addiction a crime means anything, it must also mean in all logic that (1) Congress either did not intend to expose the non-trafficking addict possessor to criminal punishment, or (2) its effort to do so is as unavailing constitutionally as that of the California legislature.


For the future, the addict, whose acquisition and possession of narcotics is solely for his own use and who wishes to defend on these grounds, is surely not at a loss to know how to do so. . . . To the extent that he wishes to assert that the statutes are not to be read as applicable to him . . . [he should] make an alternative claim of the constitutional defectiveness, under Robinson, of the statutes as applied to him.

Id. at 21-22.


Corrections Act had applied, he would have been entitled to have the conviction set aside upon successful completion of his period of probation.

The problem was that the Youth Corrections Act was expressly inapplicable to statutes with mandatory penalties. In light of the legislative history of the Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Judge Weinstein felt constrained to hold that the narcotics and marijuana laws imposed mandatory penalties within the meaning of the Youth Corrections Act. He noted, however, that he thought the result absurd. In a passage particularly germane to the constitutional issue and the meaning of Watson I, he stated:

While the result is harsh, it does not appear to rise to the kind of cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Constitution, in light of the possibilities of probation and suspension of sentence here present. The wisdom or justice of treating those young adults convicted of possession of marijuana in the same way as those convicted of armed bank or mail robbery or those convicted of selling narcotic drugs is doubtful. But revision of the law in this field must be left to Congress.

Unlike Judge Weinstein, however, the Supreme Court of New Jersey was not satisfied with the mere possibility of suspension of prison terms meted out to first-offense possessors of marijuana for personal use. In its landmark decision in State v. Ward, the supreme court held as a matter of law that prison “sentences for first offenders should be suspended.” The court strove manfully to base the decision on its statutory authority to review sentencing suspension decisions for abuse of discretion. However, both the breadth of the holding and its reasoning suggest constitutional underpinnings.

66 Judge Weinstein noted:

In light of the unique structure and harshness of the penalty provisions of the narcotics and marijuana laws—almost byzantine in their complexity—and previous interpretations of related statutes, it is clear that the penalties are “mandatory” within the meaning of [the Youth Corrections Act].

306 F. Supp. at 315.

67 Id. at 317.

68 Id. (emphasis added).

69 State v. Ward, No. A-9 (N.J., Oct. 26, 1970). The court affirmed the conviction but modified the sentence. Two justices dissented from the affirmance on the grounds that the defendant did not receive a fair trial. They concurred in the sentencing modification on the grounds that the sentence was “grossly excessive.”

70 Id. at 9. Although the court devoted some attention to the defendant's particular record and probation report, id. at 7, it did not pretend to limit the decision to the
In the first place, taken on its face, the court's opinion appears to hold that trial court denials of motions to suspend prison sentences for first offenders will always be reversed for abuse of discretion. However, such a "guidance" flies in the face of two basic procedural concepts: the sentencing authority is generally free to impose any penalty within the range permitted by the legislature; and to the extent that an appellate court reviews such judgments, it customarily defers to the proximity of the trial judge and reverses, on a case by case basis, only for gross disregard of the trial record and presentence reports. In effect, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that where youthful marijuana users are concerned, imprisonment is an excessive sanction even though within the statutory range of alternatives. This is no ordinary decision.

Although the court sloughed over the analytical problem, it did not disguise its rationale. The disturbing number of users, the ambiguous nature of the wrong, and the counterproductive effect of imprisonment each played a part:

We cannot escape the unhappy fact that our youth have been involved with marihuana in disturbing numbers. That this is so does not palliate the wrong. Nor should we be thought to encourage or condone such conduct. The statute should and will be enforced. But it remains the policy of the law to reform the youthful offender. Sentencing judges should direct the punishments they impose to the goal of reformation. Too severe a punishment will do little towards advancing this goal. Incarceration is a traumatic experience for anyone. The effect must be particularly devastating upon young persons such as the defendant here. A sentence of two to three years in State Prison in a case like this will probably be more detrimental to both the offender and society than some other discipline. 7

In essence, the court held that incarceration was not a rational sanction for this particular crime.

The sixteen years between Thomas on the one hand and Watson I, Kleinzahler and Ward on the other have witnessed a significant expansion of the contours of the eighth amendment and a noticeable change in judicial attitude toward defendants charged with marijuana violations. As constitutional lawyers, we must acknowledge the difficulty of halting a case at bar. At one point the court stated that it was establishing "guidelines for the sentencing of first offenders who were found guilty of possessing marijuana for their own use." Id.

71 Id. at 8.
rationality-excessiveness inquiry, once begun. For this reason, the New Jersey court’s end run around the constitutional issue is a defensible approach. In any event, we think that the courts will continue to enter this thicket unless the legislatures reduce marijuana penalties to comport with reality.

B. Should the Burden Be Shifted?—Marijuana and Fundamental Rights

The Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co.\textsuperscript{72} is the most frequently cited authority for the presumption of constitutionality, the implications of which were explored in the preceding section. However, Justice Stone’s famous footnote four, tentatively cataloging exceptions to the rule of judicial deference, is the philosophical forebear of contemporary contentions that marijuana legislation cannot be presumed constitutional. Recent constitutional history has been characterized by a new judicial activism in defense of “fundamental” human rights.\textsuperscript{73} Footnote four was a tentative attempt to anticipate and rationalize that activism while retreating from the old economic activism and its major vehicle—substantive due process.

Still allergic to the substantive due process label and to any form of judicial review not tied to more or less specific constitutional provisions, the modern Court has utilized the doctrine of incorporation and the once dormant equal protection clause to fill in the contours of footnote four. For some of the Justices, substantive due process is limited, theoretically at least, to the specific guarantees of the first eight amendments, and perhaps their collective penumbra. To others, that phrase has an independent potency, sometimes more, sometimes less, than the Bill of Rights, including rights essential to a concept of ordered liberty. In either event, the “rights” protected must have the trappings of permanence. Frequently, however, pressures of new social developments have led the Court to expand the coverage of the specific provisions through unadulterated, but unlabeled, substantive due process. A similar development is the active judicial enforcement of the mandate of the equal protection clause to legislation involving “suspect classifications” or sensitive subjects. In either case, the Court is called upon to define and separate that “fundamental” area of human conduct, the regulation of

\textsuperscript{72} 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

which must be justified by the government, and that area where legisla-
tive action carries the protection of the deferential presumption.

As advocates, the challengers of marijuana legislation must fit their
contentions within the current patterns of constitutional pigeon-holing.
To cast off the shackles of the stultifying presumption, they must per-
suade the courts that marijuana use somehow constitutes a fundamental
right. Utilized, thus far unsuccessfully, for this purpose have been the
eighth amendment, the first amendment free exercise of religion clause
and the penumbral right of privacy. Failing with these approaches, the
challengers have found in the ninth amendment a “right to get high.”

1. The Robinson-Powell Argument

In Robinson v. California,\textsuperscript{74} clearly a substantive due process decision
cloaked in the protective garb of the eighth amendment,\textsuperscript{75} the Supreme
Court held that the status of being a narcotics addict could not be made
a crime. The Court was careful to note in dictum that the state legisla-
tures were still free to punish addicts for possessing drugs.\textsuperscript{76} Subsequent
courts found this distinction untenable\textsuperscript{77} and the Supreme Court ad-
dressed it again in its 1968 decision in Powell v. Texas.\textsuperscript{78}

Powell, a chronic alcoholic, had been convicted for public drunken-
ness. His conviction was affirmed in three separate opinions. However,
five members of the Court, as then constituted, disavowed the Robinson
dictum. The four dissenting Justices found it “cruel and unusual” to
punish an alcoholic “for a condition—being ‘in a state of intoxication’
in public—which is a characteristic part of the pattern of his disease and
which, the trial court found, was not the consequence of appellant’s
volition but of ‘a compulsion symptomatic of the disease of chronic
alcoholism.’”\textsuperscript{79} Justice White, casting the deciding vote for affirmance,
asserted nevertheless that, “[u]nless Robinson is to be abandoned, the
use of narcotics by an addict must be beyond the reach of the criminal
law.”\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{74} 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
\textsuperscript{75} Id. at 685 (White, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{76} Id. at 665, 666, 667-68.
\textsuperscript{77} See, e.g., Watson v. United States, No. 21,186 (D.C. Cir., July 15, 1970) (en banc);
Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 929
(1965).
\textsuperscript{78} 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
\textsuperscript{79} Id. at 548-49. Although Justice White dissent in Robinson, he saw no distinction
between the status of addiction and acts compelled by that status. He voted to affirm
Assuming for present purposes that a majority of the newly-constituted Supreme Court adheres to the principle that the state may not punish conduct performed under direct compulsion of a disease, application of the principle to marijuana use is extremely unlikely. The challengers themselves assert that marijuana has been scientifically proven not to be addictive, either physically or psychologically. They can nevertheless argue that the state may not have its cake and eat it too: The rationality of the legislation rests upon the allegation that marijuana is at least psychologically “addictive,” and the state may not now defend the punishment by arguing that it is not addictive. Superficially appealing, this argument must falter for two reasons. First, the state’s interest in prohibiting marijuana use may rest on deleterious effects unrelated to psychological dependency. Second, defendants invoking the Robinson-Powell argument, even if it is applicable, are unlikely ever to prove by clear and convincing evidence, as they must, that they were without “free will” to desist from using marijuana.

2. Free Exercise of Religion

Several major challenges to marijuana legislation, premised on the first amendment, have relied heavily on the California Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in People v. Woody. Finding that sacramental use of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, constituted the cornerstone of Peyotism both as symbol and object of worship, the California Supreme Court held that prohibition of possession constituted a direct burden upon the free exercise of the defendant’s religion, as practiced by the Native American Church. Since freedom of religious practices is not absolute, however, the court inquired whether the state had shown a “compelling interest” sufficient to justify the infringement.

First, the state could not support its allegations that use of peyote would lead to use of more dangerous drugs or would cause permanent injury to the user. Assuming such a state interest to be legitimate, it was never proven, and could scarcely be labeled compelling. Second,
the state insisted that fraudulent claims of religious immunity would frustrate enforcement of the state's narcotics laws. Again, the court found that the state had produced no evidence to that effect. Accordingly, since California had not shown that these presumably "compelling" state interests would be frustrated by the immunity, the narcotics statute was unconstitutional as applied to possession of peyote for religious purposes.

The court distinguished Reynolds v. United States, where the Supreme Court had ruled that Congress could constitutionally apply to Mormons a prohibition against polygamy. First, said the California court, polygamy was not essential to the practice of Mormonism, as was use of peyote to the practice of Peyotism. Second, the Supreme Court in Reynolds viewed polygamy as destructive of basic tenets of a democratic society, as dangerous and repulsive as human sacrifices. The state interest was therefore compelling and unavoidable.

Several defendants in recent marijuana cases, Dr. Timothy Leary among them, have strenuously contended that the first amendment similarly requires immunity for users who seek in good faith the "religious experience" induced by marijuana and other psychedelic substances. Some users incorporated in 1965 the Neo-American Church, claiming a nationwide membership of twenty thousand. According to the tenets of the faith, psychedelic substances, particularly marijuana and LSD, are the "True Host," and it is the religious duty of all members to partake of the sacraments on regular occasions.

Judicial response to the free exercise argument has been uniform only in result. Some courts, including the Fifth Circuit in the Leary case, have simply held that passage of a criminal law per se constitutes a compelling state interest overriding any free exercise claims. These courts think Reynolds indistinguishable, and cite the following language:

Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices . . . .

85 Id. at 723, 394 P.2d at 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 75.  
86 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  
... To permit... [a man to execute his practices because of his religious beliefs] ... would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name in such circumstances.91

The net result of such an approach is that criminalization of conduct which for some is a required religious practice is presumed constitutional. "Congress," said the Fifth Circuit, "has demonstrated beyond doubt that it believes marijuana is an evil in American society and a serious threat to its people."92 Accordingly, "it [is] not incumbent upon the Government to produce evidence to controvert the testimony of witnesses on the controversial question whether use of the drug is relatively harmless."93

Other courts have assumed that the Woody interpretation of Reynolds is correct, but have found that the Neo-American Church is not a bona fide religion94 and that personal use of psychedelic drugs, untied to a bona fide organized church, cannot constitute the religious exercise protected by the first amendment.95 Alternatively, these courts have determined that marijuana use is not essential to religious practice as was peyote in Woody and that the compelling interests in prevention of violence and self-destruction are rationally supported by current medical knowledge.96

We think the courts have correctly rebuffed the free exercise argument but not for the right reasons. First, we do not agree that Reynolds holds all criminal legislation to be outside the balancing test ordinarily employed in free exercise cases.97 Second, we believe that if marijuana use were essential to the practice of a bona fide religion, it would be

91 98 U.S. 145, 166, 167.
92 383 F.2d at 861 (emphasis added).
93 Id. at 860-61.
97 Judge Gasch in the Kuch case apparently assumed that the customary balancing test would be applicable if the Neo-American Church were a bona fide religion. Before applying the "prevailing doctrine," however, he criticized the Supreme Court:

No United States District Judge who must act within the confines of a record and available judicial time has the wisdom or means of doing adequately what the cases appear to require. It is to be hoped that there will develop a constitutional doctrine in this field that more closely approximates that contemplated by the framers of the Constitution and that leaves the balancing function in all but obvious cases of clear abuse in the hands of Congress, where it belongs.

Id. at 446.
Marijuana Prohibition

incumbent on the state to demonstrate that use of the drug would frustrate its interests in preventing violence and individual harm to the user. More than a rational basis would be required. However, we agree with Professor Donald Giannella that the free exercise clause would become dysfunctional were psychedelic philosophy to qualify as a religion.\(^9\) As we will suggest below, there should be some degree of constitutional protection for this allegedly "religious" personal behavior,\(^9\) but severe perversion of the principle embodied in the free exercise clause would occur were it to become a sanctuary for all colorably spiritualistic conduct that otherwise stands condemned.

3. Right of Privacy

Any litigant attempting to secure recognition of any right as "fundamental," no matter how remote, will likely cite \textit{Griswold v. Connecticut}.\(^10\) Marijuana advocates are no exception. Like \textit{Robinson}, \textit{Griswold} was essentially a substantive due process decision.\(^10\) In a decision rationalized by Justice Douglas under the rubric of penumbral rights tied to specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, the Court held that the states were substantively barred from prohibiting the use of birth control devices. Together with \textit{Stanley v. Georgia},\(^10\) where the Court held that private possession of obscene material may not be punished, \textit{Griswold} serves as the basis for an argument that private possession and use of marijuana, at least in the home, may not be punished.

Because of the "chilling effect" on privacy necessitated by enforcement techniques where crimes are ordinarily committed in private, the \textit{Griswold-Stanley} argument is appealing. The problem, however, is one of limitation. Surely it cannot be contended that private acts cannot ever constitute crimes. The Court specifically refuted this notion in \textit{Stanley}:

What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime. Our holding in the present case turns upon the Georgia statute's infringement of fundamental

\(^9\) See note 5 at p. 1175 infra.
\(^10\) 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
\(^101\) See \textit{id. at} 507 (White, J, concurring).
liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. No First Amendment rights are involved in most statutes making mere possession criminal.\textsuperscript{103}

As precedents and on their own terms, \textit{Griswold} and \textit{Stanley} are not enough to support the proposition that private marijuana possession cannot be punished. "Fundamental" rights other than simple privacy were involved—marital freedom and the "right to receive"\textsuperscript{104} written materials. In each case the Court was dealing with isolated problems. In \textit{Griswold}, the Court finally grappled with an issue it had avoided for a decade,\textsuperscript{105} the multiplicity of opinions and labels manifest the reason for its reluctance.\textsuperscript{106} In \textit{Stanley}, the Court probably took a tentative step toward a revision of the obscenity doctrine. The Court may eventually abandon the notion that obscenity is not constitutionally protected, and may establish instead that it may be prohibited only when it is distributed, displayed, or employed in such a way as to create a nuisance to others.\textsuperscript{107} Holding that private possession may not be prohibited may represent the first step along that path.

In any event, so long as the fundamental rights framework is utilized, \textit{Griswold} and \textit{Stanley} do not alone make the challengers' case. State and federal courts confronted with the privacy argument have found it lacking.\textsuperscript{108} Within the current matrix of constitutional doctrine, the privacy factor functions as a catalytic rather than an active force. Substantive freedoms that may be qualified in public are absolute in private in the same way that exercise of religious beliefs is a relative freedom while freedom of belief is absolute. Marital and perhaps consensual sexual freedom and intellectual liberty were the substantive

\textsuperscript{103}Id. at 568 n.11.

\textsuperscript{104}Id. at 564.


\textsuperscript{106}The six \textit{Griswold} opinions are particularly notable for the light they shed on each author's conception of his role in the constitutional system. The philosophical parameters of the marijuana problem and the birth control problem are identical. For this reason alone, \textit{Griswold} is essential reading for all advocates seeking to break new constitutional ground.


forces in *Griswold* and *Stanley*. In order for privacy to affect the marijuana equation, a right to pursue sensual individuality must pre-exist.

4. *The Ninth Amendment—The Forgotten Kitchen Sink*

Unable to tie marijuana use to an established "fundamental right," the challengers have resorted to the ninth amendment as a vehicle for defining the necessary protected right. Their advocacy for a "right to get high" or a right "to use one's body as one wishes" is essentially an attempt to equate sensual with intellectual and spiritual freedom. Although there may be some merit in such a contention, its advocates have not yet established a sound constitutional basis. The typical approach is to catalog all civil liberties cases, ignoring the precise constitutional principles involved, and to suggest that rights reserved to the people by the ninth amendment amount to the constitutional equivalent of "personal liberty." Accordingly, any legislation which restricts individual pursuit of happiness must be necessitated by sound state interests.

Obviously the ninth amendment is, in such a context, merely a launching pad for the free-form pursuit of happiness inquiry utilized in the early alcohol Prohibition cases. It surely does not function as an "explicit" constitutional limitation, nor does it suggest a judicial limitation. The challengers scarcely serve their cause well by asking the courts to discard a century and a half of constitutional doctrine as a price for the desired decree.

Even former Justice Goldberg, whose requiem for the ninth amendment in *Griswold* induced the argument, noted that the fundamental rights existing apart from the Bill of Rights must be found in the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people." In other words, the ninth amendment is simply another way of avoiding the due process label while applying the incorporation doctrine and an expanded version of the traditional historically rooted due process test. "Fundamentality" must have the appearance of permanence. History and perhaps contemporary positive morality provide an acceptable index of permanence.

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110 See note 118 infra.

111 E.g., Note, *supra* note 109, at 257.

Historical inquiry might well reveal a traditional acceptance of the right to become intoxicated so long as others are left alone, and the rash of contrary decisions after 1915 might have constituted temporary constitutional madness. The research reported earlier in this Article provides tentative support for this hypothesis. Further digging into historical sources would appear warranted. At least a palatable constitutional framework would be employed.

Similarly, developing notions of positive morality might provide an acceptable basis for the "right to use one's own body." Laws regarding abortion, nudism, homosexuality and motorcycle crash helmets are already receiving adverse judicial treatment, usually on other grounds. The American Civil Liberties Union plans a continued campaign against these laws and against drug legislation under the "body use" umbrella. Although an extended critique of this approach is beyond the scope of this Article, we do not believe, as a general matter, that the courts are properly advised to keep the legislatures in touch with evolving positive morality, at least while social mores are in a state of transition. Another question would be presented if that evolution had rendered current legislation aberrational, but that is not yet the case with respect to the issues noted above. Abortion, homosexuality and drug abuse are currently being addressed by the public opinion process. In such circumstances, where an articulation of positive morality would be the gravaman of judicial interference, we believe judicial restraint to be in order.

In any event, neither the historical nor the positive morality approach has been utilized and supported by those attacking the marijuana laws. Instead they have been content to cry "fundamental right," "ninth amendment" and "right of privacy," and have expected the courts to go along. Much as we doubt the wisdom of current marijuana legisla-

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113 See pp. 1005-10 supra.
116 E.g., People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967) (sodomy prohibition void as to consenting married couples, questionable as to consenting male adults).
118 The Board of Directors of the ACLU is now contemplating a policy recommendation that the organization press for judicial recognition of the right to do with one's body whatever he wishes, including using drugs. Washington Post, June 8, 1970, § A, at 3, col. 5.
C. Another Constitutional Perspective: The Police Power

All this is not to say, however, that we do not think marijuana legislation to be susceptible to an acceptable constitutional attack. To the contrary, our objections to the usual arguments emanate from a concern for institutional responsibility. So long as the "fundamental rights" perspective is invoked—despite the extant divergent notions of fundamentality—we believe that only extensive historical and philosophical inquiry could and should now persuade a diligent judiciary, conscious of its limited role, that freedom of marijuana use is "essential for the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." To put it quite simply, the drug revolution is generally perceived as a contemporary phenomenon. When roaming in the vague expanse of substantive due process, however labelled, the courts should continue seeking to root their response in the mandate of history or in some other indicium of the "collective conscience of the people." Fundamentality suggests permanence, and drug use too much resembles a transient social problem to qualify.

At the same time, however, we believe that our central objection to the marijuana laws is of constitutional dimensions. We believe that those laws are irrational. We noted above that if they are entitled to the presumption of rationality, they should stand, at least at the present time. We do not think they are entitled to that presumption. We would impose the burden of justification on the state not because any fundamental "right" is affected but because the conduct prohibited is on its face private or self-regarding. Because the police power is designed to promote the public health, safety, welfare and morals, it can reach private conduct only if a public detriment is thereby avoided. On the one hand, if the conduct proscribed on its face involves other people or property, the courts must presume that the legislature rationally found an injurious effect. On the other hand, if the conduct proscribed does not prima facie affect others, the state must demonstrate a rational basis in fact.

It should be apparent that this is a modified version of the "inherent limitations" approach popular in the nineteenth century. Unlike the earlier conception, it does not preclude the state from reaching private conduct. Unlike the "rights" framework, it does not impose a heavy

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burden on the state to justify legislation affecting the protected right, nor does it burden the courts with the onerous balancing responsibility. It simply shifts to the state the original burden of demonstrating a rational factual nexus between the proscribed private activity and the public weal. If the state can sustain that burden, the inquiry is terminated. This requirement would not represent a significant change in current doctrine. First, it affects only a limited class of situations where the physical and social sciences have not yet established the relevant factual propositions but where the hypotheses regarding public effect that underlie the legislation have no rational basis in current data. In short, given the "no-evidence" situation with respect to prima facie private conduct, the state is not entitled to guess. Moreover, the principle is limited to legislation prohibiting allegedly injurious private conduct, and does not extend to a public policy that seeks to deter such conduct through nonprohibitive regulation or taxation.

It should also be noted that this "inherent limitation" approach, which has lain dormant for half a century, has already begun to forge its way into modern constitutional reasoning, especially on the state level. Particularly relevant are the motorcycle helmet cases, to which we will return later. In a recent case holding unconstitutionally vague a Tennessee statute prohibiting nudist colonies, a concurring member of the three-judge district court located the true parameters of the decision:

120 See note 117 supra.
121 See text at note 131 infra.
123 The court used an increasingly popular escape valve, holding the terms "nudist colony" and "nudist practices" unconstitutionally vague since, in light of the dictionary definition of "nude" and "nudity," they literally might be construed to "prevent nudism in health clubs, YMCA's school gymnasiums or other recreational systems, and possibly in the home." Id. at 843.
124 Concurring in a separate opinion, Judge Darr correctly noted that "nudism" and "nudist" are distinguishable, grammatically and in common parlance, from "nude" and "nudity," and that it is inconceivable that the statute covers people who are temporarily nude. Id. at 846-47. Instead he opined that the statute constituted unwarranted invasion of the rights of privacy and of association of those who wish to engage in the cult of nudism. He employed the ninth amendment and the equal protection clause as well, cataloging all the recent Supreme Court cases speaking to privacy and association to support his holdings. But as we noted earlier, context is extremely important in constitutional decision-making, especially in an area as open-ended as "privacy." The sanctity of the marital relation—under any view of fundamentality—and the structural significance of political association and free expression of ideas are the dispositive overtones in the privacy cases. The "right to privacy" is a dependent concept, and this part of the judge's opinion, standing alone, is unconvincing.
There is nothing in the record to indicate directly or by inference that any nudist colony or member thereof is the source of any injury whatever to the public welfare, health, or morals. To the contrary, the proof in the record asserts that the prime purpose of the nudist movement is to promote health of the body and mind.

There is nothing in the proof whatever to indicate that nudism is other than an idiosyncratic, though innocuous, practice which engenders no harm or danger either to its members or society in general.\textsuperscript{125}

It is in this "power" rather than the traditional "rights" framework\textsuperscript{126} that statutes involving private consensual sexual conduct, abortion and drug abuse should be tested at both state and federal levels of government. Such an approach was theoretically unnecessary at the federal level until quite recently. Unlike the states, the federal government did not possess plenary police powers; since Congress had only delegated powers, it could not conceivably reach private conduct without exceeding permissible Article I bounds. Both the Harrison Act and the Marihuana Tax Act made the prohibited acts revenue-related to avoid this difficulty. However, it would be foolish to suggest in 1970 that there is no federal police power. The Article I grants of power have now become analytical equivalents of "promotion of public health, safety and morals," and the necessary and proper clause imposes no more than the traditional rational basis in fact requirement. The new Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 illustrates the

\textsuperscript{125} Id. at 850.

\textsuperscript{126} We do not pretend that the sought-after principle could not be expressed in terms of a right. Indeed the temptation is great to limit the government to the "other-regarding" rationale and to enunciate a correlative right to pursue happiness as one pleases as long as others are not harmed. See Note, supra note 109, at 254-55.

The difference in attitude is more significant than the semantic difference. The "power" approach in effect demands of the government, "Why on earth do you want to proscribe the conduct; why do you care?" The "right" approach suggests, "You can't do this unless..."

In a highly complex society where little that we do and consider personal does not potentially affect other persons and the environment, a freewheeling statement of personal freedom is dangerous. For the same reasons that it was unwise to shackle the government between 1890 and 1937 so that it was unable to deal with complex economic problems, it would be foolhardy now to adopt a constitutional framework which might inhibit an attempt to deal with complex environmental and social problems. We subscribe to the contention that the police power is inherently limited but we are wary to overemphasize the nature of this limitation.
disappearance of the early limitations by abandoning the revenue mas-
quarade and reaching drug use directly.\footnote{Pub. L. No. 91-513 (Oct. 27, 1970).}

If, under the intrinsic limitation theory or some other rationale, the state and federal governments were called upon to establish a rational scientific basis for marijuana legislation, we believe they would fail.\footnote{The medical and sociological conclusions used in the following discussion are examined in depth and documented in pt. VIII, supra.} If the governmental objective were to prevent harm to others, they would be able to find no reliable scientific support for the proposition that marijuana use itself leads to violent crime or to use of hard narcotics which in turn leads to crime. Although they could prove that the drug has some adverse effect on psychomotor functions, the relationship between this fact and harm to others through automobile accidents is tenuous at best, especially when compared with alcohol.

If the state's objective were to prevent the user from injuring himself on the ground that he would otherwise become a drain on the state's resources rather than a contributor, the essential scientific hypothesis is that marijuana use "inevitably leads to excess" or to permanent physical or psychological incapacitation and therefore to dependency. Again, however, the government would be unable to establish a rational factual basis for this hypothesis. First, marijuana is not physically addictive and creates no serious psychological dependence, at least not as much as alcohol or tobacco. We do not believe the "addictive" qualities of alcohol are "inevitable" enough to justify prohibition and that the harm engendered by tobacco dependence is too remote to justify prohibition under the "dependency" rationale. Moreover, even if the addictive qualities of hard narcotics justify their prohibition, there is insufficient support for the "stepping stone" hypothesis to sustain marijuana prohibition on that ground.

Second, marijuana users do not run a significant risk of physical or psychological harm. Use of the drug produces no significant acute adverse psychological effects and probably contributes to no chronic ill effects as great as those produced by alcohol or tobacco. Nor would the government be able to establish a significant risk of psychological incapacitation. As to the hypothesis that the drug precipitates "psychotic breaks," the evidence is slight and at best establishes the proposition that the drug is not itself a creative force, perhaps accentuating psychological tendencies already present in predisposed individuals. There is no re-
liable evidence that marijuana smoking produces any chronic psychological ill effects.

Some commentators have urged that the state has no power to protect the individual from his own stupidity and that the dependency rationale is merely a cover for unwarranted paternalism. We are not prepared to go so far as a matter of constitutional law; there may be circumstances where the risk of incapacitation is so substantial that criminal legislation is warranted. In fact, the line between self-regarding harm and societal harm, drawn in the breach by the dependency rationale, is increasingly difficult to draw as society becomes more complex and its members more interdependent. Moreover, whenever the subject conduct is colored by moral considerations, as are drug practices, where that line is drawn is determined not so much by logic or precedent as by the degree to which the society at a given time is willing to tolerate deviance. The difference between social tolerance in 1915 and 1970 is the best possible proof of this proposition. In short, this is not fertile ground for a neutral principle.

At the same time that we reject the general rule, we contend that in many individual cases the state cannot bear its burden of affirmative proof of the risk of incapacitation or other adverse social effect, albeit indirect. Setting aside for a moment the possible moral considerations, we do not think that either marijuana prohibition or the compulsory motorcycle helmet laws can be justified on this basis. However, even if marijuana use is an appropriate matter for criminal legislation, the

129 See articles cited at notes 109, 118 supra.
130 See note 126 supra.
131 States that have upheld helmet laws have attempted to do so on an "other-regarding" rationale. We believe that such a justification is absurd. Unlike goggle requirements, helmet laws do not increase the motorcyclist's ability to maintain lookout and control. To the contrary, helmets tend to curtail hearing, peripheral vision and comfort. Feeling that persons should be protected whether they care to be or not, courts have fabricated very tenuous arguments to justify these laws. It does not tax the intellect to comprehend that loose stones on the highway kicked up by passing vehicles, or fallen objects such as windblown tree branches, against which the operator of a closed vehicle has some protection, could so affect the operator of a motor cycle as to cause him momentarily to lose control and thus become a menace to other vehicles on the highway. State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625, 627 (R.I. 1968). Other courts have not attempted to raise hypotheticals but have merely stated that the law "bears a real and substantial relation to the public health and general welfare and is thus a valid exercise of the police power." Commonwealth v. Howie, 354 Mass. 769, 770, 238 N.E.2d 373, 374, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 999 (1968). So too would laws requiring citizens to brush their teeth three times daily.
rationality arm of the eighth amendment should prohibit imprisonment for violation of that legislation, even for five minutes.  

Now we come to the heart of the matter. It is the so-called "moral" considerations which we believe truly motivated the preceding generations of legislators responsible for marijuana prohibition. Once the Harrison Act converted narcotics abuse from a medical to a moral problem, marijuana was easily superimposed on the existing framework because of mistaken factual assumptions. At the same time, the undercurrent of American culture opposed to intoxicant use in any form reached the level of positive morality when combined by criminal law with the early twentieth century preference for cultural homogeneity. That is, because of the ethnic identity and small number of users, the stamp of illegitimacy successfully made the use of marijuana immoral; at the same time the stamp of illegitimacy had to be withdrawn from alcohol use because the large number of middle-class users were unwilling to comply.

It is because the law created for a half century a positive morality opposed to drug use that the state, defending its laws in court, might now rely on its duty to protect the spiritual and moral well-being of the community. The core of the police power being self protection, the state would adopt Lord Devlin's argument that where societal opposition to certain conduct on moral grounds is so pervasive that its widespread commission would weaken the social fabric and facilitate the breakdown of societal institutions, the society is justified in suppressing that conduct. As applied to marijuana, the law's defense is that marijuana use frustrates productive participation in social, economic and political processes and that its widespread use would bring society grinding to a halt.

Even if we accepted Lord Devlin's justification for the legal enforcement of positive morality, which we do not, it still would not justify marijuana prohibition. In the first place, as we shall note in the concluding section, the moral judgments supporting the early marijuana laws are no longer predominant. Especially at a time when a sizeable segment of society attributes many social ills to a mindless pursuit of material values

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132 See text at and following notes 59-71 supra.
134 In H. L. A. Hart's debate with Lord Devlin on this general question, the specific issue being the defensibility of homosexuality laws, we think Hart was victorious. See H.L.A. Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law (1965); Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1967).
and when that society becomes increasingly depersonalized, there is a growing preference for individual search for identity and spiritual renaissance. Second, in light of current use patterns, the effect of marijuana use on productivity and therefore on the social fabric is too speculative to justify criminal sanctions. In fact, the social fabric may suffer greater damage through continued prohibition than from legalization; that is, as the number of deviants continues to increase, the law cannot be successfully enforced and the authority of all law is endangered. As a larger and larger segment of the society ceases to view marijuana use as a moral question (except insofar as it is against the law), marijuana prohibition, like alcohol prohibition before it, cannot be sustained.

In conclusion, we do not believe that a state can sustain its burden of establishing a rational nexus between a person's private use of marijuana and either harm to others or incapacitating harm to himself. Moreover, the state may not legitimately rely on alleged harm to public morals. Public opinion, properly informed, would oppose marijuana no more than it opposes alcohol. And to the extent that marijuana use is inconsistent with prevailing positive morality, compliance with that morality is not a legitimate aim of the criminal law as a matter of political philosophy or constitutional law. As Justice Brandeis eloquently noted in his famous dissent in *Olmstead v. United States*:

> The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.

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**XI. LEGISLATIVE RECONSIDERATION: 1965-1970**

With the public opinion process in full operation for the first time in the fifty-year history of American marijuana prohibition, great pressure for legislative reform developed at both state and federal levels.
Innumerable public and private organizations have advocated reduction of marijuana penalties; some have urged that the drug be legalized. Several states and the District of Columbia have responded by de-escalating penalties, especially for first offense possession. Unfortunately, however, most of these "reforms" smack of tokenism. On the federal level, the Dodd bill now pending before Congress incorporates many major reforms, but it too remains grounded in many of the old misconceptions and outworn phrases that characterize the earlier legislation.

On the state level, the issue has become stalemated because of growing legislative distaste for student unrest. Consequently, the legislatures have simply reformed the most obnoxious parts of the old laws—the outrageous penalties. Apparently the law-making bodies feel that even an open inquiry into less restrictive legislation would resemble capitulation to another "nonnegotiable demand." The new rationale for this resistance is the possibility that some of the questions unanswered today will be answered tomorrow. As of this writing, the legislatures have stiffened against public opinion in preservation of the status quo.

There are two conspicuous examples of this political retraction. In 1968 the Governor of California appointed a blue-ribbon commission to study the state's drug laws. When the news leaked that the commission intended to recommend legalization of marijuana, the commission was forthwith disbanded. Similarly, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws performed the monumental tasks of identifying the governmental interests in drug prohibition and integrating existing drugs into the scheme according to their effects. The Commission classified drugs as dangerous, abusable and restricted on the basis of their potential for harm, requiring an affirmative demonstration of such potential as a precondition for classification. Yet after objectively reviewing the scientific data on marijuana and concluding, "candidly, we do not know how harmful marijuana is," the Commission recom-

See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 27 (1967); Washington Post, June 20, 1970, § A, at 17, cols. 5-8 (Canadian drug commission).


J. KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 2; Washington Post, supra note 1.

See Appendix A.


mended its inclusion as an abusable drug. Political acceptability is the only possible explanation for this ruse.

In the succeeding pages, we shall briefly analyze the pending federal legislation and the provisions of the recently enacted Virginia law as illustrations of current legislative response, reserving our suggestions for a desirable legislative approach for our concluding section.

A. Virginia Legislative "Reform": Publicity Begets Tokenism

It is fitting that the most objectionable provision contained in Virginia's drug laws, that pertaining to the illegal possession of marijuana, sparked a controversy which eventually culminated in a general reform of the state's entire scheme of drug control in the spring of 1970.

The controversy centered around a twenty-year-old ex-University of Virginia student, Frank P. LaVarre, who, on February 24, 1969, was arrested in a Danville, Virginia, bus station while enroute to Atlanta from Charlottesville, Virginia. In his possession were four plastic containers of marijuana valued at $2,500 plus smaller amounts in a tobacco pouch and a shoe. Refusing to "cooperate" by disclosing the names of all university students whom he knew were using drugs, LaVarre's bond was set at $50,000.

Following a plea of guilty to possession of marijuana, LaVarre was sentenced on July 31, 1969, in the Danville Corporation Court to twenty-five years in the state penitentiary, five years suspended, and fined $500. The sentencing judge admonished him, "Now I want to say to you, young man, that you still have time to mend your ways and make a useful citizen out of yourself." Presumably this meant that under Virginia law LaVarre, "who had never so much as stolen a hub-cap," would be eligible for parole in five years.

Although the trial was reported on the front page of the Richmond Times-Dispatch, the conscience of the citizens of Virginia was not awakened until several months later following the publication of an article in Life magazine, which used the LaVarre case as an illustration of the nation's antiquated and inhumane drug laws. One suspects that

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9 Life, supra note 8, at 30.
10 Id. at 31.
11 Id.
all this publicity embarrassed the people of Virginia, thus fostering general agreement that marijuana penalties were far too harsh. Such was clearly the belief of the Governor, who pardoned LaVarre on January 2, 1970, placing him on five years probation. This act was noted nationally and applauded locally. The existing law was criticized and reform was urged.

The General Assembly responded, and a subcommittee of the House General Laws Committee held hearings. At these hearings, both legislators and experts generally agreed that drug laws should be aimed primarily at dealers and should allow more leeway "for youngsters caught following a current fad." Testimony also indicated that many persons arrested were never prosecuted because some Commonwealth's Attorneys felt that even the minimum penalty for unlawful possession was too great. Many of the legislators believed that lighter penalties would encourage more uniform enforcement of the law.

Responding to these and similar pressures, the General Assembly enacted the Drug Control Act, which was signed into law on April 5, 1970. The Act replaces the old Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and is itself a comprehensive narcotic control measure. We shall deal here only with those provisions of the Act pertaining to cannabis sativa. The Act defines as separate substances marijuana and hashish. The former includes all parts of the plant, excluding the resin extracted from any part thereof; the latter is defined to include only such resin. Such drugs may be manufactured and sold only subject to certain restrictions.

The Act further provides for penalties for the unlawful manufacture,
sale and possession of marijuana and hashish. Section 54-524.101 prohibits the knowing or intentional manufacture, sale or possession with intent to sell of a controlled drug, except as authorized under the Act. A conviction for a violation of this provision "may be based solely upon evidence as to the quantity of any controlled drug or drugs unlawfully possessed." The penalty for first violation of this provision is imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than forty years, or a fine of not more than $25,000, or both. A second or subsequent offender is subject to imprisonment for not less than ten years to life, or a fine of up to $50,000 or both.

The Act also prohibits the unlawful possession of marijuana and hashish; possession of hashish carries a more severe penalty than possession of marijuana. The initial conviction of any person illegally possessing marijuana is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or confinement in jail not to exceed twelve months, or both. Unlawful possession of hashish is designated as a felony carrying a penalty of not less than one nor greater than ten years in the penitentiary or, at the discretion of the jury or the court sitting without a jury, confinement in jail not to exceed twelve months and a fine of up to $5,000. A conviction for a second or subsequent offense involving the unlawful possession of either marijuana or hashish is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for between two and twenty years or, at the discretion of the jury or the court sitting without a jury, confinement in jail up to twelve months and a fine of not more than $10,000. The sale of marijuana or hashish by any person over eighteen to one below that age is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than five nor more than forty years, or a fine of not more than $50,000, or both.

Although the Act has remedied the worst provision under the Virginia drug laws—that governing first offense penalties for the unlawful possession of marijuana—it did little else. The most disturbing aspect of the legislation is its continuation of one classification that includes both cannabis and the "hard" drugs. With the exception noted above, the illegal manufacture, sale (including sale to those under eighteen) and possession of marijuana and hashish are treated with equal severity as violations involving heroin, opium, morphine or cocaine. Only con-

24 Id. § 54-524.101(a)(2).
25 Id. § 54-524.101(b)(1).
26 Id. § 54-524.101(c).
27 Id. § 54-524.103.
continuing ignorance about the pharmacological effects of marijuana could explain the failure to declassify. Embarrassed by the LaVarre case and its attendant publicity, Virginia legislators took the smallest possible step. They clearly continue to view the drug as vicious and consider those using it highly culpable.28

The legislation has two additional weaknesses even on its own terms. One of the main criticisms of the old law was that it was inflexible; in an obvious attempt to relieve the prosecution of proving intent to sell, the law provided that a person who unlawfully possessed more than 25 grains of the forbidden drug was subject to the most severe penalties.29 Although the new Act requires an intent to distribute for possession offenses with severe penalties and does not stipulate a presumptive quantity, it too is bound to produce “embarrassing” results, since a conviction may be “based solely upon evidence as to the quantity of any controlled drug or drugs unlawfully possessed.”30 To avoid unjust punishment, such modifying language should be deleted, thus rightly placing upon the state the burden of proving intent to sell beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finally, the sentencing discretion left to the finder of facts has no meaningful bounds. The legislation reflects one of the most abominable conjunctions of mandatory minimum sentences and excessive, discretionary maximums that could have been devised. What can be said of legislative rationality when sale of marijuana is punishable by one to forty years at the whim of the trier of fact?

Similarly, by escalating the penalty drastically between first and second offense possession and retaining a distinction between possession and sale, the legislation reflects a continuing misconception about marijuana use and traffic patterns. Finally, the perpetuated severity of penalties is totally unsupportable under any interpretation of modern medical data. Only if marijuana use caused the user to murder instan-

28 Delegate Walter B. Fidler summed up the argument for relatively light sentences for first offense possession and extremely tough ones for second and subsequent violations:

This misdemeanor penalty on the first offense will straighten out most of the kids fooling with it . . . make them stop and think . . . scare them . . . The ones who are really hooked on it will be back . . . we’ll get them on repeat business [and imprison them upon a second offense].


taneously would a second possession offense justify a twenty-year sentence and a first sale offense justify a forty year jail term.

B. The Dodd Bill: Half a Loaf

The House version\textsuperscript{31} of the Dodd bill,\textsuperscript{32} which had been shepherded through the Senate by Senators Dodd and Hruska in February, finally passed the House of Representatives on September 24, 1970.\textsuperscript{33} If a conference version of the Dodd bill is enacted, it will take several small steps toward sanity in the area of narcotics abuse. Beginning with the Narcotics Rehabilitation Act of 1966,\textsuperscript{34} Congress began reversing the progressively absurd extensions of the Harrison Act's original conversion of drug abuse from a medical problem to a law-enforcement problem. The 1966 Act included extensive provisions regarding the care and rehabilitation of the narcotics addict.\textsuperscript{35} To a lesser degree the Dodd bill continues this trend of viewing drug abuse as a medical problem.\textsuperscript{36}

The bill abandons the traditional method of control—taxation—in favor of direct regulation under the interstate commerce clause.\textsuperscript{37} Dangerous substances are classified in different schedules according to criteria such as potential for abuse, acceptability for medical use, and degree of safety in use.\textsuperscript{38}

The Attorney General, acting on the medical and scientific advice of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and a special Scientific Advisory Committee created by the law has complete power to remove or reclassify drugs within the four different schedules.\textsuperscript{39} Each schedule has its own set of criteria for determining which drugs it should include. The schedules not only classify drugs but also determine, by reference to Title V of the bill, what penalties will be incurred by violators of the laws dealing with drugs of a particular schedule. Marijuana is included within Schedule I and is subject to the most stringent controls, largely on the grounds that it and the other drugs of Schedule I,

\textsuperscript{33} 116 CONG. REC. 9162 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1970).
\textsuperscript{34} Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-793, 80 Stat. 1438 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
\textsuperscript{36} See note 47 infra and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{38} Id. § 202.
\textsuperscript{39} Id. § 201. The Attorney General's power is limited in the House version. H.R. 18583, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(b) (1970).
like heroin and LSD, have little medical value and a high abuse potential.\textsuperscript{40} The law does provide lower maximum penalties for trafficking in nonnarcotic Schedule I and II drugs, such as marijuana, than narcotic drugs—five years and $15,000 instead of twelve years and $25,000.\textsuperscript{41} In addition, there is a special provision stating that distribution of a "small amount of marihuana for no remuneration" is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of one year, a fine of $5,000, or both.\textsuperscript{42} Possession offenses are divided into two types: simple possession, which is treated as a misdemeanor regardless of the drug involved,\textsuperscript{43} and possession with intent to distribute, which is a felony and treated as a trafficking offense.\textsuperscript{44} The bill also provides for controls on import and export\textsuperscript{45} and for industry regulation.\textsuperscript{46}

With respect to marijuana, the bill finally acknowledges the need for medical research and establishes a Committee on Marihuana to study the drug's pharmacological effects.\textsuperscript{47} Second, with respect to drugs generally, and marijuana in particular, the bill reduces the outrageous penalties enacted in the 1950's. It would appear that Congress has finally recognized that severe punishments have little or no deterrent value.\textsuperscript{48} The lawmakers may also have abandoned the "stepping stone" notion. The testimony of Dr. Stanley Yolles, former Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, that less than five percent of marijuana smokers go on to hard drugs, was stressed during debate on the bill.\textsuperscript{49} The fact that this testimony was not seriously challenged indicates that Congress has finally focused on the possible harm of \textit{marijuana} to the user as the primary rationale for its prohibition.

It is precisely on this point, however, that we find the first major defect in the Dodd bill. Marijuana continues to be classified with hard narcotics as a Schedule I drug, contrary to repeated testimony that marijuana is not a narcotic drug and has little or no harmful effects on the user.\textsuperscript{50} Dr. Yolles, although opposed to legalization on the ground that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} 116 Cong. Rec. 797 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1970).
\item \textsuperscript{41} S. 3246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. \S\S 501(c)(1), (2) (1970).
\item \textsuperscript{42} Id. \S 501(c)(4).
\item \textsuperscript{43} Id. \S 501(c).
\item \textsuperscript{44} Id. \S\S 501(a)(1), (5), (c)(1), (2).
\item \textsuperscript{45} Id. \S\S 401-04.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Id. \S\S 301-09.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Id. \S 801.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Id. at 790-91.
\end{itemize}
medical knowledge was too tentative, particularly with regard to the drug's effects on a chronic adolescent user, stated:

To equate its risk—either to the individual or to society—with the risks inherent in the use of hard narcotics is—on the face of it—merely an effort to defend an indefensible, established position that has no scientific basis.  

Our second major objection to the bill is its perpetuation of grossly dissimilar penalties for possession and sale. As we noted above, users and traffickers tend to be the same people, and the professional pusher has little if any place in the distribution of marijuana, as the pattern of hand-to-hand exchange among friends is repeated on college campuses throughout the country. The relative fortuity that law enforcement officers may be able to obtain evidence of intent to sell in some instances of possession does not justify the disparity of penalties. Third, we agree with Senator Hughes that in matters of scheduling and in certain other areas, the Attorney General should not have the power to classify drugs without the permission of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The classification of drugs as dangerous substances is a medical-scientific question, not a law enforcement problem. Although the Dodd bill calls for the Attorney General to act with the advice of HEW and the Scientific Advisory Committee, it does not require him to heed that advice. Under the Dodd scheme the law enforcement mentality continues. An amendment, such as the one that was proposed by Senator Hughes during the Senate debate on the bill, allowing the Attorney General to reschedule only on a recommendation by HEW and the Scientific Advisory Committee, would insure that medical and scientific considerations would be definitive. The defeat of that proposal was a serious setback in making this bill a meaningful reform. The House version, however, includes most of the Hughes amendment, making HEW's recommendations binding on medical findings and expressly forbidding the Attorney General from overriding an HEW

51 Id. at 791.
52 Compare S. 3246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 501(e) (1970) (possession) (one year, $5,000, or both) (probation without entry of judgment available under § 507 for those guilty of a first offense), with id. § 501(a)(1), (c)(2) (sale or possession with intent to sell) (five years, $15,000, or both).
recommendation that a drug not be controlled. We can only hope that the House version prevails in conference.

In conjunction with a requirement that HEW have the ultimate control over essentially scientific and medical questions, the Committee on Marijuana which the bill would establish should be composed of individuals chosen by HEW with the advice of the Attorney General, instead of jointly. The function of the Committee would be almost exclusively medical, social and scientific, and as such it should be constituted under the direction of HEW. The subjects of the Committee's research as outlined by the Dodd bill should include a more definite set of matters on which the Committee must report including a specific determination about the real nature of marijuana and the degree of control, if any, required. It is absolutely necessary, given the tremendous public and official concern about marijuana, that we have a definitive statement on the drug as quickly as possible so that an intelligent public policy might finally be designed. Simple ignorance about the drug persists in the United States Congress, despite the overwhelming evidence of the relatively harmless nature of marijuana. Even the bill's sponsor went overboard: "Certain types of marijuana do dreadful things to people...Marijuana is a personality changer. It is a mind destroyer." Senator Dodd supported his statement by the latest sensationalist accounts of marijuana's crime-provoking and incapacitating tendencies—case studies on toxic psychoses suffered by soldiers in Vietnam.

In conclusion, the Dodd bill, when compared with earlier statutes, reflects some of the major changes in the official view of marijuana which took place during the sixties. By 1970 it has been almost universally recognized that the number of users of marijuana has increased tremendously and that harsh penalties, including minimum mandatory sentences, do not deter. Also abandoned is the notion that marijuana is the "stepping stone" to hard drugs. Unfortunately the Dodd bill fails to reflect many other findings. There still persists a strong feeling that marijuana is seriously harmful, evidenced by the bill's classification of marijuana with heroin. Furthermore, the bill's punishment of "traffick-

57 Id. § 801(a) (1).
59 Id. at 783. These studies may be meaningless. At one point Senator Hughes commented that under combat conditions he had become trigger happy without the aid of marijuana. Id. at 782.
ers" in marijuana more harshly than possessors reflects a continued mis-
apprehension about the nature of the marijuana trade.\textsuperscript{60} However, 
despite its shortcomings, the Dodd bill, especially through its Com-
mittee on Marihuana, leaves open the possibility of substantial changes in 
the legal status of marijuana in the future.

C. Postscript: The Dodd Bill Becomes the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970

As this Article was going to press, the House version of the Dodd 
bill was enacted by Congress and signed into law by the President as 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.\textsuperscript{61}

XII. Conclusion: Before the Fall

Many pages ago we promised that the legal history of marijuana pro-
hibition was in itself an interesting story; we hope we have kept that 
promise. We also suggested that marijuana prohibition would be an 
appropriate vehicle for study of two broader phenomena—the public 
policy formation process and the evolution of American cultural values 
in the twentieth century. Having indulged, insofar as law review style 
would permit, in the sheer joy of telling a good story, we now turn 
to the more pretentious purposes of our Article.

A. Public Policy Formation Process

The legal history of marijuana prohibition may reasonably be di-
vided into four phases. The first phase, roughly from 1915 to 1930, 
witnessed sporadic localized legislation in a substantial number of states 
criminalizing sale and/or possession of marijuana. This phase followed 
hard on the heels of nationwide anti-narcotics legislation and coincided 
almost perfectly with the ascendancy of alcohol prohibition. During 
the second phase, from 1932 to 1937, the drug was suppressed nationally, 
by every state and by the federal government. The third phase, the 
decade of the 1950's, was characterized primarily by escalation of the

\textsuperscript{60} See Joint Legislative Committee for the Revision of the Penal Code, California 

Our data indicate that over 20% of the users of marijuana have sold the drug on 
on occasion in small quantity to friends who tacitly agree they will return the favor 
if the drug becomes available to them in the future.

\textit{Id.} at 153.

\textsuperscript{61} Pub. L. No. 91-513 (Oct. 27, 1970).
penalties. The final phase, beginning around 1965 and still continuing, is characterized by vigorous public debate and deescalation of the penalties, and may eventually result in legalization.

During the first phase, the initial emergence of the anti-marijuana public policy, the public opinion process was inoperative. Since the group of people directly affected was small and inaccessible, the matter attained the lowest possible visibility in the decision-making process. Yet the early marijuana legislation probably comported with latent public opinion, or perhaps even general community consensus, in several respects.

In the first place, the lawmakers assumed that the drug was addictive and that its consumption precipitated crime, pauperism and insanity. Accordingly, public interest in, and desire for, its suppression might well have been considered settled by the earlier anti-narcotics legislation. At the same time, however, there does not appear to have been any interest in substantiating these assumptions. Although primary source materials on the question are scarce and difficult to locate, we have found no indication that the legislators consulted scientific data; instead they relied on sensationalistic police and newspaper identification of marijuana with crime. Naturally these assumptions went unchallenged; the only segment of the public likely to challenge them was small and outside the public opinion process.

From another perspective, however, the true pharmacological effects of the drug may have been immaterial to a decision to suppress it. Since marijuana was an intoxicant consumed only by immigrant Mexicans in the South and West and by ghetto Blacks in the East, the legislators might have accurately reflected a public hostility to the drug wholly without regard to its pharmacological effects. It should be noted in this respect that this first phase of marijuana prohibition occurred simultaneously with the successful thrust of alcohol prohibition. During this period, the legislators might well have assumed that public policy condemned the use of intoxicants in any form.

Moreover, to the extent that alcohol prohibition was motivated, or at least quickened, by ethnic prejudice against the Irish, marijuana prohibition, once proposed, was an inevitable by-product of anti-Mexican

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1 Either a large number of affected persons or high public visibility, and usually both, is a necessary condition for public interest. And, of course, public interest is a necessary condition for the operation of the public opinion process by which the interested segment of the public communicates its opinions or attitudes directly or indirectly to the decision-maker.
feeling. In fact, the ethnic factor might well have been the primary force. Since marijuana was so strongly tied to the newly immigrant Mexican minority, and to a lesser degree to urban Blacks, the melting-pot syndrome, so prevalent at this stage of American history, predisposed the issue without regard to the drug's effects. Designed to foster cultural homogeneity, and in particular the Protestant Ethic, marijuana legislation may well have reflected an automatic public antipathy to any deviant tendency of newly immigrant, sometimes despised, minorities.

At the time of its passage, therefore, early marijuana legislation may have fit well in a society assigning moral condemnation to use of narcotics, apparently opposing any consumption of intoxicants, and striving either to suppress or to assimilate deviant minorities. With the repeal of Prohibition, however, the bubble of the anti-intoxicant rationale burst. Too many people who acquiesced in alcohol prohibition to eliminate the abuses of excessive consumption were unwilling to comply with a public policy prohibiting any use at all. Perpetuation or extension of marijuana prohibition in light of this new alignment of public attitudes now depended either on the drug's allegedly insidious effects or on the melting-pot syndrome. Yet, there was still no visible public interest in marijuana, and the courts were moved neither to scrutinize the legislatures' factual suppositions nor to question their motives.

And so it was that by 1931, twenty-two states had enacted prohibitionary marijuana legislation. It was during the ensuing decade—what we have labelled the second phase of this history—that this primarily regional phenomenon twice achieved national proportions. That is not to say, however, that the question even once received national attention; in fact, anti-marijuana public policy was established on a national scale even more effortlessly than it had been on the local scale.

The first of these two events was the inclusion of marijuana in the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, submitted for state adoption by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1932. The war against the evils of narcotics had by now become old hat and was waged in this forum by a few doctors interested in establishing uniform obligations and by the newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics. A low-keyed, uncomplicated drafting process transpired in committee, the basic provisions having been appropriated from the 1927 New York narcotics statute. The final committee draft, including an optional marijuana provision, was rubber-stamped by the Commissioners and subsequently
passed as a uniform afterthought by thirty-five states in the succeeding five years.

The same factual suppositions and ethnic aspersions characterizing the earlier state laws now colored the limited references to marijuana accompanying passage of the Uniform Act. There were two significant differences, however. First, legislative unawareness of marijuana as a separate substance was exacerbated by its inclusion as just another “narcotic” in everyone’s new anti-narcotics law. Second, although the Federal Bureau of Narcotics played a superfluous role in the passage of the Uniform Act, it initiated an educational campaign against narcotic drugs, and included marijuana.

Once the Uniform Act had been successfully inscribed on the statute books, the Bureau turned its propaganda arsenal on marijuana alone. Although largely unsuccessful in arousing public interest in the marijuana “problem,” the Bureau created in the Congress a “felt need” for federal legislation.2 Again the public opinion process remained dormant while Congress passed still another law, the Marihuana Tax Act—this time to fill a nonexistent enforcement void against the abuse of a drug known only to a small, isolated segment of the population. Once again, the republic’s duly authorized decision-makers nonchalantly criminalized possession of a drug without a factual inquiry even though this shortcoming was brought to their attention. The Act was hastily drawn, heard, “debated” and passed.

Thus, by 1937, marijuana had joined heroin, cocaine, morphine and opium in state and federal codes as a prohibited substance. As in 1914, new “stateways” were created and “folkways” gradually followed; users of the “killer weed” joined the despicable “dope fiend” as purveyors of evil in the public mind as well as in the public law.

The 1950’s witnessed an explosion of the psychology of fear—repression of political and cultural deviation was the order of the day. It is not surprising, then, that the criminal law orientation toward drug

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2 Differences in intensity of commitment can explain how stateways can create new folkways. For example, the many may have no view at all and be influenced by intense leaders. Such was the case with Congress, and in turn the public in 1937, when the intensely committed Bureau of Narcotics singlehandedly created the Marihuana Tax Act. One scholar of the public opinion process has stated that even where many people have convictions opposed to the law, the law may be carried through by a comparatively small body of very earnest men, who produce a disproportionate effect by the heat of their conviction; while the bulk of the people are apathetic and unwilling to support the effort required to overcome a steady passive resistance to the enforcement of the law. A. LOWELL, PUBLIC OPINION AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT 15 (1926).
use, initiated with regard to narcotics at the turn of the century and to marijuana two decades later, reached full crescendo at the same time.

For the first time in our national history, there was public interest in narcotic drugs. There apparently was an increase in drug abuse in the late forties, and the public mind was ripe for the onslaught of propaganda disseminated by the Bureau of Narcotics. In the paranoid atmosphere of the period, the Bureau's call for harsher penalties was a soothing one. Congress responded with the Boggs Act and many states followed suit.

At the same time, however, the primary rationale for the illegal status of marijuana—the assumption that it was an addictive, debilitating drug—was disproved. In its stead, a new factual premise appeared—that the use of marijuana was a stepping stone to the use of heroin and other "hard" drugs—a rationale that the Bureau had expressly rejected in 1937. Despite medical testimony unequivocally differentiating marijuana from hard narcotics, the legislatures were in no mood to quibble; marijuana's pernicious effects, although once removed, equally warranted escalated penalties. The peak was reached with the passage of the Narcotic Control Act of 1956. This time public interest had disappeared, earlier doubts about the nature of marijuana had subsided, and Congress mindlessly escalated the penalties indiscriminately for narcotics and marijuana laws. Several states followed suit, and the courts, both state and federal, unquestioningly administered these harsh laws and sanctioned the dubious techniques by which they were enforced.

Thus, by 1956, possession of marijuana was a felony practically everywhere, and judges were generally precluded from mitigating the long prison terms prescribed by statute. Such legislation had never been supported by authoritative scientific inquiry regarding the pharmacological effects of the drug.

Then it was 1965. As more and more middle-class campus youths experimented with the drug with no apparent ill effects, so did their friends... and theirs... and so on. By 1970 between ten and fifteen percent of the American middle class had violated the marijuana laws, sometimes overtly.3 For the first time since the anti-marijuana policy initially appeared, a substantial segment of the public was directly affected. Public interest naturally increased even beyond those immediately affected as the marijuana issue achieved higher visibility. The public opinion process had finally lurched into motion.

3 See pp. 1096-1100 supra.