University of Virginia School of Law faculty listed here are available to speak to the media about the 2020 Supreme Court term. The list will be updated as more cases are announced.

 

Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta

Does the policy of the California attorney general’s office requiring charities to disclose the names and addresses of their major donors violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?

Mahoney teaches courses in property, government finance, constitutional law and nonprofit organizations.

Mahoney: “In AFP v. Bonta, the Supreme Court held invalid a California requirement that charitable organizations disclose the identities of their major donors to state officials. Writing for a six-justice majority, Chief Justice Roberts stressed that the court has ‘long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others.’ Compelled disclosure requirements, wrote the Chief Justice, must be reviewed under a standard of ‘exacting scrutiny,’ and while California has a strong interest in monitoring charities to prevent wrongdoing, the state’s demanding disclosure regime is a ‘mismatch’ with the state interests it is designed to protect. In dissent, Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justices Kagan and Breyer) expressed skepticism that the complaining nonprofit organizations can prove that the disclosure requirements at issue are likely to cause actual harms, arguing that the majority’s approach represents a departure from the court’s ‘traditional, nuanced approach to First Amendment challenges.’ Going forward, AFP v. Bonta may have important ramifications for campaign finance disclosure laws, as the imposition of an ‘exacting scrutiny’ framework has the potential to make it harder for courts to sustain such laws as constitutional.”  


Arizona Republican Party v.​ Democratic National Committee

Whether the Voting Rights Act compels states to authorize any voting practice that would be used disproportionately by racial minorities, even if existing voting procedures are race-neutral and offer all voters an equal opportunity to vote.

Gilbert teaches courses on election law, legislation, and law and economics, and directs UVA Law’s Center for Public Law and Political Economy.


Barr v. Alcaraz-E​nriquez

Whether a court of appeals may conclusively presume an applicant’s testimony is credible and true whenever an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals adjudicates a withholding-of-removal application without making an explicit adverse credibility determination.

Cope’s research focuses on the measurement of legal and political phenomena. Substantively, he is most interested in the law and politics of international institutions, migration, and relationships between domestic institutional structure and international behavior.


Barr v. Dai

Whether the court of appeals violated the remand rule as set forth in INS v. Ventura when it determined in the first instance that the respondent was eligible for asylum and entitled to withholding of removal.

Cope’s research focuses on the measurement of legal and political phenomena. Substantively, he is most interested in the law and politics of international institutions, migration, and relationships between domestic institutional structure and international behavior.


Borden v. U.S.

Whether the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompasses crimes with a mens rea of mere recklessness.

Frampton studies criminal law and constitutional criminal procedure with a focus on how legal actors, institutions and doctrines have responded, or failed to respond, to the dramatic expansion of the carceral state. Frampton is co-author of an amicus brief in Borden.


Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee

Whether Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy and ballot-collection law violate the Civil Rights Act.

Gilbert teaches courses on election law, legislation, and law and economics, and directs UVA Law’s Center for Public Law and Political Economy.


California v. Texas

Whether the unconstitutional individual mandate to purchase minimum essential coverage is severable from the remainder of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

Bonnie is director of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. He has co-authored leading textbooks on criminal law and public health law and has devoted special attention during his career to public policies relating to mental health and substance abuse.

Bonnie: “In my opinion, much of the litigation relating to the Affordable Care Act has been political rhetoric masquerading as constitutional litigation. The opponents lost repeatedly in the Congress in their efforts to repeal Obamacare, but they persisted in what has been a futile effort to get the Supreme Court to give them what they could not achieve in the Congress. The implausibility of their legal arguments was especially apparent today. The court decided, 7-2, that being politically opposed to Obamacare doesn’t provide a legal basis for a lawsuit. The plaintiffs have to have a genuine personal stake in the outcome, not just a political interest. In the absence of such an interest, they have no ‘standing to sue,’ and the court has no constitutional authority to decide the case.

The Supreme Court upheld the so-called individual mandate as an exercise of Congress power to ‘tax’ in 2012. However, because of continuing political opposition to the individual mandate, Congress made it unenforceable by reducing the ‘penalty’ to zero. The whole purpose of this lawsuit was to give the Supreme Court another chance to strike down the entire statute based on the argument (again) that the individual mandate was unconstitutional and that the rest of the act was not severable from the individual mandate.

The problem was that no one (and no state) is ‘harmed’ by an unenforceable ‘mandate’ to buy insurance. In effect, ‘the plaintiffs had no skin in the game,’ legally speaking. There was therefore no ‘case or controversy,’ which is a necessary predicate for exercise of judicial power. In the absence of a genuine ‘case,’ what plaintiffs are asking for is an ‘advisory opinion’ on the constitutionality of the act. But that would not be an exercise of ‘judicial power’ under the Constitution. So the courts have no jurisdiction and case has to be dismissed.”


Edwards v. Vannoy

Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, barring nonunanimous jury verdicts, applies retroactively to cases on federal collateral review.

Frampton studies criminal law and constitutional criminal procedure with a focus on how legal actors, institutions and doctrines have responded, or failed to respond, to the dramatic expansion of the carceral state. Frampton is author of an amicus brief in Edwards.

Frampton: “The court held that its decision last term in Ramos v. Louisiana, requiring jury unanimity for criminal convictions, would not apply retroactively to cases that were already final. In so doing, the court overturned Teague v. Lane, a case suggesting that certain ‘watershed’ rules of criminal procedure could apply retroactively to benefit defendants convicted in years past. Importantly, though, Edwards applies only in the federal habeas context: The Court expressly left open the door for Louisiana and Oregon to grant retroactive relief to prisoners convicted by nonunanimous verdicts under state law, in years or decades past, should they so choose.”

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Facebook I​nc. v. Duguid

Whether the definition of an “automatic telephone dialing system” encompasses any device that can “store” and “automatically dial” telephone numbers.

Nachbar has both practiced and published in the field of telecommunications law. He co- authored the casebook “Communications Regulation.” His research focuses on the nature of regulation: how the law is used (and by whom) to shape and control behavior.


Federal Communications Commission v. Prometheus Radio Project

Whether a federal appeals court erred in vacating as arbitrary and capricious the Federal Communications Commission orders under review.

Nachbar has both practiced and published in the field of telecommunications law. He co- authored the casebook “Communications Regulation.” His research focuses on the nature of regulation: how the law is used (and by whom) to shape and control behavior.

Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp

Whether the “expropriation exception” of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides jurisdiction over claims that a foreign sovereign has violated international human-rights law when taking property from its own national within its own borders.

Rutherglen has chaired the advisory committee on Fourth Circuit Rules and served as director of the Graduate Program for Judges at the Law School. He teaches admiralty, civil procedure, employment discrimination and professional responsibility.


Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer

Whether the “arise out of or relate to” requirement of the 14th Amendment's due process clause is met when none of the defendant’s forum contacts caused the plaintiff’s claims.

Rutherglen has chaired the advisory committee on Fourth Circuit Rules and served as director of the Graduate Program for Judges at the Law School. He teaches admiralty, civil procedure, employment discrimination and professional responsibility.


Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial ​District Court

Whether the “arise out of or relate to” requirement for a state court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is met when none of the defendant’s forum contacts caused the plaintiff’s claims.

Rutherglen has chaired the advisory committee on Fourth Circuit Rules and served as director of the Graduate Program for Judges at the Law School. He teaches admiralty, civil procedure, employment discrimination and professional responsibility.

Rutherglen: “The Supreme Court unanimously upheld personal jurisdiction over Ford Motor Co. in two cases, each involving harm to a state resident from an accident in the state and massive activity of Ford in the state. The case is Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court. The unanimity of the Supreme Court stopped, however, at the result. Separate opinions revealed different approaches to the analysis of personal jurisdiction. For a majority of five, Justice Kagan emphasized that Ford’s contacts with the forum state, even though they did not involve the sale by Ford of the car in question in the state, still were sufficient to ‘relate to’ the plaintiffs’ claims. Justice Alito concurred in the result but would not have given the same weight to the ‘relate to’ branch of personal jurisdiction as the majority. Justice Gorsuch, with Justice Thomas, questioned whether the Court’s entire approach, based on International Shoe v. Washington, a decision from 1945, should be reconsidered to give greater weight to originalist methods, which would emphasize the meaning of ‘due process’ in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. Justice Barrett did not participate, leaving only a bare majority of five justices for the opinion of the Court. The problem for the Court’s opinion is fleshing out the ‘relate to’ requirement in a way that gives it definite content and acts as a definite restraint on forum shopping by plaintiffs. If a causal connection between the defendant’s contacts with the state and the plaintiff’s claim is not enough, what is? A causal connection would have been satisfied by Ford’s sale of the cars inside the state, but these sales were made elsewhere. If ‘relate to’ requirement is more easily satisfied than a causal connection, how much more easily? The problem for the separate opinions is how to adapt the 19th century understanding of due process to business operations and litigation in the 21st century. We have yet to hear from Justice Barrett on these questions.”

Solum is an internationally recognized legal theorist who works in constitutional theory, procedure and the philosophy of law. Solum contributes to debates in constitutional theory and normative legal theory.

Solum: “The Supreme Court decided an important question of ‘personal jurisdiction’ under the due process of law clause of the 14th Amendment. The court revisited a question that it has ducked in several prior decisions. What legal standard governs the question whether a claim ‘arises from’ or ‘is related to’ the contacts of the defendant with the forum state? This threshold issue is important, because a plaintiff must meet a very high standard if the claim does is not sufficiently related to the contacts. Justice Kagan’s opinion for the court says that Ford Motor Company does have sufficient contacts with Montana — even if the particular car that was involved in an accident was purchased outside the state, but the court once again fails to tell us what the legal test should be.”


Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Whether free exercise plaintiffs can only succeed by proving a particular type of discrimination claim, and whether conditioning a religious agency’s ability to participate in the foster care system on taking actions that directly contradict the agency’s religious beliefs violates the First Amendment.

Cahn is an expert in family law, trusts and estates, feminist jurisprudence, reproductive technology, and aging and the law.

Cahn: “For the more than 400,000 children in foster care in the United States, today’s decision is disappointing, allowing foster care agencies to eliminate potentially eligible foster parents solely on the basis of their sexual orientation. Nonetheless, the justices did not dramatically undermine existing First Amendment law.”  

Laycock is perhaps the nation’s leading authority on the law of religious liberty and also on the law of remedies. He has argued before the Supreme Court five times. Laycock has co-authored an amicus brief in Fulton.

Laycock:Fulton v. Philadelphia is an important win for religious liberty. Teachings about sex and marriage have been central to many religions for millennia; if they cannot act on those teachings, little of free exercise would be left. The biggest news here is that Fulton is unanimous on the result.

The case is complicated to explain. The key precedent, Employment Division v. Smith, famously holds that the free exercise clause does not apply to laws that are neutral and generally applicable. That is Smith’s unprotective rule. But Smith also states a more protective rule: If a law that burdens religion is not neutral, or not generally applicable, then the burden on religion must be justified by a compelling government interest. Fulton substantially clarifies that more protective rule and gives it real content.

Fulton holds that a law is not generally applicable if a government official has discretion to grant exceptions, even if he never grants any, because that discretion empowers the official to discriminate.

This case is a symbolic loss for the gay-rights movement, but same-sex couples are fully served in Philadelphia. It is a critical practical win for Catholic Social Services. Philadelphia could rewrite its contracts, eliminate any discretion to grant exceptions and take the case right back up to the Supreme Court again. But with five justices saying explicitly that Smith’s unprotective rule was a mistake, the city may choose not to do that.”

Schragger’s scholarship focuses on the intersection of constitutional law and local government law, federalism, urban policy, and the constitutional and economic status of cities. He also writes about law and religion.

Schragger: “Most commentators had expected this court to side with Catholic Social Services, which had entered into a contract with the city of Philadelphia to provide adoption and foster care services but did not want to abide by the city’s LGBTQ antidiscrimination policy. What they hadn’t expected was a narrow ruling that gained the consensus of almost all of the justices, including the progressive justices. Chief Justice Roberts seems to have threaded the needle in this case, ruling that the city had to give CSS an exemption because its own rules permitted exemptions in other cases, while holding out the possibility that antidiscrimination requirements in other areas of the law will be upheld. We’ll find out if that is true.”

Schwartzman focuses on law and religion, jurisprudence, political philosophy and constitutional law.

Schwartzman:Fulton is a narrow opinion holding that the city of Philadelphia’s contract with Catholic Social Services (CSS) had an antidiscriminiation provision that was not generally applicable and thus violated the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, avoided a broader ruling by finding the CSS is not a public accommodation and therefore is not covered by more categorical prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination. The Court also declined to overrule Employment Division v. Smith, which has governed the Court’s interpretation of the free exercise clause since 1990. The upshot is that the Court in Fulton focuses on a city contract and, once again, punts larger questions about constitutional interpretation and the conflict between religious free exercise and LGBT rights in the context of public accommodations.

But the signal is clear enough that the Court will allow social service providers religious exemptions even when they refuse to comply with antidiscrimination laws. No one will be surprised at that outcome. No Court in American history has been more solicitous of religious organizations than this one, and after Fulton, the question remains: What are the limits of religious exemptions? How much and what types of harms is the Court willing to permit under its capacious understanding of the religion clauses of the First Amendment? 

Another question is why the liberal justices joined the conservative majority and why Justices Sotomayor and Kagan were silent in this case. One explanation might be that by aligning with the majority and not dissenting, they avoided a more damaging result. That might seem like an appeasement strategy, and an obvious question about Fulton will be why it didn’t draw separate opinions form the Court’s more liberal justices.”

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Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc.

Whether copyright protection extends to a software interface and whether, as the jury found, the petitioner’s use of a software interface in the context of creating a new computer program constitutes fair use.

Haley writes and teaches about the intersection of law and technology, particularly matters of privacy.

Haley: “This case is a victory for proponents of software interoperability, albeit a limited one. The majority found Google’s copying of portions of the Java application programming interface (‘API’) for use in its development of the Android operating system a ‘fair use’ within the meaning of copyright law. In doing so, the court emphasized the negative effect on development of new, creative and useful software that might occur if too many restrictions were placed on the ability of the millions of programmers familiar with the Java API to apply that knowledge to new platforms and problems. However, the majority expressly declined to take up the threshold question of whether the Java API is copyrightable at all. The dissent would have reached the issue and held the Java API copyrightable, as the Federal Circuit did earlier in the case. Leaving that question open all but guarantees protracted future litigation on this issue. The decision may therefore be of limited utility to developers who wish to repurpose popular APIs in new contexts — especially given the majority’s emphasis on the enormous amount of work Google undertook to avoid copying more of the Java API.”

Oliar teaches courses on intellectual property law, entrepreneurship, and law and economics. He writes on those topics and their intersection with empirical and behavioral methods, legal history, property theory and cyberlaw.


Jones v. Mississippi

Whether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without parole.

Bonnie is director of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. He has co-authored leading textbooks on criminal law and public health law and has devoted special attention during his career to public policies relating to mental health and substance abuse.

Bonnie: “The Court ruled in a 6-3 decision that a state may sentence a juvenile to a life sentence without parole without making a specific determination that the youth is permanently incorrigible, a requirement that many observers assumed was implied in the Court’s earlier decision in Miller v. Alabama. This case signals clearly that the new conservative majority of the Supreme Court will not expand the reach of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions barring harsh sentences for juveniles. The only hopeful sign for those who support those decisions is that Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion for the Court did summersaults to avoid saying that it was overruling any of the Court’s previous decisions. The dissent accuses the Court of overruling Miller v. Alabama without saying so and registers its concern that the new majority has its sights on other precedents as well.”

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Johnson v. Guzman Chavez

Whether the detention of an alien who is subject to a reinstated removal order and who is pursuing withholding or deferral of removal is governed by 8 U.S.C. 1231, or instead by 8 U.S.C. 1226.

Cope’s research focuses on the measurement of legal and political phenomena. Substantively, he is most interested in the law and politics of international institutions, migration, and relationships between domestic institutional structure and international behavior.

Cope: “The court’s 6-3 decision involves a technical interpretation of two provisions of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act. The case concerned noncitizens who were previously deported and later apprehended after reentering the country without permission. The question was whether those detained noncitizens who then seek ‘withholding of removal’ relief — because they claim they would face persecution or torture in some other country — have a right to a bond hearing and a chance for release pending adjudication of their claim, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, or whether they can be detained indefinitely, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231. The majority opinion by Justice Alito held that the latter provision applies: They can be detained until their case is resolved. Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence joined by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Breyer’s dissent was joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.”


Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. B. L.

While public schools may have a special interest in regulating some off-campus student speech, the special interests offered by the school are not sufficient to overcome B.L.’s interest in free expression in this case.

Schauer is a world-renowned expert in the areas of constitutional law, evidence, legal reasoning, freedom of speech, and jurisprudence and the philosophy of law. His expertise has been demonstrated in hundreds of books, book chapters, articles, essays, classes and personal appearances.


National Association of Broadcasters v. Prometheus Radio Project

Whether the Federal Communications Commission may repeal or modify media ownership rules that it determines are no longer “necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.”

Nachbar has both practiced and published in the field of telecommunications law. He co- authored the casebook “Communications Regulation.” His research focuses on the nature of regulation: how the law is used (and by whom) to shape and control behavior.

NCAA v. Al​ston

Whether the National Collegiate Athletic Association eligibility rules regarding compensation of student-athletes violate federal antitrust law.

Nachbar’s research focuses on the nature of regulation: how the law is used (and by whom) to shape and control behavior. His current work is on the relationship between public and private regulation. Throughout, his work has retained a focus on the regulation of markets and networks. Nachbar has authored an amicus brief in Alston.

Nachbar: “NCAA v. Alston had the potential to remake the NCAA and antitrust law along with it, but the court’s unanimous opinion was extremely narrow, on both the law and the facts. The court unsurprisingly rejected the NCAA’s attempt for something like wholesale deference for its rules. But in doing so, the court accentuated the fact-specific nature of every ‘rule of reason’ case, to the point of providing no definitive statement of how to perform rule of reason analysis. The court accepted the lower court’s three-step approach to the rule of reason, but did so by saying that the ‘Court has sometimes spoken of “a three-step, burden-shifting framework”’ like the one the lower court applied. At the same time, the court noted the NCAA’s extreme market position, the narrow nature of the district court injunction and the potential for Congress to intervene in this set of disputes. The narrowness of the case was important enough to Justice Kavanaugh for him to write separately to point out how narrow the case was and to cast doubt on the NCAA rules not challenged at the Supreme Court. Thus, it remains to be seen how significant the case will be for antitrust law, although the court’s emphasis on the fact-specific nature of the rule of reason (and specifically the role of less restrictive alternatives, which played an important role in this case) could lead to more drawn out antitrust cases by giving plaintiffs and defendants more to argue over in rule of reason cases.”


Nestlé USA v. Doe

Whether an aiding and abetting claim against a domestic corporation brought under the Alien Tort Statute may overcome the extraterritoriality bar where the claim is based on allegations of general corporate activity in the United States and where the plaintiffs cannot trace the alleged harms.

Rutherglen has chaired the advisory committee on Fourth Circuit Rules and served as director of the Graduate Program for Judges at the Law School. He teaches admiralty, civil procedure, employment discrimination and professional responsibility.

Rutherglen:Nestlé USA v. Doe exemplifies two trends in recent decisions on human rights claims under the Alien Tort Statute. First, a nearly unanimous court found insufficient activity within the United States to support coverage of a federal remedy for human rights violations. All the relevant activity giving rise to the alleged human rights violations occurred overseas in the Ivory Coast. Second, at least three justices (Thomas, Kavanaugh and Gorsuch) expressed great skepticism about implying any federal remedy from the Alien Tort Statute, which is framed entirely in jurisdictional terms. Justice Alito, although he dissented on other grounds, expressed sympathy for this position.”


PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey

Whether a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission authorizes a private company to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or states.

Mahoney teaches courses in property, government finance, constitutional law and nonprofit organizations. Her scholarly articles include works on land preservation, eminent domain, health care reform and property rights in human biological materials.


Republic of Hungary v. Simon

Whether a District Court may abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for reasons of international comity.

Rutherglen has chaired the advisory committee on Fourth Circuit Rules and served as director of the Graduate Program for Judges at the Law School. He teaches admiralty, civil procedure, employment discrimination and professional responsibility.


Sanchez v. Ma​yorkas

Whether an individual who entered the United States unlawfully is not eligible to become a lawful permanent resident, even if the United States has granted the individual temporary protected status.

Martin, a leading scholar in immigration and international law, served as principal deputy general counsel of the Department of Homeland Security from January 2009 to December 2010, and in earlier government service at the Department of State and the Department of Justice.

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Tanzin v. Tanvir

Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 permits suits seeking money damages against individual federal employees.

Laycock is perhaps the nation’s leading authority on the law of religious liberty and also on the law of remedies. He has argued before the Supreme Court five times. Laycock has co-authored an amicus brief in Tanzin.

Laycock: “In Tanzin v. Tanvir, the Court held unanimously that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act creates a damages remedy against federal officials who violate it. The statute expressly creates a cause of action and authorizes ‘appropriate relief.’ The provisions relating to remedies were pretty clearly modeled on § 1983, the statute that creates damage remedies against state and local officials who violate constitutional rights. ‘Appropriate relief’ appears to have been a shorthand way of referring to the whole body of remedies law under § 1983. The government demanded a super clear statement rule that would require the statute to expressly spell out damages, but the Court wasn’t willing to do that. There are not many damage claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Most of the damages are violations of conscience, which the law would treat as a source of emotional distress, and which a jury of diverse religious views might not put a high value on. It is usually more important to get an injunction and  protect the religious exercise for the future. But there are some cases with more tangible damages, and some cases in which the harm isn’t likely to be repeated, so that an injunctions is unavailable. Both of those things were true in Tanzin. FBI agents allegedly retaliated against the plaintiffs by putting them on the no-fly list. When they sued, the government took them off the list, so their claim for an injunction was moot. But in the meantime, one plaintiff had lost his job because he was unable to fly; others had forfeited plane tickets they had paid for; some had been unable to attend funerals and other family events. So for these plaintiffs, it was damages or nothing.”

Schragger’s scholarship focuses on the intersection of constitutional law and local government law, federalism, urban policy, and the constitutional and economic status of cities. He also writes about law and religion.

Schragger: “This case was fairly straightforward, as civil rights statutes generally have been read to include a damages remedy. The Court decided to treat the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) no differently. The Muslim plaintiffs won in this case, but it is important to remember that this Court previously upheld President Trump’s Muslim ban in 2018 — a much more consequential case for religious liberty. There is some irony in the fact that Muslim travelers improperly subjected to no-fly orders can receive damages under RFRA, but that travel to this country from predominantly Muslim countries can at the same time be categorical curtailed or eliminated.”

Schwartzman focuses on law and religion, jurisprudence, political philosophy and constitutional law.


Torres v. Madrid

Whether an unsuccessful attempt to detain a suspect by use of physical force is a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Coughlin’s primary research and teaching interests are in the areas of criminal law, criminal procedure, feminist jurisprudence, and law and humanities.


United States v. Arthrex Inc.

Whether administrative patent judges of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are principal officers who must be appointed by the president with the Senate’s advice and consent, or “inferior Officers” whose appointment Congress has permissibly vested in a department head.

Duffy teaches torts, administrative law, patent law and international intellectual property law. He has testified before Congress on the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, and was cited in the Federal Circuit’s opinion.


Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski

Whether a request for nominal damages satisfies the redressability element necessary for Article III standing where a plaintiff’s claim is based on a completed violation of a legal right.

Douglas Laycock is perhaps the nation’s leading authority on the law of remedies. He is the author (co-author in the most recent edition) of the leading casebook Modern American Remedies, the award-winning monograph The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule and many articles in leading law reviews.

Ann Woolhandler is an expert on the federal court system and civil procedure.

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Wolf v. Innovation La​w Lab

Whether the Migrant Protection Protocols is a lawful implementation of the statutory authority.

Cope’s research focuses on the measurement of legal and political phenomena. Substantively, he is most interested in the law and politics of international institutions, migration, and relationships between domestic institutional structure and international behavior.

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