Michael Glennon has identified important and powerful truths about the structures and incentives of our national security institutions today. But his theory is (deliberately, one senses) stylized and, as a result, only partly correct. Agencies surely have wide powers, including certain responsibilities that Congress has assigned to them in statute. But the president has ample power and control as well. Recent policy developments implicating Iran, Israel, and Cuba have been led (in both appearance and reality) by the White House. Yet Glennon’s ability and willingness to put a sharp point on the difficulty of maintaining a balance of control between these institutional actors are refreshing, as is his honesty about the challenges of making changes to today’s technocratic U.S. government and re-energizing the body politic.

Ashley S. Deeks, Review of Michael J. Glennon, <em>National Security and Double Government</em> (reviewing Michael J. Glennon, National Security and Double Government) 109 American Journal of International Law 900–904 (2015).