DISOBIEDENCE AND ITS OBJECTS

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I. JUSTIFYING DISOBIEDENCE

When John Rawls reinvigorated the contemporary philosophical debate about civil disobedience with his 1969 essay, The Justification of Civil Disobedience,1 he also largely set the terms for subsequent discussions of that subject. Rawls, of course, went on to refine and further defend his account of the nature and justification of civil disobedience in A Theory of Justice;2 but the basics of the account remain the same as in his earlier essay. Rawls's theory of civil disobedience is firmly embedded in his overall theory of justice, and he discusses civil disobedience only as an issue in near-just societies—which for Rawls means constitutional democracies whose basic institutional structures3 are mostly “well-ordered” by the correct (Rawlsian) principles of justice, but which still contain some serious injustices.4

According to Rawls, the natural duty of justice (along with what he calls the “duty of civility”5) requires that we comply with those laws that apply to us in

* Commonwealth Professor of Philosophy, and Professor of Law, University of Virginia. This Essay examines the permissible aims or objects of disobedience to law, a subject on which David Lyons has had much to say, both in and out of print, over the years. David was my teacher and dissertation supervisor at Cornell, where the high standards he set (and lived up to) in his professional, personal, and political lives served as an inspiration to many, myself included. This Essay is intended to contribute to our celebration of David’s wonderful career.

3 Id. at 7 (suggesting that a society’s “basic structure” is its “major social institutions,” that is its “political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements”).
4 Id. at 8, 195.
5 Id. at 355.
near-just societies. This implication of the duty, he believes, is uncontroversial in the case of just laws. And legal obedience is generally required even if the laws in question are unjust, as some laws will inevitably be, even with a nearly just constitution and just legislative procedures. Compliance is here simply part of the cost of making a constitutional democracy work, and all must share this burden — at least, if the injustice in question is not too severe and if the burdens of injustice do not fall too regularly on the same people (e.g., minority groups). This duty to comply, however, appears to conflict with our duty to oppose injustice (along with our right to defend our own liberties). So the central question of Rawls's theory of civil disobedience becomes: When does injustice in a near-just constitutional regime establish a right of (and, further, a justification for) disobedience to unjust law?

Rawls's answer is that one has a right to disobey unjust law in a near-just state only when one's disobedience is civil — where disobedience takes the form of non-violent, political, conscientious protest, done openly and addressed to the majority's sense of justice — and only where the injustice in question is clear and substantial, where normal legal appeals have already been made in good faith, and where disobedience will not lead to a breakdown in respect for law. Disobedience so characterized is principled (not merely self-interested) and political (and so a possible part of, rather than antithetical to, ordinary political processes). One is justified in acting on this right of civil

6 Id. at 350. Exactly when a society counts as being "nearly just" is left extremely vague by Rawls; and that vagueness is accentuated by Rawls's further qualifications, such as "making due allowance for what it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances" and "reasonably just, as estimated by what the current state of things allows." Id. at 351. Another complication is that a society can be "nearly just" in either of two ways: by having institutions and laws that fall slightly short of a defensible shared public sense of justice (say, a Rawlsian one), or by having institutions and laws that conform perfectly to a defective public sense of justice. Id. at 352. Rawls focuses on the former case. Of the latter case — where one cannot hope to repair injustice by appealing to the public's sense of justice — Rawls says that we must consider exactly how unreasonable the defective sense of justice is; and if it is not too unreasonable, we may in fact have a duty to live with our society's injustices and do the best we can. Id. at 352.

7 Id. at 350. I challenge even this initial claim in Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? A. John Simmons, Natural Duties and the Duty to Obey the Law, in IS THERE A DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW? 121, 157-59, 168-70 (R.G. Frey ed., 2005).

8 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 352-55.

9 Id. at 363.

10 Id. at 363-91.

11 Rawls contrasts "civil disobedience," so understood, with what he calls "conscientious refusal" — that is, "noncompliance with a more or less direct legal injunction or administrative order," where the noncompliance is "not necessarily based on political principles" and "is not a form of address appealing to the sense of justice of the majority." Id. at 368-71.
disobedience only when legal disobedience is conducted reasonably so as to actually assist in achieving the aim of eliminating the injustice in question.\textsuperscript{12} Disobedience to law that is limited by these conditions will, Rawls thinks, be consistent with the idea of a constitutional democracy, helping to strengthen the just institutions of society (by making them more just) and focusing public attention on the principles of justice according to which their institutions are structured.\textsuperscript{13} Such disobedience cannot endanger the society, for it is undertaken in ways that demonstrate a broader allegiance to law and an acceptance of society’s near-just character.\textsuperscript{14}

Even operating within the very limited scope of Rawls’s account, there are several obvious questions that ought to be raised. First, in concentrating solely on the idea of legal disobedience as a way of addressing the public in political terms, Rawls seems to ignore two motives for legal disobedience that seem both perfectly justifiable and to frequently guide the choices of actual practitioners of civil disobedience: namely, the desire to frustrate evil (as in Gandhi’s campaigns\textsuperscript{15}) and the desire to avoid complicity in injustice or wrongdoing (as in Thoreau’s disobedience\textsuperscript{16}). Is it obvious that “non-political” legal disobedience originating in such concerns, even in a near-just state, will always be morally indefensible? Second, if such reasons for noncompliance are (as I believe them to be) often defensible, it is further unclear why legal disobedience (in a near-just state) should always be open and public, with “fair notice” given in advance. Our morally respectable desire (or perhaps our moral duty) to avoid complicity in wrongdoing (by, say, refusing to pay a legally prescribed tax that supports an unjust policy) seems adequate by itself to justify legal disobedience. Why should open acceptance of (perhaps quite harsh) legal punishment be necessary to justify it? And the laudable goal of frustrating evil or unjust policies is seldom very effectively advanced by announcing in advance the time, place, and manner of planned legal disobedience.

Further, it seems possible to question even the most basic (and perhaps the most widely shared) of Rawls’s assumptions – that disobedience in a near-just state must always be non-violent. Rawls’s own commitment to this view is not motivated by any prior commitment to pacifism (like that of Gandhi or King). It is motivated rather by his other requirements that legal disobedience be a political act, addressed to the public.\textsuperscript{17} One cannot, Rawls thinks, address the

\textsuperscript{12} Id. at 376.
\textsuperscript{13} Id. at 382-91.
\textsuperscript{14} Id. at 388-91. The paragraph above summarizes (with nearly unconscionable brevity) the arguments of A Theory of Justice, sections 55, 57, and 59.
\textsuperscript{16} See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Resistance to Civil Government (Civil Disobedience), in Political Writings 1, 7 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1996) (1849).
\textsuperscript{17} RAWLS, supra note 2, at 364-67.
public with violence; violence constitutes an assault, not a conversation.\textsuperscript{18} And violent acts, far from being political (that is, fitting usefully within a framework of basically just political institutions), in fact are antithetical to and express contempt for law and politics (which are premised on limiting threats and uses of violence to the legal institutions charged with maintaining order).

However, once we question (as we have just done) the Rawlsian requirements that defensible legal disobedience be public and political, we also threaten Rawls’s principal rationale for the non-violence clause. But even if we instead accept Rawls’s public and political requirements, it is simply not at all clear why violent acts could not be addressed to the public in the right way – as an attempt, say, to get the majority to reconsider its position on the justice of some policy. Indeed, it is not evident why an act of violence must always fail the test of counting as an appropriately political act, by necessarily expressing contempt or diminished respect for law and politics – especially if the violent act is carefully presented to the public as protest, if it is isolated (an unusual act in an otherwise non-violent life), if it has been preceded by passive political efforts, and if it is followed by non-evasion and acceptance of punishment. Further, it just seems generally implausible to suppose that in the face of significant injustice, even in an otherwise just society, violence – and especially violence against property only – could never be morally justified if it were likely to be effective in its aims. Violence against persons will obviously always be harder to morally justify. But it again seems far from obvious that some such violence – say, kidnapping a public official who is instrumental in administering an unjust policy – could never be both effective and morally justifiable.

All of this can be argued even within the primary Rawlsian terms of the debate over civil disobedience. David Lyons has characterized those terms as follows:

True civil disobedients are supposed by theorists to regard the systems under which they live as morally flawed but basically just and requiring modest reform rather than fundamental change. Evidence of this outlook is seen in the disobedients’ nonviolent methods and use of moral suasion rather than violent rebellion. Their submitting to arrest and punishment is taken as further evidence of respect for legal authority and recognition of a moral obligation to obey.\textsuperscript{19}

But, as Lyons goes on to show, these assumptions about their positions and attitudes were in fact false with respect to the paradigmatic practitioners of civil disobedience, including Thoreau, Gandhi, and King.\textsuperscript{20} Since Gandhi was not confronting a constitutional democracy, and since King’s position has been

\textsuperscript{18} Id. at 366.


\textsuperscript{20} Id. at 39-46.
ably discussed by Lyons, I will in this Essay use Thoreau’s “civil disobedience” as my principal example. But my aim here will not be merely to demonstrate the ways in which Thoreau’s stance departs from that of the “true civil disobedient,” aptly characterized above by Lyons. Rather, I aim to use the example of Thoreau to demonstrate the broader inadequacy of the Rawlsian conception of nonideal theory within which Rawls’s account of civil disobedience—which includes his only substantial discussion of legal disobedience—is developed.

Accordingly, I discuss Thoreau’s position as an illustration in Part II. I then use that illustration to motivate my exploration of the nature and limits of the Rawlsian nonideal theory of justice in Parts III and IV. To be clear, my intention here is to discuss only deliberate, principled, plainly illegal conduct. I will not consider here cases of lawful protest or resistance, unintentional disobedience, disobedience flowing from confusion or factual error, disobedience to “laws” which have unclear status, or plainly unprincipled (e.g., merely self-interested or malicious) illegal conduct. I shall also leave to one side the more difficult case of “principled” disobedience that is based on plainly invalid principles, such as the white supremacist’s legal disobedience aimed at correcting or protesting racially equitable social policies. I shall ask only: Supposing that the disobedient person is correct in her diagnosis of the relevant social ills and is acting in the name of defensible moral or political principles, how should we understand the possible objects of any justified legal disobedience?

II. AN EXAMPLE: THOREAU ON THE STATE’S AUTHORITY

Henry David Thoreau, the person whose essay by this name brought the term “civil disobedience” into common usage—and the person whose writings were identified by both Gandhi and King as a significant influence on their own thought—was neither practicing nor trying to justify the kind of “civil disobedience” discussed by Rawls. In Thoreau’s 1849 essay Civil

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21 Id. at 42-49.
22 Id. at 39.
23 See Hugo Adam Bedau, Introduction to Civil Disobedience, supra note 1, at 15, 15 (“Even though civil disobedience is as old as Antigone and Socrates, it is Thoreau to who, especially in this country, we return again and again to take our bearing as we confront a government or a law we judge to be immoral.”).
24 See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction to Political Writings, supra note 16, at vii, xxiv.
25 Rawls acknowledges that Thoreau’s (“traditional”) understanding of “civil disobedience” encompasses both what Rawls calls “civil disobedience” and what Rawls calls “conscientious refusal.” Rawls, supra note 2, at 368. I focus here on deeper disagreements between Thoreau and Rawls.
Disobedience, he is, of course, protesting injustice – in particular, the injustices done by his nation in its legal recognition of human slavery (and the slave trade), in its treatment of Native Americans, and in its shamelessly acquisitive war on Mexico. But he also makes it quite clear that his were not acts of legal disobedience that were undertaken by one committed to demonstrating his general fidelity to law or his continuing allegiance to his government. On the contrary, Thoreau argues that his government and law have no legitimate claim to his obedience or support at all. Far from being the civilly disobedient protester discussed in the literature spawned by Rawls’s treatments, Thoreau’s view of his legal disobedience may in fact be closer to that of contemporary “philosophical anarchists” like Robert Paul Wolff. While Rawls and those who engage his account are, of course, free to use the term “civil disobedience” as they choose, their discussion thus threatens to be irrelevant to any analysis of the arguments of those we think of as the paradigm practitioners of civil disobedience – as Lyons has persuasively argued, and as I argue further in this Part.

Thoreau’s radicalism has usually been obscured in philosophical discussions of his thought. There are, I think, two reasonably natural – but in the end both at least incomplete – ways in which Thoreau’s stance on civil disobedience might be (and has usually been) read. First, we might suppose that Thoreau’s

26 The essay was originally published in 1849 under the title Resistance to Civil Government and only later renamed Civil Disobedience – by the editor of a posthumous collection of Thoreau’s writings (who claimed, however, that Thoreau had himself renamed the essay before his death). See Wendell Glick, Textual Introduction to HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Resistance to Civil Government, in REFORM PAPERS 313, 320 (Wendell Glick ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1973); see also Bedau, supra note 23, at 16. The written essay was based on Thoreau’s 1848 public lecture in Concord, which was titled “The Rights and Duties of the Individual in Relation to Government” and was designed to explain to his neighbors his reasons for refusing to pay his legally required poll tax (which had gone unpaid for six consecutive years at the time of his arrest). Rosenblum, supra note 24, at xii. As a result of that refusal, Thoreau was arrested and spent one night in jail – a night which was, by his own account, a happy and interesting one. His edifying incarceration was cut disagreeably short when an “interfer[ing]” aunt paid his taxes for him. THOREAU, supra note 16, at 13-16.

27 Thoreau elaborated his views on these topics in a later essay. See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Slavery in Massachusetts, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 16, at 123, 126 (1854) (“Have [all these soldiers] been trained merely to rob Mexico, and carry back fugitive slaves to their masters?”).

28 THOREAU, supra note 16, at 17.

29 Id. at 4.

30 See Rosenblum, supra note 24, at xxiv.

31 See generally A. JOHN SIMMONS, Philosophical Anarchism, in JUSTIFICATION & LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS (2001) (outlining the possible forms of and justifying arguments for “philosophical anarchism”).

32 Lyons, supra note 19, at 32, 39-46.
view is that legal disobedience is morally justified either where the laws disobeyed are themselves intolerably unjust or where obedience to law would (in some reasonably direct fashion) facilitate or support the state’s unjust policies. Otherwise, however, legal obedience is morally required. Tax resistance like Thoreau’s, on this reading, is permissible where those taxes can be reasonably expected to support injustice (as Thoreau believed to be true in his case); but it is impermissible where they cannot be. Thus, this first reading has Thoreau accepting the idea that even in a society with some seriously or deeply unjust laws or policies, there is still a generic moral obligation to obey the law (where doing so does not give direct support to that injustice) and to help to uphold the state’s just policies and laws.

The second, more radical (but equally natural) reading of Thoreau would take him to be arguing that the unjust policies and laws of the United States had exceeded morally tolerable limits and that the state had, in enforcing and pursuing such laws and policies, simply rendered itself morally illegitimate. In doing so, the state had deprived itself of the moral authority to impose on its citizens any obligations of obedience or support whatsoever, leaving them all (morally speaking) to their own devices. When a state’s injustices exceed reasonable limits, the argument would go (sounding now rather like one of Locke’s arguments), governments forfeit the rights with which they were entrusted and no longer have any moral standing beyond that of a powerful bully. This second reading (correctly, in my view) presents Thoreau as denying not just the moral authority of particular American laws, but the moral authority of his government itself. But, I will suggest, even this more radical reading of Thoreau is still insufficiently radical to do full justice to Thoreau’s critique of his state and his defense of his legal disobedience.

Because the second reading of Thoreau presents his views as more radical than his popular reputation suggests, the first reading has been more common. For instance, I think the first reading probably lies behind Hugo Bedau’s treatment of Thoreau in a well-known article on civil disobedience. Bedau focuses in his discussion of Thoreau on what he calls “Thoreau’s principle”:

that is, on Thoreau’s insistence that, “[W]hat I have to do is to see . . . that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn.” Thoreau’s refusal to pay his taxes was, Bedau argues, a refusal to participate in the state’s injustices against third parties (since Thoreau knew that his tax money would be used by his government to carry out unjust policies), and so constituted a strategy for avoiding partial responsibility for those wrongs. This, Bedau argues, is a justification for the use of “indirect” civil disobedience that offers a plausible defense of such practices – that is, a plausible defense against those who

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34 Id. at 53.
36 Bedau, supra note 23, at 52.
maintain that only "direct" civil disobedience (which violates only the actual unjust law that is being protested), and never indirect disobedience, can be morally justified.\textsuperscript{37}

While Bedau has no doubt identified one of Thoreau's concerns about paying taxes to an unjust government, Thoreau's position was more complicated than Bedau's observations suggest. Bedau, for instance, goes on to worry that tax resistance of this sort is in fact an undesirably "blunt" instrument to properly sever the links of our responsibility for unjust government policies, since it also unfairly severs our ties to the \textit{just} policies and practices of our government.\textsuperscript{38} But Bedau's concern on that point clearly misses Thoreau's aim, which was precisely to deny the authority of United States over him and to deny any duty of allegiance to its government. Thoreau was arguing that he should be understood to have severed all ties between him and the government of the United States, in consequence of which he can be held to bear no responsibility for any of its actions or policies, unjust or just.\textsuperscript{39}

This, of course, seems to characterize Thoreau's position in a way that is more consistent with the second, more radical, reading suggested above. But that reading is still not, as I have said, radical enough. According to the second reading, it is the state's unjust laws and policies that have de-legitimated it. To maintain (or regain) its moral authority, the state need only avoid (or rectify) such injustice, leaving its moral standing in its own hands, as it were. But Thoreau's arguments include suggestions that the state's legitimacy or authority depends less on what the state itself does than on the wills or the independent obligations of the state's subjects. Thoreau makes two such claims, both of which would make his argument more radical than, and clearly logically distinct from, any argument that simply ties the state's moral authority to the presence or absence of intolerable injustice.

The first of these claims makes the state's authority and the subject's political obligations a function of individual consent. Thoreau insists that \textit{his} political obligations and the authority of the state over \textit{him} can derive only from his own personal consent, a consent which he may never have given in the first place, or which may have been withdrawn because of his perception of, or voided by the fact of, severe governmental injustice: "The authority of government, . . . to be strictly just, . . . must have the sanction and consent of the governed. It can have no pure right over my person and property but what I concede to it."\textsuperscript{40} Given that the injustice of politically sanctioned human slavery (along with the abuse of Native-Americans) not only pre-dated Thoreau's birth but is repeatedly mentioned by him as the source of his refusal

\textsuperscript{37} Id. at 50-51.

\textsuperscript{38} Id. at 65-66.

\textsuperscript{39} THOREAU, supra note 16, at 4.

\textsuperscript{40} Id. at 20; see also id. at 13 ("I, Henry Thoreau, do not wish to be regarded as a member of any incorporated society which I have not joined.").
of consent, it may be that Thoreau took himself never to have consented to the authority of his government over him. Or perhaps he takes himself to have given and then legitimately withdrawn that consent (or to have given only a conditional consent, whose conditions were exceeded by severe societal injustice). In any event, Thoreau presumably regards the same consent-style argument as applicable to the positions of all of his fellow citizens (the individuals who constitute the “higher and independent power” from which all of the state’s “own power and authority are derived”), which might imply governmental illegitimacy with respect to either many or all of those citizens.

Whether or not Thoreau believed that his fellow citizens had never really consented at all, he was well known for believing at least that his neighbors should withdraw their consent and, when appropriate, disobey as he had done. Recall the oft-quoted (but probably apocryphal) exchange between a distressed Emerson and an untroubled Thoreau in the Concord jail: “Henry, why are you here?”; “Waldo, why are you not here?” It is less clear (as we will see) where Thoreau stood on the question of whether all United States citizens should withdraw their consent if their doing so would result in the collapse of the United States, rather than merely in its reform.

The second, still more radical, claim made by Thoreau is that political allegiance and state authority conflict with our more fundamental moral obligation to act rightly – that is, to act in accordance with our own, not our society’s (or the majority’s), judgment of where the right lies: “I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume, is to do at any time what I think right.” On this point, Thoreau stands on familiar anarchist ground, denying that the state’s demand for obedience could ever be legitimate. He anticipates Robert Wolff’s

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41 Id. at 4 (“I cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as my government which is the slave’s government also.”). Of the Governor of his state, Thoreau writes, “He was no Governor of mine. He did not govern me.” THOREAU, supra note 27, at 125.

42 See THOREAU, supra note 27, at 133 (“Let each inhabitant of the State dissolve his union with her, as long as she delays to do her duty.”).

43 THOREAU, supra note 16, at 21.


45 THOREAU, supra note 16, at 2; see also THOREAU, A Plea for Captain John Brown, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 16, at 137, 156 (1859) (“What right have you to enter into a compact with yourself that you will do thus or so, against the light within you? Is it for you to make up your mind . . . and not accept the convictions that are forced upon you . . . ?”); THOREAU, supra note 27, at 135 (“I would remind my countrymen that they are to be men first, and Americans only at a late and convenient hour.”).

46 Thoreau’s relationship to anarchism is a subject of some controversy. He is often mentioned as one of the American fathers of “individualist anarchism” (along with the so-called “Boston anarchists,” including Tucker and Spooner). Myron Simon, Thoreau and Anarchism, 23 Mich. Q. Rev. 360, 363-68 (1984). But it is just as frequently denied that
virtually identical assertion of an absolute "obligation" of personal "autonomy" (and echoes William Godwin’s related concern that any duty of political allegiance would conflict with our fundamental moral duty to promote utility and with each individual’s right to privately judge the actions mandated by the utilitarian calculus). Here the idea is that any sort of generic obligation to obey the law – including an obligation to obey all just laws, or to obey all laws that are simply within a tolerable distance from the just – is inconsistent with our more fundamental moral obligations. Thus, such an obligation of legal obedience simply cannot exist, however hard we might try to undertake or impose it. Laws must be complied with only where the acts (or omissions) they require are independently morally obligatory, and they may be complied with only where they require acts that are independently morally permissible. But obedience to law, where “obedience” is strictly construed, cannot be morally required at all. This line of argument not only constitutes a defense of anarchism, it makes the truth of anarchism knowable a priori. No state, no matter how just it might be, could claim genuine moral authority to impose on its subjects’ moral obligations of legal obedience.

Thoreau was any sort of anarchist. See, e.g., Rosenblum, supra note 24, at xix; Simon, supra, at 368-84. In the opening paragraphs of Civil Disobedience, Thoreau is plainly distancing himself from one sort of anarchism – namely, the Christian anarchism of Garrison and his abolitionist followers, who were pacifist non-resisters (because of God’s prohibitions on violence) and “no-government men” (rejecting the state because of the superiority of God’s claims to control over man to those made government). THOREAU, supra note 16, at 1-6. But Thoreau is, I believe, defending another, more “philosophical” sort of anarchism – one that acknowledges the potential usefulness of the state (“Government is at best but an expedient . . .”) and that denies any moral imperative to do away with states (“I ask for, not at once no government, but at once a better government.”), but that maintains nonetheless the moral illegitimacy of the state’s demand for obedience (as I argue in the text below). Id. at 1-2. We may not yet be ready to live without government. But: “That government is best which governs not at all”; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have.” Id. at 1.

47 Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism 12-18 (1970). Wolff says “the primary obligation of man is autonomy,” an obligation which he characterizes in terms of “taking responsibility for one’s actions,” refusing to be “subject to the will of another,” and never neglecting the task “of attempting to ascertain what is right.” Id. at 12-14, 18. Compare Thoreau: “What is it to be born free and not to live free? What is the value of any political freedom, but as a means to moral freedom?” THOREAU, Life Without Principle, in Political Writings, supra note 16, at 103, 117 (1863).

48 See William Godwin, 1 An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, and Its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness 110 (Raymond A. Preston ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1926).

49 And these obligations are ubiquitous: “Our whole life is startlingly moral.” Henry David Thoreau, Walden, in Walden and Other Writings of Henry David Thoreau 3, 196 (Brooks Atkinson ed., 1937) (1854). “It is not for a man to put himself in such an attitude to society, but to maintain himself in whatever attitude he find himself through obedience to the laws of his being . . . .” Id. at 287-88.
Like a contemporary philosophical anarchist, Thoreau is not unwilling to acknowledge the obvious virtues of the United States, nor does he deny that the state may be useful in various ways. Indeed, he intends to make good use of his state where doing so advances his purposes. Thoreau, rather dramatically, claims, "I quietly declare war with the State, after my fashion, though I will make what use and get what advantage of her I can, as is usual in such cases." He is principally concerned to deny only that the United States has legitimate authority with respect to him and that it may justifiably demand his obedience. He thus declares his intention "to refuse allegiance to the State, to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually." Thoreau will comply with law only in a selective fashion, as the right permits, confident that he can discharge his moral obligations as a person (as well as his duties as a neighbor) without accepting either membership in the political society or its demanded obligations of compliance and support.

Thoreau's declaring his willingness to quietly "use" the state that illegitimately coerces him, rather than his advocating for or engaging in revolutionary activity against the state, highlights the principal respect in which Thoreau's is a more "philosophical" brand of anarchism (in contrast with the familiar caricature of anarchists as "bomb-throwers"). Thoreau seems to allow both (a) that his obligations to his fellow humans and his duties to his neighbors set limits on permissible strategies of disobedience, and (b) that the state's illegitimacy with respect to him does not require him (or anyone else) to actively oppose or attempt to do away with that state. Less plausibly, perhaps, he also seems to take his obligations and duties to be at least primarily negative - that is, to be requirements only to refrain from directly harming others or from participating in activities that do harm to them. Not only does he not take himself to be obligated to actively oppose the state that illegitimately coerces him, he appears not to take himself to be bound even to try to actively oppose the injustices that led him to withdraw his consent to his government's political authority over him:

"It is not a man's duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the eradication of any, even the most enormous wrong; he may still properly..."

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50 THOROE, supra note 16, at 18 ("[T]he Constitution, with all its faults, is very good; the law and the courts are very respectable; even this State and this American government are, in many respects, very admirable and rare things, to be thankful for..."").

51 Id. at 17.

52 In Walden, Thoreau says that he was arrested because he "did not . . . recognize the authority of . . . the state which buys and sells men, women, and children, like cattle at the door of its senate-house." THOROE, supra note 49, at 155.

53 THOROE, supra note 16, at 17.

54 Of his jailing and his possible responses to it, Thoreau says, "It is true, I might have resisted forcibly with more or less effect, might have run 'amok' against society; but I preferred that society should run 'amok' against me, it being the desperate party." THOROE, supra note 49, at 155.
have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and . . . not to give it practically his support.\textsuperscript{55}

Thoreau was, of course, raised in an abolitionist household (that served as a refuge for fugitive slaves), and he became himself increasingly active in the abolitionist movement in New England in his later years.\textsuperscript{56} But he seemed never to regard such positive involvement as each person’s moral duty. At the very least, though, we should take Thoreau to be subscribing to the Rawlsian view that our natural duty of justice is limited by a cost-qualifier, that we need not “further just arrangements” beyond that point where we can do so “without too much cost to ourselves.”\textsuperscript{57}

There is one final respect in which the civil disobedience defended and practiced by Thoreau was plainly unlike the kind of civil disobedience discussed by Rawls (and his interlocutors). While Thoreau was, of course, concerned that his conduct toward his neighbors should be suitably “neighborly,” it is unlikely that the “civil” in Thoreau’s term “civil disobedience” was intended by him to refer to forms of disobedience that were appropriately neighborly, peaceful, or otherwise characterized by any special kind of “civility.” Our inclination to regard Thoreau as so motivated seems less a matter of our reading his texts than one of our reading back into those texts the commitments to pacifism and non-violence with which many of the more recent campaigns of civil disobedience (such as those of Gandhi and King) have been associated. Thoreau’s first title for the published essay was simply \textit{Resistance to Civil Government}, in which the “civil” clearly refers to the sort of institution at which the disobedience was directed, not the kind of disobedience employed.\textsuperscript{58} Though Thoreau disobeyed peacefully and went quite contentedly to jail for it, he was by no means obviously committed, at least as any matter of principle, to non-violence in protesting or combating injustice.\textsuperscript{59} Indeed, he strongly praised the “noble” (and, of course, quite violent) actions of John Brown, which in Thoreau’s view “earned immortality” for Brown and finally cast their shared abolitionist cause “in the clearest light that shines on this land.”\textsuperscript{60}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[55] \textsc{Thoreau, supra} note 16, at 7.
\item[56] See \textsc{Rosenblum, supra} note 24, at vii-viii.
\item[57] \textsc{Rawls, supra} note 2, at 115.
\item[58] See \textsc{Glick, supra} note 26, at 320.
\item[59] \textsc{Thoreau, supra} note 45, at 153 (“I do not wish to kill nor to be killed, but I can foresee circumstance in which both these things would be by me unavoidable.”); \textsc{Thoreau, supra} note 27, at 134 (“Show me a free state, and a court truly of justice, and I will fight for them, if need be . . . .”).
\item[60] \textsc{Thoreau, The Last Days of John Brown, in Political Writings, supra} note 16, at 165-66, 169 (1860).
\end{footnotes}
III. NONIDEAL THEORY AND PRINCIPLES FOR INDIVIDUALS

Rawls's discussion of civil disobedience (and conscientious refusal) in *A Theory of Justice* stands out from the bulk of that work – as well as from Rawls's entire body of philosophical writings – in two ways. First, most of Rawls's work concerns the principles of justice for the basic structure of society, those principles that should shape society's fundamental political, legal, and economic institutions. These are principles that are not directly applicable to the conduct of private individuals, including conduct involving individual disobedience to law. Rawls's treatment of civil disobedience, by contrast, is said by him to be part of his explication of what he calls "principles for individuals." Second, where Rawls's philosophical work concentrated throughout on the "ideal theory" of justice, his discussion of civil disobedience was (until *The Law of Peoples*) Rawls's only serious foray into what he called the "nonideal theory" of justice. As Rawls gradually recast the arguments of *A Theory of Justice*, first to shape them into a more straightforwardly "political conception" of justice and then to extend them to the domain of international relations, the nature of the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, I think, grew clearer. At the same time, however, the role of the "principles for individuals" in Rawls's theory of justice grew progressively more obscure.

Rawls introduced the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory in order to structure his ideas about the relationships between philosophical theory and political practice. Like so many of the distinctions he first drew, this one is now widely employed, with the language of ideal and nonideal theory now commonplace in moral and political philosophy. The basic distinction seems simple and uncontroversial: Rawls proposes to "split the theory of justice into two parts." The first – ideal – part of the theory identifies and defends the principles of justice according to which a perfectly just society would be ordered. Assuming "strict compliance" with the principles (but otherwise taking full account of the most intractable features of humans' moral and psychological characters and the facts about the ways in which social institutions must accommodate them), we ask which principles of justice ought to guide the design and operation of the basic structure of a society. Ideal theory thus specifies what Rawls later came to call "a realistic utopia."

Nonideal theory, taking this ideal of social justice as its "long-term goal" or target, then identifies and defends the principles that should guide our actions and policies in our discharging of our "natural duty" of justice – that is, our

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61 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 333-34.
62 Some of the following summarizes the much more detailed treatment of Rawls's ideal and nonideal theories in my *Ideal and Nonideal Theory*, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5 (2010) in which I defend Rawls's view of the nature of, and the relationship between, ideal and nonideal theory in political philosophy. It is only with the content or substance of Rawls's ideal and nonideal theories that I quarrel here.
63 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 245.
duty "to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us" and "to further just arrangements not yet established." Nonideal theory "looks for . . . courses of action that are morally permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective" in advancing us toward a perfectly just social arrangement. Like ideal theory, nonideal theory will thus require both normative and empirical input, including specific empirical facts about the society under consideration as well as more generally applicable social-scientific data. Wherever "here" happens to be, nonideal theory provides philosophical guidance concerning how various agents ought to try to get from "here" to the target ideal of social justice. Because Rawls takes civil disobedience to have as its goal the improvement of near-just social institutions, nonideal theory will include the principles that should guide the actions of civil disobedients. But because societies are not always (or even commonly) nearly just, nonideal theory must also include principles governing actions aimed at more radical or revolutionary social change.

The ideal theory of A Theory of Justice is actually more complex than suggested above, for it appears to be divided into three parts, only the first of which is discussed at length in the book. Rawls divides "the concept of right" into three kinds of principles (each set of principles being, in "justice as fairness," the subject of a separate choice for original position contractors): the principles for "social systems and institutions," those for "individuals," and those for "the law of nations." The two principles of justice, explained and defended at great length by Rawls in A Theory of Justice, are the principles for the first ("social systems and institutions") part of ideal theory. And the principles for the law of nations are eventually described and defended by Rawls (as the choice that would be made in a second kind of original position) in The Law of Peoples. But by the time we get to The Law of Peoples, we find Rawls saying that ideal theory has only two parts: the principles for the basic structure of a perfectly just liberal society and the principles for a just international "Society of Peoples." The "principles for individuals" — including those that apparently formed the basis for Rawls's earlier account of justified civil disobedience and conscientious refusal — seem to have been lost somewhere in the transition.

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls describes the principles for individuals as consisting of "the principle of fairness" (under which fall all "obligations" — that is, all voluntarily assumed moral requirements arising from special

65 Id. at 89; RAWLS, supra note 2, at 115.
66 RAWLS, supra note 64, at 89.
67 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 109 fig., 111.
68 Id. at 109 fig., 110.
69 RAWLS, supra note 64, at 32-34.
70 Id. at 4-5.
71 Id.
relationships or transactions) and the various principles that define our "natural duties." These duties importantly include the natural duty of justice (which underlies Rawls's defense of civil disobedience), but include as well our duties not to injure the innocent and to give mutual aid and respect. What became of this portion of Rawls's ideal theory? I think the likeliest explanation is that as Rawls developed justice as fairness into a purely "political conception of justice," he came to think of these principles for individuals as part of the kind of "comprehensive doctrine" that he wished to reject. The political conception of justice as fairness treats its principles as parts of an autonomous domain of moral philosophy, distinct from and in no way derived from more general moral principles that would be applicable to individuals' private lives. But the "natural" duties to aid and to refrain from injuring others have the look of parts of a moral theory of "natural law" (or of some other kind – perhaps a Kantian kind – of comprehensive moral theory), a theory applicable to persons both in and out of political society, in both their private and their public lives.

Once Rawls elected (in the papers leading up to Political Liberalism) to defend the principles for society's basic structure as only "reasonable" (for a liberal society with a shared liberal political culture), rather than as parts of a true comprehensive moral theory, it may have seemed to him that the principles for individuals – and especially the natural duties – ought to be jettisoned as now-unnecessary parts of his abandoned comprehensive moral theory of "rightness as fairness." Thus, by the time of The Law of Peoples, the principles for individuals are nowhere in evidence. They do make a kind of brief reappearance in a new guise in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, where Rawls again describes "three levels of justice": "first, local justice (principles applying directly to institutions and associations); second, domestic justice (principles applying to the basic structure of society); and finally, global justice (principles applying to international law)." While Rawls is not entirely clear about what he means by "local justice," he appears to be thinking of special principles of justice that govern our "sub-structural level" voluntary arrangements and associations. While local associations are, as Rawls explains, constrained and limited by the broader principles of domestic justice – so that we may not associate in ways prohibited by just institutions of the basic structure – there are additional moral constraints (of justice) on how local associations may operate (without which there would, of course, be no "third level" of justice, no third group of principles, at all).

Rawls does not tell us what principles of "local justice" might look like, but a natural conjecture is that a central principle would be something like the

72 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 111-12.
73 Id. at 109 fig.
75 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 17.
principle of fairness – the principle that specifies that we must honor our agreements\(^7\) and do our fair shares within cooperative schemes (that is, within voluntary local associations and institutions).\(^8\) If so, then one part of Rawls’s earlier “principles for individuals” has reemerged, but only under a heading that appears designed to distance the principle of fairness from any more general (or comprehensive) moral theory that might be taken to apply as well to our more private lives. Rawls now has his theory of justice require fairness only in our more “institutional” interactions with others. Oddly, this way of reintroducing the principles for individuals again appears to commit Rawls to abandoning his efforts to offer theoretical guidance to practitioners of civil disobedience and conscientious refusal. For those activities plainly need not be undertaken through anything that qualifies as a local “association” or “institution,” meaning that they will not necessarily fall within the domain of “local justice,” as Rawls describes it.

Even more oddly, this entire strategy of avoidance in the “progress” of Rawls’s theory of justice seems to me entirely unnecessary. For we can surely accept Rawls’s insistence on the autonomy of political philosophy – that we sharply separate the theory of social justice from the principles of interpersonal morality\(^9\) – without abandoning the idea of principles for individuals as a (third) part of the ideal theory of justice. All that is necessary is that we construe the principles for individuals not as moral principles for individuals \textit{qua} persons, but only as principles requiring just conduct by individuals in their roles as citizens of just societies. The original position contractors will presumably be interested (just as Rawls argued in \textit{A Theory of Justice}\(^80\)) not only in the ways in which their basic institutions are structured, but also in the ways that individuals behave in their institutional roles or in their public roles as citizens. And the principles for individuals originally defended by Rawls seem a particularly likely expression of this latter interest. A just society

\(^7\) In \textit{A Theory of Justice}, Rawls argues that “the principle of fidelity [which requires the keeping of promises] is but a special case of the principle of fairness applied to the social practice of promising.” \textit{Rawls}, supra note 2, at 344.

\(^8\) The kinds of local institutions or associations Rawls has in mind would presumably have to be voluntary ones, since justified use of coercion is the special province of the political/legal institutions at the level of the basic structure.

\(^9\) This separation is, of course, a result of Rawls’s worries that a defensible conception of justice must be \textit{stable} (and “stable for the right reasons”). \textit{See Rawls, supra} note 64, at 44-45. If we defend justice as fairness as a \textit{true} conception of justice, derived from more comprehensive true moral principles (say, principles defining the natural rights of persons), those who embrace competing comprehensive principles (say, utilitarian ones or those of some religious ethic) must reject justice as fairness. That conception cannot then serve as a \textit{public} conception of justice which we can expect to be endorsed and supported by all reasonable members of the society. It can at best generate its own support as the subject of a \textit{shared modus vivendi}, rather than being regarded by all as the \textit{best} conception of justice for their society.

\(^80\) \textit{Rawls, supra} note 2, at 113-14.
requires that its citizens acknowledge both special, voluntarily-assumed obligations of certain kinds (including those created by the oaths of office of those citizens who become public officials) and various non-voluntary ("natural") duties (including the duty to support and comply with the state's just institutions).81 Nothing in the acceptance of such principles of justice for individuals seems (to me, at least) in any way at odds with the "political turn" in Rawls's thought. If so, then we should expect that even a "fully developed" (i.e., "political, not metaphysical"82) Rawlsian theory will indeed include the kinds of moral principles that Rawls claims are directly at issue in the justifications of various kinds of legal disobedience.

Because Rawls's ideal theory of justice contains multiple parts (either two or, as I have argued, three), so must his nonideal theory, which governs our responses to failures to live up to the relevant ideal principles. The ideal theory of domestic (basic structural) justice, then, will define the target for the nonideal theory of domestic justice; the ideal theory of international justice will define the target for nonideal international theory, and so on. That much seems clear. When Rawls initially tries to explain further the structure and content of nonideal theory in A Theory of Justice, however, his few remarks are confusing: He tells us that nonideal theory (focusing here, it seems, only on domestic nonideal theory) has "two rather different subparts," the first consisting of principles for addressing "natural limitations and historical contingencies" and the second of "principles for meeting injustice."83 Since nonideal theory in its entirety was originally characterized as telling us how we ought to respond to injustice — that is, to failures to satisfy the ideal principles of justice — having only one of these "subparts" of nonideal theory concern "meeting injustice" remains somewhat mysterious in A Theory of Justice. The point of the distinction eventually becomes clearer, however, when Rawls addresses (twenty-eight years later) nonideal theory for international relations.84

In The Law of Peoples, remember, Rawls again describes a two-part nonideal theory, the parts similarly concerned, respectively, with "unfavorable conditions" and "noncompliance." But in the international theory, the "cases" covered in the two parts are two kinds of societies or "peoples." The "unfavorable conditions" cases are what Rawls calls "burdened societies," while the "noncompliance" cases are the so-called "outlaw states." Burdened

81 Id. at 111-17.
83 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 246.
84 RAWLS, supra note 64, at 89-120. Most of the following interpretive points in this Part are argued for in much more detail and at much greater length in my Ideal and Nonideal Theory. Simmons, supra note 62, at 12-18.
85 RAWLS, supra note 64, at 5.
86 Id.
societies are ones that should be helped (to become well-ordered); outlaw states should be pressured to change their ways, and their wrongs (both internal and external) should be opposed (by force, if necessary). This makes it clear, I think, that Rawls’s real intention (in his divisions of nonideal theory) is to distinguish between the nonideal principles governing our dealings with merely unfortunate (or non-blameworthy) failures to comply with ideal principles and the nonideal principles governing our responses to deliberate (or blameworthy) failures. And, of course, Rawls seems correct that the ways we should address those two kinds of failures might be quite different; a morally permissible (and effective) response, for instance, to societal poverty or cultural obstacles to full justice would likely be rather different from the response we ought to make to deliberate human rights violations or international aggression.

Bearing in mind this two-part division of nonideal theory – while recalling that ideal theory itself has multiple parts, each with its own corresponding branch of nonideal theory – we are left with a more complicated picture of the structure of Rawlsian nonideal theory than one might have anticipated. In fact, there would seem to be six separate parts of nonideal theory, comprising, respectively, the principles for dealing with:

1. Deliberate noncompliance with ideal principles for the basic structure
2. Unfortunate noncompliance with ideal principles for the basic structure
3. Deliberate noncompliance with ideal principles for international society
4. Unfortunate noncompliance with ideal principles for international society
5. Deliberate noncompliance with ideal principles for individuals
6. Unfortunate noncompliance with ideal principles for individuals

As we have seen, the principles of part 3 (covering responses to outlaw states) will specify the occasions for and permissible (or obligatory) forms of international intervention and just war. The principles of part 4 (for burdened societies) will cover the requirements of international aid.

Further, Rawls appears to suggest in A Theory of Justice that the principles of nonideal theory for individuals will divide into those flowing, on the one hand, from the principle of paternalism – for the treatment of unfortunate noncompliance with the principles for individuals (my part 6), as in cases of immaturity or insanity – and, on the other, from principles of retributive and compensatory justice, which will dictate appropriate responses to crimes and other (deliberate or blameworthy) wrongs (in part 5). Finally, nonideal theory

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87 Id.
88 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 244, 249.
for noncompliance with the two principles of justice (the ideal theory for basic structures) – the part of nonideal theory with which Rawls concerned himself in *A Theory of Justice* – divides into (a) "temporary adjustments," guided by "the general conception of justice" and aimed at eventual full compliance, in order to deal with unfortunate societal poverty or historical or cultural limitations (in part 2);²⁸⁹ and (b) the principles of civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and non-civil resistance, understood now as responses to deliberate or blameworthy domestic injustice (in part 1).

Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience (and conscientious refusal), then, is part of nonideal theory for the basic structure, because civil disobedience, properly understood, is motivated by and aimed at repairing injustice in the institutions of society’s basic structure. Rawls’s account of civil disobedience is *not*, as I understand it (and contrary to at least the appearance of some of Rawls’s claims about it), a part of the nonideal theory that deals with failures to comply with the principles for individuals.⁹⁰ The theory of civil disobedience is connected to Rawls’s “principles for individuals” only in the following sense: The ideal principles of justice for individuals specify the obligations and duties of citizens in just or near-just societies, some of which must be overridden in order to justify legal disobedience, and some of which directly require that we respond to societal injustice. In particular, the individual citizen’s natural duty of justice both requires general compliance with the institutional rules of a just basic structure (a duty that must be overridden in order for legal disobedience to be justified) and requires that we further just arrangements where they do not exist (which imposes a duty to try to remedy injustices in our basic institutions).

IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTS OF DISOBEDIENCE

Rawls’s nonideal theory of justified legal disobedience by individuals thus identifies as the object of that disobedience repairing injustice in society’s basic structure. If that injustice is limited or anomalous, so that we have a near-just institutional structure, then any justified disobedience must be civil. If injustice is more widespread and intransigent, then non-civil forms of disobedience may be justified (which might aim at repairing the injustice by radically changing or even by removing the infected institutions). Recall,

²⁸⁹ *Id.* at 62, 152.

⁹⁰ Each of the three parts of nonideal theory will specify secondary principles for addressing noncompliance with the primary principles of its corresponding part of ideal theory. And the agents bound by the principles of nonideal theory need not be of only one kind. So, for instance, for noncompliance by the institutions of society’s basic structure, nonideal theory may specify different principles to direct the actions of individual citizens, of government officials, of foreign nationals, and so on. Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience is (part of) the content of nonideal theory for the basic structure; but it is the part addressed to ordinary citizens of the particular society whose basic structure has failed the test of ideal justice.
however, that Thoreau’s civil disobedience was a response not only to injustice in his society’s core institutions. Thoreau also took his disobedience to be justified by the fact that he owed no obligations of allegiance at all to his state or government. The presence of such obligations establishes (at least) a strong moral presumption in favor of obedience to law. But Thoreau saw no moral presumption at all in favor of legal obedience, no presumption which needed to be overcome or outweighed in order to justify his disobedience. How might a position like Thoreau’s be reconciled with the structure of Rawlsian nonideal theory?

We can for current purposes set to one side Thoreau’s anarchist pronouncements; Rawls obviously cannot endorse any argument aiming to show that even a perfectly just state would still be morally illegitimate with respect to all of its subjects (because, according to Thoreau, their accepting its authority would be inconsistent with their fundamental obligations to personally decide and do what is right). And Rawls clearly supposes that he has good grounds for rejecting Thoreau’s personal consent-based standards for governmental legitimacy, so that Thoreau could not reasonably insist that he, simply by virtue of his personal withdrawal of (or failure to) consent, was freed of duties of allegiance. What cannot be so blithely dismissed by Rawls (or Rawlsians), however, is the more general line of argument suggested by Thoreau’s remarks: namely, that structural injustice is not the only defensible object of legal disobedience, that historical illegitimacy can also poison the state’s claims to allegiance and can justify disobedience as a response to (or in order to repair) that wrong.

By “structural injustice,” of course, I mean injustice in the institutional rules of society’s basic structure. But by “historical illegitimacy,” I mean wrongful conduct in the history of the state’s subjection of persons or territories to its coercive powers. Thoreau’s critique of his United States, I think, involved charging it with both of these kinds of defects. Now it might seem that one cannot charge a state with historical illegitimacy except in consequence of its great structural injustices, so that while perhaps Thoreau’s critique was defensible in his day, it could not have been in a better, more just day. In the kind of near-just state discussed by Rawls, there could only be justified complaints about the remaining imperfections in the basic structure – but no warranted complaints about historical illegitimacy. But any such appearance is clearly mistaken.


92 My subsequent focus in this Essay on questions of historical legitimacy should not be taken to indicate that I think state legitimacy is the only important dimension of the moral assessments of states (and their conduct). But I do think that it is a dimension importantly distinct from those factors that bear on states’ justifications. My remarks here should be read in light of the distinction between state legitimacy and the justification of the state, as I present it in Justification and Legitimacy. A. JOHN SIMMONS, Justification and Legitimacy, in JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 31, at 122, 122.
Societies may have nearly, or even perfectly, just basic structures in the Rawlsian sense while still wrongly imposing those structures on persons, in consequence of historical "wrongs of subjection." Justice for Rawls is perfectly forward-looking; just institutions are simply those that satisfy Rawls's two principles of justice, neither of which in any way addresses the issue of to which particular persons those institutions' rules are legitimately applied.\footnote{See \textit{Rawls}, supra note 2, at 60.} Consider again the charges Thoreau levels against "his" country.\footnote{See \textit{Thoreau}, supra note 16, at 123-36.} His state's institutions had \textit{plainly} not been imposed in defensible ways on those who had been kidnapped and brought to "his" country in chains to live out short, miserable lives in bondage, or on the aboriginal peoples who had been decimated, forcibly relocated, and whose ways of life had been destroyed or deliberately corrupted. Nor were the territories (or their inhabitants) seized from (or "ceded" by) Mexico in a trumped-up war of acquisition subjected to the United States' institutional rules in a legitimate fashion. Nor (finally) is it in any way obvious that the United States somehow mysteriously acquired legitimate authority over those persons or territories -- or over the children of those persons -- simply through the passage of time.\footnote{The passage of time can, of course, complicate questions about \textit{membership} in illegitimately subjected groups (because of intermarriage, etc.), as Susanne Sreedhar observed. \textit{See} Susan Sreedhar, \textit{Anarchism, Historical Illegitimacy and Civil Disobedience: Reflections on A. John Simmons's Disobedience and Its Objects}, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1833, 1837 (2010). Such complications, however, seem to me only complications, not in any way \textit{nullifications} of the relevant moral facts. Those facts may be easiest to sort out -- as they were in Thoreau's case -- when they are addressed soon after the historical wrongs at issue.}

Rawls must say of Thoreau's United States that it was simply too unjust to be able to render legitimate its coercive powers. But let us strip Thoreau's United States of human slavery and its program of destroying its aboriginal peoples, alter its constitution and laws to protect the basic rights of its subjects, and deny it its expansionist propensities, and we would then have a state sufficiently just to render legitimate its demands for support and compliance. Thoreau's refusal of allegiance would then be indefensible in Rawlsian terms, as would be similar refusals of allegiance by the remnants of and the children of slaughtered aboriginal peoples, by the now-freed African slaves and their children, or by newly anointed U.S. citizens in former Mexican territories. The grim and bloody histories of political subjection and their enduring consequences would purportedly be laid to rest by simple institutional reform and modification.

But surely that is to ignore an extremely important dimension of the citizen-state relationship, a dimension regularly appealed to by, or on behalf of, those who claim to have been (possibly because of having ancestors who were) wrongly subjected to states' claimed authority. It is a dimension that is quite distinct from the dimension of structural justice. To take an obvious
contemporary example (but also a deeply complicated one, to only one aspect of which I attend here): Consider the stated position of some Palestinians. Their principal charge is not that Israel’s basic structure is in itself deeply unjust or that its government is (for that or for any other reason) illegitimate with respect to all who live in Israel’s claimed territories. It is rather that the subjection specifically of Palestinians and their homeland to Israeli rule was historically, and, consequently, continues to be, illegitimate.96

Many groups around the world that are seeking independence or greater autonomy make similar claims. The numerous suits by Native American tribes all around the United States aimed at recovering lands (or the value of such lands) stolen or fraudulently acquired from them constitute similar appeals to the historical illegitimacy of state subjection, not appeals to any structural injustice.97 When we assess the plausibility of such group demands for reparations or for political autonomy, the kinds of historical standards for legitimacy which we are discussing are precisely the ones we are normally inclined to employ. Whether or not persons are legitimately subject to political power is a question most naturally addressed by considering whether or not they were (or have since become) willingly subjected. Whether or not a geographical territory is legitimately subject to state control is a question most naturally addressed by considering whether or not that land has been lived on or used by the state’s willing subjects and whether or not those subjects wrongly forced others from the land.

My point here is only that many of the objects of legal disobedience in actual political affairs concern neither some simple structural injustice nor some particularly deep structural injustice that is thought to have delegitimated the state with respect to all of its claimed subjects (or territories). Rather, the claim is often one of partial state illegitimacy with respect to certain wronged peoples, and the object of their disobedience is precisely to defy or to repair that wrong. Rawls’s theory of domestic justice appears to have no place for such complaints of partial illegitimacy, for considering the moral positions of subsets of the society’s members who are illegitimately subjected to state power.98

Rawls begins with the idea of domestic societies or nations

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96 Such claims, of course, are meant to deny or trump similar historical claims to this same territory by Israeli citizens. That is just one of the many complexities of the case that I do not even begin to address here.

97 This is not to say, of course, that the relative urgency of demands for reparation would not be likely to be reduced by instead simply moving closer to or bringing about full structural justice. It is to say, rather, that Rawls’s theory seems unable to account for a significant moral “vector” in our commonsense analysis of such cases.

98 I, in fact, subscribe to the kind of philosophical anarchism to which some of Thoreau’s remarks point. On that view, of course, the “partial state legitimacy” to which I refer here is actually rather complete. Most of us are illegitimately subjected to state coercion. My purpose here is to grant Rawls his denial of the anarchist view to see whether his position could then yield a plausible account of justified legal disobedience. My argument here is that the answer to that question is no.
("peoples") as having fixed sets of members and fixed geographical boundaries. The moral question for Rawls is simply whether the basic structure of the society is sufficiently just that its coercive powers can be justified to all reasonable persons within its claimed (or acknowledged) boundaries.99

There is, then, no place in Rawls's theory of domestic justice to acknowledge the legitimate grievances of — and the moral justifications for legal disobedience by — persons who have been illegitimately subjected to state coercion, except in cases where all subjects can be so described. States, for Rawls, are either sufficiently just that all of their claimed subjects are legitimately subject to their coercive powers — because the states' basic structures could be expected to be endorsed by all reasonable persons100 — or they are sufficiently unjust that they have no authority whatsoever, leaving all of their claimed subjects morally at liberty (that is, bound only by whatever morality they are subject to simply as persons). Rawls's nonideal theory is not, then, inadequate merely because its account of civil disobedience fails to apply to the paradigm practitioners of civil disobedience, such as Thoreau. It is more deeply inadequate in precluding without argument even the possible justifiability of legal disobedience for the sorts of reasons (and with the sorts of objects) that characterize not only some of Thoreau's concerns, but those of many others, both historical and contemporary.

Now it might seem that the place to look for Rawls's acknowledgment of the justifiability of disobedience on grounds of "partial illegitimacy" is not in his theory of domestic justice at all, but rather in his theory of international justice. The principles of "the law of peoples," after all, include the prohibition of aggressive war and require that human rights be honored,101 so wrongful subjection of persons (though perhaps not always of territories) might appear to be prohibited by Rawls's ideal "law of nations." But notice that the law of peoples requires these things only going forward.102 None of the principles of the law of peoples require that past wrongs be corrected or rectified, even if those past wrongs are identical in all but temporal location to wrongs that would now justify intervention or defensive war with the objective of restoring the status quo ante.103 Rawls's reasoning about the law of peoples,

99 See RAWLS, supra note 74, at 137.
100 Id. ("[O]ur exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy.").
101 RAWLS, supra note 64, at 37.
102 See id. at 35.
103 Nor would violations of the principles of the law of peoples justify responses by individuals or sub-state groups who were victims of such wrongs. See id. at 5. Nonideal international theory for Rawls governs the justified responses by peoples or nations (or "societies") to violations by other societies of the ideal principles for "international society." Id. The justified responses to injustice by individuals or sub-state groups appear to be
like his reasoning about domestic justice, simply presumes the current legitimacy of generally recognized territories and claimed subject groups.

Rawls does comment very briefly in passing on the fact that societies’ boundaries may be viewed as “historically arbitrary”:

It does not follow from the fact that boundaries are historically arbitrary that their role in the Law of Peoples cannot be justified. On the contrary, to fix on their arbitrariness is to fix on the wrong thing. In the absence of a world-state, there must be boundaries of some kind, which when viewed in isolation will seem arbitrary, and depend to some degree on historical circumstances.\(^{104}\)

But the kind of complaint about “historical illegitimacy” with which I am concerned is not just the complaint that a society’s boundaries (and thus the individual and groups of persons and useful resources that are subject to its coercive control) are “arbitrary” in the sense that they could easily have been otherwise, given different historical events. It is rather that the boundaries in question, both internal and external, have in fact been established by state conduct that was undeniably morally wrong. Rawls’s only argument for disregarding such wrongs and for taking “presently accepted” boundaries as morally “fixed,” is the following:

An important role of a people’s government, however arbitrary a society’s boundaries may appear from a historical point of view, is to be the representative and effective agent of a people as they take responsibility for their territory and its environmental integrity, as well as for the size of their population. . . . Unless a definite agent is given responsibility for maintaining an asset and bears the loss for not doing so, that asset tends to deteriorate. In this case the asset is the people’s territory and its capacity to support them in perpetuity . . . .\(^{105}\)

But this kind of “stewardship argument,” and the potential for “commons tragedies” to which it refers, – even if we were to accept it without qualification – cannot help Rawls deal with the problem of “partial illegitimacy” to which Thoreau’s arguments have pointed us. At most this argument shows that some state or other should control useful land and material assets (and the people who depend on them), not that any particular state should control any particular assets. This argument certainly does not demonstrate that all “currently established” boundaries (according to whatever “consensus” the “community of nations” might have managed to achieve) are morally unchallengeable.\(^{106}\) For Rawls to think otherwise seems to me to

\(^{104}\) Id. at 39.

\(^{105}\) Id. at 38-39.

\(^{106}\) I also do not believe that Rawls’s points actually show (or even argue for) political control of all of the world’s (or the solar system’s, or the universe’s) useable assets. On the
amount to his committing himself to one or the other of two indefensible views: either (a) that wrongs done yesterday are in principle morally different from identical wrongs done tomorrow; or (b) that all cases of “historical illegitimacy” – that is, all past wrongful subjections by states of persons and territories – are in principle irremediable and so morally uninteresting. Both views seem to be self-evidently false. And non-Rawlsian explanations for such moral conservatism about “historically arbitrary” boundaries – such as utilitarian worries about the transition costs of territorial adjustments – seem to me also inadequate to justify that conservatism. While we may indeed need to “start somewhere,” the particular place where we find ourselves now need not be that place.

The focus in Rawls’s theory of domestic justice is on the structural features of just political, legal, and economic institutions (just as the focus of his theory of international justice is on the structural features of a just society of peoples, and of its participating liberal – and other “decent” – peoples). But structurally just arrangements, no matter how admirable they may be in themselves, may not be justifiably imposed on all and sundry, without regard for whether this imposition is defensible as a process. Simply in virtue of (let us say, arguendo) the near-justice of the basic structure of the United States, the United States surely could not be justified in annexing Mexico and coercively imposing U.S. law on Mexican citizens (even if that were accompanied by the granting of U.S. rights) – as we tried to do, after a fashion, with a portion of Mexico in Thoreau’s day.

And if we cannot do this now, then we may not reasonably assume that all existing states’ currently accepted claims with regard to subject populations or geographical territories are simply to be given a free pass, subjected to no moral scrutiny – regardless of how fine or just those states’ legal, political, and economic institutions may have been (or have become). The legitimacy of state coercion requires more than its being in accordance with near-just institutions. It requires that those institutions be (and have been) imposed on persons and territories in morally defensible ways.¹⁰⁷ These points highlight inadequacies not only in Rawls’s particular political philosophy, but also in much of contemporary democratic theory, which suffers from the same problems. In trying to explain “democratic authority,” philosophers often proceed as if the problem of legitimate subjection for democratic states has

¹⁰⁷ On such internal “pedigree” requirements for legitimacy, see John Rawls, Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas, 92 J. Phil. 132, 175 (1995). Rawls’s only reference to more historical – or “pedigree-based” – standards for legitimacy concerns simply the non-moral, internal (primarily legal) criteria for governmental legitimacy (or for the legitimacy of specific rulers or specific laws) within a structurally just or legitimate state. Id. Rawls does not consider the sorts of non-structural, historical moral standards for the legitimate subjection of persons or territories to state coercion with which we are here concerned. Id.
already been resolved. Our only concern need be, then, how to explain the peculiar authority of the resolutions of disagreements accomplished by democratic institutions in action. But democratic decision procedures could only plausibly be thought to be authoritative with respect to all members of a group of persons if all of those persons had been previously determined to be legitimately subject to one and the same collective decision procedure. And that determination requires consideration of historical, not merely (democratic) structural, factors. It requires that we assess, not that we accept, the claims of even democratic states to authority over particular persons and territories.

Therefore, nonideal theory for political philosophy must take as its target not simple structural justice, but full—including historical—legitimacy with respect to the uses of political coercion in controlling subjects and territories. Legal disobedience may be justified either simply in response to historically illegitimate subjection by demonstrating the absence of political obligation or by showing how disobedience can justifiably advance the cause of full political legitimacy—which we can here take to include full structural justice. Nonideal theory will then recommend the most effective, morally permissible path to that end. And determinations of moral permissibility will presumably involve balancing the progress that legal disobedience can stimulate against any harms done to others and their associations by acts of legal disobedience, with any negative effects that disobedience might have on the provision of goods that even bad states often accomplish (such as the deterrence and disabling of ordinary criminals). Whether and when legal disobedience must be civil (in Rawls’s sense of that term) will be determined by this same set of factors.

In the end, Thoreau is correct in stressing the importance of historical considerations in the analysis of state legitimacy—by implying that an account like Rawls’s is importantly truncated, and that true moral legitimacy requires more of political societies than that they produce adequately just institutions while wearing forward-looking blinders. It requires options and rectifications for those indefensibly subjected to societies’ coercive powers. 108 Perhaps it requires even that states become the kind of state that Thoreau pleases himself to imagine:

A State at last which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor; which even would not think it inconsistent with its own repose, if a few were to live aloof from it, not

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108 Societies owe rectifications to those they have illegitimately subjected to their political and legal institutions. In my view, this group includes not only the obvious cases of subjugated peoples, but most of the rest of us as well. May we then justifiably disobey the law with the object of doing away with the state altogether? Because many innocent people rely on and want to preserve their states, legal disobedience may in practice now be justified in pursuing only quite gradualist aims, with the achievement of structural justice within the familiar sovereign state as its most imperative “short-term” goal. Thoreau's dream of free political association—and free political disassociation—may be an ideal that can only defensibly be approached very slowly.
meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neighbors and fellow-men.\footnote{THOREAU, supra note 16, at 21.}