Frederick Schauer

  • David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law

Frederick Schauer is David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. From 1990 to 2008 he was Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment at Harvard University, and was previously professor of law at the University of Michigan. He has been visiting professor of law at the Columbia Law School, Fischel-Neil Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, Morton Distinguished Visiting Professor of the Humanities at Dartmouth College, distinguished visiting professor at the University of Toronto, visiting fellow at the Australian National University, distinguished visitor at New York University, and Eastman Professor and fellow of Balliol College at the University of Oxford. A fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship, Schauer is the author of The Law of Obscenity (BNA, 1976), Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge, 1982), Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Clarendon/Oxford, 1991), Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (Harvard, 2003), Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Harvard, 2009), and, most recently, The Force of Law (Harvard, 2015). The editor of Karl Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules (Chicago, 2011), and a founding editor of the journal Legal Theory, he has been chair of the Section on Constitutional Law of the Association of American Law Schools and of the Committee on Philosophy and Law of the American Philosophical Association. In 2005 he wrote the foreword to the Harvard Law Review’s annual Supreme Court issue, and has written widely on freedom of expression, constitutional law and theory, evidence, legal reasoning and the philosophy of law. His books have been translated into Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Chinese and Turkish, and his scholarship has been the subject of three books (Rules and Reasoning: Essays in Honour of Fred Schauer, Linda Meyer ed., Hart Publishing, 1999; A Demokracia es a Szolasszabadsag Hatari, Andras Koltay ed., Wolters Kluwer 2014; The Force of Law Reaffirmed; Christoph Bezemek & Nicoletta Ladavac eds., Springer, 2016) and special issues of Jurisprudence, Law & Social Inquiry, Ratio Juris, Politeia, the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, and the Notre Dame, Connecticut and Quinnipiac Law Reviews.

Scholarship Profile: Unconventional Wisdom (Virginia Journal 2010)


  • J.D.
    Harvard Law School
  • M.B.A.
    Dartmouth College
  • A.B.
    Dartmouth College

Books and Book Chapters:

“Incomplete Responses,” in Christoph Bezemek & Nicoletta Ladavac eds., The Force of Law Reaffirmed: Frederick Schauer Meets the Critics 145 (Springer, 2016).

Leading Cases in Constitutional Law (with Choper, Fallon, & Dorf) (West Publishing, 2016). 

“Lessons from the Free Speech Clause,” in Micah Schwartzman et al., eds., The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty 193 (Oxford University Press, 2016).

The Force of Law (Harvard University Press, 2015) (Italian edition, Milan, Libreria Mimesis, forthcoming 2016) (Spanish edition, Fuerza de Ley, Lima, Editores Palestra, 2015) (Portuguese edition, Sao Paolo, Martins Fontes, translation in progress).

Constitutional Law (with Choper, Fallon, & Dorf) (West Publishing, 12th ed., 2015) .

The First Amendment (with Choper & Shiffrin) (West Publishing, 6th ed., 2015).

“Law and Social Cognition” (with Barbara A. Spellman), in Donal E. Carlston, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Social Cognition 829 (Oxford University Press 2014).

“Proportionality and the Question of Weight,” in Grant Huscroft et al., eds., Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning 173 (Cambridge University Press, 2014.

“Foreword,” in Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning v (University of Chicago Press, 2013).

“Hart’s Anti-Essentialism,” in Luis Duarte d’Almeida et al., eds., Reading HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law 237 (Hart Publishing, 2013).

“Must Virtue Be Particular?,” in Amalia Amaya & Ho Hack Lai, eds., Law, Virtue and Justice 265 (Hart, 2013).

“Necessity, Importance, and the Nature of Law,” in Jordi Ferrer Beltrán et al., eds.,Neutrality and Theory of Law 17 (Springer, 2013).

“Positivism Before Hart,” in Michael Freeman & Patricia Mindus, eds., The Legacy of John Austin’s Jurisprudence 271 (Springer, 2013).

“Stare Decisis and the Selection Effect,” in Christopher J. Peters, ed., Precedent in the United States Supreme Court 121 (Springer 2013).

“The Ubiquity of Prevention,” in Andrew Ashworth et al., eds., Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law 10 (Oxford University Press, 2013).

“Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text,” in Matthias Klatt, ed.,Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy 307 (Oxford University Press, 2012).

“Comparative Constitutional Compliance: Notes Towards a Research Agenda,” in Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff, eds., Practice and Theory in Comparative Law 212 (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

“Is Defeasibility an Essential Property of Law?,” in Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista Ratti, eds., The Logic of Legal Requirements: Essays on Defeasibility 77 (Oxford University Press, 2012).

“Legal Reasoning” (with Barbara A. Spellman), in Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison, eds., Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning 719 (Oxford University Press, 2012).

“Social Epistemology, Holocaust Denial, and the Post-Millian Calculus,” in Michael Herz & Peter Molnar, eds., The Content and Regulation of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses 129 (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

“Editor’s Introduction,” in Karl Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules 1 (University of Chicago Press, 2011).

“Perché il precedente nel diritto (e altrove) non è interamente (e nemmeno sostanzialmente) questione di analogia,” in Luca Pelliccioli & Vito Velluzzi, eds., L'analogia e il diritto: Antologia Breve 111-120 (Pisa, Italy: Edizioni ETS, 2011).

“Ponderación, subsunción, y el rol restringente del texto juridico,” in Gustavo A. Beade & Laura Clérico, eds., Desafíos a la ponderación 51-77 (Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2011).

“The Trouble with Cases” (with Richard Zeckhauser), in Daniel P. Kessler, ed., Regulation versus Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law 45 (University of Chicago Press, 2011).

Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Harvard University Press, 2009). (Spanish edition, Madrid, Marcel Pons Ediciones, translation in progress) (Portugese edition, Madrid, Marcial Pons Ediciones, translation in progress) (South Asia edition, Universal Law Publishing Company, forthcoming 2011)

Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (Harvard University Press/Belknap Press, 2003) (paperback edition, 2006)(Italian edition forthcoming Spring 2008, Il Mulino, Bologna; Spanish translation now in progress).

“Institutions and the Concept of Law: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin (with Some Help from Neil MacCormick),” in Maksymilian del Mar & Zenon Bankowski, eds., Law as Institutional Normative Order: Essays in Honour of Sir Neil MacCormick 35 (Ashgate Publishing, 2009).

“Paltering” (with Richard Zeckhauser), in Brooke Harrington, ed., Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating 38 (Stanford University Press, 2009).

“Rules of Recognition, Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law On Acceptance” (with Larry Alexander), in Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Kimma, eds., The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution 175 (Oxford University Press, 2009).

Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, 1991) (paperback edition, 1992) (Italian edition, La Regole del Gioco, Bologna, il Mulino, 2000) (Spanish edition, Las Reglas en Juego, Madrid, Marcel Pons Ediciones, 2004).

The Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary (with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) (Harcourt Brace/Oxford University Press, 1996).

Supplements to Gunther, Constititional Law (Foundation Press, 1983-96).

Law and Language (ed.) (Dartmouth/Gower/Ashgate Publishing Company, 1992).

The First Amendment: A Reader (with John H. Garvey) (West Publishing Company, 1992, 2nd ed., 1995).

Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press, 1982) (paperback edition, 1982) (Turkish edition, İfade Özgürlüğű: Felsefǐ Bir İnceleme, Ankara, Liberal Dűşűnce Topluluğu, 2002).

The Law of Obscenity (BNA Books, 1976).

Articles and Review Essays:

"Sanctions for Acts or Sanctions for Actors"

"Free Speech, the Search for Truth, and the Problem of Collective Knowledge," 70 SMU L. Rev. 231 (2017).

"Law's Boundaries," 130 Harv. L. Rev, 2434 (2017).

"Analogy, Expertise, and Experience" (with Barbara A. Spellman), 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. (2017).

"Every Possible Use of Language?"

"Preferences for Law?"

"Calibrating Legal Judgments" (with Barbara A. Spellman)

“Not Just About License Plates: Walker v Sons of Confederate Veterans, Government Speech, and Doctrinal Overlap in the First Amendment,” The Supreme Court Review 2014(forthcoming 2016).

“Second-Order Vagueness in Law,” in Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher, eds., Vagueness and Law: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives 177 (Oxford University Press, 2016).

“How (and If) Law Matters,” 129 Harvard Law Review Forum, 350 (2016).
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“Fuller’s Fairness: ‘The Case of the Speluncean Explorers,’” 35 U. Queensland L.J. 11 (2016).
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“On the Utility of Religious Toleration,” 10 Crim. L. & Phil. 479 (2016).

“Defeasibilities,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, February 25, 2016.

“Why the Declaration of Independence Is Not Law—and Why It Could Be,” 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 619 (2016).
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“Source Formality in International Law,” in Samantha Besson & Jean d’Espremont, eds.,Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (forthcoming 2016).

“A Reply to Five Friends,” 29 Ratio Juris 348 (2016).

“Free Speech on Tuesdays,” 34 Law and Philosophy 119 (2015).

“Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech,” 128 Harvard Law Review Forum 346 (2015).
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“On the Distinction between Speech and Action,” 65 Emory Law Journal 427 (2015).
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“Legal Fictions Revisited,” in Maksymilian Del Mar & William Twining, eds., Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice 113 (Springer, 2015).

“Testing the Marketplace of Ideas” (with Daniel Ho) 90 New York University Law Review1160 (2015).
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“The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage,” 56 William & Mary Law Review 1613 (2015).
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“The Path Dependence of Legal Positivism,” 101 Virginia Law Review 957 (2015).
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“On the Relationship Between Legal and Ordinary Language,” in Lawrence Solan, Janet
Ainsworth, & Roger Shuy, eds., Speaking of Language and Law 35 (Oxford, 2015).

“Twining on Llewellyn and Legal Realism,” in Christopher McCrudden ed., Law’s Theoretical and Global Contexts: Essays in Honour of William Twining 265 (Cambridge, 2015).

“Is Law a Technical Language?,” 52 San Diego Law Review 1 (2015).
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“Constitutions of Hope and Fear,” 124 Yale L.J. 528 (2014) (reviewing Robert C. Post,Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution (2014)).

“Do People Obey the Law?,” 51 San Diego L. Rev. 939 (2014).

“The Mixed Blessings of Financial Transparency,” 31 Yale J. on Reg. 809 (2014).

“Memorial to John Mansfield,” 128 Harv. L. Rev. 533 (2014).

“Modeling Tolerance,” 170 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 83 (2014).

“Our Informationally Disabled Courts,” 143 Daedalus 105 (2014). 

"Constitutionalism and Coercion," 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1881 (2013).
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“The Decline of ‘The Record’: A Comment on Posner,” 51 Duq. L. Rev. 51(2013).
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“Fish’s Five Theories,” 9 FIU L. Rev. 21 (2013).

“Is Expert Evidence Really Different?” 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (2013) (with B. Spellman).
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“The Jurisprudence of Custom,” 48 Tex. Int'l L. J. 523 (2013).
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“Legal Realism Untamed,” 91 Tex. L. Rev. 749 (2013).
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“The Miranda Warning,” 88 Wash. L. Rev., 155 (2013).
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“Official Obedience and the Politics of Defining ‘Law,’” 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1165 (2013).
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“On the Open Texture of Law,” 87 Grazer Philosophische Studien, 197 (2013).

"Law and Social Cognition," (with Barbara Spellman), Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2012-10.

"Legal Reasoning," (with Barbara Spellman), Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2012-09.

"Lie-Detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence," in Dennis Patterson & Michael S. Pardo, eds., Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience 85 (Oxford University Press, 2016).

“Anonymity and Authority,” 27 J.L. & Pol. 597 (2012).
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"Is the Rule of Recognition a Rule?,” 3 Transnat’l Legal Theory 173 (2012).

“On the Nature of the Nature of Law,” 98 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 457 (2012).

“The Permutations of Academic Freedom,” 65 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2012).
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“Harm(s) and the First Amendment,” 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81 (2012).

“The Political Risks (If Any) of Breaking the Law,” 4 J. Legal Analysis 83 (2012).

"The Best Laid Plans," 120 Yale L.J. 586 (2010) (reviewing Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (2011)).

“Bentham on Presumed Offenses,” 23 Utilitas 363 (2011).

"Is Legality Political?," 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 481 (2011).
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“On the Relation Between Chapters One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty,” 39Cap. U. L. Rev. 571 (2011).
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“Positivism Before Hart,” 24 Can. J.L. & Juris. 455 (2011).
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“Transparency in Three Dimensions,” 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1339.
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"Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence?: Neuroscience, Lie Detection, and Beyond," 95Cornell L. Rev. 1191 (2010).
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"Facts and the First Amendment," 57 UCLA L. Rev. 897 (2010).
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"Is There a Psychology of Judging?," in David Klein & Gregory Mitchell, eds., The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making 103 (Oxford University Press, 2010).

"Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law," 14 Trends Cognitive Sci. 101 (2010).

"Was Austin Right After All? On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law," 23 Ratio Juris1 (2010).

"When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Individual Action?," 44 Ga. L. Rev. 769 (2010).
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“Institutions and the Concept of Law: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin (with Some Help from Neil MacCormick),” in Maksymilian del Mar & Zenon Bankowski, eds., Law as Institutional Normative Order: Essays in Honour of Sir Neil MacCormick 35 (Ashgate Publishing, 2009).

"Legal Fictions Revisited" (work in progress).

"Necessity, Importance, and the Nature of Law" (work in progress).

"On Open Texture of Law" (work in progress).

“Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text,” in Matthias Klatt, ed.,Institutional Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2010).

“Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence?: Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Mistaken Conflation of Legal and Scientific Norms,” 95 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).

“Is Defeasibility an Essential Property of Law?” in Jordi Ferrer, ed., Defeasibility in Law(Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2010).

“The Trouble with Cases” (with R. Zeckhauser), in Daniel Kessler & Andrei Shleifer, eds.,Litigation versus Regulation (National Bureau of Economic Research/University of Chicago Press, forthcoming 2010).

"When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official Action? (The Sibley Lecture)," 44Ga. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).
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“Facts and the First Amendment (the Melville Nimmer Memorial Lecture),” 57 UCLA L. Rev. 897 (2010).
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“Is There a Psychology of Judging?” in David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell, eds., The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making 103 (Oxford University Press, 2010).

“Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law: A Contrarian View,” 14 (3) Trends in Cognitive Sciences 101 (2010).

“Was Austin Right After All?: On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law,” 23 Ratio Juris1 (2010).

“Is it Important to be Important?: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Case Selection Process,” 119 Yale L.J. Online 77 (2009).

"Artists’ Moral Rights and the Psychology of Ownership" (with Barbara A. Spellman) 83Tul. L. Rev. 661 (2009).
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“Institutions and the Concept of Law: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin (with Some Help from Neil MacCormick),” in Maksymilian Del Mar, ed., Law as Institutional Normative Order: Essays in Honour of Sir Neil MacCormick 35 (Ashgate Publishing, 2009).
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"Is it Better to Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech and the Precautionary Principle," 36Pepp. L. Rev. 301 (2009).

"Paltering" (with Richard Zeckhauser), in Brooke Harrington, ed., Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating 38 (Stanford University Press, 2009).

“Rules, Rationality, and the Significance of Standpoint,” 35 Queen’s L.J. 305 (2009).

“Rules of Recognition, Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance” (with L. Alexander), in Matthew Adler & Kenneth Himma, eds., The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitutuion 175 (Oxford University Press, 2009). 

"Authority and Authorities," 94 Va. L. Rev. 1931 (2008).
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"A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park," 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1109 (2008).
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“In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law – and Epistemology Too,” 5 Episteme 295 (2008).

"Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) Is Not Totally (or Even Substantially) about Analogy," 3 Persp. on Psychol. Sci. 454 (2008).

“Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick,” 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 316 (2008).

"Hohfeld’s First Amendment," 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 914 (2008).
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“Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?” (The Henry J. Miller Lecture), 24 Ga. State L. Rev., 381 (2008). 

“Regulation by Generalization (with Richard J. Zeckhauser)," 1 Reg. & Governance 68 (2007).

“Expression and Its Consequences,” U. Toronto L.J., 57 705 (2007).

"Ambivalence about the Law," 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (2007).
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“Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories,” 54 UCLA L. Rev., 1747 (2007),
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“Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law,” in Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy, eds., 13 The Nature of Customary Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

“Should Presidents Obey the Law (And What Is 'The Law,' Anyway),” in Terry L. Price & J. Thomas Wren, eds., 183 The Values of Presidential Leadership (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

“Foreword: The Court’s Agenda – And the Nation’s,” 120 Harv. L. Rev., 4 (2006).
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"Do Cases Make Bad Law?", 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883 (2006).

“On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law,” 155 U. Penn. L. Rev., 165 (2006).
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“(Re)Taking Hart,” 119 Harv. L. Rev., 852 (2006).

“Legislatures as Rule-Followers,” in Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds., The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State 468 (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

“Is There a Right to Academic Freedom,” 77 U. Colo. L. Rev., 907 (2006).
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“Legal Information as Social Capital” (with V. Wise), 99 Law Lib. J., 267 (2006).

"The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson," 25 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 493 (2005).

“Towards an Institutional First Amendment," 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1256 (2005).

“Imposing Rules,” 42 San Diego L. Rev., 85 (2005).
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“The Exceptional First Amendment,” in Michael Ignatieff, ed., American Exceptionalism and Human Rights 29 (Princeton University Press, 2005).

"Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and America: A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture," in Georg Nolte, ed., 47 European and U.S. Constitutionalism (2005).

“On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas,” 37 Conn. L. Rev. 907 (2005).
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“The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards,” 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues803 (2005).
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“On the Relationship Between Press Law and Press Content,” in Timothy Cook, ed.,Freeing the Presses: The First Amendment in Action 51 (Louisiana State University Press, 2005). 

“Deferring,” 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1567 (2005).
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“The Wily Agitator and the American Free Speech Tradition,” 58 Stan. L. Rev. 2157 (2005).

“La Categorizacion, en el Derecho y en el Mundo,” 28 Cuadernos de Filosofia del Derecho307 (2005).

"The 'Speech-ing' of Sexual Harassment," in Catharine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel, eds.,Directions in Sexual Harassment Law 347 (2004).

“The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience," 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765 (2004).
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“The Limited Domain of the Law,” 90 Va. L. Rev. 1909 (2004).
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“Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution,” 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1045 (2004).
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“The ‘Speech-ing’ of Sexual Harassment,” in Catharine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel, eds.,Directions in Sexual Harassment Law 347 (Yale University Press, 2004).

“Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning,” Sup. Court Rev. 2003 197 (2004).
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“The Failure of the Common Law” (The Willard Pedrick Lecture), 36 Az. St. L. Rev., 765 (2004).

“Neutrality and Judicial Review,” 23 Law and Philosophy, 217 (2003).
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“The Convergence of Rules and Standards,” N. Z. L. Rev., 303 (2003).
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“The Heroes of the First Amendment,” Michigan Law Review, 101 (2003), 2118-33
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“The Dilemma of Access,” in Nancy Palmer, ed., Terrorism, War, and the Media (Hollis Publishing, 2003), 259-69

“The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour v. Casey Martin,” Supreme Court Review, 2001 (2002), 267-97
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“First Amendment Opportunism,” in Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone, eds., Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era (University of Chicago Press, 2002), 174-97

“Bundling, Boundary Setting, and the Privatization of Legal Information” (with V. Wise), in John Donahue & Joseph Nye, eds., Market Based Governance (Brookings, 2002), 129-42

“Free Speech and the Social Construction of Privacy,” Social Research, 68 (2001), 221-32

“Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply,” Constitutional Commentary, 17 (2000), 455-82 (with L. Alexander)
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“Non-Legal Information and the Delegalization of Law,” Journal of Legal Studies, 29 (2000), 495-515 (with Virginia J. Wise)
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“Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 17 (2000), 293-309

“The Generality of Rights,” Legal Theory, 6 (2000), 323-36
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“Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior” (The Robert Marx Lecture), University of Cincinnati Law Review, 68 (2000), 615-36
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“The Cost of Communicative Tolerance,” in Raphael Cohen-Almagor ed., Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance (University of Michigan Press, 2000), 28-42

“Speech, Behaviour, and the Interdependence of Fact and Value,” in David Kretzmer & Francine Hazan eds., Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against Democracy (Kluwer, 2000), 28-42

“Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment,” Texas Law Review, 77 (1999), 1803-36 and in J. Rosencranz ed., If Buckley Fell (Century Foundation. 1999), 103-20 (with R. Pildes)

“Talking as a Decision Procedure,” in Stephen Macedo ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999), 17-27

“Fuller on the Ontological Status of Law,” in W.J. Witteveen ed., Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design (Amsterdam University Press, 1999), 124-42

“Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment,” Harvard Law Review, 112 (1998), 84-120

Current Courses


"The Force of Law": UVA Law Professor Frederick Schauer on His New Book