Frederick Schauer

  • David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law

Frederick Schauer is a David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. From 1990 to 2008 he was Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment at Harvard University, and was previously professor of law at the University of Michigan. He has been visiting professor of law at the Columbia Law School, Fischel-Neil Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, Morton Distinguished Visiting Professor of the Humanities at Dartmouth College, distinguished visiting professor at the University of Toronto, visiting fellow at the Australian National University, distinguished visitor at New York University, and Eastman Professor and fellow of Balliol College at the University of Oxford. A fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a corresponding fellow of the British Academy and a recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship, Schauer is the author of The Law of Obscenity (BNA, 1976), Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge, 1982), Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Clarendon/Oxford, 1991), Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (Harvard, 2003), Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Harvard, 2009), and, most recently, The Force of Law (Harvard, 2015). The editor of Karl Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules (Chicago, 2011), and a founding editor of the journal Legal Theory, he has been chair of the Section on Constitutional Law of the Association of American Law Schools and of the Committee on Philosophy and Law of the American Philosophical Association. In 2005 he wrote the foreword to the Harvard Law Review’s annual Supreme Court issue, and has written widely on freedom of expression, constitutional law and theory, evidence, legal reasoning and the philosophy of law. His books have been translated into Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Chinese and Turkish, and his scholarship has been the subject of three books (Rules and Reasoning: Essays in Honour of Fred Schauer, Linda Meyer ed., Hart Publishing, 1999; A Demokracia es a Szolasszabadsag Hatari, Andras Koltay ed., Wolters Kluwer 2014; The Force of Law Reaffirmed; Christoph Bezemek & Nicoletta Ladavac eds., Springer, 2016) and special issues of Jurisprudence, Law & Social Inquiry, Ratio Juris, Politeia, the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, and the Notre Dame, Connecticut and Quinnipiac Law Reviews.

Scholarship Profile: Unconventional Wisdom (Virginia Journal 2010)


  • J.D.
    Harvard Law School
  • M.B.A.
    Dartmouth College
  • A.B.
    Dartmouth College


Precedent and Similarity (with Barbara A. Spellman), in Philosophical Foundations of Precedent, Oxford University Press (2023).
Lon Fuller and the Rule of Law, in Routledge Handbook of the Rule of Law, Routledge (2023).


The Proof: Uses of Evidence in Law, Politics, and Everything Else, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (2022).
Leading Cases in Constitutional Law, A Compact Casebook for a Short Course (with Jesse H. Choper, Michael C. Dorf & Richard H., Fallon), West Academic (2021 ed. 2021).
The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech (edited with Adrienne Stone), Oxford University Press (2021).
Leading Cases in Constitutional Law: A Compact Casebook for a Short Course (with Jesse H. Choper, Michael C. Dorf & Richard H., Fallon), West Academic (2020 ed. 2015–2020).
The Normative Force of the Factual: Legal Philosophy Between Is and Ought (edited with Christoph Bezemek & Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac), Springer (2019).
The Force of Law, Harvard University Press (2015).
The Theory of Rules, University of Chicago Press (2011).
Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (2006).
The Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary (edited with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong), Harcourt Brace College Publishers (1995).
Law and Language, Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd (1993).
The First Amendment: A Reader (edited with John H. Garvey), West Publishing Company (1992).
Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, Cambridge University Press (1982).
The Law of Obscenity, Bureau of National Affairs (1976).


Constitutional Law: Cases, Comments, and Questions, 2020 Supplement (with Jesse H. Choper, Michael C. Dorf & Richard H., Fallon), West Academic (13 ed. 2020).
Constitutional Law: Cases, Comments and Questions (with Jesse H. Choper, Michael C. Dorf & Richard H., Fallon), West Academic (2019 ed. 2019).
The First Amendment: Cases, Comments, Questions (with Jesse H. Choper), West Academic (6–7 ed. 2015–2019).

Book Chapters

Hohfeld on Legal Language, in Wesley Hohfeld A Century Later: Edited Work, Select Personal Papers, and Original Commentaries, Cambridge University Press, 99–111 (2022).
The Role of Rules in the Law of Evidence, in Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, Oxford University Press, 69–82 (2021).
Free Speech and Commercial Advertising, in The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech, Oxford University Press, 444–454 (2021).
What is ‘Speech’? The Question of Coverage, in The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech, Oxford University Press, 158–172 (2021).
Introduction (with Adrienne Stone), in The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech, Oxford University Press (2021).
Normative Legal Positivism, in The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism, Cambridge University Press, 61–78 (2021).
Ruleness, in Legal Rules in Practice: In the Midst of Law’s Life, Routledge, 13–26 (2020).
Rules, Defeasibility, and the Psychology of Exceptions, in Exceptions in International Law, Oxford University Press, 55–64 (2020).
Social Science and the Philosophy of Law, in The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Law, Cambridge University Press, 95–114 (2020).
The Hostile Audience Revisited, in The Perilous Public Square: Structural Threats to Free Expression Today, Columbia University Press, 65–83 (2020).
Dialogue and Its Discontents, in Constitutional Dialogue: Rights, Democracy, Institutions, Cambridge University Press, 423–435 (2019).
Every Possible Use of Language?, in The Free Speech Century, Oxford University Press, 3–47 (2019).
Intentions in Tension, in Moral Puzzles and Legal Perplexities: Essays on the Influence of Larry Alexander, Cambridge University Press, 206–220 (2019).
On the Alleged Problem of Legal Normativity, in The Normative Force of the Factual: Legal Philosophy Between Is and Ought, Springer, 171–180 (2019).
Recipes, Plans, Instructions, and the Free Speech Implications of Words That Are Tools, in Free Speech in the Digital Age, Oxford University Press, 74–87 (2019).
In the Shadow of the First Amendment, in Charlottesville 2017: The Legacy of Race and Inequity, University of Virginia Press, 63–69 (2018).
Law as a Malleable Artifact, in Law as an Artifact, Oxford University Press, 29–43 (2018).
Positive Rights, Negative Rights, and the Right to Know, in Troubling Transparency: The History and Future of Freedom of Information, Columbia University Press, 34–51 (2018).
Statistical (and Non-Statistical) Discrimination, in Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination, Routledge, 42–53 (2018).
Sources in Legal-Formalist Theories: A Formalist Account of the Role of Sources in International Law, in The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law, Oxford University Press, 384–398 (2017).
Incomplete Responses, in The Force of Law Reaffirmed: Frederick Schauer Meets the Critics, Springer, 145–166 (2016).
Lessons from the Free Speech Clause, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty, Oxford University Press, 85–104 (2016).
Lie-Detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence, in Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, Oxford University Press, 85–104 (2016).
Second-Order Vagueness in the Law, in Vagueness and Law: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 177–188 (2016).
Legal Fictions Revisited, in Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice, Springer, 113–129 (2015).
On the Relationship Between Legal and Ordinary Language, in Speaking of Language and Law: Conversations on the Work of Peter Tiersma, Oxford University Press, 35–38 (2015).
Twining on Llewellyn and Legal Realism, in Law’s Ethical, Global and Theoretical Contexts: Essays in Honour of William Twining, Cambridge University Press, 265–279 (2015).
Proportionality and the Question of Weight, in Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning, Cambridge University Press, 173–185 (2014).
Foreword, in An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, University of Chicago Press, v-xvi (2013).
Hart’s Anti-Essentialism, in Reading HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law, Hart, 237–246 (2013).
Law and Social Cognition (with Barbara A. Spellman), in The Oxford Handbook of Social Cognition, Oxford University Press, 829–850 (2013).
Must Virtue Be Particular?, in Law, Virtue and Justice, Hart, 265–276 (2013).
Necessity, Importance, and the Nature of Law, in Neutrality and Theory of Law, Springer, 17–31 (2013).
On the Relationship Between Press Law and Press Content, in Freeing the Presses: The First Amendment in Action , Louisiana State University Press, 51–68 (2013).
Positivism Before Hart, in The Legacy of John Austin’s Jurisprudence, Springer, 271–290 (2013).
Stare Decisis and the Selection Effect, in Precedent in the United States Supreme Court, Oxford University Press, 121–133 (2013).
The Ubiquity of Prevention, in Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 10–22 (2013).
Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text, in Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy, Oxford University Press, 307–316 (2012).
Comparative Constitutional Compliance: Notes Towards a Research Agenda, in Practice and Theory in Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press, 212–229 (2012).
Is Defeasibility an Essential Property of Law?, in The Logic of Legal Requirements: Essays on Defeasibility, Oxford University Press, 77–88 (2012).
Legal Reasoning (with Barbara A. Spellman), in Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, Oxford University Press, 719–735 (2012).
Precedent, in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, Routledge, 123–136 (2012).
Social Epistemology, Holocaust Denial, and the Post-Millian Calculus, in The Content and Regulation of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses, Cambridge University Press, 129–143 (2012).
Editor’s Introduction, in The Theory of Rules, University of Chicago Press, 1–28 (2011).
Perche il precedente nel diritto (e altrove) non e interamente (e nemmeno sostanzialmente) questione di analogia, in L'analogia e il diritto: Antologia Breve, Edizioni ETS, 111–120 (2011).
Ponderacion, subsuncion, y el rol restringente del texto juridico, in Desafios a la ponderacion, Universidad Externado de Colombia, 51–77 (2011).
The Trouble with Cases (with Richard Zeckhauser), in Regulation versus Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law, University of Chicago Press, 45–70 (2011).
Is There a Psychology of Judging?, in The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making, Oxford University Press, 103–120 (2010).
Institutions and the Concept of Law: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin (with Some Help from Neil MacCormick), in Law as Institutional Normative Order: Essays in Honour of Sir Neil Maccormick, Ashgate, 35–44 (2009).
Must Speech Be Special? (excerpts), in The First Amendment, Freedom of Speech: Its Constitutional History and the Contemporary Debate, Prometheus Books, 85–99 (2009).
Paltering (with Richard Zeckhauser), in Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating, Stanford University Press, 38–54 (2009).
Rules of Recognition, Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance, in The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution, Oxford University Press, 175–192 (2009).
Should Presidents Obey the Law? (And What Is “The Law,” Anyway?), in The Values of Presidential Leadership, Palgrave Macmillan US, 183–197 (1 ed. 2007).
Pitfalls in the interpretation of customary law, in The Nature of Customary Law, Cambridge University Press, 13–34 (2007).
Legislatures as Rule-Followers, in The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State, Cambridge University Press, 468–479 (2006).
The Exceptional First Amendment, in American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, Princeton University Press, 29–56 (2005).
Freedom of expression adjudication in Europe and the United States: a case study in comparative constitutional architecture, in European and US Constitutionalism, European Commission for Democracy through Law (2005).
The ‘Speech-ing’ of Sexual Harassment, in Directions in Sexual Harassment Law , Yale University Press, 347–363 (2004).
The Dilemma of Access, in Terrorism, War and the Press, Hollis, 259–269 (2003).
Bundling, Boundary Setting, and the Privatization of Legal Information (with J. Wise Virginia), in Market-based Governance: Supply Side, Demand Side, Upside, and Downside, Brookings Institution Press, 128–144 (2002).
First Amendment Opportunism, in Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era, University of Chicago Press, 174–197 (2002).
The Cost of Communicative Tolerance, in Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance, University of Michigan Press, 28–42 (2000).
Speech, Behaviour, and the Interdependence of Fact and Value, in Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against Democracy, Kluwer Law International, 43–61 (2000).
Talking as a Decision Procedure, in Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement, Oxford University Press, 17–27 (1999).
Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment (with Richard Pildes), in If Buckley Fell, Century Foundation Press, 103–120 (1999).
Fuller on the Ontological Status of Law, in Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design, Amsterdam University Press, 124–144 (1999).
The Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary (edited with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong), in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed., , Harcourt Brace College Publishers (1996).

Articles & Reviews

Unoriginal Textualism, 90 George Washington Law Review 825 (2022).
Kelsen, Kletzer, and the Differentiation of Law, 66 American Journal of Jurisprudence 269–278 (2021).
Constructing Interpretation, 101 Boston University Law Review 103–132 (2021).
Freedom of Thought?, 37 Social Philosophy & Policy 72–89 (2020).
Free Speech Overrides, 2020 University of Chicago Legal Forum 255–271 (2020).
Probabilistic Causation in the Law (with Barbara A. Spellman), 176 Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics 4–17 (2020).
Costs and Challenges of the Hostile Audience, 94 Notre Dame Law Review 1671–1698 (2019).
One Small Step towards a Metatheory of Evidence and Proof, 23 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 176–183 (2019).
Lawness, 95 Washington University Law Review 1135–1148 (2018).
On Treating Unlike Cases Alike (reviewing Randy J. Kozel, Settled versus Right: A Theory of Precedent) 33 Constitutional Commentary 437–450 (2018).
Response: A Continuing Conversation, 9 Jurisprudence 385–393 (2018).
Rights, Constitutions and the Perils of Panglossianism, 38 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 635–652 (2018).
Stare Decisis—Rhetoric and Reality in the Supreme Court, 2018 Supreme Court Review 121–143 (2018).
Analogy, Expertise, and Experience (with Barbara A. Spellman), 84 University of Chicago Law Review 249–268 (2017).
Calibrating Legal Judgments (with Barbara A. Spellman), 9 Journal of Legal Analysis 125–151 (2017).
Commercial Speech and the Perils of Parity, 25 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 965–979 (2017).
Free Speech and Obedience to Law, 32 Constitutional Commentary 661–674 (2017).
Free Speech, the Search for Truth, and the Problem of Collective Knowledge, 70 Southern Methodist University Law Review 231–251 (2017).
Jeremy Bentham, Tom Campbell, and the Normative Positivist Tradition, 42 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 204–213 (2017).
Law’s Boundaries, 130 Harvard Law Review 2434–2462 (2017).
On the Nature of Legal Reasoning: Comments on a Symposium, 47 Materiali per una Storia della Cultura Giuridica 277–294 (2017).
Preferences for Law?, 42 Law & Social Inquiry 87–99 (2017).
The Supreme Court as Public Educator?, 88 University of Colorado Law Review 333–347 (2017).
What Counts as Law?, 52 Valparaiso University Law Review 1–17 (2017).
Guarding the Guardians (reviewing Lars Vinx, translator & editor, The Guardians of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law) New Rambler (2016).
Defeasibilities (reviewing Luis Duarte d’Almeida, Allowing for Exceptions: A Theory of Defences and Defeasibility in Law) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2016).
Review of Luis Duarte d’Almeida, Allowing for Exceptions Notre Dame Philosophy Reviews (2016).
A Reply to Five Friends, 29 Ratio Juris 348–363 (2016).
Fuller’s Fairness: "The Case of the Speluncean Explorers", 35 University of Queensland Law Journal 11–20 (2016).
How (and If) Law Matters, 129 Harvard Law Review Forum 350–359 (2016).
On the Utility of Religious Toleration, 10 Criminal Law & Philosophy 479–492 (2016).
Why the Declaration of Independence Is Not Law—and Why It Could Be, 89 South Carolina Law Review 619–636 (2016).
Reforming the Supreme Court (reviewing Erwin Chemerinsky, The Case Against the Supreme Court) New Rambler (2015).
Free Speech on Tuesdays, 34 Law & Philosophy 119–140 (2015).
Is Law a Technical Language?, 52 San Diego Law Review 501–513 (2015).
On the Distinction Between Speech and Action, 65 Emory Law Journal 427–454 (2015).
Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech, 128 Harvard Law Review Forum 346–353 (2015).
Testing the Marketplace of Ideas (with Daniel E. Ho), 90 NYU Law Review 1160–1228 (2015).
The Path Dependence of Legal Positivism, 56 William & Mary Law Review 1613–1636 (2015).
The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 William & Mary Law Review 1613–1636 (2015).
Constitutions of Hope and Fear, 124 Yale Law Journal 528–562 (2014).
Do People Obey the Law?, 51 San Diego Law Review 939–952 (2014).
In Memoriam: John H. Mansfield, 128 Harvard Law Review 533–537 (2014).
Modeling Tolerance, 170 Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics 83–95 (2014).
Our Informationally Disabled Courts, 143 Daedalus 104–114 (2014).
The Mixed Blessings of Financial Transparency, 31 Yale Journal of Regulation 809–823 (2014).
Analogy in the Supreme Court: Lozman v City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 2013 Supreme Court Review 405–432 (2013).
Constitutionalism and Coercion, 54 Boston College Law Review 1881–1908 (2013).
Fish’s Five Theories, 9 Florida International University Law Review 21–31 (2013).
Is Expert Evidence Really Different? (with Barbara A. Spellman), 89 Notre Dame Law Review 1–26 (2013).
Legal Realism Untamed, 91 Texas Law Review 749–780 (2013).
Official Obedience and the Politics of Defining “Law”, 86 Southern California Law Review 1165–1194 (2013).
On the Open Texture of Law, 87 Grazer Philosophische Studien 197–215 (2013).
The Decline of “The Record”: A Comment on Posner, 51 Duquesne Law Review 51–66 (2013).
The Jurisprudence of Custom, 48 Texas International Law Journal 523–534 (2013).
The Miranda Warning, 88 Washington Law Review 155–170 (2013).
Anonymity and Authority, 27 Journal of Law & Politics 597–607 (2012).
Is the Rule of Recognition a Rule?, 3 Transnational Legal Theory 173–179 (2012).
On the Nature of the Nature of Law, 98 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 457–467 (2012).
The Permutations of Academic Freedom, 65 Arkansas Law Review 193–201 (2012).
The Political Risks (If Any) of Breaking the Law, 4 Journal of Legal Analysis 83–101 (2012).
Bentham on Presumed Offenses, 23 Utilitas 363–379 (2011).
Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 Supreme Court Review 81–111 (2011).
Is Legality Political?, 53 William & Mary Law Review 481–506 (2011).
On the Relation Between Chapters One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, 39 Capital UUniversity Law Review 571–592 (2011).
Positivism Before Hart, 24 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 455–471 (2011).
The Legality of Evil or the Evil of Legality?, 47 Tulsa Law Review 121–132 (2011).
Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 University of Illinois Law Review 1339–1357 (2011).
Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA Law Review 897–919 (2010).
Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law, 14 Trends in Cognitive Sciences 101–103 (2010).
The Best Laid Plans (reviewing Scott J. Shapiro, Legality) 120 Yale Law Journal 586–621 (2010).
When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official Action?, 44 Georgia Law Review 769–801 (2010).
Artists’ Moral Rights and the Psychology of Ownership (with Barbara A. Spellman), 83 Tulsa Law Review 661–678 (2009).
Rules, Rationality, and the Significance of Standpoint, 35 Queen’s Law Journal 305–325 (2009).
A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 NYU Law Review 1109–1134 (2008).
Authority and Authorities, 94 Virginia Law Review 1931–1961 (2008).
Hohfeld's First Amendment, 76 George Washington Law Review 914–932 (2008).
Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) Is Not Totally (or Even Substantially) About Analogy, 3 Perspectives on Psychological Science 454–460 (2008).
Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v Frederick, 2007 Supreme Court Review 205–236 (2007).
Ambivalence About the Law, 49 Arizona Law Review 11–28 (2007).
Expression and Its Consequences, 57 University of Toronto Law Review 705–720 (2007).
Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?, 24 Georgia State University Law Review 381–402 (2007).
Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA Law Review 1747–1766 (2007).
Is Policy within Law's Limited Domain? (with Larry Alexander), 26 University of Queensland Law Journal 221–236 (2007).
Law's Limited Domain Confronts Morality's Universal Empire (with Larry Alexander), 48 William & Mary Law Review 1579–1604 (2007).
Legal Information as Social Capital (with Virginia J. Wise), 99 Law Library Journal 267–284 (2007).
Regulation by Generalization (with Richard J. Zeckhauser), 1 Regulation & Governance 68–87 (2007).
(Re)Taking Hart, 119 Harvard Law Review 852–884 (2006).
Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 University of Chicago Law Review 883–918 (2006).
Foreword: The Court's Agenda—And the Nation's, 120 Harvard Law Review 4–64 (2006).
Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 University of Colorado Law Review 907–928 (2006).
On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 165–202 (2006).
Deferring, 103 Michigan Law Review 1567–1577 (2005).
Imposing Rules, 42 San Diego Law Review 85–90 (2005).
La Categorizacion, en el Derecho y en el Mundo, 28 Cuadernos de Filosofia del Derecho 307 (2005).
On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 Connecticut Law Review 907–920 (2005).
The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson, 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 493–501 (2005).
The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 803–814 (2005).
The Wily Agitator and the American Free Speech Tradition, 57 Stanford Law Review 2157–2170 (2005).
Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 Minnesota Law Review 1256–1279 (2005).
Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 California Law Review 1045–1069 (2004).
The Failure of the Common Law, 36 Arizona State Law Journal 765–782 (2004).
The Generality of Law, 107 West Virginia Law Review 217–234 (2004).
The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 Virginia Law Review 1909–1956 (2004).
Legal Development and the Problem of Systemic Transition, 13 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 261–278 (2003).
Neutrality and Judicial Review, 22 Law & Philosophy 217–240 (2003).
The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 New Zeland Law Review 303–328 (2003).
The Heroes of the First Amendment, 101 Michigan Law Review 2118–2133 (2003).
The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin, 2001 Supreme Court Review 267–297 (2002).
Free Speech and the Social Construction of Privacy, 68 Social Research 221–232 (2001).
Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?, 17 Social Philosophy & Policy 293–309 (2000).
Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply (with Larry Alexander), 17 Constitutional Commentary 455–482 (2000).
Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 University of Cincinnati Law Review 615–636 (2000).
Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law Interpreting Legal Citations (with Virginia J. Wise), 29 Journal of Legal Studies 295–515 (2000).
The Generality of Rights, 6 Legal Theory 323–336 (2000).
Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment (with Richard H. Pildes), 77 Texas Law Review 1836 (1999).
Instrumental Commensurability, 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1215–1234 (1998).
Internet Privacy and the Public-Private Distinction, 38 Jurimetrics 555–564 (1998).
Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 Harvard Law Review 84–121 (1998).
Constitutional Invocations, 65 Fordham Law Review 1295–1312 (1997).
Discourse and Its Discontents, 72 Notre Dame Law Review 1343–1360 (1997).
Legal Positivism as Legal Information (with Virginia J. Wise), 82 Cornell Law Review 1080–1110 (1997).
On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation (with Larry Alexander), 7 Harvard Law Review 1359–1387 (1997).
Prescriptions in Three Dimensions, 82 Iowa Law Review 911–922 (1997).
The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 Arkansas Law Review 687–702 (1997).
Defining Originalism, 19 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 343–346 (1996).
Justice Stevens and the Size of Constitutional Decisions, 27 Rutgers Law Review 543–562 (1996).
On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions (with Richard Zeckhauser), 25 Journal of Legal Studies 27–52 (1996).
Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Supreme Court Review 71–98 (1995).
Editorial (with Larry Alexander & Jules L. Coleman), 1 Legal Theory 1–3 (1995).
Giving Reasons, 47 Stanford Law Review 633–660 (1995).
Opinions As Rules, 62 University of Chicago Law Review 1455–1476 (1995).
The Constitution of Fear, 12 Constitutional Commentary 203–206 (1995).
Cable Operators as Editors: Prerogative, Responsibility, and Liability, 17 Hastings Communications & Entertainment Law Journal 161–178 (1994).
Commensurability and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45 Hastings Law Journal 785–812 (1994).
Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94 Columbia Law Review 1326–1347 (1994).
Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional Norms, 17 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 45–56 (1994).
A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 Georgia Law Review 415–434 (1993).
Constitutional Positivism, 25 Connecticut Law Review 797–828 (1993).
On Deriving Is-Not from Ought-Not, 64 University of Colorado Law Review 1087–1094 (1993).
Slightly Guilty, 1993 University of Chicago Legal Forum 83–100 (1993).
The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 University of Colorado Law Review 935–958 (1993).
Messages, Motives, and Hate Crimes, 11 Criminal Justice Ethics 52–54 (1992).
The First Amendment as Ideology, 33 William & Mary Law Review 853–870 (1992).
The Occasions of Constitutional Interpretation, 72 Boston University Law Review 729–746 (1992).
The Questions of Authority, 81 Georgetown Law Journal 95–116 (1992).
The Sociology of the Hate Speech Debate, 37 Villanova Law Review 805–820 (1992).
Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 Columbia Law Review 1321–1357 (1992).
Exceptions, 58 University of Chicago Law Review 871–900 (1991).
Free Speech and Its Harms, 2 Constitutional Forum 80–81 (1991).
National Security and the Disparate Impact of Free Speech Rules, 3 St. Thomas Law Forum 115–130 (1991).
Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 Case Western Reserve Law Review 699–724 (1991).
Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 645–694 (1991).
The Authority of Legal Scholarship, 139 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1003–1018 (1991).
The Calculus of Distrust, 77 Virginia Law Review 653–668 (1991).
The Determinants of Legal Doubt, 89 Michigan Law Review 1295–1301 (1991).
The Rules of Jurisprudence: A Reply, 14 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 839–852 (1991).
Rules and the Rule-Following Argument, 3 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 187–195 (1990).
Judicial Self-Understanding and the Internalization of Constitutional Rules, 61 University of Colorado Law Review 749–772 (1990).
Mrs. Palsgraf and the First Amendment, 47 Washington & Lee Law Review 161–170 (1990).
Property as Politics, 13 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 60–66 (1990).
Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 Supreme Court Review 231–256 (1990).
Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 Northwestern University Law Review 562–568 (1989).
Constitutional Conventions Constitutional Law and the Federal Courts, 87 Michigan Law Review 1407–1507 (1989).
Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism, 56 University of Chicago Law Review 397–414 (1989).
Is the Common Law Law?, 77 California Law Review 455–472 (1989).
Rules, the Rule of Law, and the Constitution, 6 Constitutional Commentary 69–86 (1989).
The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 William & Mary Law Review 1–24 (1989).
Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1181–1204 (1988).
Context and Constitutionalism, 12 Hamline Law Review 59–70 (1988).
Equality and Identity, 33 NYU Law Review 375–382 (1988).
Formalism, 97 Yale Law Journal 509–549 (1988).
Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 Southern California Law Review 1717–1734 (1988).
Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 737–772 (1987).
The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 William & Mary Law Review 41–52 (1987).
The Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 Michigan Law Review 847–870 (1987).
Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity, 84 Michigan Law Review 1504–1517 (1986).
May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 William & Mary Law Review 1075–1086 (1986).
Opinions as Rules (reviewing Bernard Schwarz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court) 53 University of Chicago Law Review 682–689 (1986).
The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 California Law Review 761–789 (1986).
Thinking about Causation with Special Reference to Pornography, 21 International Society of Barristers Quarterly 380–391 (1986).
Liars, Novelists, and the Law of Defamation, 51 Brooklyn Law Review 233–268 (1985).
Free Speech and the Demise of the Soapbox, 84 Columbia Law Review 558–572 (1984).
Public Figures, 25 William & Mary Law Review 905–936 (1984).
Refining the Lawmaking Function of the Supreme Court, 17 Michigan Journal of Law Reform 1–24 (1983).
An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA Law Review 797–832 (1982).
Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Supreme Court Review 285–318 (1982).
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vanderbilt Law Review 265–308 (1981).
Legal Scholarship and the Mission of a Law Faculty (with Charles Koch), 11 Colonial Lawyer 21–22 (1981).
Law as the Engine of State: The Trial of Anne Boleyn (with Margery Stone Schauer), 22 William & Mary Law Review 49–84 (1980).
Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A Comparative Analysis, 1 Journal of Media Law & Practice 3–23 (1980).
Response: Pornography and the First Amendment, 40 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 605–618 (1979).
Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect", 58 Boston University Law Review 685–732 (1978).
The Return of Variable Obscenity?, 28 Hastings Law Journal 1275–1292 (1977).
School Books, Lesson Plans, and the Constitution, 78 West Virginia Law Review 287–314 (1976).
Obscenity and the Conflict of Laws, 77 West Virginia Law Review 377–400 (1975).

Op-Eds, Blogs, Shorter Works

Methodological Quibbles and Their Non-Quibbly Implications, Balkanization (September 13, 2019).
The Hostile Audience Revisited, Knight First Amendment Institute (November 2, 2017).
Magna Carta and Its Constitutional Status, UVA Lawyer 73–74 (2014).
Pornography and the Consequences of Communication, 4 Communications Lawyer 16–17, 20 (1986).




Frederick Schauer Discusses 'The Proof'

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