- David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law
Frederick Schauer is a David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. From 1990 to 2008 he was Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment at Harvard University, and was previously professor of law at the University of Michigan. He has been visiting professor of law at the Columbia Law School, Fischel-Neil Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, Morton Distinguished Visiting Professor of the Humanities at Dartmouth College, distinguished visiting professor at the University of Toronto, visiting fellow at the Australian National University, distinguished visitor at New York University, and Eastman Professor and fellow of Balliol College at the University of Oxford. A fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship, Schauer is the author of The Law of Obscenity (BNA, 1976), Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge, 1982), Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Clarendon/Oxford, 1991), Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (Harvard, 2003), Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Harvard, 2009), and, most recently, The Force of Law (Harvard, 2015). The editor of Karl Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules (Chicago, 2011), and a founding editor of the journal Legal Theory, he has been chair of the Section on Constitutional Law of the Association of American Law Schools and of the Committee on Philosophy and Law of the American Philosophical Association. In 2005 he wrote the foreword to the Harvard Law Review’s annual Supreme Court issue, and has written widely on freedom of expression, constitutional law and theory, evidence, legal reasoning and the philosophy of law. His books have been translated into Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Chinese and Turkish, and his scholarship has been the subject of three books (Rules and Reasoning: Essays in Honour of Fred Schauer, Linda Meyer ed., Hart Publishing, 1999; A Demokracia es a Szolasszabadsag Hatari, Andras Koltay ed., Wolters Kluwer 2014; The Force of Law Reaffirmed; Christoph Bezemek & Nicoletta Ladavac eds., Springer, 2016) and special issues of Jurisprudence, Law & Social Inquiry, Ratio Juris, Politeia, the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, and the Notre Dame, Connecticut and Quinnipiac Law Reviews.
Scholarship Profile: Unconventional Wisdom (Virginia Journal 2010)
- J.D.Harvard Law School1972
- M.B.A.Dartmouth College1968
- A.B.Dartmouth College1967
Books and Book Chapters:
“Lon Fuller and the Rule of Law,” in Michael Sevel, ed., Routledge Handbook of the Rule of Law (Routledge, forthcoming 2021).
“The Role of Rules in the Law of Evidence,” in Christian Dahlman, Alex Stein and Giovanni Tuzet, eds., Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2021).
“Ruleness,” in Baudouin Dupret, Julie Colemans and Max Travers eds., Legal Rules in Practice (Routledge, forthcoming 2021).
“Free Speech and Commercial Advertising,” in Frederick Schauer and Adrienne Stone, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2021).
“Introduction” (with Adrienne Stone), in Adrienne Stone and Frederick Schauer, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2021).
“Normative Legal Positivism,” in Torben Spaak and Patricia Mindus, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism (Cambridge University Press, 2021).
The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech (editor with Adrienne Stone) (Oxford University Press, 2021).
“What is ‘Speech’? The Question of Coverage,” in Frederick Schauer and Adrienne Stone, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2021).
“Rules, Defeasibility, and the Psychology of Exceptions,” in Lorand Bartels and Federica Paddeu, eds., Exceptions in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2020).
“Social Science and the Philosophy of Law,” in John Tasioulas, ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2020).
“The Hostile Audience Revisited,” in David E. Pozen, ed., The Perilous Public Square: Structural Threats to Free Expression Today (Columbia University Press, 2020).
“Dialogue and Its Discontents,” in Geoffrey Sigalet, Grégoire C. N. Webber and Rosalind Dixon, eds., Constitutional Dialogue: Rights, Democracy, Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 2019).
“Every Possible Use of Language?,” in Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone, eds., The Free Speech Century (Oxford University Press, 2019).
“Intentions in Tension,” in Heidi M. Hurd, ed., Moral Puzzles and Legal Perplexities: Essays on the Influence of Larry Alexander (Cambridge University Press, 2019).
“On the Alleged Problem of Legal Normativity,” in Frederick Schauer, Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac and Christoph Bezemek, eds., The Normative Force of the Factual: Legal Philosophy Between Is and Ought (Springer, 2019).
“Recipes, Plans, Instructions, and the Free Speech Implications of Words That Are Tools,” in Susan J. Brison and Katharine Gelber, eds., Free Speech in the Digital Age (Oxford University Press, 2019).
The Normative Force of the Factual: Legal Philosophy Between Is and Ought (editor with Christoph Bezemek and Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac) (Springer, 2019).
“In the Shadow of the First Amendment,” in Louis P. Nelson and Claudrena N. Harold, eds., Charlottesville 2017: The Legacy of Race and Inequity 63 (University of Virginia Press, 2018).
“Law as a Malleable Artifact,” in Luka Burazin, Kenneth Einar Himma and Corrado Roversi, eds., Law as an Artifact (Oxford University Press, 2018).
“Penser en juriste: Nouvelle introduction au raisonnement juridique,” Dalloz (2018).
Leading Cases in Constitutional Law (with Jesse H. Choper et al) (West Publishing, 2018 ed., 2016).
“Positive Rights, Negative Rights, and the Right to Know,” in David E. Pozen and Michael Schudson, eds., Troubling Transparency: The History and Future of Freedom of Information 34-51 (Columbia University Press, 2018).
“Statistical (and Non-Statistical) Discrimination,” in Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, ed., The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination 42 (Routledge, 2018).
“Sources in Legal-Formalist Theories: A Formalist Account of the Role of Sources in International Law,” in Samantha Besson and Jean d’Aspremont, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law 384 (Oxford University Press, 2017).
“Il ragionamento giuridico: Una nuova introduzione,” Carocci (2016).
"Lie-Detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence," in Dennis Patterson and Michael S. Pardo, eds., Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience 85 (Oxford University Press, 2016).
“Second-Order Vagueness in Law,” in Geert Keil and Ralf Poscher, eds., Vagueness and Law: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives 177 (Oxford University Press, 2016).
“Incomplete Responses,” in Christoph Bezemek and Nicoletta Ladavac eds., The Force of Law Reaffirmed: Frederick Schauer Meets the Critics 145 (Springer, 2016).
“Lessons from the Free Speech Clause,” in Micah Schwartzman et al., eds., The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty 193 (Oxford University Press, 2016).
The Force of Law (Harvard University Press, 2015) (Spanish edition, Fuerza de Ley, Lima, Editores Palestra, 2015) (Italian edition, Milan, Libreria Mimesis, 2016) (Portuguese edition, Sao Paolo, Martins Fontes, translation in progress).
“Legal Fictions Revisited,” in Maksymilian Del Mar and William Twining, eds., Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice 113 (Springer, 2015).
Constitutional Law (with Choper, Fallon, & Dorf) (West Publishing, 12th ed., 2015) .
The First Amendment (with Choper & Shiffrin) (West Publishing, 6th ed., 2015).
“On the Relationship Between Legal and Ordinary Language,” in Lawrence Solan, Janet Ainsworth and Roger Shuy, eds., Speaking of Language and Law 35 (Oxford, 2015).
“Twining on Llewellyn and Legal Realism,” in Christopher McCrudden ed., Law’s Theoretical and Global Contexts: Essays in Honour of William Twining 265 (Cambridge, 2015).
“Law and Social Cognition” (with Barbara A. Spellman), in Donal E. Carlston, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Social Cognition 829 (Oxford University Press 2014).
“Proportionality and the Question of Weight,” in Grant Huscroft et al., eds., Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning 173 (Cambridge University Press, 2014).
“Foreword,” in Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning v (University of Chicago Press, 2013).
“Hart’s Anti-Essentialism,” in Luis Duarte d’Almeida et al., eds., Reading HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law 237 (Hart Publishing, 2013).
“Must Virtue Be Particular?,” in Amalia Amaya and Ho Hack Lai, eds., Law, Virtue and Justice 265 (Hart, 2013).
“Necessity, Importance, and the Nature of Law,” in Jordi Ferrer Beltrán et al., eds.,Neutrality and Theory of Law 17 (Springer, 2013).
“Positivism Before Hart,” in Michael Freeman and Patricia Mindus, eds., The Legacy of John Austin’s Jurisprudence 271 (Springer, 2013).
“Stare Decisis and the Selection Effect,” in Christopher J. Peters, ed., Precedent in the United States Supreme Court 121 (Springer 2013).
“The Ubiquity of Prevention,” in Andrew Ashworth et al., eds., Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law 10 (Oxford University Press, 2013).
“Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text,” in Matthias Klatt, ed., Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy 307 (Oxford University Press, 2012).
“Comparative Constitutional Compliance: Notes Towards a Research Agenda,” in Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff, eds., Practice and Theory in Comparative Law 212 (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
“Is Defeasibility an Essential Property of Law?,” in Jordi Ferrer Beltrán and Giovanni Battista Ratti, eds., The Logic of Legal Requirements: Essays on Defeasibility 77 (Oxford University Press, 2012).
“Legal Reasoning” (with Barbara A. Spellman), in Keith J. Holyoak and Robert G. Morrison, eds., Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning 719 (Oxford University Press, 2012).
“Social Epistemology, Holocaust Denial, and the Post-Millian Calculus,” in Michael Herz and Peter Molnar, eds., The Content and Regulation of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses 129 (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
“Editor’s Introduction,” in Karl Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules 1 (University of Chicago Press, 2011).
“Perché il precedente nel diritto (e altrove) non è interamente (e nemmeno sostanzialmente) questione di analogia,” in Luca Pelliccioli and Vito Velluzzi, eds., L'analogia e il diritto: Antologia Breve 111-120 (Pisa, Italy: Edizioni ETS, 2011).
“Ponderación, subsunción, y el rol restringente del texto juridico,” in Gustavo A. Beade and Laura Clérico, eds., Desafíos a la ponderación 51-77 (Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2011).
“The Trouble with Cases” (with Richard Zeckhauser), in Daniel P. Kessler, ed., Regulation versus Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law 45 (University of Chicago Press, 2011).
"Is There a Psychology of Judging?," in David Klein & Gregory Mitchell, eds., The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making 103 (Oxford University Press, 2010).
Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Harvard University Press, 2009). (Spanish edition, Madrid, Marcel Pons Ediciones, 2013) (Chinese edition, Beijing, Zhong guo fa zhi chu ban she, 2016) (Italian edition, Rome, Carocci, 2016) (French edition, Paris, Dalloz, 2018) (Portugese edition, Madrid, Marcial Pons Ediciones, translation in progress).
“Institutions and the Concept of Law: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin (with Some Help from Neil MacCormick),” in Maksymilian del Mar and Zenon Bankowski, eds., Law as Institutional Normative Order: Essays in Honour of Sir Neil MacCormick 35 (Ashgate Publishing, 2009).
“Paltering” (with Richard Zeckhauser), in Brooke Harrington, ed., Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating 38 (Stanford University Press, 2009).
“Rules of Recognition, Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law On Acceptance” (with Larry Alexander), in Matthew D. Adler and Kenneth Einar Kimma, eds., The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution 175 (Oxford University Press, 2009).
“Should Presidents Obey the Law (And What Is 'The Law,' Anyway),” in Terry L. Price and J. Thomas Wren, eds., 183 The Values of Presidential Leadership (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
“Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law,” in Amanda Perreau-Saussine and James Bernard Murphy, eds., 13 The Nature of Customary Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
“Legislatures as Rule-Followers,” in Richard W. Bauman and Tsvi Kahana, eds., The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State 468 (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
“The Exceptional First Amendment,” in Michael Ignatieff, ed., American Exceptionalism and Human Rights 29 (Princeton University Press, 2005).
"Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and America: A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture," in Georg Nolte, ed., 47 European and U.S. Constitutionalism (2005).
“On the Relationship Between Press Law and Press Content,” in Timothy Cook, ed.,Freeing the Presses: The First Amendment in Action 51 (Louisiana State University Press, 2005).
“The ‘Speech-ing’ of Sexual Harassment,” in Catharine MacKinnon and Reva Siegel, eds.,Directions in Sexual Harassment Law 347 (Yale University Press, 2004).
“The Dilemma of Access,” in Nancy Palmer, ed., Terrorism, War, and the Media 259 (Hollis Publishing, 2003).
Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (Harvard University Press/Belknap Press, 2003) (paperback edition, 2006) (Italian edition, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2008) (Spanish translation now in progress).
“First Amendment Opportunism,” in Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone, eds., Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era 174 (University of Chicago Press, 2002).
“Bundling, Boundary Setting, and the Privatization of Legal Information” (with Virginia Wise), in John Donahue and Joseph Nye, eds., Market Based Governance 129 (Brookings, 2002).
“The Cost of Communicative Tolerance,” in Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ed., Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance 28 (University of Michigan Press, 2000).
“Speech, Behaviour, and the Interdependence of Fact and Value,” in David Kretzmer and Francine Hazan, eds., Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against Democracy 28 (Kluwer, 2000).
“Talking as a Decision Procedure,” in Stephen Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement 17 (Oxford University Press, 1999).
“Fuller on the Ontological Status of Law,” in W.J. Witteveen, ed., Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design 124 (Amsterdam University Press, 1999).
The Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary (with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) (Harcourt Brace/Oxford University Press, 1996).
Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, 1991) (paperback edition, 1992) (Italian edition, La Regole del Gioco, Bologna, il Mulino, 2000) (Spanish edition, Las Reglas en Juego, Madrid, Marcel Pons Ediciones, 2004) (Chinese edition, Beijing, Zhong guo fa da xue chu ban she, 2015).
Supplements to Gunther, Constititional Law (Foundation Press, 1983-96).
Law and Language (editor) (Dartmouth/Gower/Ashgate Publishing Company, 1992).
The First Amendment: A Reader (with John H. Garvey) (West Publishing Company, 1992, 2nd ed., 1995).
Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press, 1982) (paperback edition, 1982) (Turkish edition, İfade Özgürlüğű: Felsefǐ Bir İnceleme, Ankara, Liberal Dűşűnce Topluluğu, 2002).
The Law of Obscenity (BNA Books, 1976).
Articles and Review Essays:
“Unoriginal Textualism,” 90 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022).
“Constructing Interpretation,” 101 B.U. L. Rev. 103 (2021).
“Free Speech Overrides,” 2020 U. Chi. Legal F. 255 (2020).
“Probabilistic Causation in the Law” (with Barbara A. Spellman), 176 J. Inst. and Theoretical Econ. 4 (2020).
“Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Abrams Case, and the Origins of the Harmless Speech Tradition,” 51 Seton Hall L. Rev. (2020).
“Costs and Challenges of the Hostile Audience,” 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1671 (2019).
“One Small Step towards a Metatheory of Evidence and Proof,” 23 Int’l J. Evidence & Proof 176 (2019).
“Lawness,” 95 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1135 (2018).
“Rights, Constitutions and the Perils of Panglossianism,” Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1 (2018).
“What Counts as Law?,” 52 Val. U. L. Rev. 1 (2017).
“The Annoying Constitution: Implications for the Allocation of Interpretive Authority,” 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1689 (2017).
“Commercial Speech and the Perils of Parity,” 25 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 965 (2017).
“Free Speech and Obedience to Law,” 32 Const. Comment. 661 (2017).
“On the Nature of Legal Reasoning: Comments on a Symposium,” 47 Materiali per una Storia della Cultura Giuridica 277 (2017).
“On the Relationship between International Law and International Constitutionalism,” 11 ICL J. 1 (2017).
“The Supreme Court as Public Educator?,” 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 333 (2017).
"Sanctions for Acts or Sanctions for Actors"
"Every Possible Use of Language?"
“How (and If) Law Matters,” 129 Harvard Law Review Forum, 350 (2016).
“Fuller’s Fairness: ‘The Case of the Speluncean Explorers,’” 35 U. Queensland L.J. 11 (2016).
“On the Utility of Religious Toleration,” 10 Crim. L. & Phil. 479 (2016).
“Defeasibilities,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, February 25, 2016.
“Why the Declaration of Independence Is Not Law—and Why It Could Be,” 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 619 (2016).
“A Reply to Five Friends,” 29 Ratio Juris 348 (2016).
“Not Just About License Plates: Walker v Sons of Confederate Veterans, Government Speech, and Doctrinal Overlap in the First Amendment,” 2015 Sup. Ct. Rev. 265.
“Free Speech on Tuesdays,” 34 Law and Philosophy 119 (2015).
“Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech,” 128 Harvard Law Review Forum 346 (2015).
“On the Distinction between Speech and Action,” 65 Emory Law Journal 427 (2015).
“Testing the Marketplace of Ideas” (with Daniel Ho) 90 New York University Law Review1160 (2015).
“The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage,” 56 William & Mary Law Review 1613 (2015).
“The Path Dependence of Legal Positivism,” 101 Virginia Law Review 957 (2015).
“Is Law a Technical Language?,” 52 San Diego Law Review 1 (2015).
“Constitutions of Hope and Fear,” 124 Yale L.J. 528 (2014) (reviewing Robert C. Post,Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution (2014)).
“Do People Obey the Law?,” 51 San Diego L. Rev. 939 (2014).
“The Mixed Blessings of Financial Transparency,” 31 Yale J. on Reg. 809 (2014).
“Memorial to John Mansfield,” 128 Harv. L. Rev. 533 (2014).
“Modeling Tolerance,” 170 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 83 (2014).
“Our Informationally Disabled Courts,” 143 Daedalus 105 (2014).
"Constitutionalism and Coercion," 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1881 (2013).
“The Decline of ‘The Record’: A Comment on Posner,” 51 Duq. L. Rev. 51(2013).
“Fish’s Five Theories,” 9 FIU L. Rev. 21 (2013).
“Is Expert Evidence Really Different?” 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (2013) (with B. Spellman).
“The Jurisprudence of Custom,” 48 Tex. Int'l L. J. 523 (2013).
“The Miranda Warning,” 88 Wash. L. Rev., 155 (2013).
“On the Open Texture of Law,” 87 Grazer Philosophische Studien, 197 (2013).
"Law and Social Cognition," (with Barbara Spellman), Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2012-10.
"Legal Reasoning," (with Barbara Spellman), Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2012-09.
“Anonymity and Authority,” 27 J.L. & Pol. 597 (2012).
"Is the Rule of Recognition a Rule?,” 3 Transnat’l Legal Theory 173 (2012).
“On the Nature of the Nature of Law,” 98 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 457 (2012).
“The Permutations of Academic Freedom,” 65 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2012).
“Harm(s) and the First Amendment,” 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81 (2012).
“The Political Risks (If Any) of Breaking the Law,” 4 J. Legal Analysis 83 (2012).
"The Best Laid Plans," 120 Yale L.J. 586 (2010) (reviewing Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (2011)).
“Bentham on Presumed Offenses,” 23 Utilitas 363 (2011).
"Is Legality Political?," 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 481 (2011).
“On the Relation Between Chapters One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty,” 39Cap. U. L. Rev. 571 (2011).
“Transparency in Three Dimensions,” 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1339.
"Facts and the First Amendment," 57 UCLA L. Rev. 897 (2010).
"Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law," 14 Trends Cognitive Sci. 101 (2010).
"Was Austin Right After All? On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law," 23 Ratio Juris1 (2010).
"Legal Fictions Revisited" (work in progress).
"Necessity, Importance, and the Nature of Law" (work in progress).
"On Open Texture of Law" (work in progress).
“Was Austin Right After All?: On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law,” 23 Ratio Juris1 (2010).
“Is it Important to be Important?: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Case Selection Process,” 119 Yale L.J. Online 77 (2009).
"Artists’ Moral Rights and the Psychology of Ownership" (with Barbara A. Spellman) 83Tul. L. Rev. 661 (2009).
"Is it Better to Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech and the Precautionary Principle," 36Pepp. L. Rev. 301 (2009).
“Rules, Rationality, and the Significance of Standpoint,” 35 Queen’s L.J. 305 (2009).
“In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law – and Epistemology Too,” 5 Episteme 295 (2008).
"Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) Is Not Totally (or Even Substantially) about Analogy," 3 Persp. on Psychol. Sci. 454 (2008).
“Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick,” 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 316 (2008).
"Hohfeld’s First Amendment," 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 914 (2008).
“Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?” (The Henry J. Miller Lecture), 24 Ga. State L. Rev., 381 (2008).
“Regulation by Generalization (with Richard J. Zeckhauser)," 1 Reg. & Governance 68 (2007).
“Expression and Its Consequences,” U. Toronto L.J., 57 705 (2007).
“Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories,” 54 UCLA L. Rev., 1747 (2007),
“Foreword: The Court’s Agenda – And the Nation’s,” 120 Harv. L. Rev., 4 (2006).
"Do Cases Make Bad Law?", 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883 (2006).
“On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law,” 155 U. Penn. L. Rev., 165 (2006).
“(Re)Taking Hart,” 119 Harv. L. Rev., 852 (2006).
“Is There a Right to Academic Freedom,” 77 U. Colo. L. Rev., 907 (2006).
“Legal Information as Social Capital” (with V. Wise), 99 Law Lib. J., 267 (2006).
"The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson," 25 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 493 (2005).
“Towards an Institutional First Amendment," 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1256 (2005).
“Imposing Rules,” 42 San Diego L. Rev., 85 (2005).
“On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas,” 37 Conn. L. Rev. 907 (2005).
“The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards,” 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues803 (2005).
“Deferring,” 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1567 (2005).
“The Wily Agitator and the American Free Speech Tradition,” 58 Stan. L. Rev. 2157 (2005).
“La Categorizacion, en el Derecho y en el Mundo,” 28 Cuadernos de Filosofia del Derecho307 (2005).
“The Limited Domain of the Law,” 90 Va. L. Rev. 1909 (2004).
“Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution,” 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1045 (2004).
“Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning,” Sup. Court Rev. 2003 197 (2004).
“The Failure of the Common Law” (The Willard Pedrick Lecture), 36 Az. St. L. Rev., 765 (2004).
“Neutrality and Judicial Review,” 23 Law and Philosophy, 217 (2003).
“The Convergence of Rules and Standards,” N. Z. L. Rev., 303 (2003).
“The Heroes of the First Amendment,” Michigan Law Review, 101 (2003), 2118-33
“Free Speech and the Social Construction of Privacy,” Social Research, 68 (2001), 221-32
“Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply,” Constitutional Commentary, 17 (2000), 455-82 (with L. Alexander)
“Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 17 (2000), 293-309
“The Generality of Rights,” Legal Theory, 6 (2000), 323-36
“Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior” (The Robert Marx Lecture), University of Cincinnati Law Review, 68 (2000), 615-36
“Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment,” Texas Law Review, 77 (1999), 1803-36 and in J. Rosencranz ed., If Buckley Fell (Century Foundation. 1999), 103-20 (with R. Pildes)
“Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment,” Harvard Law Review, 112 (1998), 84-120