Review of Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L. Fuller
Publisher
Modern Law Review
Date
2013
In Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L. Fuller, Kristen Rundle offers a perceptive and sympathetic interpretation of the mid-century Harvard law professor’s published and unpublished work in the philosophy of law. According to Rundle, legal philosophers have long misunderstood and underappreciated Fuller because they have viewed his work within the terms of a debate that were not of his own choosing. If we look at Fuller’s specific arguments about the connections between law and morality within the broader context of his scholarly ambitions as a whole, she argues, we can see that he was primarily concerned with exploring how law’s distinctive form entailed a respect for human agency and thus implicitly set limits on lawgiving authority. Although Rundle’s account leaves some questions about, and objections to, Fuller’s philosophical claims unanswered, she makes a persuasive case for putting some of Fuller’s concerns – such as the moral implications of adopting particular institutional forms and methods – back on the jurisprudential agenda.
Citation
Charles Barzun, Review of Kristen Rundle, <em>Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L. Fuller</em>, 76 Modern Law Review, 935–948 (2013).