This Article examines the Court's view of how rationality should (and by virtue of the power of judicial review must) feature in legislation by tracing the development of rationality review and comparing it to more rigorous understandings of political rationality. Comparison reveals the Court's limited conception of rationality, which allows the Court to avoid difficult questions in pursuit of seemingly uncontroversial instrumental ends. Examination of the Court's approach to rationality demonstrates the need for a broader conception of legislative rationality - one that includes "constitutive ends. " Recognizing constitutive legislative ends, combined with an information-forcing rule for revealing those ends, can both improve democratic discourse in the legislature and lead to a richer and more intellectually honest form of rationality review.

Citation
Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 Virginia Law Review, 1627–1690 (2016).