In “Corruption, Campaign Finance, and Criminal Law,” Deborah Hellman examines the legacy of Buckley v. Valeo in making the Supreme Court the final expositor on the nature of corruption. She argues that by deciding that campaign finance raises First Amendment issues, and that the only interest sufficiently compelling to offset campaign finance restriction was the avoidance of corruption, the Supreme Court effectively arrogated the task of defining corruption for the judicial branch. But Hellman argues that Buckley and its progeny defined only what one might call “compelling-interest corruption.” Such corruption, however, is not necessarily coextensive with corruption in all its forms, as commonly understood. In other words, while the Court properly decides what problems are sufficiently weighty to justify speech restrictions, Hellman believes that it cannot simply decide what activities undermine democracy in fact. She concludes by arguing that these distinct concepts of corruption may provide an opportunity for legislatures to influence constitutional doctrine on campaign finance.