In the context of comparative constitutional law, “canon” is an ambiguous concept that can assume very different forms and functions, some of which are profoundly problematic. For purposes of evaluation, it is necessary to distinguish among at least four varieties of “canon”: descriptive, normative, pedagogical, and discursive. The descriptive and normative varieties tend to be constructed in highly path-dependent ways from a very limited population of countries and cases, with the result of perpetuating and reinforcing the blind spots and systematic biases of the field as well as the privileged positions of scholars in Western, English-speaking settings. Conscious pursuit of a comparative constitutional law “canon” for its own sake should therefore be abandoned. The idea of canon might appear at first blush to satisfy the practical need to cull the overabundance of materials generated by an expanding, international, and interdisciplinary field. For pedagogical purposes, time constraints and student needs necessitate highly selective coverage, and for discursive purposes, coordination upon some common conceptual vocabulary is helpful. However, canon in its conventional form is not a satisfactory way of culling materials in either context. Instead, pedagogical and discursive choices should be guided by principles of representativeness and generality. Representativeness includes, among other things, sampling the universe of constitutional experience and materials along all major dimensions of variation, such as region and regime type. Generality entails a preference for a country-neutral and thus more inclusive and universalistic vocabulary: for example, one would discuss the generic concept of “override clauses” rather than the country-specific example of “Canada’s notwithstanding clause,” which in turn facilitates study of the same phenomenon across a broader, more representative sample of jurisdictions.

Citation
David S. Law, Canon and Comparative Constitutional Law, in Redefining Comparative Constitutional Law: Essays for Mark Tushnet, Oxford University Press, 56–72 (2024).