After two years of debate in Congress and the broader world over forfeiting the frozen assets of the Russian Central Bank for the benefit of Ukraine, President Biden on April 24 signed into law the REPO Act, which bestows this authority on him. As Ingrid Brunk has written, the administration now has the option to take the money frozen in the United States and give it to Ukraine to pay for its recovery from Russia’s manifestly illegal war.
But a number of legal and policy questions remain. There is a relatively small amount directly at stake—less than 2 percent of the total amount frozen by our allies. How the United States acts, however, will influence those allies, set legal precedents, and shape future U.S. policy choices. The administration could structure the transaction in a way that comfortably fits within U.S. law, puts little or no pressure on the international legal regime, protects the role of the dollar as an international currency, and makes ending this terrible war more likely. Alternatively, it could structure the transaction in a way that gives rise to substantial Russian claims for compensation; stretches, if not undermines, the international legal order; harms the dollar; and makes peace harder to reach. We offer here a road map that would maximize the chance of the former outcome and minimize the risks of the latter.