“Dignity” is a rallying cry of social and political movements worldwide. It also appears in legal doctrine and scholarship. But the meaning of dignity and its legal implications are deeply contested. What is dignity, and which concrete legal outcomes does it support? Dignity and Judicial Authority focuses on the role of dignity in courts in the United States. It offers a theory of dignity that emphasizes respect for status, nondomination, and control over self-presentation to others. It then explains how courts can recognize dignity as legally actionable harm and how they can provide remedies for this harm. In applying these ideas, the book explores such topics as constitutional standing doctrine, the “dignitary torts,” and court-mandated apologies. The book’s inquiry sheds light not only on the nature of dignity but also on the power of courts and their proper function in a constitutional democracy. How can judges decide whether dignity has been violated, especially when these decisions risk embroiling judges in contentious social disputes? Will accepting dignitary claims burst open the proverbial “floodgates of litigation”? The book shows how courts can productively integrate dignity into legal determinations. More generally, the book brings together theoretical analysis and detailed doctrinal discussion. It demonstrates the connections between dignity and subjects such as jurisdiction and remedies, which help to delineate the bounds of judicial authority.