Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts declares that every contract imposes a duty on the parties to act in good faith toward and deal fairly with their counterparties. Over the past forty-five years, courts in many states have accepted that declaration as black-letter law, yet have not clearly articulated what the duty entails. The Restatement drafters envisioned something ambitious: an affirmative covenant that would permit courts to police opportunism by imposing and enforcing community standards of decency, fairness, and reasonableness. But that ambition is unrealized. Today, that view of the implied covenant, like the dragon in our title, is largely a myth, especially in contracts involving sophisticated parties. It persists as legend, but not in the doctrine’s application in most major U.S. jurisdictions. Courts primarily deploy the implied covenant for the pedestrian purpose of supplying terms necessary to give effect to the contract’s express provisions, and sometimes to constrain extreme opportunism. Drawing on the doctrine’s history, the law of several jurisdictions, and interviews with deal lawyers and judges, we attempt to drag the implied-covenant dragon from its cave and, in doing so, reveal that what was thought to be a dragon is actually a tame (sometimes useful) lizard.