In a striking passage from Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC highlighted by Professor Dawood in her contribution to this symposium, the Chief Justice defines political participation as including five components: running for office, voting, urging others to vote, volunteering on a campaign, and contributing to a candidate’s campaign. For Professor Dawood, this passage is significant because the Chief Justice demotes voting from its status as a preeminent right, preservative of other rights, to merely one of several ways a person can participate in politics. This is important, as she argues. But the list is also significant in another way. When the Chief Justice describes contributing to a campaign as a type of political participation along with running for office, voting, urging others to vote and volunteering, he implicitly asserts that these modes of participation are similar to one another. But contributing to a campaign is importantly different from the others modes of political participation. People are roughly equal in their ability to exercise each of the other modes of participation while they are dramatically and manifestly unequal in their ability to contribute money to candidates or campaigns.

Citation
Deborah Hellman, Political Participation: A Hybrid Sphere, 89 New York University Law Review Online, 28 (2014).