About
Philosophical problems rest at the heart of each area of law. Criminal law punishes people for wronging others, but what conduct is wrong exactly, and do current criminal laws prohibit only such conduct? Civil rights law prohibits discrimination, but what kinds of differential treatment are morally troubling and why? Family law governs relationships among adults and between adults and children, but what right does the state have to intervene in our personal affairs and what rights and responsibilities do parents have with respect to children? Constitutional law offers special protection for freedom of speech and religion, but are speech and religion really special?
Legal philosophy also asks foundational questions about the nature of law and about which methods of legal interpretation are most justified. To discern the rule created by a statute, should judges look only at its text or may they also look to the purpose of its drafters? Should courts be bound by the rulings of past judges, and to what extent? Do our answers to these interpretive questions differ when it comes to the Constitution? Finally, jurisprudence interrogates ideas about law that underlie all these debates. When does a rule qualify as a rule of “law,” as distinct from a rule of morality or etiquette? Law purports to bind citizens and officials. Is law simply a system of rules issued by an authority and enforced with coercion, or must a law be minimally just to count as binding? What is an “authority,” and what makes an authority legitimate?
These questions of legal philosophy are not merely academic. They bear on pressing questions of social justice. The moral and philosophical assumptions that structure our current law may be justified or may be ripe for critique and revision. The Virginia faculty associated with the Center for Law & Philosophy investigate each of these questions, as well as many others. The center also facilitates exceptional scholarship through its Legal Theory Workshop and occasional symposia. We look forward to examining these questions with our students.
This chapter discusses the repugnant income generating activities (“RIGA”) of phase I medical research, sex work, and plasma donation. Though each is...
We introduce altruism into standard models of bargaining and explore its implications for the Coase Theorem. A strict interpretation of the Coase...
Psychology and law, by their nature, are deeply entwined. Both are about human behavior – understanding it, modifying it, regulating it. Psychology’s...
Although ethical critiques of markets are longstanding, modern academic debates about the ‘moral limits of markets’ (MLM) tend to be fairly limited in...
The Founders were not textualists. The letter of the law mattered quite a bit. But, as William Blackstone noted, interpretation also required the...
Faculty Director(s)
Research
This chapter discusses the repugnant income generating activities (“RIGA”) of phase I medical research, sex work, and plasma donation. Though each is...
We introduce altruism into standard models of bargaining and explore its implications for the Coase Theorem. A strict interpretation of the Coase...
Psychology and law, by their nature, are deeply entwined. Both are about human behavior – understanding it, modifying it, regulating it. Psychology’s...
Although ethical critiques of markets are longstanding, modern academic debates about the ‘moral limits of markets’ (MLM) tend to be fairly limited in...
The Founders were not textualists. The letter of the law mattered quite a bit. But, as William Blackstone noted, interpretation also required the...
Leaders often try to amend constitutions to remove checks on their powers. To help protect against such democratic erosion, constitutional drafters...
This essay is a contribution to a special issue of the Florida State University Law Review in memory and honor of Dan Markel, who was tragically...
A large segment of the political left identifies as “progressive,” but what does a belief in progress entail? This short essay, written for a...
Our perceptions of what we owe each other turn somewhat on whether we consider “another” to be “an other”—a stranger and not a friend. In this essay...
Many analyses of law take an unsentimental, perhaps even cynical view of regulated actors. On this view, law is a necessity borne of people’s selfish...
In 1963, Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote Letter from Birmingham Jail in response to white clergy members who had urged him to cease demonstrating...
How should judges decide hard cases involving rights conflicts? Standard debates about this question are usually framed in jurisprudential terms...
This article argues that the fact that an action will compound a prior injustice counts as a reason against doing the action. I call this reason The...
At first blush, the debate between Stanley Fish and Ronald Dworkin that took place over the course of the 1980s and early 90s seems to have produced...
Given that no two acts, events, situations, and legal cases are identical, precedential constraint necessarily involves determining which two...
This chapter examines the intellectual and social contexts in which the American Law Institute (ALI) has operated and how they have influenced the...
This short essay considers Benjamin Zipursky’s intriguing effort to identify a tradition of “American natural law theory” that links Benjamin Cardozo...
Both statutory and constitutional law prohibiting discrimination forbid actions taken on the basis of certain traits. But rarely are those traits...
In this review of Jamal Greene’s How Rights Went Wrong, we raise a series of questions about proportionality review as a model for adjudicating rights...
This article examines the complaint that arbitrary algorithmic decisions wrong those whom they affect. It makes three contributions. First, it...
A commitment to nondiscrimination at times appears to require both that one not act in particular ways and that one not believe certain things. This...
In this reply to Benjamin Eidelson’s Patterned Inequality, Compounding Injustice and Algorithmic Prediction, I argue that moral unease about...
This essay, written for a symposium honoring John Henry Schlegel, is part intellectual history, part philosophical polemic. It first briefly compares...
One can ask two different questions about a given social, political, or legal practice. First, how, if at all, do the ideas embodied in that practice...
Because common-law doctrines have long served as targets for critical theorists, it would be easy to see the common law and critical theory as...
Resident Faculty
The program is committed to offering courses each year that reflect an interdisciplinary law and humanities perspective. Students can also find relevant courses in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. See the school's dual-degree programs.
Courses and Seminars
The following is a list of courses in law, philosophy and humanities offered during 2024-26. Numbers in parentheses indicate which academic year(s) the courses were offered, i.e., 2023-24 is coded (24), 2024-25 is coded (25) and 2025-26 is coded (26). (SC) stands for short course and (YR) stands for yearlong.
Bioethics and the Law Seminar (24,25,26)
Climate Law and Climate Ethics (24)
Constitutional Law and Jurisprudence (SC) (26)
Contract Theory (25)
Critical Race Theory (SC) (24)
Dignity Law Seminar (24)
Discrimination Theory (24)
Feminist Jurisprudence (24,25)
Interpretation Theory and Methods (25)
Law and Literature: Storytelling (24,25,26)
Law and Theories of Justice Lecture (25)
Legal Theory in Europe and the United States: A Very Brief Introduction (SC) (24)
Legal Theory Workshop Seminar (26)
Liberalism and its Critics (25,26)
Mindfulness and Legal Practice (25,26)
Neoliberalism (24)
Pain and the Law (25,26)
Sports and Games (24,25,26)
Voice and Silence in Law and Literature Seminar (24,25,26)
Events
The annual conference of NOMOS: The American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy is focused this year on freedom of speech and its critics. Each year, NOMOS brings together scholars from the fields of philosophy, political science and law. A primary paper on the annual topic is presented by a scholar from each field, with commentators drawn from the others. This year’s conference on free speech is hosted and co-sponsored by the Karsh Center for Law and Democracy, and the Center for Law and Philosophy. All panels are open to the public.
Professor Jack Kieffaber of George Mason University and Catholic University, and Professor Thomas Nachbar will debate the following proposition: “Resolved: Textualists must bow to Judge.AI.” U.S. Judge Chad Readler will moderate. For background, see Kieffaber’s article “Predictability, AI, and Judicial Futurism: Why Robots Will Run the Law and Textualists Will Like It.” Food will be provided.
Former U.S. Judges Thomas B. Griffith ’85 and David S. Tatel, who both served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, will discuss collegiality on the bench amid partisan polarization, in a conversation moderated by UVA Law professor and former Dean Risa Goluboff. Griffith is currently special counsel at the law firm Hunton and Tatel is pro bono senior counsel with the litigation, arbitration and employment practice at Hogan Lovells. Lunch will be provided on a first-come, first-served basis.
The Federalist Society welcomes Judge Stephanos Bibas of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for a discussion of judicial humility and the proper role of judges in a constitutional democracy. Drawing on his recent Yale Law Journal essay, Bibas contrasts the ideal of the judge as Hercules: a powerful, theory-driven figure imagined by some legal theorists, with the more modest model associated with Judge Learned Hand. Bibas argues that American constitutional structure calls for judges who exercise restraint–deciding cases according to text, precedent and limited judicial authority rather than attempting to reshape law or policy. A Q&A will follow. Food will be provided.
Media law scholar and feminist legal theorist Jessica Lake will discuss her 2025 book, “Special Damage: The Slander of Women and the Gendered History of Defamation Law.” In her book, Lake analyzes a comparative legal history of gendered hate speech, verbal abuse and sexual harassment across the common law world. Lake is a senior lecturer at Melbourne Law School at the University of Melbourne in Australia. She researches the regulation of expression, reputation and creativity in the common law world from the early 19th century to the present, with a focus on gender. A reception will follow the event.